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Foreword 
F ew things can better serve managers undertaking leadership roles in large, complex. technology-based organizations than knowing how 
other such organizations have coped with the problems that must be 
solved to achieve success. Yet few studies of the administrative records 
provide detailed case studies of how very large research and dcvelop- 
nlent programs have been managed, or what has worked and why. The 
same is true of large, nontechnical endeavors. We have Sapolsky's study 
of Polaris development, Hewlett and Anderson on the origins of the 
Atomic Energy Commission. Peck and Scherer on the weapons acquisi- 
tion process, Sayles and Chandler on managing large systems, and ~ ' i r h  
this book. Arnold Levine's .\Ianclpng .\'.fS.-l rn dr .fpollo Eta. 
Dr. Lcvine's approach and his large investment of time t o  study the 
detailed record of documents and interviews, together with his institu- 
tional viewpoint, rather than one th t is program-oriented. make this an 
imporrant book. He takes the entire agent!.. rather than any singl: 
component or program, as the subject of his study. emphasizing those 
features that NASA shared with other federal agencies in the 1960s and 
with previous large dcvclopmcntal efforts. In addition. Lcvine seeks 
difTcrcnces from other such efforts in the cause-effect coupling in 
NASA't approach to management. Specific administrative actions are 
placed within the context of the larger whole. While documenting and 
describing NASA's formal organizational structure. Levinc concentrates 
on those key policy decisions that ultimatclv shaped the agency: reliance 
on the American industrial establishment. not as vendors. but as research 
and development partners; sharing decision-making with the centers to 
the fullest rxtent possible; avoidance of bureaucratic delays and inertia at 
headquarters; injection of the profit motive into a traditional cost-plus 
environment; conscioilsly and continuously striving to retain NASA's 
freedom of action to move forward with strength in thosc areas ncccssan. 
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for success in its missions, even when the concurrence of other ofir~als  
and agencies 'was delayed; finally, extensive use of the Department of 
Defense for contract management and launch and of military personnel 
in key management positions in NASA itself. This book, by implication, 
shows that NASA found many traditional management axioms do not 
apply within the large, complex R&D organization-axioms like "well 
defined areas of authority and responsibility," "unity of command," 
"one man, one boss," or "centralized operations." These principles 
often work well in static organizations, but more is needed if dynamic, 
large-scale endeavors are to succeed. He describes the role of the federal 
R&D manager as above all a political one in the sense that he must find 
ways for inter-personal and inter-organizational relationships to be a 
positive, rather than a negative, element in achieving the desired results. 
If NASA program managers, scientists, engineers, and top oficials had 
not thought of their work in political (personal pditical and organized 
units-political) terms, if they had not arranged their activities to gain 
support from other NASA divisions, Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, 
the scientific community, etc.-Apo1:o would not have met its goals. 
An important value of this book, 1 think, is in Dr. Levine's meticu- 
lous examination of the record for evidence to demonstrate why the 
NASA structure w;is adequate to deal with some of the most complex 
problems any organization has had to face. And increasingiy, large 
organizations confronted with novel technical problems-be ~ 5 i  j public 
agencies, multinational corporations, or joint public-pribate ventures like 
the civilian space program-will find the NASA approach of a loosely 
coupled, decentralized organization an effective means of managing such 
large-scale endeavors. In this regard, Dr. Levine finds, and I believe, that 
three lessons can be derived from the NASA experience. The first is that 
political relationships are not (nor can they be) somethiag added on to 
the work of line managers or program officials as less important than 
other duties; these relationships are an integral part of their work, 
inasmuch as personal relationships and a sensitivity to the total environ- 
ment arc essential parts of leadership responsibilities if the system is to 
work at all. 
The second lesson to be derived is that a decentralized organization 
can be made compatible with precise objectives and timely performance. 
During the 1960s, Deputy Administrator Hcgh Dryden, Associate Ad- 
ministrator Robert Seamans, and I went to considerable lengths both to 
delegate authority to center directors and project managers whom we 
had tested by experience or knew from past associations, and to make 
explicit our reasons for doing so. ttvine gives a long list of functions- 
planning, procurement, launch management, inspection-that could 
have been, but were not, concentrated at the headquarters level. Our 
xii 
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philosophy was to givc the field installations and their industrial partners 1 
the widest discretion compatible with agency missions. The missions 
NASA was assigned almost dictated considerable autonomy and freedom 
to innovate at scveral levels in the organiration, while carefully keeping 
within the framework provided by the Space Act. 
The third lesson follows from the -cond. NASA could not have 
accomplished its missions without the ability to adapt to cont: auous  
change. By adapting I include not only the numerous reorganizations of 
the 1960s. but also constant attention to the mechanisms introduced to 
provide senior management with reliable feedback. 'l'his is what lay 
behind the creation of an executive secretariat, the exchange of officials 
between headquarters and the centers, the development of sophisticated 
reporting systems, and the constant strengthening of the role of the 
headquarters program manager as a link between the agency's general 
manager and the centers. Equally important, Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, 
and I recognized that reliable feedback requires a flow of i~'-tmation in 
two directions. Our objective was to ensure that NASA emp...rees, from 
executives to a point far down the line, understood rather precisely what 
was to be their role in accomplishing specific missions and that NASA 
senior officials also understood those factors which most affected the 
performance of those same executives down the line. 
This book, in focusing tightly on issues of' organization and gover- 
nance, to some extent, scants the richness and variety within NASA. I 
would have liked somethinv about the sustaining university program and 
the continuing effort to foster interdisciplinary teams at the universities, 
our international policies, and our attempt to utilize cffcctively the 
technologies developed by NASA and its rontractors. But these omis- 
sions are minor in a work that has much to :;v to public administrators, 
managers of large-scale research and deve!opmcnt programs, and stu- 
dents of the relation of science and public policy. 
At a time when thoughtful observers, including the editors of the 
Howard Bwincss Review, are asking, "Do the assumptions on which its 
market economy rests still have meaning for American Society?" and 
emphasizing such subjects as "The Morality of the Market Place" and 
"Capitalism and Freedom," I believe students of administration should 
seek the effect on NASA's success of such policies as the openness of 
NASA programs, and the fact that we could say to the press and the 
scientists and enqineers of the eighty nations cooperating, "Come and 
bring your camera." Dr. Dryden, br.  Scamans, and I, in making the 
substantive and administrative decisions, constantly and deliherately 
sought to spread our most difiicult problems over the largest possible 
nunher of able minds and to develop means to evaluate, from the 
broadest national and international viewpoints, thc concepts and propos- 
. . . 
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als that resulted. We could not know *.%at some o t  this large number 
could invent, but we ~!rc;.~iy telt many innovative ideas would emerge 
from a widespread invitation to work on the problems related to an 
understanding of the solar system and the universe beyorld. We con- 
stantly sought to develop and employ ways through which all the 
individuals, organizations, institutions, and government units could build 
strength for their own purposes while adding to NASA strengths. Our 
polic-j was not to draw strength from our partners in such a way as to 
weaken them, but rather to participate with them in a Samewor'.. that 
helped both of us reach our own main objectives. 
As to long-range planning, on which Dr. Levine sets down the 
documentation and finds our efforts inadequate, contrary to many 
assertions that we had a "blank check," NASA was constantly fixed with 
strong public and private opposition to manned spaceflight. NASA was 
constantly warned by those political, educational, press, and congres- 
'onal sources who were most supportive that any evidence of commit- 
ment to a large, long-term, expensive program beyond Apollo would 
lose us the margin of strength needed to finish Apollo. In fact, several 
near successful efforts were made by influential leaders to cut back on 
Apollo to the point that we could not assure success. I, myself, and most 
NASA senior executives were convinced that if Apollo resulted in one or 
more failures. and was curtailed or  eliminated, the monuments to such 
failure would be visible for a long time in many places-as symbols of 
U.S. inability to see the project through and master the problems ot 
operating in space. In fact. Apollo and other miinned spaceflight projects 
gave our citizens and those of many other countries tremendous pride 
ana encouragement. Levine summed this up when he wrote: "Webb" 
(really the senior executive group) "became more determined than ever 
to salvage Apollo, even if it meant postponing decisions about its 
sequel." In fact, just as we needed Gemini to guide our work on Apollo, 
until we  had digested the Apollo experience, it was difficult to make fully 
creditable plans for larger manned missions. 
In all the welter of problems and daily immersion of NASA senior 
executives in both the substantive and administrative issues and actions 
which Dr. Levine describes, Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and 1 never lost 
sight of the underlying concept that, in our haste, we must not take 
shortcuts that were not consistent with the basic values on which our 
democratic society was based. 
James E. Webb 
June 1982 ,WSA Adminutrator, 1961-1 968 
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Introduction 
T he aim of this book is to describe and analyze the organization of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration during the 1960s and, in so doing, to 
test certain assumptions about the nature of administrative history. To date, 
administrative history has been as much the victim of its friends and practitioners 
as of those who wonder if it exists as a distinct genre. The assumption behind 
much of the administrative theory that finds its way into such works-that officials 
and bureaucrats live in a world where rational behavior is pnceivable and 
attainable-has been in question at least since the publication of Herbert Simon's 
Administrative Behavior in 1946.' In the real world, Simon argues, a fragmr 'ary 
knowledge of consequences and the inability to choose among all possible altt la- 
tives set severe constraints on the administrator's ability to act rationally. Ration- 
ality as a goal-the efficient matching of means to ends- -can be described, but for 
the reasons given, "it is impossible for the behavior of a single isolated individual 
to reach any high degree of rationality."' To these objections may be added two 
more. One is the tendency of cenain key decisions to have cumulative effects 
throughout the organization, whether such decisions are documented or not. The 
logic of a particular course of action may bring certain consequences, even (or 
especially) when these are not consciously intended. The other objection to the 
view that there is measurable correspondence between intentions and results is 
that superiors may not know or want to know what their subordinates are doing. 
Whether the sheer volume of feedback is self-defeating, or subordinates cannot or 
will not do what their superiors want, the problem remains: Descriptions of 
formal organization structures may, at best, tell only what the organization was 
intended to do." 
Still, it would be a mistake to substitute for a "formalist" approach to 
organizations something equally one sided. Statements of intent do matter since 
they define the boundaries within which the organization must operate. The 1958 
act establishing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
contains nothing about the manned lunar landing program, yet almost all the 
powers and authorities needed for the success of Apollo,are found there. Thus 
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enabling legislation, formal delegations of authority, and descriptions of powers 
and functions are important because they determine that the agency shall be this 
rather than that. Indeed, one can draw no firm line between the procedural and 
substantive aspects of an agency's work. Rather, one must set the agency in its 
environment; the historian ought to describe the agency's institutional sur- 
roundings, its clients and allies, its budgetary strategies, and the extent to which 
its functions were competitive with those of other agencies. The defect of treating 
an agency in purely formal terms is precisely that this approach ignores the 
surroundings. 
The problem of writing about NASA becomes manageable because, given the 
vast accumulation of documents, by far the greater part consists of paper generated 
to meet the stringent reporting requirements of the manned spaceflight and space 
science programs. What is left is documentation that serves to shape agency policy 
before it hardens into definite programs, to enunciate that policy once it has been 
ratified, and to record problem areas that come to the attention of general manage- 
ment. Despite advances in communications technology, the primary materials are 
still written. For policy to be effective it must eventually be issued in written 
instructions: Policy must be written to reduce the scope of ambiguity, and it must 
be in the form of instructions to indicate that it is authoritative rather than 
advisory. However, one must know the written sources and their limitations. For 
example, the tension between NASA Headquarters and the field centers may run 
throughout the documentation, but it runs between the lines. It is seldom enunci- 
ated. The administrative historian must read between the lines to discern it. 
Administrative history, as the account of the interaction between an organi- 
zation and its environment, is possible and can provide valuable information. An 
account of NASA is singularly fitted to test this conclusion. Established by Con- 
gress in the aftermath of Sputniks 1 and 2, NASA quickly grew by accretion, the 
incorporation of older installations, and the creation of new capabilities into an 
agency employing 36 000 persons and owning facilities worth $3.65 billion by 
1965-1 966.' From 1958 to 1968 NASA launched several dozen unmanned space- 
craft that revolutionized communications and meteorological technology on the 
one hand and electronics on the other, created or fostered new scientific disciplines 
like bioastronautics and space medicine, and s:irred up the field of astronomy. But 
in the public mind NASA was most closely associated with the manned spaceflight 
programs-Project Mercury (1958-1963), which tested the ability of one man to 
function up to several hours in Earth orbit; Gemini (1962-1966), in which two- 
man crews in one spacecraft were assigned a variety of tasks, including rendezvous 
and docking in Earth orbit with a target vehicle and moving around outside the 
spacecraft itself; and Apollo (1960-1972), in which three-man crews were sent on 
progressively more ambitious missions, culminating in the lunar landing of July 
1969. Merely to sketch the civilian program is to indicate the magnitude of 
NASA's assignments and the scope of its successes. One must take seriously the 
contention of James E. Webb, NASA Administrator from 1961 to 1968, that the 
success of NASA was a success in organizing "large-scale endeavors," that is, that 
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the same system of management that made the lunar landing possible may also 
have been its most important byproduct? 
T o  understand what NASA did, one must begin by considering it as an 
institution coordinated to achieve certain goals that were neither fixed nor always 
precisely determined. Coordination had to be achieved on diffmnt levels: within 
the agency among the substantive program offices, the several field installations, 
and the central functional offices; between NASA and the Executive Office of the 
President, which determined the funding levels of each item in the NASA budget 
before congressional review; between NASA and congressional committees that 
authorized its programs, allocated its funds, and provided continuous oversight; 
between NASA and the scientific community, which was client, critic, and not-so- 
loyal opposition; finally, between NASA and other Federal agencies, which might 
be partners (as ih the joint NASA-Atomic Energy Commission Space Nuclear 
Propulsion Office), rivals (as in the case of the Defense Department's manned 
programs), or symbiotic (as in the supporting aeronautical research undertaken 
for the Federal Aviation Agency). Thus the picture of an organization pressing 
single-mindedly toward its main goal must be replaced by one that recognizes the 
complexity of the internal and external communities that affected NASA policy. 
Neither the manned lunar landing nor any other NASA program is quite as 
straightforward as it may first appear: first, because different officials tended to 
have different perceptions of the program; second, because the program itself can 
be seen in different contexts, depending on whether one takes the short-, inter- 
mediate, or long-range view; third, because it was not clear whether the lunar 
landing program (and some others) was an end in itself, designed to give the 
I *,nred States a "total capability" in space, or a diplomatic counter against the So- 
viet Union. 
This book, then, is a study of the development, results, and causes of NASA 
decisions. It is an attempt to relate administration to the total agency mission, 
rather than to treat administration as though it were a discrete, c l o d  system. 
Such a study, to be adequate, should include the following elements. 
It should describe the formal authority structure for delegating 
powers a.~d functions, fund allocation, planning, and relations with and between 
Nt!S/. centers. For the reasons given above, the formal mechanisms are important 
in ~kmselves as well as for illuminating the way in which informal lines of 
wthority developed. An account of formal structures will not tell if the agency 
succeeded or failed; it may, however, tell why it succeeded or failed. 
It should give some account of the informal structure that devel- 
oped within the formal one. What were these informal relations, and how did they 
originate? To what extent did they supplement agency policy, supersede it, or 
create a new set of procedures in advance of their standardization by senior 
management ? 
In this context one should distinguish informal, unwritten operating pro- 
cedures from the informal relations within program and functional offices and 
between the centers. In some cases headquarters management did not--or perhaps 
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could not-take official notice of tensions generated by NASA programs until they 
had become too serious to ignore. Such tensions included, for example, the ques- 
tion of whether the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, or the 
Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, would have control of the 
Manned Space Flight network; the conflict between the Marshall Space Flight 
Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, 
Texas, over the "roles and missions'' of Marshall after the production of Saturn 
rockets ceased; and, within headquarters, the debate over the resources allocated 
for manned spaceflight and space science.Whether such tensions were inherent in 
a decentralized civilian space program or not, and whether they resulted in man- 
agement directives or not, they are among the most important, yet most elusive, 
topics to be discussed. 
An agency history, as distinct from a management history, should concentrate 
on the senior officials who set NASA's goals, allocated funds, instituted reporting 
requirements, and set up mechanisms for continuous feedback of information. In 
short, top management sets the rules of the game; within those rules the centers 
had to manage approved projects. Thus an administrative history of NASA that 
attempts, as does this one, to write from the headquarters point of view should 
analyze the interplay between centralized control and decentralized project man- 
agement, and it should bring to the forefront those Government-wide policies that 
determined how NASA got its work done. 
Finally, history consists of events situated within a temporal framework. One 
can "freeze" the action at any point on a continuum, but that point is the result 
of what has preceded, and from it will flow second- and third-order consequences, 
not all of which can be foreseen. To cite one example: While the method of 
managing research and development known as phased project planning was for- 
mally instituted in October 1965, something like it had been used in projects from 
the time of NASA's establishment. The process by which phased project planning 
was implemented represented a sharper definition, a more emphatic statement of 
something inherent in the logic of large-scale program management. In like 
manner, the procedures by which the headquarters program offices set priorities 
and chose among alternatives were adopted for agencywide long-range planning. 
In sum, the question this book seeks to answer is, what can the study of 
NASA as an organization teach us? This book concentrates on NASA as a going 
concern, as an organization that, instituted for specific purposes at a specific time, 
strove to maintain itself, to operate within the terms of its establishment, and to 
compete with other agencies for the limited resources made available by the White 
House and Congress. The criteria for the inclusion of a particular subject are the 
extent to which a problem or issue was agencywide; whether an issue reached the 
higher levels of management for resolution; whether a program interacted with 
othcr programs, internal or external; and the extent to which problems of the kind 
mentioned above-say, the relations of headquarters to centers or the balance 
of work done intramurally and that contracted out-recurred. Put somewhat 
crudely, the principal themes of this book are (1) how a high-technology agency 
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was run in a decade marked by rapid expansion of funds and manpower in the 
first half and almost as rapid contraction in the second and (2) how NASA com- 
bined centralized planning and control with decentralized project e~ecution.~ 
With a subject such as this, a major problem is how to reconcile the narrative 
with the topical approach. The first chapter is a summary of the key adminis- 
trative decisions in the early history of NASA; chapter 2 is a narrative account of 
NASA from its origins to 1969. The intent is to adumbrate the main themes of 
the book, to sketch the history of the period, and, by a gradual buildup of detail, 
to prepare the reader for the analytical treatment of the following chapters. 
Starting with chapter 3, the mode shifts from the narrative to the topical. Separate 
chapters dealing with contracting, manpower, the budgetary process, headquar- 
ters organization, and relations with the Department of Defense carry the reader 
from the early to the late 1960s. Chapter 9 coven the long-range planning of 
1964-1969, when this most missionsriented of agencies sought a program around 
which all elements of the organization could unite. 
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Chapter 1 
Key Administrative Decisions of 
NASA's First Decade 
I n terms of its proclaimed objectives, the civilian space program in the 1960s was an extraordinary success. The manned lunar landing was achieved on schedule, 
the record of successful launches improved steadily between 1961 and 1970, and 
NASA worked steadily and well to develop launch vehicles capable of being 
produced serially and of accepting a variety of payloads. As far as this book is 
concerned, the problem is to explain how decisions about NASA's organization 
accounted for this success-if, indeed, such success occurred because of the or- 
ganization, not in spite of it. No doubt it is possible to state the reasons for NASA's 
success in general, straightforward terms. The argument might run along these 
lines: Congress gave NASA a blank check because the lunar landing had to be 
managed on a crash basis. Furthermore, by committing itself to extremely precise, 
measurable, all-or-nothing goals, NASA had powerful incentives not to fail. 
All this may be true as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. Terms 
such as "crash program" or "decentraiization" derive their meaning from a 
specific context. For example, the 1963 organizational.changes discussed in chap- 
ter 3 "decentralized" NASA so that lines of authority reverted to what they had 
been prior to 1961. But one cannot step in the same stream twice; the 1963 decen- 
tralization occurred in the context of the vast new lurlar landing mission ordained 
for NASA by President Kennedy in May 1961. These conditions did not recur. 
Similarly, one should be cautious in applying the term "crash program" to Apollo. 
If the term is used to denote a program in which "the cost is not the major 
consideration . . . several parallel approaches are taken ior the solution of each 
major problem, and . . . cwrtime and multiple shifts are utilized to a very large 
degree," then Apollo was not a crash program, sinct the first two criteria, at least, 
did not apply.' Whenever these terms appear in this book, the reader should be 
aware of their contextual implications. 
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The salient featum of the space program must be sought elsewhere. Among 
them was the often fruitful tension between applied researdh and basic m a r c h .  
In the development of a space capability, space applications, supporting tech- 
nology, and aeronautics, NASA's program was essentially applied research. The 
manned lunar landing was comparable to the development of a polio vaccine, 
rather than to a cure for cancer. The latter entails fundamental knowledge about 
the nature of the cell, whereas the former involves only a more sophisticated use 
of existing research techniques. On the other hand, space science was accorded a 
prominent position in NASA's program and organization. T h m  NASA centers 
were devoted-two of them almost completely and one of them substantially-to 
space science. 
Other features of the agency's operations may help to explain the s u m s  of 
the space program. There was the ability of the agency to draw on the scientific 
community for advisors, principal investigators, and consultants; the absence of 
distinction between the budgetary process and short- and long-range planning; the 
refusal of NASA officials to enforcc .? ceparation between those who built flight 
hardware and the scientists who designed and developed the experiments to be 
flown; the ability of the agency to draw on the capabilities of the Department of 
Defense for launch support, contract administration, program managers, and 
astronauts; and, finally, the authority vested in the Administrator to waive some 
civil service requirements in recruiting executives from the outside. But the deci- 
sions that made these features possible are not, in a se,rse, the most important 
administrative decisions. To use Nelson's distinction, these are decisions within an 
organizational structure rather than decisions about that organizational structure, 
which Nelson s n s  as the major decisions.' Decisions about an organization occur 
when "a given organizational regime is limited in the range of contingencies it can 
hariciie effectively. . . . when circumstances evolve outside of this range, the symp- 
tom is a growing restiveness (on the part of one group or another) with the routine 
flow of events and decisions; and . . . sumssful resolution requires some kind of 
significant reorganization." It is this kind of administrative decision about the 
NASA organization that is discussed here. 
Anyone who studies the morphology of large organizations is apt to be struck 
by the power of a few key administrative decisions to set the organization's course. 
By "administrative" is meant the choim between alternatives that shape the 
agency from within, not those imposed from without. The peculiarities of such 
decisions are that thcy represent choices among altcrnatives, some of which might 
have been equally sucnssful; they tend to be cumulative in effect; one such dc- 
cision requires many others, both to carry it out and to make explicit what was 
only implied in the original directive; they arc at once shaped by and shapers of 
the agency's terms of reference; and thcy are not themselves discrete, self- 
contained derisions as much as they arc bundles of administrative acts that grad- 
ually rise to the level of agency policy.' 
Consider, for cxamplc, the NASA policy, avowed from the beginning, to mn- 
tract out research and development rather than do such work entirely in-house. 
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The decision itself was made before the mechanism n d e d  to make it work-a 
rational soura selection procedure-had been perfected. One might go as far as 
to say that NASA began with an operating philosophy whose implications took 
some w e n  years to work out. In this regard, the decision to contract out stands 
somewhat apart from other decisions considered here. The others were formally 
enunciated in a specific directive as internal agency policy, and each contributed 
greatly to NASA's ability to interpret its mission. In this respect, administrative 
decisions differ fundamentally from those that establish the mission. The decision 
to prescribe phased project planning as NASA policy is different in kind from the 
decision to establish a civilian space agency or President Kennedy's decision to 
"send a man to the moon and bring him back before the end of the decade." The 
latter decisions are "organic"; the former, attempts to translate them into day-to- 
day operating proctdure. As with most translations, something is inevitably lost 
in the process. First, management and line officials will carry out broad goals us 
they understand them. Second, the same communications gap as that be- 
tween the agency and the executive branch is repeated within the agency itself be- 
tween the offices that constitute it and the senior officials who act as links between 
the organization and an environment that may be indifferent or even hostile. No 
formulation or directive can cover all contingencies; no decision will be seen in 
precisely the same way by those affected by it; no policy is so impregnable that 
alternatives are inconceivable. 
The decisions that follow were broad formulations; they had to be sold to the 
center directors, headquarters line officials, and the functional staff. In this re- 
spect, technical, political, and management considerations could not be separated 
for long. The decision to develop the F-1 and 5-2 engines for the Saturn rocket 
stages could not be made in advance of the mechanism for procuring such hard- 
ware. Similarly, neithcr Apollo nor Gemini would have been feasible as agency 
programs in the absence of a firm policy that established relations between the 
centers and headquarters. 
The decision to rely on private industry, rather than in-house staff, for 
development of NASA programs has probably been the key internal decision in 
the history of NASA, yet its genesis is by no means clear. The policy of contracting 
out was arrived at in gradual stages, each of which made the policy more precise, 
hence more effective. The Space Act authorized NASA "to enter into and perform 
such contracts . . . , and on such terms as it may deem appropriate . . . with any 
person, firm, association, corporation, or educational institution,"' Except for a 
proviso concerning small-business set-asides, the act (by its silence) gave NASA 
the freedom to work out its contracting procedures, the forms of which were 
borrowed from the armed services procurement regulations, adapted to the nmls 
of a young, rapidly expanding agency. The key steps were as follows: 
1. Ptbmulgation of source evaluation procedures in August 1959. 
2. Publication in 1960 of the first procedures manual; new edition issued in 
August 1964. 
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3. Publication of guidelines for incentive contracting in September 1962; first 
mapr incentive contract (with Boeing for the Lunar Orbiter) negotiated in 
1963. 
4. Promulgation of phased project planning guidelines in October 1965. 
These steps made NASA procurement philosophy mom precise and flerible, 
while placing heavy responsibilities on the centers and the line organization to 
initiate feasibility studies, pepare project guidelines, assist in the evaluation of 
contractor proposals, and supervise and evaluate work accomplished under con- 
tract. Despite its undeniable success, the policy of contracting out-begun by 
T. Keith Glennan, the first NASA Administrator, and greatly expanded by James 
E. Webb-raised serious problems that were at once technical and political. 
First, there was the question of how large an in-how staff was needed to 
monitor prime contractors. If the staff was too small, lacked experience in manag- 
ing large development contracts, or was inclined to favor contractors who had 
worked for the agency before, NASA would be at the mercy of its contractors. 
Should the staff be too large, there would be pressure from the centers to do the 
work in-house. There was always some tension between forcing the ctnters to 
learn to deal with contractors and setting aside a certain percentage of funds for 
small internal projects, without which NASA could not retain its most talented 
scientists and engineers. As Wernher von Braun, Director of the Marshall Space 
Flight Center (MSFC), once remarked to a House subcommittee: 
A good engineer gets stale very fast if he doesn't keep his hanb dirty. . . . it is for this teason 
that we are spending about 10 percent of our money in-hour..: it enabler us to really talk 
competently about what we are doing. This is the only way knc n to us to retain ptofeuional 
t a p  on the part of out contracton.' 
Second, NASA officials had to decide what functions might properly be 
delegated. The negotiated contract might be for hardware, services, or study re- 
ports; the line between what was and was not proper was often exceedingly fine. 
For example, was it proper for a company to do a feasibility study, recommend 
that a project be authorized, and then receive a contract to produce hardware for 
the project? Should a company that offered technical advice to NASA be able to 
benefit from that advice? What kinds of decisions could not be delegated to private 
bodies of any kind? 
A third problem had to do with contractirig for specific services when civil 
service staff was avrilable to do the job. This was the same problem in another 
form: What criteria should the Government use in procuring something, be it a 
launch vehicle, management of a center cafeteria, or test and checkout servim? 
No set of criteria (the Bureau of the Budget issued several %is of guidelines) could 
meet every contingency." The presumption in favor of a commercial source, save 
when no such source was available or when using it might somehow disrupt the 
agency's work, smacked too much of a short-term solution. Excessive dependence cj 
on private industry would eventually endanger NASA's ability to determine the 
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kinds of programs it wanted, to estimate feuonable prices, and to evaluate pro- 
gram mults. But too much work done in-houu would have wived thorc prob- 
lems it was the ostensible purpoae of the contractual instrument to molve: a lack 
of flexibility, the accumulation of a large permanent staff for whom jobs had to 
be found, and a concomitant vested intemt in particular programs. No decision 
in NASA's history has been fraught with greater consequences than this one. No 
aspect of NASA organization was left untouched by it. 
Another significant decision concerns the reorganization in November 196 1, 
by which mponsih3lity for hardware and mponsibility for programs were con- 
cmtrated in the same program offim. The euence of NASA program planning 
was organization by goal rather than by hardware. Prior to 1961 a separate Omce 
of Launch Vehicle Programs was responsible for engine and launch vehicle 
development. If NASA was to be a single agency, rather than a congeria of semi- 
independent fiefdoms, hardware and programs had to be combined in the head- 
quarters program office and the centers then reporting to them. The catalyst for 
the change was the decision to give highest priority to the manned lunar landing. 
What had been d i m d  for over a year within NASA now became a matter of 
ugency. The basic changes-omitting the details for now-wm (1) that the 
centers were to report directly to the h i a t e  Administrator, (2) that four new 
program offices were estahlished in place of the four that had been abolished, and 
(3) that a new Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition was set up to provide 
agmcywide support. 
The reorganization gave the Manned Space Flight (MSF) program the orga- 
nizational prominence needed to carry ~ u t  its goal and, in so doing, paved the way 
for the centers to manage the large deveiopment contracts on which the success of 
the program depended. From these two things-the special fmdom of the Ofiice 
of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) and the doubling and tripling of appropriations 
and manpower-resulted the most important changes of the next two years: the 
introduction of incentive contracts and the conversion of older contracts from 
cost-plus-fixed-fee; the establishment of an Ofiicc of Industry Affairs with agency- 
wide mponsibility for procurement; and the decision to build a research center 
dedicated to electronics, the crucial discipline in the refinement of span hardware. 
The 1961 reorganization, in sum, emphasized the "commonality" of agency ob- 
jectives. "The manned lunar landing was a NASA objective, not just the objective 
of the OfTim of Manned Space Flight. All NASA field inrtallations were to con- 
tribute to its accomplishment, not just the centm labelled as manned space flight 
cmtm. Agencywide functions . . . were to be performed for the benefit of the 
entire NASA ptognm, not just one w e n t  of it.'" 
A third decision is that of the November 1963 reorganization, after which the 
field centm once more reported to the program officer, not to the Associate Ad- 
ministrator. This decision signaled the maturity of the NASA organization. The 
enters now had the capacity to conceive projects, develop specifications for con- 
tractors, supervise contractors, and conduct sufficient in-house work to maintain 
the excellence of their staffs. The priority of the MSF program war clearly rec- 
ognized and with it the necessity of shifting the locus of decision making down- 
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w a d  from the Associate Adminiantor to the herds d pm(prm &ca, center 
directors, md project managem. Many fauon had to amverge before such a 
system could work or be worked. Fim, then had to k rundudid procedures 
for authorizing projects, tracking rerounxr through the agency, and translating 
data received into information about ongoing programs. Second, m m a p m t  
needed techniques to measure perfonnurce, costs, and scheduler. Third, NASA 
needed special scientific and engincaing pmonnel for its and develop 
mmt program. It is perhaps truer to a l l  the 1963 reogurization an end rather 
than a beginninn, becaw without the apabilitiu listed no such dipenion of 
authority would have succeeded. In other words, the functions of senior manage- 
ment, i.e., Administrator James E. Webb, Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden, 
a d  Associate Administrator Rdiert C. Scamans, Jr., would be leu day-today su- 
pervision and more long-range planning, handling interagency matters, and attend- 
ing to the delicate international implications of the U.S. space program. The 1963 
mrganization did not change NASA's organizational philosophy; it ratified it. 
The fourth mapr decision was to go to "all-up" flight testing of Saturn 
vehides (1963-1966). The all-up philosophy had a rather long history before 
rising to the level of agency policy. All-up testing means that a vehicle "is as 
complete as practicable for each flight, so that a maximum amount of test infor- 
mation is chained with a minimu.m numar of flights."' In other words, all three 
stages of the Saturn V w m  to be flown with the Apollo command and service 
modules irtstead of being tested and flown separately. Unlike the decisions listed 
so far, it may seem more technical than administrative; again, unlike the othm, 
it was made by George E. Muellcr, Auociare Administrator (OMSF), and the 
OMSF Management Council, rather than in the Administrator's office.' If the 
MSF program, by the size of its appropriations and the extent of its rerourcer, was 
the pacing element of NASA planning, if Apollo was the pacing item for that 
program, and if the lunar landing had to be campleted before the end of the 
decade, then any decision that would decrease the number of test flights would be 
crucial. In one respect the all-up decision w u  like the previous decisions dilcuued: 
It evolved from earlier decisions and, in turn, p r a u p p d  subsequent decisions 
to implement it. The all-up decision presupposed th. July 1962 decision to use 
lunar orbit rendezvous as the mission mode for Apollo, and it q u i d  an ever 
stricter control of quality and monitoring of contractors, the budgeting of weight 
within the launch vehicle and spacc~aft (iwlf requiring mapr advanas in 
electronia and miniaturization), much closer attention to improving some por- 
tions of the Apollo program without delaying other prtions, and the building in 
of redundancy wherever possible. All-up testing falls into the atcgoiy of 3d- 
ministrative decirions because it was developed by agency manogm and enter 
dimtors who felt that mall incremental development s tep would be too time 
consuming and expensive, and because it did u much as any single decision to 
establish the allocation of n r o u m  and manpower within NASA. 
Another significant decision was to strmgtlren the Office of the Adminis- 
tratar(Dcccmber 1965-March 1967). H m ,  too, the decision to create an Office 
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of the Administrator was inextricably involved with prior top management deci- 
sions. The year 1965 had been one of intense activity, and the capacity of Webb 
and Seamans to absorb information, to see the agency as a whole, and to makc 
smre of the welter of rcportr and iuuancu generated at the lower levels was 
stretched very thin. Following Dryden's death on 2 December, Seamans, while rc- 
mining general manager, became Deputy Administrator. Webb then moved to 
tighten his control o v a  the functional management officer. In a 29 December 
memorandum for agencywide distribution, he announced the establishment of an 
Office of the Administrator as "a single, uncompartmented entity to afford maxi- 
mum, direct, personal and informal contact between Dr. Seamans and myaclf and 
our auoci;?*es."'O In addition to detailing the functions of the recntariat, Webb's 
memorandum was the most complete expression of his philosophy of ti c .x!minis- 
trative division of labor up to that time. Seamans remained in charg~ of aav-to-day 
operations; Webb, of protecting N.QSA from an ever more: threatening .tetnal 
environment. The functimal staff serving the new office would monitor and auin 
the program offim. 
The second phase of Webb's strategy, kgun in early 1967, changed drastic- 
ally afttr the Apollo 204 fire of 27 January. The Office of the Administrator had 
made the division of functions more clear-cut and precise; by itself. r6is could go 
only so far to reduce bureaucratic inertia: the delays in reaching ~ccisions, the 
shifting of decisions upward, the chaotic state of the management issuance system, 
the real possibility rlf an Apollo "stretchsut," and so on. Webb appointed Harold 
B. Finger, manager of the NASA-Atomic Energy Commission Nuclear Propul- 
sion Ofice (and leader of a task force to study NASA organization) as Associate 
Administrator for Organization and Management. His functions would include 
supervising the functional offices, such as Industry Affairs and Administration, 
and acting as the central point of control within the agency for all project authori- 
zations. Instead of the relatively loose contra1 exercised since 1963, Webb, through 
Seamans and Finger, worked to bring about much tighter control from above. Tc 
many, the Apollo fire was u n d t r t t d  to be the failure of North American Avia- 
tion, the prime contractor for the Apollo command and service modules, to do what 
it was supposed to have done. To Webb, it meant more: He had been misinformed 
by his staff to the point where such an accident had becorbre first possible, then 
likely, then seemingly inevitable. Finger's mission would be to make sure that the 
program officer, particularly OMSF, got what they needed and that Webb and 
Seamans would know it. in effect, the Office of Organization and Management 
became for NASA what the Bureau of the Budget was for the executive branch. 
The decision to establish the project approval document as the single basic 
device for authorizing and directing NASA programs (1 962-1 968) marked 
Webb's final move in controlling agency resources. P h a d  project planning could 
break a project into four distinct but related steps, allowing management tne 
option of continuing or terminating at three precise points. What was still needed 
was a document ".st could match program costs against agency resources, present 
and futurt. The budget, after all, was not j u t  an expression of agency desires; it 
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had to show, lint item by h e  item, the relation between programs, reporting 
systems, and changes in midcourse. To this end, the system projected by Webb 
would include an operating budget and the project approval document (PAD), 
which would contain "the official statement of objectives, technical and man- 
agement requirements . . . allocated m o u r n s  . . . and other controlled mile- 
stones. . . . An absolute one-for-one . . . relationship would exist at all times 
between controlled line items . . . in the NASA Operating Budget and the related 
PAD'S, whereby a change in either will require a concomitant change in the 
other."" Although PADS had been the principal mechanism for authorizing the 
usc of dpprapriated funds since the early 19609, they were now to be the single 
device for authorization, with only one or two signatures required for approval. 
To a degree, any list of y decisions must partake of the arbitrary. A decision 
'v to do one thing is also a decision not to do something else. Indml, some of the most 
important NASA decisions for the period under consideration were those not to 
do something: not to ask for the $400 million supplemental appropriation re- 
quested by OMSF in 1963, a request that might well have unbalanced the NASA 
program; not to set up a general advisory wmmittee, as a high-level scientific 
panel recommended in 1966; not to change the prime contractors for the Apolio 
spacecraft in the aftermath of the January 1967 fire. 
Several more technical decisions could be listed. But at the risk of tautology, 
the ones listed here are the key decisions because they mattered greatly to the 
futclre of the space program. They were not imposed from without, nor were they 
the result of attcn .>ts to placate this or that group through a shift in organizational 
window dressing. The nature of the decisions does not presuppose one specific or- 
ganizational theory; the policy analyst may find in any or all of them elements of 
"disjointed incrementalism," group consensus, participative management, or the 
theory of organization as problem-solving coalition. Thr  value of the list is that 
it invites the reader to consider therncs, certain of which are latent in the facts 
presented and others that are reserved for f u l h  treatment in subsequent chapters. 
The themes are, first, the sequence in which the decisions were made, for example, 
the way in which program authorization procedures were developed before, just 
after, and subsequent to the lunar IanCng decision; second, the way that political, 
technical, managerial, and administrative considerations came to form a body of 
decisions; third, the distinction (if any) between gross structural changes in the 
organization and the many s m a k  changes whose net effect may be as great; and 
finally, the contrast between th: -umss of NASA programs and the frequent 
inefficiency of the agency's administrative housekeeping. The discussion now 
turns to an account of NASA' fcunding and the problems and achievenrents of 
its first eleven years. 
Chapter 2 
I The Making of NASA Policy, 1958-1969 
T he organization and management of NASA cannot be understood apart from the circumstances that brought the agency into being. T o  grasp the relations 
between headquarters and the centers, one must know what brought the centers 
into being, how each center's mission related to thosc: of the other centers, and how 
the missions tended to change over time. Similarly, the agency itself was not 
created out of whole cloth; it had an ancestry, several research installations, and 
a nucleus of skilled technicians before there was an entity called the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. The purpose of this chapter is to present 
a brief survey of the history of NASA and its predecessor agency up to 1969, to 
do this with a minimum of scholarly apparatus, and, incidentally, to introduce the 
officials, programs, and installations that recur throughout the book. Readers who 
are already familiar with the history of NASA may wish to proceed to chapter 3. 
I 
THE ORIGINS OF NASA 
The two sources of the US. space program were the military services and the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA).' Chartered by Congress 
in 191 5, NACA was authorized to "supervisi and direct the scientific study of the 
r 
'i problems of flight with a view to their practical solution . . . to determine the 
t , 
problems which should be experimentally attacked, and to discuss their solution 
and their application to practical  question^."^ Unlike its successor, NACA was 
i strictly a research, test, and advisory organization. NACA let no major devel- 
i opment contracts, owned few airplanes, and manufactured no flight hardware. Its 
t mission, as enunciated by two generations of Committee members, chairmen, and executive directors, was to conduct applied research into the nature of flight to the 
f 
C point where the research could be applied to the production of aircraft. 
NACA's research history began with the establishment in 1920 of the Lang- 
ley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory near Hampton, Virginia. In 1939 Con- 
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gnss authorized another installation at Moffett Field, California, followed a year 
later by a flight propulsion laboratory next to the Cleveland Municipal Airport. 
In time the former was named after Joseph Ames, Main Committee Chairman 
from 1927 to 1939; the latter after Dr. George W. Lcwis, NACA's Director of 
Aeronautical Research from 1919 to 1947. In 1945-1946 NACA added two more 
installations: one at Wallops Island on the coast of Virginia and the High Speed 
Flight Research Station at Edwards Air Force Rase, California.' The location of 
three of the five installations on or near military bases was not accidental. From 
an early date NACA worked closely with the services, as well as with airframe and 
engine manufacturers, in its research. 
Over the years, NACA compiled a long list of significant achievements in 
aeronautics. In 1928 it developed the famous NACA cowling, which greatly 
increased the flight efficiency of air-cooled engines and which won NACA's first 
Collier Trophy. NACA research on laminar flow and the resulting lowdrag wing 
contributed to the sumss of the P-51 Mustang in World War 11. The research 
facilities built by NACA, such as the pioneering variable density wind tunnel and 
the award-winning transonic wind tunnel, not only set the pace for other research 
laboratories around the world, they also allowed NACA to conduct original and 
unparalleled research. Although drawn into testing and cleanup work in World 
War 11, NACA returned to fundamental research after the war and developed 
important concepts in the new fields of supersonic and hypersonic flight: swept 
wings, the "area rule" of fuselage configuration, and the blunt nose cone for dis- 
sipating the heat of atmospheric reentry. By 1954 these achievements had earned 
NACA an enviable reputation. 
Three features of NACA practice may serve to make its sumss comprehen- 
sible. Its mission made it complementary to, not competitive with, the services and 
industry; its research was only loosely coupled to its users; and its laboratories 
enjoyed a certain autonomy in the selection of specific research projects and the 
manner in which research would be conducted. The first of these features should 
not be taken to mean that NACA did no work to order; most NACA work was 
to order. Less than half of what the Committee did was the basic, fundamental 
research it preferred to do. To stay alive it had to keep its customers. industry and 
the services, happy. The laboratory directors did have considerable flexibility to 
concentrate on certain fundamental problems that appeared most promising to 
them, but always they had to do it within the context of job work for industry and 
the services and the broad guidelines established by headquarters. Incidentally, 
whatever the reasons for NACA's reputation, the level of salaries was not one of 
them. The agency's budget was austere; in fiscal year (FY) 1958, its last full 
operating year, NACA, with just under 8000 employees, had a budget of 
S 1 17 million.' 
The Langlcy, Ames, and Lewis laborstoria wcre designated "mearch m t m "  in 1958, when NASA nu 
formed. Wallops Station became an independent installation in 1959 and waa renamed "Wallop Flight Center" 
in 1974. The H ~ g h  Sped  Flight Rcrcrrch Station became the Flight Raearch Cmter in 1959 and the Dryden 
Fl i~ht  Rcscarch Center in 1976. 
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After World War I1 and the appointment of Hugh L. Dryden as Director 
in 1947, NACA began moving into new fields. Spurred on by young engineers 
who were critical of the agency's conservatism and concerned about the competing 
research facilities of the Air Force and industry, the Committee authorized work 
in such new fields as rocket propulsion, nuclear propulsion, hypersonic flight, and 
exploration of the upper atmosphere. In July 1952 the Main Committee directed 
its laboratories to begin research into flight beyond the atmosphere. This led in 
May 1954 to an agreement with the Department of Defense to develop a manned 
hypersonic rocket plane, later dubbed the X-15. Development work had been 
eschewed by NACA throughout mast of its history, but, once committed, the 
agency pushed on. In February 1957 NACA established a "Round T h m "  Steer- 
ing Committee to study the feasibility of a hypersonic booster-glider, the remote 
ancestor of what became the space shuttle in the 1970s. One year later NACA 
Chairman James Doolittle could tell Congress that "4 years ago, about 10 percent 
of our activities was associated with space; 2 years ago about 25 percent, and 
in . . . 1959, we will be devoting almost half of our time to missiles, antimissiles, 
and other space objectives."' Thus NACA was well on its way to becoming a 
space agency even before sputnik. 
While NACA was conducting research programs in the upper atmosphere, 
the services were exploring the military uses of space. The V-1 and V-2 developed 
by Wernher von Braun and his technical team at Peenemunde had demonstrated 
the potential of guided missiles; the end of World War I1 witnessed a flurry of 
study proposals funded by the services. The Naval Research Laboratory devel- 
oped the Viking sounding rocket, which later became one of the stages of Van- 
guard; the Army brought the von Braun team to work first at White Sands, New 
Mexico, and later at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama; the Air Force 
subsidized several projects for air-breathing (cruise) missiles, and one, under 
contract to Convair, for a ballistic missile, i.e., a missile that expends its fuel in 
its launch beyond the atmosphere, coasts through near-Earth space, and reenters 
the atmosphere approaching its target. In 1947 the Air Force canceled that 
contract, but Convair continued work on its own for several years, until the Cold 
War atmosphere revived interest in ballistic weapons. Specifically, by 1953 
RAND Corporation scientists and an Air rorce Stratigic Weapons Evaluation 
Committee chaired by John von Neumann had concluded independcwly that an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was technically feasible. In early 1954 
the von Neumann committee recommended that the United States undertake an 
ICBM program on a highest-priority basis. By the end of 1955 all three services 
had ballistic missile programs: the Air Force was developing Atlas and Titan 
ICBMs and the Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM); the Army's 
von Braun team was working on the Jupiter rocket; the Navy had initiated what 
was to become the submarine-launched Polaris IRBM. In addition, in September 
1955 the Secretary of Defense authorized the Navy to develop a rocket for 
launching a small satellite as the U.S. entry for the 1957-1958 International 
Geophysical Year. 
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Well befort sputnik, the United States had the beginnings of a sophisticated 
space program. The missiles that would serve as satellite launch vehicles were 
being designed and built; test facilities existed at NACA laboratories and else- 
where; and a number of p m p l s  had been advanctd, several of them by the 
RAND Cxporation, for meteorological, '~)r*munications, and mnnaisance sat- 
ellites. All that was lacking was a sense of urgency knd coordir,?tion. In particular, 
the future role of NACA was uncertain. The conttruction of ne* military facilities 
with Government funds ended NACA's near monopoly in aeronautical testing. 
Alm, by the mid-1950s NACA was losing some of its best engineers to industry 
because the salary differential had inmascd. By 1957 NACA was facing in 
different directions. It could remain what it had always been, a small awncy 
specializing in advanced aeronautical m a r c h ,  or it could move further into span  
mearch, with mults that could only be guessed at. 
The importance of sputnik to NACA's future was at first overshadowed by 
the profound blow to the self-esteem of the sewim, Congress, the White House, 
and the public. On 4 October 1957, the Soviet announcement of a satellite in 
near-Earth orbit caught the U.S. military and civilian leadership somewhat off- 
guard. The Soviet Union had annnunctd the intention of orbiting sputnik, but it 
was the disparity between Soviet and American payloads-sputnik's d3.5 kilo- 
grams compared with Vanguard's 1.47 kilograms (Vanguard, the Navy's scien. 
tific satellite, was hardly larger than a grapefruit)-and the inrplication that the 
Soviet Union had an ICBM capability that surprised and alarmed the public. So 
far-reaching an event was perceived and acted on in different ways. President 
Eisenhower advocated a thorough reorganization of the Department of Defense 
(DOD), coupled with improvement in the quality of scientific advice available to 
him. On 7 November he announced the appointment ofJames Killian. Jr., of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as Special Assistant to the President for 
Science and Technology, and on 27 November the transfer of the Science Advisory 
Committee from the Office of Defense Mobilization to the Executive Oflice. 
Reconstituted as the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and en- 
larged to a membership of eighteen leading scientists (with hundreds of others 
consulted for part-time advice), PSAC gave the scientific community greater 
amss  to the White House than it had ever had before. With the Special Assistant 
as the chairman of PSAC and, in 1959, of the newly creatd Federal Council for 
Science and Technology (of which the NASA Administrator was a member ex 
officio), Eisenhower hoped to obtain a body of politically neutral experts to 
provide disinterested advice at all levels of the Government. 
The congressional reaction to sputnik was compounded of apprehension, 
embarrassment, and the desire to make political capital of the failures of a 
Republican administration. Should the Administration policy be found seriously 
wanting, the Democrats would have the opportunity to pose as champions of 
pnpartdness and a national space program. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. 
Johnson (D-Tex.) and the Prtpamlness Investigating Subcommittee of the 
Armed Service Committee began to probe the weaknesses of U.S. military policy. 
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Johnson's strategy was to use the subcommittee to question the defense posture of 
the Eisenhower administration. Johnson, as one student of defense has said, was 
"clearly able and anxious to take the initiative in policymaking for national 
security affairs, including space. His choice to do so, more than any other factor, 
guaranteed that the resolution of the space issue would take place in a broad 
political arena."5 Both the Preparedness Subcommittee and the Special Commit- 
t n s  on Space and Astronautics, established in both Houses of Congress in Feb- 
ruary 1958, emphasized the importance of a national space program and an 
agency-preferably independent and civilian-to administer it. 
At the beginning of 1958 several agencies were in the running for the job of 
managing the U.S. space program, among them NACA, the military services, and 
the Atomic Energy Commission. The Army and the Air Force were preparing to 
take the initiative: the Army because its Jupiter program was being developed 
unofficiaily as a backup to Vanguard, the Air Force because the jevelopment and 
launching of space vehicles seemed a logical extension of its mission. On the other 
hand, Defense Secretary Neil McElroy and his staff were preoccupied with 
bringing the Vanguard program to a successful conclusion and in effecting a 
division of labor to satisfy the rival services. The humiliation attendant on Sput- 
niks 1 and 2 was compounded by the failure of the early Vanguards on the launch 
pad. On 8 November 1957 DOD (with President Eisenhower's approval) autho- 
rized ihe Army satellite program as a backup to Vanguard; on 15 November 
Secretary McElroy announced that he would appoint a new director for advanced 
weapons dr~elopment; on 31 Jacuary 1958 the von Braun team's Jupiter placed 
Explorer 1 in orbit, the first successful launch of a U.S. spacecraft; on 7 February 
McElroy established the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to elimi- 
nate wasteful duplication of research and .levelopment in the services. McElroy 
hoped to defuse the issue of the military role in space: first, by giving ARPA 
responsibility for evaluating novel proposals during the earliest planning stages; 
second, by locating space programs at the level of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD); third, by setting up a research and development arm to deal with 
programs that were long range and possibly tangential to work in progress? 
McElroy was no more prepared than the services to leave the field to a new civil- 
ian agency. The Air Force might protest the centralization of space programs in 
OSD, while the Army command might act as if any gain in Air Force funding 
must somehow be at the Army's expense. But "confronted with a civilian chal- 
lenge to the freedom to dmrmine what programs were to be considered militarily 
significant, the services closed ranks with the OSD."' 
The outcome was a check to DOD. During Johnson's subcommittee hear- 
ings, the Administration reviewed the available options. The decision to put the 
space program in civilian hands was made by a President whose strongest feeling 
about the space program was that it must be kept from military control, both to 
keep space activity peaceful and to avoid creating a new, large, and expensive 
program located in the Pentagon. This left open the question of where to locate 
the new agency. Should it be placed in an expanded Atomic Energy Commission, 
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a central Department of Science, or a reconstituted NACA? When the Adminis- 
tration decided on 5 March 1958 in favor of NACA, it did so not l e ~ s t  because 
Dryden, Doolittle, and Main Committee members-in speeches, resolutions, and 
staff paperz-had stated that they were willing to take on the job. NACA was 
already there. It had a specifically technical orientation, a highly trained research 
staff, a recent history of research on flight in the lower reaches of space, and ex- 
cellent relations with DOD. Furthermore, NACA had outlived its mission and 
was in need of a new one. Interestingly, it was the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), 
not Congress, that proposed NACA as the organizational home of the new agency; 
the Administration's draft legislation was largely the work of analysts like Wil- 
liam Finan of the Office of Management and Organization and Willis H. Shapley 
of the Military Division. They and Budget Director Maurice Stans preferred 
single-hcaded agencies reporting directly to the President, as opposed to indepen- 
dent commissions. The bill's objective, according to Stans, was "to build upon 
existing institutions and to avoid increasing the total number of Federal agencies 
involved in aeronautics and space matters."' 
The Administration bill, introduced on 14 April, modified by Congress, and 
signed on 29 July, contained two provisions particularly important to this study. 
First, the act made NACA the nucleus of the new agency, but not NACA as then 
constituted. Rather than NACA's proposal of a multiheaded executive branch, the 
act authorized an Administrator with wide powers, including the right to appoint 
260 individuals exempt from civil service classification. The new agency would 
have power to contract out for hardware, support services, and university- 
sponsored research. Most important, the spacvr agency was empowered to conceive 
and carry out major development programs, including the development of large 
launch vehicles. 
Second, neither the Administration bill nor the Space Act settled the matter 
of one national space program or two. Once it became clear that the agency would 
be civilian controlled, DOD officials droppea overt opposition to NASA, concen- 
trating instead on making it respond to their needs. The Air Force found NASA 
something it could live with; top officials saw the agemy as merely NACA 
enlarged and somewhat strengthened but still responsive to Air Force interests and 
a convenient location for noncompetitive military projects. At the same time, the 
Administration bill contained almost nothing about coordinating military and 
civilian programs and provided no solution for the jurisdictional conflicts that 
were bound to arise. It was difficult to findthe middle ground; officials like 
Herbert York, ARPA's chief scientist, argued that space was a region, not a 
program, and that DOD should be free to operate in any field-including space- 
that it found interestingag Cairied to its logical conclusion, this view would have 
negated the distinction between civilian and military programs the Administration 
intended to safeguard. The Space Act represented a compromise. Being civilian, 
the agency accorded with the views of tile Administration, PSAC, and the leaders 
of both Houses of Congress. At the same time, the new agency would have to 
depend heavily on DOD for launch vehicles, launch facilities, personnel-many 
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of them officers detailed from the services-and contract administration. T o  the 
extent that the Administration bill did not provide for NASA-DOD coordination, 
the space program would have been somewhat less than national. To remedy this, 
Congress moved in two directions. First, section 102(b) of the Space Act enjoined 
the civilian agency to make available to DOD those discoveries having military 
value or significance. Second, Congress added (sections 201 and 204) two coordi- 
nating bodies: the National Aeronautics and Space Council, a high-level policy- 
making-body, chaired by the President, that embraced all Federal agencies with 
a major interest in space (NASA, DOD, the Atomic Energy Commission, the 
State Department) and a Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, which was super- 
seded in 1960 bv the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board.' The 
success of these ~ A e s  would depmd entirely on the willingnBs of agency heads 
and the President to use them; coordination assumed the existence of a community 
of interest. 
THE TRANSFER OF PROGRAMS TO NASA 
Within three weeGs of the passage of the Space Act, President Eisenhower 
nominated and the Senate confirmed T. (Thomas) Keith Glennan, presiden: of 
the Case Institute of Technology, to be NASA Administrator, with Hugh Dryden 
as Deputy Administrator. On 30 September NACA went out of existence; the 
following day, the President signed an executive order transferring to NASA the 
civilian personnel of the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard division; several 
lunar probes relinquished by ARPA; and the 1.5 million-pound thrust F-1 engine, 
for which the Air Force had let a study contract to North American Aviation. 
In December another executive order transferred to NASA the services of the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California, founded in 1944 and 
operated by the California Institute of Technology (CalTech) under contract to 
the Army. In JPL, NASA acquired an institution whose future relations with it 
could not be precisely defined. Although JPL's facilities were owned by the 
Government, the laboratory was ta be managed by CalTech under contract to 
NASA. Indml, NASA created a special Western Operations Ofiice to administer 
the JPL ~ o n t r a a . ~  As a contractorsperated facility, JPL's status was equivocal: 
first, because of the contract's "mutuality clause," under which JPL and NASA 
agreed to undertake projects deemed of "mutual interest"; second, because the role 
of CalTech had yet to be determined; and third, because JPL was organized to 
' The Spaw Council was reorganized in 1961 under the chairmanship of thc Vice President. Although it 
participated in the lunar landing decision and in the bill that became the 1962 Communications Satellite Act, 
it never really played the coordinating role that Con- had in mind, and it waa abolished by the Pmident's 
Reorganization Plan No. 1 in 1973. 
' It wa: renamed the Western Suppon OMa in 1966 and abolished in 1968, when its functions w m  
transferred to the NASA Paaadena (Mice. 
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do most of its work in-hou 2, including the testing and production of spacecraft. 
Althoug1l JPL was a major acquisition for NASA, its ambiguous status was to 
lead to serious difficulties over the next six years. 
The last major transfer of facilities and programs took place in October 1959, 
when NASA acquired the Army's Saturn project and the Ballistic Missile Agen- 
cy's Development Operations Division. The Army reluctantly acquiesced, mainly 
to prevent the Air Force from taking over the von Braun team, whose transfer to 
NASA gave the agency a launch vehicle capability it had hitherto lacked. NASA 
took over a portion of the Redstone Arsenal, renaming it the George C. Marshall 
Space Flight Center in March 1960, although the transfer was not completed 
until July.* It should be noted that DOD ampted these transfers because they 
did not jeopardiie military programs and because the Saturn booster had "its 
primary place in space exploration and not in our missile pr~gram." '~ Yet the 
completion of these transfers raised urgent questions about priorities. First, there 
were technical questions bearing on future programs. How should NASA choose 
between liquid- and solid-fuel boosters for first-stage use? Were nuclear-powered 
upper stages feasible? (NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission established a 
joint Space Nuclear Propulsion Office in 1960.) How far should NASA go in de- 
veloping new launch vehicles or in adapting Air Force ballistic missiles for space 
exploration? Second, what was the proper division of labor between military and 
civilian programs? To what extent should NASA rely on DOD for launch and 
ground support or develop its own facilities at the risk of duplicating what was 
already available? Third, how should the agency plan in respect to manned space- 
flight? In October 1958 Glennan had established a Space Task Groupt at Langley 
under Robert Gilruth to work on Project Mercury, the nation's first manned 
program. By 1960 a headquarters group had recommended that NASA plan a 
lunar landing for some time after 1970, a prediction soon to be overtaken by 
events. Mercury was plagued with technical problems, schedule slippages, and 
doubts about its sequel-if sequel there would be. 
Yet it would be worse than misleading to look only at NASA's teething 
troubles while ignoring its accomplishments. By 1961 it had acquired new instal- 
lations in addition to those inherited from NACA: JPL, Marshall, and the 
Goddard Space Flight Center at Beltsville, Maryland, established in 1959 with a 
nucleus of scientists transferred from the Naval Research Laboratory. In addition, 
the Office of Space Flight Programs, directed by Abe Silverstein, started work on 
many of the unmanned programs that flew five to seven years later: Ranger, 
designed to take photographs of the lunar surface before crash-landing on the 
* Thc rcnrcr was named in honor of General George C. Marshall, chief of staff during World War 11, 
Secretary of Starc from 1948 to 1949, and author of the Marshall Plan. As a rule, a n t m  named after individuals 
will be rcfcrrcd to as Goddard, Langlcy, Manhall, and so on, to sparc the reader an overgrowth of acmnyms. 
' Nor to be mnfuscd w~th  rhc President's Space Task Group established in February 1969 by Pmident Nixon 
to map out thc L! S. sparc program over the next two decades. 
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Moon; Surveyor, intended to soft-land on the Moon, take photographs, and ana- 
lyze soil specimens; the Orbiting Observatories, which were designed to carry a 
variety of experiment packages; Nimbus, a weather satellite intended as a more 
advanced system than the Tiros spacecraft transferred kom ARPA in 1959; and 
Syncom, a communications satellite designed (like the Army's Advent) to provide 
synchronous, twenty-four-hour coverage. What NASA lacked was program direc- 
tion. But the arrival of new personnel, the accession of new programs, and the 
dramatic shift in national priorities following the presidential election of John F. 
Kennedy pushed NASA far indeed from the modestly funded, science-based 
agency contemplated by President Eisenhower. 
THE LUNAR LANDING DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The decision to go to the Moon was predictable, if not inevitable. Few things 
seem inevitable until after they have occurred." At the beginning of 1961 the 
future of NASA's manned program was uncertain. In Dmmber 1960 a PSAC 
committee had reported that a manned lunar landing was feasible but that it 
would cost between $26 and $38 billion.I2 President Eisenhower refused to ap- 
prove any manned program beyond Mercury, save for $29.5 million for a space- 
craft for Apollo, as NASA's lunar landing program was designated in the summer 
of 1960. In addition, the Space Council met so seldom and accomplished so little 
that Eisenhower proposed abolishing it; nor would the Kennedy administration 
nmssarily take a more favorable view. In a report of 10 January 1961, the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Space chaired by Jerome Wiesner, an engineer at the Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Technology, soon to become Kennedy's Science Advisor, had 
warned the President-elect of grave deficiencies in the national space program: 
"inadequate planning and direction . . . the lack of outstanding scientists and 
engineers."'"he report had further criticized NASA for emphasizing its manned 
spaceflight programs at the expense of the more scientifically productive un- 
manned probes. The report argued that Mercury exaggerated "the value of that 
aspect of space activity where we are less likely to achieve success. . . . W e  should 
stop advertising Mercury as our major objective in space activities. " '' While it 
was hastily prepared and offered the President no new options, the report did 
make explicit the beliefs of many inquential scientists. The worth of the civilian 
space program, their argument ran, was proportional to the scientific information 
obtained. This was only another way of saying what NASA officials would not 
have denied-that a manned program, especially a Moon mission, could not be 
justified on purely scientific grounds. 
Why did President Kennedy commit the nation to a lunar landing as and 
when he did? The decision was shaped by many considerations: the knowledge 
that it was possible; the crucial role of Vice President Lyndon Johnson; the hu- 
miliating news of Yuri Gagarin's Earth-orbital flight of 12 April and the failure 
of the Bay of Pigs invasion a week later; and the conviction-strengthened by 
. . . ..-.,. *. I .  I*... --... -. .-..-.*". .. . - 
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NASA Administrator James Webb and Defense Serretary Robert McNamara- 
that a manned lunar landing was the logical, inevitable way for the United States 
to demonstrate its superiority in space. Within NASA, the feasibility of lunar 
landing had been under study since 1959. The Space Task Group had worked out 
precise guidelines, and a headquarters study committee chaired by George Low 
had reported in February 1961 that "the manned lunar landing mission could be 
accomplished during the decade . . . at a cost of just under $7 billion through FY 
1969."'Moreover, NASA was able to make a better case than the Air Force that 
it was the agency best equipped to manage such a program. Webb undercut the 
Air Force's attempt to take over the space program by negotiating jurisdictional 
agreements with McNamara and Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, both of 
whom wished to bring the services under tighter control. 
Another ingredient in President Kennedy's decision was the role of Vice 
President Johnson. As chairman of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub- 
committee, he had been one of the prime movers behind the Space Act, and later 
of the "Johnson Rider," by which NASA had to seek annual authorizing legis- 
lation before requesting appropriations. On 20 April Congress revised the Space 
A a  so that the Space Council, now located in the Executive Office and chaired by 
the Vice President, would "assist" as well as advise the President. Johnson then 
installed his own man, Edward Welsh, as the Council's Executive Secretary, 
rather than have the post filled by a NASA official, as President Eisenhower had 
done. Johnson was now the ex officio head of the national space effort; indeed, he 
was quicker than Kennedy to seize the political implications of space exploration. 
By revitalizing the Space Council and using it to review the space program, 
persuading Webb to a m p t  the appointment to head NASA, emphasizing the 
importance of space for national prestige, and drumming up congressional sup- 
port against the time when it would be needed, Johnson did more than anyone 
except Kennedy to make the lunar landing decision possible. 
When Kennedy came before Congress on 25 May 1961 to request a $549 
million supplemental appropriation for NASA, he outlined what were to be the 
principal features of the civilian space program for the next eight years. He 
proposed an advance on a broad front: a lunar landing within the decade (this was 
the language suggested by NASA), scientific investigations, worldwide opera- 
tional satellite communications and weather prediction systems, and the concur- 
rent development of liquid-fuel boosters (by NASA) and solid-fuel boosters (by 
the Air Force). 
The steps taken by NASA officials were an adequate response to the chal- 
lenge Kennedy presented. As is the way of organic decisions, this one tended to 
reorder all NASA's programs with reference to one central, all important goal. 
Ranger and Surveyor, originally conceived as open-ended and predominantly sci- 
entific programs, were now to do the preliminary scouting of the lunar surface for 
Apollo. An even more important shift pertained to the role of NASA prime 
contractors. Instead of the centers doing most of the work in-house and using 
industry for support services, the roles were to be reversed, with industry handling 
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production and most of the design, while the catera approved or disapproved of 
changes and checked performance against schedules and cost. Altemativea were 
dismissed out of hand. It was obvious to Webb that industry aad the universities 
had to be brought in, not only for the urgently practical reason that this war the. 
only way to get the job done, but because it was a way of building support-by 
geographical area, by political affiliation, by economic interest. 
Once Con- had voted the supplemental appropriation Kennedy re- 
quested, NASA started to negotiate the prime contracts of the Apollo program. By 
the end of 1961, NASA had c h a m  many of the firms with which it would nego- 
tiate the most important contracts: the Apollo guidance and navigation contract 
was awarded to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Instrumentation Lab- 
oratory on 9 August; the contracts for the three stages of Saturn V were negotiated 
respectively with Boeing, the Rocketdyne Pivision of North American Aviation, 
and Douglas in September and Dmmber; and the contract for the Apollo com- 
mand and service modules was awarded to North American by Webb, Dryden, 
and Seamans on 28 November. The awards were huge. They could not but affect 
the structure both of NASA and the aerospace industry; the command service 
module contract was the largest peacetime contract awarded by the U.S. Govern- 
ment up to that time. 
Greatly expanded launch facilities, an engine and booster testing facility, and 
a launch vehicle assembly installation would be rquircd. By Dmmbcr NASA 
had made the most important decisions: selecting a vehicle fabrication and test site 
at the Governmentswned Michoud plant near New Orleans; choosing Cape 
Canaveral on the Florida coast as the launch site and the Army Corps of En- 
gineers to build the launch facilities; and announcing the selection of Houston as 
the site for a Manned Spacecraft Center* to conduct research and development, 
train astronauts, and manage the flight missions.'" The core of the new center 
would be the Space Task Group, which would move from Langley to Houston. 
Finally, Seamans announced a new program, Gemini, to fill the gap between 
Mercury and Apolio. It would involve a two-man crew using a more advanced 
version of the Mercury capsule, and its main purpose would be to develop the 
capability for a spacecraft to rendezvous with a target vehicle in Earth orbit. 
Concurrently, Webb faced the task of restructuring NASA and adapting it 
to the drastic changes made imperative by Kennedy's decision. To head the Office 
of Manned Space Flig:.: (OMSF), he appointed D. Brainerd Holmes, an RCA 
engineer who had been project manager for the Bdlirtic Missile Early Warning 
System. In that capacity Holmes had performed the ~ x a r  miracle of finishing on 
time and within costs. If, in choosing Holmes, Webb had expected a conciliator 
in an organization rather well supplied with strong personalities, he was to be 
disappointed. Holmes was masterful, abrasive, and determined to get what he 
needed to carry out his assignment, even at the expense of other programs. His 
most pressing task was to build an organization that could handle both launch 
R r n . ~ d  thr Johnum Sp~ce Center In 1071 (0 cnmmcmoratr formrr President Lyndon Johnson. 
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vehicle development and spacecraft duign; in Apollo, unlike most NASA pro- 
grams, the launch vehicle was deigned to be integrated with the spacecraft, not 
the revmc. 
&tween December I96 1 and the end of July 1962, t h m  decisions that were 
to prove of the utmost importance to OMSF were made: to atablish an OMSF 
Management Council, chaimi by Holmu and attended by the Manned Space 
Flight Center directors; to call in General Electric for testing and checkout 
servicca and American Telephone an+ Telegraph for systems analysis work, in the 
latter caac establishing a separate corporation working solely for NASA; and to 
aclect lunar orbit rendezvous as the miuion mode for Apollo. At ita fint meeting 
on 21 Dmmbcr the Council settled on what was to become the standard 
mnfiguration of Saturn and assiQed to Marahall the rcaponsibility for integrating 
the t h m  stagn of the booster.' The Management Cou~rcil rcpresefited an early 
stage in the quasi-autonomy of OMSF. Within broad limits, the Council had the 
authority to make the fundamental decisions concerning vehicle and spancraft 
configuration, reliability and testing standards, and the mission mode for Apollo. 
The choice of lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) in July 1962 determined the 
daign of the Apollo spacecraft and the Saturn launch vehicles. On strictly tech- 
nical grounds each of the three proposed modes--direct ascent, Earth orbit ren- 
dezvous (EOR), and LOR-was justified by internal task lorn studies. Direct 
awrmt called for a super booster, the Nova, which NASA was developing wncur- 
rently with Saturn. EOR involved many launches into Earth orbit, aurmbling the 
lunar vehicle there, and landing it on the Moon. But in 1961 several hngley 
engineers, led by John Houbolt, argued for a third option: launching the Apollo 
spacecraft into lunar orbit and detaching a small craft that would land and then 
return to the parent ship. The OMSF Management Council considered miasion 
mode from February to July 1962, and the decision was made on grounds that 
were aa much political as technid In its favor, LOR would coat 10 to IS petmt  
Inr than EOR and would rquire only half the payload weight; it was technically 
feaaible with the specified thm-man crew, although this was alao true of EOR; 
it called for only one launch from Earth; and it was the only mode to include a 
lunar landing vehicle that would not have to face Earth reentry problems. This 
approach aaaumed that one member of the crew would remain to pilot the corn- 
mand module, while the other two visited the Moon. 
The decision to use LOR was firat announced by NASA on 11 July. More 
than two weeks later the PSAC Space Vehicle Panel iasued a report criticizing 
LOR as "extrtmcly ingenious but highly specialized . . . an imlated dwel- 
opmmt" and arguing that "if a two-man crew in adquate for the moat difficult 
part of the LOR miuion . . then it cannot be pcrauasively argued that three men 
must be landed in other modes." '' The Panel preferred €OR bccauac it aecmed 
to offer a greater margin of aafct y . The iuue was Jmrnc W iesner's judgment that 
NASA could not justify its choice of mode on technical grounds and J a m  Webb's 
contention that NASA had provided all the justification necessary. Commenting 
to Holmu on the PSAC report, Webb mid that "we [i.e., NASA] were in a p n m s  
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The decisicns of July 1962 marked the end of NASA's shakedown period. An 
account of subsequent pwgram developments would go beyond the scope of a 
summary narrative, nor is srlch an account necessary. It will suffice to mention 
only a few of the most important events and to select several organizational 
problems for review. 
In manned flight, NASA went from strength to strength. After unpromising 
beginnings, Mercury met all its goals with a steady increase in the m p e  of each 
mission, from Alan Shepard" suborbital flight of 5 May 196; to John Glenn's 
threesrbit flight of 20 February 1962 to Gordon Cooper's twenty-twosrbit flight 
of 15-16 May 1963, which brought the series to a close. Gemini, with a similar 
start (and even greater cost and design problems), had similar results. In 1966 
there were five Gemini launches, all sumssful. From its first manned flight in 
March 1965 to its last in November 1966, the program achieved its purposes: 
Demonstration of ability to rendezvous and dock with target vehicle; demonstration of value 
of manned spacecraft for scientific and techr~ological experimentation; performance of work 
by astronauts in space; use of powered, fueled satellite to provide primary and secondary 
propulrion for docked spacecraft; Ion -duration space flights without ill effect on astronauts; 
and precision landing of spacecraft. J 
In a way, the most remarkable thing about Gemini was that it remained a NASA 
program in the face of attempts by DOD to make it either a joint program or one 
under de facto Pentagon management. The NASA-DOD agreement of January 
1963 recognized Gemini as a NASA program, but one that would fly military ex- 
periments and respond to DOD's needs. A few days earlier DOD had recognized 
the land acquired by NASA at C a p  Canaveral in 1961-1962 as a NASA instal- 
lation. That facility, renamed the Kennedy Space Center in honor of the slain 
President, became NASA's spaceport on the East Coast. During 1964 and 1965 
the Army Corps of Engineers continued to build at a furious pace, constructing 
launch pads 39A and B, the vehicle assembly building (166 by 220 meters) where 
the Saturn Vs would be assembled, and the 4.4-kilometer roadway along which 
a crawler would carry the assembled vehicle to the pad. 
The unmanned science and applications programs were equally successful, 
nowhere more so than with the three lunar probes-Ranger, Surveyor, and Lunar 
Orbiter. After six consecutive failures, the last three Ranger flights in 1964-1965 
returned thousands of accurate pictures of the lunar surface, with resolution to 30 
centimeters. The success of the Surveyor program was even more surprising, what 
with two congressional investigations, the inexorable climb in the weight of the 
spacecraft, the difficulties with the second-stage Centaur vehicle that was to 
launch it, and the transfer of Centaur project management from Marshall to 
Lewis in October 1962. Yet Surveyor 1, launched on 30 May 1966, worked 
perfectly, as did four of the remaining six spacecraft. As for Lunar Orbiter, which 
had originally been a part of the Surveyor program, all five spacecrart in the series 
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were sumssful. It is interesting that the project manager for Lunar Orbiter was 
the Langley Research Center, a former NACA installation taking on development 
work. 
Onc of the incidental effects of Ranger and Surveyor was to bring about 
changes in the relation between JPL, which managed both programs, and NASA 
Headquarters. The failures of Rangers 5 and 6 were galling, the latter especially 
so; everything went perfectly until a few minutes before the programmed crash 
landing, when the T V  cameras failed to turn on. Ranger 6 led to a NASA board 
of inquiry, an investigation by a House subcommittee, and a change in the contract 
with CalTech. NASA officials considered annexing JPL but preferred retaining 
it as an independent contractor. Yet JPL did become more like a NASA center. 
In particular, Surveyor was drastically reorganized; engineers who had worked on 
Ranger joined the Surveyor team, and most of them served full-time; the majority 
of the team was relocated in one building; and NASA instituted much more rig- 
orous design rev ie~s .~ '  Under pressure, JPL hired a general manager and began 
to assign an increasing number of employees full-time to individual 
Finally, the December 1964 contract extension made two important changes. It 
superseded the mutuality clause with a proviso that NASA could assign tasks 
unilaterally and replaced the annual lump-sum fee with award fees based on 
perf~rmana.~'  
All the while, NASA management sought that elusive entity, a balanced 
program. Although manned spaceflight accounted for nearly 70 percent of NASA 
outlays, there was an understanding that a limit existed beyond which it could not 
interfere with other programs. When Holmes asked Webb late in 1962 for an 
additional $400 million for the lunar landing program, Webb refused outright. 
The money could be obtained only by going to Congress for a supplemental ap- 
propriation, which Webb believed was inexpedient, or by reprogramming funds 
from other areas, such as space science. Webb was even more opposed to this course, 
since no reprogramming could be carried out "without decimating NASA's other 
vital programs by abandonment of projects well along in hardware development 
and extensive cancellation of  contract^."^' Webb and Holmes took their case to 
President Kennedy, who backed Webb. The Administration did not request a sup- 
plemental, no funds were reprogrammed, and Holmes returned to industry in the 
summer of 1963, to be succeeded by George E. Mueller.* 
By the mid-1960s NASA officials had refined certain concepts for managing 
the space program. First, they stressed the concept of a balanced program, al- 
though, as one political scientist has observed, where you stand is where you sit. 
bcond, they declined to overextend NASA beyond its existing commitments. As 
early as June 1961, NASA, DOD, and the Federal Aviation Agency had entered 
into an agreement to conduct feasibility studies on a civilian supersonic transport. 
But NASA managers, at Dryden's suggestion, refused to commit themselves 
-- 
Pronounred "Miller." By coincidcnct, the chairman of the Housc Scicncc and Astronautics Committee. 
which authorized the NASA budget, from 1961 to 1972 was Conwmman George P. Mi l la  (D-Calif.). 
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beyond the traditional NACA role of supporting research when President 
Kennedy in June 1963 asked Congress to authorize a supersonic transport pro- 
gram. Similarly, NASA entered into agreements with various user agencies that 
would transfer responsibility for managing certain applications satellites once 
they became operational. NASA was and would remain a research and devel- 
opment agency. In its 1964 agreement with the U.S. Weather Bureau, NASA 
undertook to procure a new weather satellite system, the Tiros Operational 
Satellite, launch it, and check it out in orbit. For its part, the Weather Bureau 
would finance the system, provide overall management, and be responsible for its 
operation. 
Finally, top management delegated to the program offices and field installa- 
tions the authority to get the job done. This was the rationale behind the reor- 
ganization of November 1963, when the centers were placed under the program 
offices, instead of reporting directly to Associate Administrator Seamans. In addi- 
tion, NASA officials decided not to build up capabilities where the private sector 
could fill the need. The one partial exception was the decision to create an 
Electronics Research Center near Boston. This proposal was broached in the fall 
of 1962, introduced into the NASA budget in January 1963, authorized (after an 
intensive site survey by NASA) by Congress in July 1964, and formally imple- 
mented when NASA accepted the offer of a site in Cambridge in August 1964. 
With this exception, the NASA organization at the end of 1963 changed compara- 
tively little during the next seven years. 
This record of success was brutally cut short by the Apollo fire. On 27 Janu- 
ary 1967 three astronauts-Virgil Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee- 
were killed when a fire broke out in the Apollo 204' command module as it sat 
on a launch pad at the Cape for preflight testing. Although a NASA board of 
inquiry could not determine the precise cause of the fire, certain flaws in the 
spacecraft were revealed, especially in the number of combustible materials in the 
spacecraft at the time of the fire. Subseque~t investigations by the House and 
Senate space committees uncovered two aspects of the history of the Apllo space- 
craft not generally known outside NASA: first, that Apollo program manager 
Gen. Samuel Phillips had visited the North American Aviation plant late in 1965 
and had discovered evidence of schedule slippage, bad workmanship, and a lack 
of direction from the senior management of North American; and second, that 
North American had been awarded the command service module contract despite 
a report by the NASA source evaluation board rating the Martin Company higher 
on technical performance. For several weeks Webb and Seamans (Dryden died in 
Each Saturn IB and Saturn V vehicle had a codc number, indicating its scqucncc. Thus Apollo 204 .3 
intendd as thc fourth launch of the Saturn IB, the first three having been in 1966. 
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Dmmber 1965) grappled inconclusively with the congressional committees, the 
latter demanding that NASA release the so-called "Phillips report," a collection 
of ncites prepared oy Phillips during h;s tour of inspection, while Webb and 
Seamans insisted that to do so would be a breach of faith with a NASA con- 
tractor.25 In the end, the essential facts about the circumstance surrounding the 
fire became public k~~wledge.  Errors had been made, but the design of the 
spacecrat was fundamentally sound. At a cost of an extra $410 million, a reor- 
ganization of North American's Space Division (carried out under pressure from 
NASA), and a slip of eighteen months in the launch schedule, NASA redesigned 
the block I1 Apollo spacecraft, removed combustible materials, brought in Boeing 
to integrate the spacecraft with the Saturn V, and made Grumman tighten up its 
management of the lunar module. 
There were to be few failures thereafter. On 9 November 1967 Saturn V was 
launched, unmanned, for the first time. Th:., marked the beginning of a s q u e n n  
of launches designed to culminate in the lunar landing: Apollo 7 (October 1968), 
the first flight of the three-man crew (Saturn IB); Apollo 8 (Denmber), the first 
flight to take astronauts out of the Earth's gravitational pull and place them in 
lunar orbit; the Apollo 9 launch in March 1969, which tested the lunar module 
in Earth orbit; and Apollo 10 in May, which accomplished every stage of the lunar 
landing except the landing itself. When Neil Armstrong and Edwin "Buzz" 
Aldrin set foot on the Moon on 20 July 1969, it was the culmination of more than 
eight years of plans and organization. The mission that President Kennedy as- 
signed to NASA had been accomplished on time and within Webb's estimate of 
about $20 billion as the cost of the manned program.'" 
Yet the future of NASA in 1969 was nearly as uncertain as it had been in 
the fall of 1960. Where would the agency go after the first landing? Would there 
be an extended program of lunar exploration, manned missions to the near 
planets, or a manned Earth-orbital space station serviced by a low-cost, reusable 
transportation system? When Apollo 11 was launched, planning groups at head- 
quarters were considering all three possibilities. But in 1969 and for two years 
after, very little about the agency's long-term prospects was certain. Thomas 0. 
Paine, who sumeded Webb as Administrator in October 1968, favored an ambi- 
tious long-range program with movement on all fronts: a manned mission to 
Mars, a new generation of automated spacecraft, and new programs in advanced 
research and technology. However, in 1969 the problem was less one of starting 
up new programs than of holding the agency together. At that time, NASA was 
in the middle of its third consecutive fiscal year of budget cuts and employee 
layoffs-cuts that eliminated the Voyager spacecraft for the exploration of Mars, 
the NERVA Ii nuclear rocket, a substantial portion of NASA's rquest for Apollo 
Applications (as the sequel to Apollo was called) and to the announcement at the 
end of 1969 that the Electronics Research Center would close, even as work on 
the anfinished complex continued. For NASA, the key problem of the 1970s 
would be to move from Apollo toward a program that the agency could sell to the 
Executive Office, Congress, and the American public. 
Headquarters 
Chapter 3 
Organization, or the View From 
the Seventh Floor* 
T he internal administrative history of NASA is much more difficult to write about than its external affairs. Bureaus rose and fell; functions performed in 
one were parceled out among several and vice versa. Bureaus with imposing titles 
sometimes had little real power, while others with little formal authority had 
much say in making and carrying out management decisions. Furthermore, the 
larger the organization and the greater the rate of change, the more complex 
internal relations became, with more opportunity for jurisdictional conflict and a 
greater need for specialized units to prepare and enforce agencywide rules. A final 
reason for the complexity of the relations (and the difficulty in explaining them) 
is that many agency practices were worked out through informal unwritten 
understandings. Such agreements might appear because of the tendency for insti- 
tutional reality to outrun its formal documentation, or perhaps because officials 
preferred that certain relations not be formalized, for fear that it might prove 
impossible to draft a management statement acceptable to everyone.' 
These features-the complexity of jurisdictions, the network of informal 
relations, the shifting of functions between offices, the blurring of the lines of 
authority-highlight the problem of understanding and explaining NASA man- 
agement. A logical way to begin is with an account of headquarters organization 
in general and of "top management" in particular-that is, the three or four offi- 
cials at the top of the hierarchy. This approach is attractive because top manage- 
ment was the only group who could represent the entire agency to the outside 
world. The peculiar decentralized structure of NASA is best understood as a series 
of delegations of authority from top management to the program offices and from 
- 
Thc locarion Federal Offitr Huildmg No 6 (FOB-6) in Washington, 11 C., to which NASA Headquarters 
moved in the summer o l  1961 
2 7 
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMa 
headquarters to the cunters, irnd the major rcorganizationsof the 1960s, while thcy 
affected all of NASA, began as changes at headquarters in its relations with the 
field installations. In this chapter headquartcrs adnrinistration is analyzed as it 
changed from 1961 ts the mignation of NASA Administrator James E. Wehb in 
Cktobcr 1968. The next year, ending with the presentation of the report of the 
President's Space Titsk Gmirp in Scptembcr 1969, is disctrucd in chapter 9. 'l'he 
discussion tugins with a summary anvunt of the problems confronting manage- 
ment in organizing headquarters functions. 'l'hnl the four cycles of reorganization 
of the 196th ;)re examined--why thcy c h ~ u r d  and what the) etktcd-and the 
discirssion concludes with an analysis ol the functions top manirgcnrent pcrfornrcd. 
When N:\SA twp;rn its ottici;d cxistcn(r on I (ktotwr IW, Administrator 
'1'. Keith (;lennnn ;\nd his deputy, former NACA 1)irwtor iiugh 1.. Ilrydcn. 
bcwl the pmblenl of pulling together the prugams inherited frcm NACA and 
those to 1u transferred fmm 1)Ol). Ilryden had at tirst sccnled thr logic;rl choicr 
to head the agnlcy. Before cvming to NACA in 1947, he had done notitblc work 
in aemnautinll reseitrch irt the National Hurc;ru of Standards. where Ilr Iwr to the 
position of ! kp ;  1)imtor. At Nr\Ct\, us later ;rt N.I\St\. Ilrydrn had earned 
almost irs much respect for his ;rhility i\s an ;rdministr;~tor ils he had earlier for his 
research on boundary-layer Itow. Hut he was no nranapcr in the sense thitt 
Clenn;rn and Wehb were. As one nrlleagur rcnrirrkcd, "he really wasn't the guy 
to hang nwi\v morning, ncwn, and night on kttpinp progrir~lrs ;rnd yn+cts going 
on schrdulc irnd within funds and that kind of thing. Whitt he was. rather, was 
ir lnitn with vwy gtwi  ji~dgmmt rrn what chjwtives we ought to hiwe in NASA, 
on wh.rt rcl;rtionships were redly imprtirnt. . . . H r  had ir wry pcnd under- 
standinsof how th~ngs got d(mc or rni~ht  pet sn;rrled up in the ~;overnment."" Yet 
the s;rme tirmncss, nrrthcdirirl approitch. and ciruticrn that were rrspwtni by those 
who knew him well wrrc not likely to ;..ppral to (hgress-'still less were his 
remarks abrut setting the per of thc sp;rer prtrgranr that sttaled to brtoken it I;rck 
of aggressiveness. What nrirdc (;lenn;rn acw~rt,rblt wits his cumbinirtion of expr i -  
cncr and ~nditicirl oyrltics. t i c  wits ;in cnpinccr. not a scientist; Iwfore World Wirr 
I1 he had worknl its ;r sound system enginwr in the nrcrticrn picture industry, irnd 
during the war he h.rd \wen in charge of the N.r~y's llndcrwirtn. Sound 1,;rlnrrir- 
tories. His Hcpi11rlic.irn ptrlitics m;dc him .~curpt;rh\c to the Whitc iiouse, while 
his manifest su(xrss in nrirking the ( h e  Inatitutc of 'I'whnolopy, of which he wits 
president, ir Ieadi~rs twhnic.rl institute. ;rnd his expcricnc~ i\s .I tnenrtur of the 
:\tcmic. Fmr tp  (:cwnlissicrn, the N.~tion.~l S m a r  k'ound.~tion. itnd the Institute 
for llcfense ;\n;rlyses inrplicul th.rt he t~ndcrstcnd the prcrlrlrnrs i~rvolved in m;rrr.rg- 
ing ;I scicncr-hscd .\gcncv. 
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Between them, Glennan and Dryden had the mixture of scientific and ad- 
ministrative experience to preaide over the transition from an agency doing most 
of its work in-house to one expected to contract out for most of its research and 
development. Nevertheless, the transition proved so difficult that it was not com- 
pletely effected untii the end of 1963. In truth, the problems they faced in 
1958-1959 were manifold and interrelated: to plan for an extended period of 
growth in funding and manpower, not as though these were grafted onto a pre- 
existing agency but as the foundation for a national space program; to maintain 
a proper balance between in-house and contractor capabilities, since in-house 
work would be necessary both to attract and retain the most talented scientists and 
keep them available to furnish management with objective technical advice, or 
at least not advice biased in favor of the corporations with which NASA might do 
business. They had to (1) develop and update a long-range plan that could justify 
the agency program internally and before Congress, (2) run the agency on a 
day-to-day basis, (3) refine the systems management reporting techniques used in 
the development of Polaris and Atlas and transfer them to the fabrication of 
launch vehicles and spacecraft, and (4) strike a balance between headquarters and 
centers-neither too rigidly structured nor too decentralized. Their work was fur- 
ther complicated by the way in which one problem impinged on all the others. For 
example, the perfecting of management reporting systems depended on the au- 
thorization of projects ambitious enough and complex enough to justify their use. 
What was inseparable in fact may profitably be dissociated for andysis. The 
problem of headquarters organization logically preceded the resolution of the 
other major problems. This was so for three reasons: first, because Glennan and 
Dryden had to decide which functions to reserve for themselves and which to 
delegate to the centers; second, because they needed expert staff work to assist 
them in formulating policy; and third, because agencywide functions like pro- 
curement and financial management might best be handled by central offices. 
While not a blank check, the Space Act had nonetheless given the Administrator 
considerable freedom to decide NASA's structure. Starting from scratch, Glennan 
had more reason than his successor to turn to outside consultants and committees 
to study management prob1e:i.s. It was not that he actually hired more consultants 
than Webb, who sometimes seemed to have signed up half the country to consult 
and advise. Rather, Glennan used them specifically to set up the entire headquar- 
ters structure. At a time when NASA was tending toward something very different 
from what its predecessor had been, the last thing he needed was an internal task 
force that would recommend the establishment of an agency modeled. on NACA. 
For this reason, Glennan called in outside experts. He hired a conwlting firm, 
McKinsey and Company, as early as October 1958 to assist in organtzing head- 
quarters functions and again in 1960 to study contracting systems and to provide 
staff for the Advisory Committee on Organization. Glennan's choice of outside 
consultants was also influenced by the lack of NASA personnel skilled in manage- 
ment analysis and by his knowledge of the potential advantages of forming ad hoc 
study committees whenever substantial changes had to be made. A committee leg- 
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itimized open discussion of the fact that a problem did exist, created an arena for 
bargaining, and served as a conhit for ideas and policy suggestions. The specific 
advantage of a committee external to the agency was that members could raise 
issues and suggest improvements without fear of jeopardizing their positions. On 
the other hand, the danger existed that such committees would simply rubber stamp 
what had been decided; that, in searching for consensus, the members would rub 
away the sharp edges of their differences, leaving only smooth rounded surfaces 
of agreement; and that, by being outside the organization, they had no real stake 
in whatever conclusions they might reach. The committees appointed by Glennan 
certainly did justify decisions already taken; that is, they rationalized Glennan's 
intuitive ideas. This may well have been their principal contribution and the 
reason why Glennan used them? 
Early in his tenure, Glennan started to tackle a problem inherent in the 
administration of an organization such as NASA. To make the best use of his time 
as head of an agcncy that was about to expand greatly, Glennan had to subdivide 
the duties of management. To Dryden fell the responsibility for dealing with the 
universities and the national and international scientific communities; to Glennan, 
attending to those matters of plaiining and budgeting and interagency coordina- 
tion that affected the totality of NASA. In his first year as Administrator, Glennan 
put forward the notion of a general manager (somewhat along the lines of the 
Atomic Energy Commission) to handle agency routine, freeing himself and Dry- 
den to formulate policy and Londuct the external relations of the agcncy. Having 
carried his point in the teeth of considerable opposition, Glennan named Richard 
Horner, Assistant Air Force Secretary (Research and Development), as Associate 
Administrator in April 1959. This office was of fundamental importance in the 
development of NASA policy; the organizational history of the next decade can be 
charted to a degree by the extent of the Associate Administrator's responsibility 
for program planning, monitoring the centers, and, through his management of 
daily operations, freeing the Administrator for long-range planning. 
The essential problem in establishing the position of Associate Administrator 
was that it set up a layer between the line organization and the two top officials. 
A conflict of roles was linavoidable given that the organization antedated the office. 
"The top program ar. ! administrative directors . . . were powerful individuals in 
their own right. All were on the scene several months before the position of 
Associate Administrator was filled . . . the former NACA laboratories had had a 
history of partial autonomy and resistance to central controls.'" To prevent the 
laboratories and program offices from breaking off and becoming semiautono- 
mous, certain changes were called for: a staff located in the Associate Adminis- 
trator's office to enable him to pull the agency's programs together, especially in 
submitting the annual budget requirements; a standard procedure for authorizing 
specific programs, updating these authorizations, and integrating them with the 
long-range plan; and a procedure whereby program managers could be brought 
face to face with top management to discuss areas that concerned both groups. 
None of these had been fully achieved prior to 1961. There were, to be sure, for- 
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ma1 meetings for bringing agencywide problems to light: a semiannual manage- 
ment conference usually held at one of the centers, biweekly meetings chaired by 
the Associate Administrator and attended by officials from the major program 
development offices, and a Space Exploration Program Council that, attended by 
high-level officials, served as a kind of agency supercouncil. All these reviews ind 
committees represented steps in the right direction, but none went very far. Their 
effectiveness was directly proportional to the frequency with which they met, the 
precision with which the agenda could be prepared, and the authority that those 
attending could exert in enforcing whatever decisions were reached. Where meet- 
ings were infrequent and where problems were so general and broad that nothing 
emerged beyond a vague sense of the meeting, little of consequence resulted. This 
was largely the case with the semiannual conferences and the Space Exploration 
Program Council. 
Program authorization was yet another problem that took several years to 
work out. Before 1961 "somc projects had been approved verbally only, some had 
been in the budget but no formal approval action could be found, somc were 
contracts implying some type of formal approval, some were ~ommitments made 
in letters to outside organizations, some had appeared in a variety of places . . . 
and could he presumed to have been approved." "here is no mystery about the 
lack of a standard project approval procedure, attributable in part to the number 
and variety of programs inherited or started up, ranging in size from the develop- 
ment of the F-1 engine for the Saturn rocket to small-scale Explorer spacecraft. 
No one procedure covered them all. Developing a standard authorization proce- 
dure presupposed agreement on official definitions of "program," "project," "sys- 
tem," "systems integration," and so on. NASA also had to recruit a staff capable 
of matching programs against budgets and extrapolating future programs from 
present resources; indeed, it was essential that NASA adopt or develop data 
processing systems to track resources from their appropriation by Congress to 
completion of the programs. 
There had to be standardized procedures for promulgating management 
directives; few procedures were more useful for the establishment of a hcadquar- 
ters organization than the development of a NASA Management Manual that 
would distinguish between ad hoc circulars, dirmives that stated policy in a 
general way, handbooks of detailed procedure, and instructions intended as stand- 
ard descriptions of powers and authorities for the time being. (The extent to which 
the Manual actually made policy or lagged behind is discussed separately.) Ulti- 
mately, the success with which NASA mated a uniform authorization procedure 
would depend on having a single official, a final point of contact, responsible for 
approving project plans. That official, as will be seen, was the Associate Adminis- 
trator, the key figure around whom all agency programs would ultimately pivot. 
Glennan and Dryden worked quickly and effectively to build an agency 
capable of handling large, complex programs. By the summer of 1960 NASA had 
acquired many of the people and facilities that would prove indispensable to a 
greatly expanded mission one year later. In the Jet Propulsion Laboratory NASA 
ORIGINAL PALL :,d 
OF POOR QUALrW 
MANAGING NASA IN T H E  APOLM ERA 
HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION 
had a research installation superbly equipped to design and track dnp-space and 
lunar probes snch as the Ranger and Surveyor series; in Marshall, a team with 
a long in-house tradition and competence in the development of large launch ve- 
hicles; in the Naval Rescarch Laboratory, scientists who formed the nucleus of the 
space science program, a pool of capabilities with few rivals in other Government 
laboratories; finally, in the Space Task Group, located at Langley but an autono- 
mous subdivision of Goddard, the core of what would become in 1962 the Manned 
Spacecraft Center in Houston. In fact, by the end of 1960 almost all of NASA's 
programs for the next decadc had either begun or were under study. 
The failure of Dryden and Glennan to go still further in establishing a 
stronger headquarters organization was only partly administrative; it was political 
as well. Glennan, appointed well into Eisenhower's second term, had taken a leave 
of absence from the Case Institute of Technology. He had neither the authority 
nor the inclination to lock his successor into organizational arrangements estab- 
lished in NASA's formative priod. Moreover, he had to contend with the uncer. 
taintics dogging the very concept of a national space program at a time when there 
were no manned spaceflight projects approved beyond Mercury, the overlapping 
spheres of NASA and the Air Force had yet to be defined, and the mechanism for 
placing and supervising large research and development (R&D) contracts still had 
to be worked out. Until NASA's mission in space had been enunciated, there was 
only so much that Glennan could do to mold the organization at headquarters (fig- 
ure 3-1). 
Nevertheless, Glennan establish\, ' Associate Administrator as the agen- 
cy's general manager for day-to-day operations. He set up an %ice of Plans and 
Program Evaluation to prepare and revise an official Ten-Year Plar, kmed, as 
one of his last official acts, a management instruction that provided a uniform 
mode of project authorization, and established an Office of Launch Vehicle Pro- 
grams that separated the fabrication of launch vehicles from their ultimate use. 
Finally, in March 1960 he appointed an Advisory Committee on Organization to 
evaluate NASA on the assumption thaj "the opportunity to make comprehensive 
changes in NASA's organization and procedures would not exist too much 
longer."" 
The committee, chaired by Lawrence Kimpton, former chancellor of the 
University of Chicago, consisted of corporate and foundation executives, men of 
Glennan's type; this fact almost automatically deprived the committee of any 
influence in NASA below the highest level. That the Kimpton committee's conclu- 
sions were bland, that its report had few original ideas, should not seem too 
surprising. Perhaps the lesson of the Kimpton committee was that the problems 
it was invited to address-the proportion of work that should be done in-house, 
the functions of the Associate Administrator, the responsibilities of headquarters 
staff for mcnitoring the centers-went too deep to be disposed of on the basis of 
an ad hoc committee's recommendations. Significant structural changes would be 
determined by the content of NASA programs, which in turn would be determined 
from the outside, by the executive branch and by Congress.' 
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TURN AND COUNTERTURN, 1961-1963 
When Glennan left Washingtoz on the day President Kennedy was inaugu- 
rated, the nature, the scope, and even the futureof the NASA mission w m  in doubt. 
Nor did Kennedy's belated appointment on 7 February 1961 of Jama E. Webb 
to sumed Glennan r.,olve these questions. While the President's sldvison had 
recommended that he name a scientist to head NASA, the President had wanted 
someone with experience in the political rough-and-tumble of Washington, some- 
one who could handle Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, and those elements in 
DOD that wished NASA to be essentially a supporting agency for the Air Force. 
As former Director of the Bureau of the Budget and as Under Secretary of State, 
Webb had the experience and the energy-if not at first the desire-for the job. 
He demanded, on being offered the job, the authority to run the agency as he saw 
fit, without altering everything at once. He insisted that Dryden remain as Deputy 
Administrator and that h t h  Dryden and Associate Administrator Robert C. 
Seamans, Jr., who had s u d e d  Richard Horner in September 1960, serve with 
Webb as a multiple executive, making the most important decisions together and 
otherwise working in those spheres for which each was best qualified. This 
arrangement lasted until Dryden's death in December 1965. As Administrator, 
Webb represented NASA to other agencies, to Congress, and to the White House; 
Dryden kept open the lines of cvmmunication to the international scientific com- 
munity and to the National Academy of Scienm, of which he was home secretary; 
while Seamans, as general manager, prescribed internal policy, served as co- 
chairman of the Aeronautics ar  Astronautics Coordinating Board, and until 
1967 was the official to whom most of the so-called "functional" o % m  reported? 
Very soon after Webb's appointment was confirmed, it became apparent 
within NASA that headquarters structure, especially as it pertained to the m t m ,  
would have to be changed. As an outsider, Webb had no stake in any existing 
arrangements. Like his prdmssor,  he might have decided to call in an outside 
group to evaluate NASA as a whole. Instead, he began by working with a very 
small group of insiders, none of whom had been part of NACA: the Director of 
Business Administration, Albert Siepert, who had come to NASA from the Na- 
tional Institutes of Health; Alfred Hodgson, Siepert's special assistant; and Jack 
Young, who had earlier been involved in the McKinsey studies of NASA before 
becoming Deputy Director of the Office of Administration. Without any manage- 
ment instruction or directive, the settled practice became, in Sicpert's words, to 
reserve to NASA officials rather than to outside consultants "thr continuous study 
of our management policies." Appearing before a House committee in 1962, he 
explained that one of the conclusions of the Kimpton report had been that "NASA 
has reached a period of maturity in its young life where it should definitely 
strengthen its management analysis staff. It ought to be able to appraise with its 
own in-house competenn most of the operating p h l m  as they develop."' This 
shift, prior to the major changes that it helped to effect, remained standard pro- 
cedure during the next seven years. 
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Between February and August 1961 these men carefully laid the ground- 
work for the Octobcr reorganization in a Ktia of staff p a p  that set forth the 
available ~pt ionr . '~  The campaign of self-evaluation, which began with a "Sum- 
mary LMk" in February, went on to a 14 April staff study (on the eve of the lunar 
landing decision) and culminated in a 12 June paper on "Reappraising NASA's 
Organizational Structure to Achieve the Objectives of an Acaleratd Program." 
Each paper represented an advance toward the eventual solution. Whmar  the 
February paper analyzed problems and listed alternatives without recommenda- 
tions, the subsequent papen began by recommending p d u r a l  changer-the 
way in which decisions were implemented-as a means of making substantive 
decisions. 
Undoubtedly the mwt important procedural change was the utablishment- 
p r o p 4  in April and made in June--of a "programming" office as a staff arm 
of the Associate Administrator, which would be charged with responsibility for 
budget preparation, management reporting, and the preparation of budgetary 
guidelines for the program offices. "Its loyalty would be to the Associate Admin- 
istrator rather than to any program or group of programs, or to any combination 
of field installations or program offices." " The new office's responsibilities would 
be agencywide; its staff, several of whom were recruited from Abe Silverstein's 
Otlice of Space Flight Programs, would check the tendency of any single head- 
quarters bureau to become semiautonomor~s or to grow at the expense of all the 
others. The head of the new Otlice of Programs,. DeMarquis Wyatt, who had 
worked for many years at Lewis before coming to Washington, had moat reccntly 
been in charge of program planning and coordination in Silverstein's office. Wyatt 
was quick to gasp  the possibilities of the new office, namely, that there had to be 
some single person or office to ensure that "on-going actions, new actions, and 
future plans were fitted into an identifiable work plan." The basic premise of the 
Office of Programs was that "a simultaneous technical and fiscal evaluation must 
be made of plans and actions in order to best accomplish the objectives of [the] 
program."12 
Wyatt's office became the bureau where all NASA planning converged, and 
its four divisions-facilities coordination, which oversaw all NASA construction; 
management reporting, which supplied data for scheduling and reporting to all 
levels of management; racurces programming, which prepared the data for 
NASA's budget; and p r o w  review, which would evaluate requests for new proj- 
ects or changes in old ones-provided the staff sewices that Seamanr needed as 
the agency's general manager.'' A danger war that the new office might become 
something more than a staff arm, interposing itself between the program directors 
and the Administrator. This seldom happened. For several years the M c e  ol' 
Pmgrams served principally to expedite decisions reached at the program office 
level; following the organizational changes of 1967 the M c e  of Programs, under 
Thc Olfia d Programs bmmc the CMim d Programming in 1963 a d  the WIW d Plugram Pinnr a d  
Analysis in 1467 
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a different name, surrendered its budgetary functions to prepare those studies on 
which (it was hoped) Img-range planning was intended to k ba. -3. 
The full-scale reorganization of headquartm announced on 1 Nwcmber 
1961 was both procedural and substantive (figure 3-2). Thet is, it prescribed what 
the prosram offices were to do as well as how they w m  to do it. The principal 
change, under which the center directors were to report to the Associate Adminis- 
trator, was the most difficult to carry out; it was dropped two years later, and i u  
importance may easily be overesrimated. Under the interim arrangement, the 
program directors at headquartm remained responsible for program budgeting 
and funding. They set up the technical guidelines, established milestones for re- 
porting progress on a monthly basis, and retained the authority to reprogram 
funds to the centers. The 1961 reorganization purported to pr.,vide Seamnns with 
direct observation of the centers, to bring the center directors into the planning 
process, and to guarantee control of the $2-3 billion in capital investment antici- 
pated for center facilities. It was not aimed primarily at bringing about a mecham 
i d  smoothness of functioning. Rather, this change was made in frank r q i t i o n  
that the lunar landing dcc<sion had made manned spaceflight the dominant aaiv- 
ity within the agency; that the lunar landing mission was something to which all 
the centers would have to contribute directly; and that-because z!I the centers 
had responsibilities in spacc science. applications, and advanced rtmcarch-there 
ought to be one official with agencywide responsibilities to whom they should 
report. 
The second major change was the realignment of headquarters program 
offim. The previous four were abolished,. and four new ones were created: Space 
Science under Homer Newell, Advanced Research and Technology (OART) under 
Ira Abbott, Manned Space Flight (OMSF) under D. Brained Holmc. ~ n d  
Applications under Morton J. Stoller." An Oflice of Tracking and Data Aquisi- 
tioa (OTDA) headed by Edmund C. Buckley was established for agcncywide 
support in telemetry and automatic data processing. The responsibilities for 
developing and using hardware were once again united. The tendency of thew 
changer was to separate the broad areas of the space program that required 
greater autonomy. In particular, by stressing the importance of advanced rcscarc-5 
and technology, the 1961 reorganization marked a recrude~rmce of the NACA 
concept of research in fundamental aspects of aeronautical and s p a  vehicle 
design and systematic testing "to obtain data for acmnautical and space vehicles 
of the future."" But OART was now required to go beyond this, and, by reducing 
thmry to design, it was to produce real prototypes of advanced subsystems, 
whether or not that hardware would ever be used. OART would stand in relation 
to NASA very much as NACA had stood in relation to the setvi~ur. OART would 
h.we to anticipate problems, do preliminary studi*, and carry investigations to the 
"l'hc p q r a m  cdfitt. abol~rhtd wnc Advanced Rncarrh Pragrrms, Spa- Flilht Pro&rams. Lunch Vchitk 
Programs, and 1.1fc Sc~crrcr Prctgramr .\hr Silvmtrtn, prrviously the lLrmor lor Spc t  Fl18ht Pqrrms, 
rrturncd to <:lrvelmd tn Ynvzmbrr to had  thc Lrw~s Cmtrr 
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point at which the research could be usdully applied-in this case, by NASA 
itself. 
In sum, the 1961 reorganization was a response to problems, certain of which 
stemmed from the circumstances of NASA's establishment, others from the prom- 
inence of the manned space program, while still others existed by virtue of NASA's 
status as a large organization involved in research and development. The changes 
discussed so far bound the headquarters offices and the centers more tightly 
together and at least temporarily checked the tendency of 'both to become quasi- 
autonomous. The changes confirmed the role of the Associate Administrator as the 
official responsible for authorizing projects and approving budgets and provided 
him with a staff to review and evaluate all NASA programs-those in progress 
and those for which approval was sought. Nevertheless, the reorganimtion left 
certain problems in abeyance and created new ones. The role of the Office of 
Programs reduced that of the Ofice of Plans and Program Evaluation, with its 
Ten-Year Plan, to something of a fifth wheel. The substance of planning, top 
management came to believe, lay less in stating new objectives than in getting the 
maximum return on the total dollars invested in programs already approved. The 
Ten-Year Plan, as it stood, provided no real guidance. Moreover, the budgetary 
process, for NASA as for any other Federal agency, required that funds be sought 
on a year-to-year basis, with later years always being treated as less important. 
By 1962 relatively few new projects were being started; the funds requested were 
for work in progress. The cancelation of the Ten-Year Plan early in 1963 resulted 
from the logic of the situation: Planning had to be integrated into the budgetary 
process, not superimposed on it. The budgetary process became, in Seamans' 
words, "the mechanism by which new projects, or major reorientation of current 
projects, may be proposed.""' 
One difficulty occasioned by the reorganization was that neither the centers 
nor headquarters was really prepared for it. Holmes and the other program di- 
rectors complained that they could not "task" the centers effectively enough for the 
work in hand. Many of the directives required to spell out the details of the 
changes were a long time aborning; the crucial instructions on the responsibilities 
of the program directors and the functions of the Office of Administration (re- 
sponsible for financial management, personnel, security, and the like) were first 
drafted in July 1961, issued in "informational" form in June 1962, and pro- 
mulgated authoritatively only in June 1963. But the most serious problem was 
that neither center directors nor headquarters program directors were quite cer- 
tain of their functions aud responsibilities. The management instruction on "Plan- 
ning and Implementation of NASA Projects," issued by Glennan in January 
1961, was already out of date.'' By September 1962 the situation had deteriorated 
to the point at which one official wrote to Seamans to complain of "gross inade- 
quacies in major management systems. . . [and] confusion over the respective 
authorities of the Associate Administrator and Program Directw. . . . The situ- 
ation ranges from a lack of systems to duplicative systems and in some instances 
conflicts or disregard of established systems." He was especially disturbed because 
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center directors had almost no direct contact with Seamans, although the osten- 
sible reason for having the centers report to him was precisely to foster such 
contact. Changes in organization inevitably affected the ways in which programs 
were carried out--whether the approval of contracted advanced studies, the man- 
agement of approved projects, or the center negotiations with contractors. 
In summary, the 1961 changes failed for three reasons. They tended to create 
a "free for all" between the program offices at headquarters and the centers. The  
headquarters program director had authority only over specific. discrete projects.'" 
"Often a center was working on projects in several program areas. Any one field 
center could be involved in projects under the supervision of all five Headquarters 
program offices."" This tended to obliterate each center's orientation toward its 
specific mission. Moreover, the role assigned to Seamans was extremely deaand- 
ing; it left him little time to visit the centers, confer with project managers,or grasp 
what was going on in the field. Ttr! problem was how to relieve him of part of 
this crushing workload and free him to take a broader view of his responsibilities. 
Reducing the scope of his office might be too drastic; delegating his authority, al- 
though less disruptive, would be easier to recommend than accomplish." Finally, 
until 1963 there was no set pattern for top management to meet with the program 
directors and functional staff to discuss operating problems as they arose. T o  be 
sure, there were semiannual conferences organized around some central theme, 
staff meetings chaired by Webb, and program reviews chaired, from time to time, 
by Seamans. But no real format had evolved by which Webb, Dryden, and 
Seamans could grasp and evaluate program developments before they advanced so 
far that change directed from above would be difficult to c x r j  out. 
Yet it would be too facile to interpret the 1961 changes as part of an experi- 
ment that could not be made to work. The  arrangement under which the centers 
reported to Seamans rather than to the program directors was probably never 
intended as a lasting solution. Seamans would later remark-although he may 
have been wise after the fact-that "we realized that it would not be desirable to 
maintain this structure as a lasting arrangement."?' It had served its purpose rea- 
sonably well in reminding the centers that NASA had a single mission to which 
311 local interests must remain subordinate. The  1963 reorganization was in no 
sense a return to the pre-1961 state of affairs, although the centers once more 
reported to the heads of the program offices. That NASA was once more "decen- 
tralized" signifies almost nothing, unless one adds that there were now central 
functional oftices for Defense Affairs, Public Affairs, and Industry Affairs, tn 
which NASA's Procurement and Supply Division (once part of the Office of 
Administration) was moved; for the first time a Technology Utilization Division 
reporting to Webb was set up to work out means by which the technical byprod- 
ucts of space research and development-"spin-off," "fall-out," "second-order 
ronseaucnces," or "technology transferv-could be disseminated most effectively 
to private industry and other users. In itself this was a major undertaking, involv- 
ing identification of useful technology, evaluation of its potential, support of 
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research on technology transfer (often through grants to universities and research 
institutes), and matching of data collected with potential users.?' 
The 1963 changes marked NASA's arrival at organizational matu.ity (fig- 
ure 3-10). The significant change, under which the centers once again reported 
back to the program offices, had been anticipated in October 1962 when Holmes 
was named Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Centers. 
What was new ~ d s  the role envisaged for the program directors, now the associate 
administrators for their several offices. As Webb put it several years later, the 
purpose of the reorganization was to emphasize that the director %as a guy 
running his show as an Associate Administrator, and that he ought tcl think of 
himself as nearly as possible doing the total job. He had to present his program 
to Congress-he wasn't just an internal manager. . . . It was the idea that for his 
area he had almost as broad responsibility as the Administrator, subject to super- 
vision and . . . to evolving his own relationships with functional staff and line 
staff."*' 
As it turned out, this never occurred-at least not to Webb's satisfaction- 
and it is worth considering why. The enhanced power of the program directors 
was, for Webb, only one side of the equation. The other side was the concept of 
"functional mmagement," which, although not formulated in a com;3rehensive 
policy statement until 1966, had been official NASA policy since the 1961 reorga- 
nization?" Basically, Webb tended to distinguish between program and functional 
offices, between those who prepared and carried out substantive programs and 
those who provided centralized, agencywide services in a specific professional 
discipline. The functional staff offices, most of which reported to Se?mans, had 
two responsibilities: to serve as a central staff for the three top officials and "to 
emphasize the agency-wide importance of a particular area of specializntion," that 
is, to check the tendency of the program offices to create their own supporting 
groups with their own parochial interests.'' But this never worked out. Five years 
later, Webb was complaining that the heads of the program offices had not reached 
up to use the central staff; that each of the three program associate administra- 
tors-as of 1963 George Mueller in OMSF, Homer Newell in the Office of Space 
Science and Applications (OSSA), Raymond Bisplinghoff in OART--tended to 
work in isolation from the orher two; and that while the three were to have been 
"associated with the triumvirate at the top to serve as an overall group devoted to 
getting the total NASA job done," this (he immediately added) ''lever really 
happened."'"he program offices tended to build up their own functional staffs 
at the same time that the central staff offices were discovering the limits within 
which they could impose uniform policy, especially at the center level. 
Three other features of the 1963 reorganization should be noted. The first 
entailed a shift in emphasis, a return to the NACA concept (in a very different 
context) of giving the field installation responsibility for technical decision mak- 
ing. Top management stressed, then and afterward, that project management was 
the responsibility of the centers. For all flight projects except Apollo, there was to 
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be one lead center, regardless of how many installations actually participated. In 
the case of Apollo, the major elements were given to lead centers: for example, the 
spacecraft to Houston, the launch vehicle to Marshall, and the tracking system to 
Goddard. The tools for getting the job done had to be grouped in a related fashion; 
thus Applications, which used the same launch vehicles and centers as Space 
Sciences, merged with the latter in 1963. This meant that a particular center had 
(or was assumed to have) the capzcity to manage large development contracts, the 
skills to integrate the subsystems of a project parceled out among two or three 
different centers, and the ability to draw on the resources of other centers instead 
of needlessly duplicating them. In 1963 even more than in 1961, there was an 
agency "prcgram" instead of "prograrns," hence the need for the cross-servicing 
of one center by another center. (Only in 1963 was NASA able to establish a 
unified Launch Operations Center at the Eastern Test Range, where previously 
each center had its representatives-a G d d a r d  team, a Marshall team, a JPL  
team. The  Launch Operations Center, headed by Kurt Debus, was renamed the 
Kennedy Space Center in ,December 1963.) *" 
This system was not self-regulating. It depended on a mixture of formal 
delegations of authority and a network of iniormal relations too subtle to be put 
on paper; neither was fully understood throughout the agency. Under these 
circumstances the general manager really had to be prepared to manage. He  had 
to know what was going on before problems got out of control. H e  had to make 
himself visible to the heads of the program offices, and he had to be able to say, 
"'Well, we need more data on this,' [or] 'this is something we can't decide here, 
it must go to the Administrator.'""' 
The second feature of the 1963 reorganization was to create a mechanism 
that enabled the general manager to do this. The  NASA Management Committee, 
which met for the first time in Octaber 1963, was chaired by Seamans and com- 
prised nine key headquarters staff officials reporting to him. Its terms of reference 
extended to the discussion and resolution of management problems-relations 
with the centers, procurement policy, tht  format for project authorization, and so 
on.3' 
At the .same time, Seamans instituted an intensive "monthly status review" 
at whi he would sit down in turn with each of the program associate adminis- 
trators for :! searching examination of each project for which he was responsible. 
Such reviews would cover all substantive and administrative aspects: planned 
versus actual manpower allocations at the centers and at contractor plants, 
planned versus actual expenditures, key milestones in program and procurement 
schedules, and advanced studies prior to their completion. Each review was to be 
preceded by staff discussions, and the preparation of a formal agenda by the Office 
of Programming would be followed by presentations to Seamans. The  drift of 
Seamans' thinking was to make short-range planning more realistic by seeing that 
the program offices provided him with the information on which key decisions had 
to be made. Consider for example the official monthly launch schedule, which was 
the Associate Administrator's responsibility to update. The  changes made in 1963 
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were in the direction of greater realism and precision. All launches scheduled 
within thirty days of a Management Committee meeting were to be scheduled by 
day, those within the ensuing year were to be specified by month, and launches 
planned.for the following year were to be specified by quarter. Seamans wanted 
to eliminate unnecessary reporting, while insisting that the program offices assist 
him in making launch dates as realistic as possible?' 
On balance, the system of s~z tus  reviews worked well. The  principal recur- 
ring meetings-the monthly status reviews chaired by Seamans, the internal re- 
views of the program offices themselves, the annual program reviews attended by 
Webb-did aid in bringing problems to the surface. In the annual reviews, for 
example, specific program areas were reviewed in depth from the standpoint of 
their overall objectives, scientific and technical content, organizational structure, 
and interrelationships with other Government agencies. The  meetings were held 
on Saturday and lasted all day; the following Monday the presentation was 
repeated for NASA staff and senior officials of other departments. But shortcom- 
ings remained. The  monthly status reviews covered only substantive programs, 
omitting the work of functional management, and the presentations for Webb 
outlined each program in a fragmentary way, since the programs could only be 
covered a segment at a time. Still, the 1963 reforms were a definite improvement 
over their predecessors. The  Management Committee, the monthly reviews, and 
the annual reviews of each program gave Webb and Seamans access to informa- 
tion and views that had scarcely been tapped earlier. The  meetings enabled top 
officials to use overlapping sources of information, hear all points of view, elimi- 
nate some middlemen in channeling information upward, and define the purpose 
of each meeting so that those attending would know precisely why they were 
there." 
Finally, long-range planning continued to be a vexation and a burden to top 
management. By early 1963 Webb had decided not to update the Ten-Year Plan; 
in October the Office of Plans and Program Evaluation, which had p layd  an 
equivocal role-not being quite in on decision making nor entirely out of it-was 
abolished, to be replaced by a Policy Planning Board reporting to Webb and a 
Planning Review Panel attached to Seamans' office." Neither had effective au- 
thority, presumably because top management preferred not to give them any. It 
was one thing to bring officials together to discuss NASA programs in a general 
way; it was another, much more serious step to empower them to speak author- 
itatively for NASA. Planning could be no more effective than its organizational 
location and status allowed. Webb was reluctant to propose a long-range plan, not 
solely from a conviction that NASA's long-range mission ccdd only be spelled out 
in the political arena, but also because he did not want to declare preferences that 
could set one part of the agency against another. The  so-called plans of 1965-1368 
were more in the nature of shopping lists (most of them prepared by OMSF or 
OSSA staffs) than actual outlines of what NASA intended to do; the Policy 
Planning Boiird was abolished in 1965 because, as Webb dismgenuously ex- 
plained, nobody was using it. 
1 
The years from November 1963 to November 1965 were not marked by 
changes as sweeping as those already ciiscusscd. Top management, the heads of the 1 
line and functional offices, and the center directors had worked out a system they I 
could live with. Two sumssive reorganizations had shaken up the agency, spot- < 
1 
lightrd the values top managcmcnt dnmcd important, and r d u c t d i h c  incitial 
f o r m  of custom-"this is the way things have ~ l w a y s  k n  done around here"- 
that might form in an organization that had inherit4 so much from its prcdcccs- 
sor. But it w35 not part of \\'ebb's philosophy to kecp NASA in a state of, as it 
were, permanent revolution. Smaller (although not small) changes would serve 
just as well. As hc explained to one official, top management consciously decided 
"to make relatively small changcs on a fairly frqucnt  basis. Thus we . . . have 
used our decisions on incremental improvements to teach the organization to , 
expect change rather than contemplate static periods after a series of mapr 
changes."" In his view the 1963 changcs, if carried to thcir logical conclusion, 
would free himself and Drydcn to cwnccntratc on the major issues, part~cularly 
where they impinged on other agencies, Congress, and the White House. But it 
was absolutely essential that NASA otticials understand their roles in what Webb 
called "the total milieu." As it matter of policy he believed in tr dnsierring hcad- 
quarters officials to the writers and vice versa, assigning executives jobs outside 
thcir cxpericnw and beyond their area of proven competence, and using NASA 
officials to present thcir programs before congressionnl sulrmmrnittccs. For all the 
4iifts and turns of the NASA organization during Webb's tenure, there is a 
definite mnsis:cncy of intent toward reducing the layering of authority so that 
fewer officials and fewer docirnwnts would be needed to authorize projects, and 
toward bringing as many senior otiiciais 3s possible into decision making. The  
goal being posited, the means of attaining it had to be worked out on the basis of 
periodic reviews, staff meetings, and presentations to srnior otticials-a system at 
once more rigorous but less formal than a 'I'cn-Year Plan. 
Two examples of "relatively small" changcs at headquarters arr the revision 
of the systclll of managcmcnt instructions and the formal establishmerr: of the 
exccutivc secretariat, both bcgun in 1964 and extending o x r  several years, both 
closely tied to the major changes of the previous October. The  so-called issuance 
system had k n  A longstanding gritvanw.'" The  Management Manual insti- 
tuted in 1959 could not adqaately document the changcs taking p l an  in NASA. 
Often, there were no instructions (or occasionally, conflicting instructions) cover- 
ing a subject area. lnsrructions tended to lose rclevancc within two or three years 
of publication but not to the point of beconling totally obsolete. A d d 4  to this, the 
d i n g  scheme was inadquatc, there was no indexing or cross-referencing, and 
definitive instructions ttwk too long to prcp.ire. These problems, recognized by 
1962, had become acute following the 1963 reorganization that, in delegating 
maxin~um authorr~y to the program oHiccs and the nnters, called attention to the 
sap hctwccn the directives .mi the purposes thcv were intended to serve. 
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One of the first steps in revising the Manual was taken early in 1963, when 
the Division of Management Analysis (Office of Administration) conducted a 
study based on an earlier report prepared by the Gener~! Services Administration 
at NASA's request. These two studies, the former of which was discussed by the 
Management Committee in April 1964, served as the basis for subsequent rwi- 
sions, but converting from the old Management Manual to the new directives 
system-entailing as it did the rewriting and converting of current directivcs, 
canceling others, and updating the remainder-took another two years to com- 
plete." The  job of revision included spveral sorts of change: eliminating what was 
extraneous, issuing a new coding system to distinguish ad hoc notices from policy 
directives and the management instructions that supplemented them, and the 
preparation of a checklist to make cross-referencing possible. A particularly im- 
portant step related to these reforms was the publication of "NASA Basic Admin- 
istrative Processes" in February 1964.'' This manual, complete with flow charts, 
official definitions, and enumeration of basic policies and principles, established 
the guidelines to be followed by agency officials and, as such, was the substratum 
from which the issuance system was supposed to develop. 
The  history of the management documentation problem is interesting, less 
for its own sake than for what it reveals of the workings of the NASA management 
process. For brevity's sake, the important points may b; summarized as follows. 
First, the changes or 1964 through 1966 followed logically from the decentralizing 
tendencies of 1963. In line with management's policy of delegating and dispersing 
authority, the new system authorized all officials reporting to top management 
(and, of course, top n: inagement itself) to prepare and to sign directives outlining 
their powers and responsibilities. It gave the functional offices the authority to de- 
termine the content, prepare the formht, and coordinate drafts with other offices. 
Second, while this relievcd general management of the responsibility of preparing 
all the detailed instructions, the functional offices were given the onerous burden 
of preparing directives that might affect nine or ten other offices, as well as the 
centers. 
Finally, the new system failed in its purpose alnlost as much as its predeces- 
st.. NASA did not stand still, and no set of instructionsor directives could possibly 
serve as a contemporary record of operating procedures. At the Office of Admin- 
istration, Young tried in vain to satisfy Webb's demand for precise, up-to-date 
descriptions of every responsible person's job."' "Basic Administrative Processes" 
was alreadv out of date by the end of 1966; it could not be replaced until it had 
been studied by one task group, worked over by the Office of Organization and 
Management (see below), discussed by the NASA Managefrlent Council in Jan- 
uary 1968, and subsequently coordinated between Organization and Manage- 
ment and the newly revived Office of Manpgement Deve.ooment. In the end, 
agency officials found it impossible to summarize the processes beti .em the covers 
of a small handbook. Thc compromisc effected was to replace the handbook one 
chapter at a time-a process that was never brought to a formal conclusion. 
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The creation of an executive secretariat was as much the result of the 1963 
reorganization as the enhanced authority of the program oficcs was. Although 
discussed for some years prior to its establishment, the concept of a central secre- 
tariat for handling communications made little headway prior to 1963.~" It was 
not mentioned in the December 1958 McKinsey report on establishing headquar- 
ters functions, nor in the Kimpton report of October 1960. The 1961 staff p a p  
pr :lo, i t 1  L ! 'zputy Associate Administrator Jack Young did mention and elabor- 
ate \ 1 "Central Secretariat," but no such staff office was included in the changes 
that followed. The real catalyst for change-another staff study supervised by 
Young-came toward the end of 1963, and the management instruction establish- 
ing the secretariat was only issued on 1 February 1 964.41 Why it should have taken 
so long to recqnize the need for a smetariat function in NASA is unclear. Prior 
to 1964 the responsibility for handling ~mmmunications between top management 
and the rest of the agency nad been delegated to an "Executive Officer," usually 
an officer detailed to NASA from the Army Corps of Engineen.*" 
The creation of a secretariat did not immediately resolve the several admin- 
istrative problems that had led to its creation. It was by no means clear whether 
the executive officer would be inside or outside the secretariat (ultimately inside); 
whether the secretariat would serve the Administrator a!~ne, or the Deputy and 
Associate Administrators as well (with qualifications, the latter); whether its func- 
tion was completed when the Secretary informed the Administrator of what he 
n d e d  to know, c ~ .  whether the secretariat had an additional responsibility to see 
that decisions made by the Administrator were carried out promptly (the office 
became respc nsible for both). The functions of a secretariat really depended on the 
Administrator's view of his own position vis-his  the rest of NASA. T o  a degree, 
Webb's concept of a secretariat was not radically different from the one held by 
the heads of other large Federal agencies, particularly the State Department and 
DOD. Webb needed and wanted a staff to handle all materials coming to his of- 
fice, sparing him matters that did not require his personal attention, while placing 
before him everything that he had to know to meet h;s responsibilities. Webb's 
knowledge of secretariat functions was strongly influenced by his experience as 
Under Secretary of State; the State Department secretariat was manned by offi- 
cials who frquently reported directly to the k e t a r y  or Deputy Secretary of 
State." Webb envisaged a NASA secretariat that w ~ u l d  assist in the making 
cf-,nore precisely, in the irnplemenrat~m of-agency pelicy, but it still remained 
to be seen how it would act in followi~g up decisions and in working with and 
through the headquarters offices and Geld inst~llationa." 
At the end of 1965 the secretariat's charter was conspicuously enlarged as 
part of the much broader changes broug5t about by Dryden's death on 2 D m m -  
ber. In failing health since 1961, Dryden had nevertheless managed to carry on 
with few interruptions for the next three years. By late 1964, however, he had 
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become incapacitated to the pomt that his resig~ration or death was anticipted. 
Before Dryden's death, it had k n  informally decided that Seamans would suc- 
md him as Deputy Administrator. What this would mean did not become clear 
for scveral months. During 1364-:965 Webb had started movitq toward a morc 
precise definition of his and Searnans' respective spheres. W ~ t h  Dryden gone, Webb 
decided to pull together into one unit functions ,\nd offim that had hitherto re- 
mained separate. In a memorandum of 29 December, which Seamans discussed 
with all top headquarters officials the next day, Webb a-+rounced the creation ol 
the Office of the Administrator as a "single, unmmpartmented entity to afford 
maximum, direct . . . contact between Dr. Seamans and myself and our assaci- 
 ate^."^' However, Seamans cautioned, this concept was "experimental in nature" 
and was designed to "assist in eliminating functional  delay^."^" But the creation 
of the Office of the Administrator was intended to do more than this, and it would 
be well to summarize here the kind of organizatioll Webb had in mind. 
First, Seamans remained general manager. That is, he retained his fl~nction 
of oversee~ng the agency daily. He would continue to chair the monthly status 
r\-views, update the NASA flight shedule, sign project authorization documentc, 
and so on. But his role as general manager did not exhaust his responsibilities. 
Webb wanted him to move into several of Dryden's functions, for example, to &I- 
volvc himself in international scientific programs. He especially wanted Seamans 
to work closely with the Offices of Legislative Affairs and Public Affairs in pre- 
paring NASA's congressiorlal statements and in meeting with those Congreumen 
who had most to say in determining NASA authorizations and appropriatit~ns. 
Seamans had been doing much of this before; he was now expected to carry it to 
the iullest extent. All staff and ps,ogram offices (with certain exceptions shown in 
figure 3-1 1) would report directly to Scamans. 
Second, Webb intended to make the secretariat visible throughout the agency. 
As the staff arm of the Office of the Administrator, ~t became responsible not only 
for reviewing incoming correspondence but for establishing and maintaining "a 
need-to-know reporting system of items of signifi~nce to general management . . . 
a Critical Reports and Correspondence Review System to keep pe~reral manage- 
ment currently informed of significant matters covered in written reports and 
communications by the heads of Hcadquartcrs cffim" and "a Codified Policy 
Reference that will provide for recording policy directives . . . and for making 
them available to appropriate  official^."^' By what he said and did, it is clear that 
Webb intended the secretarizit to have a de iacto role in policy making. It became 
the Secretary's responsibility to prepare the agenda for marqement reviews, to 
attend major staff meetings (for example, those attended by Mueller, Seamans, 
and Webb) and to prepare a memorandum for the record afterward, and, through 
his assistants, to obtain copies of the internal papers of all the program ofTt~w 
(including OTDA, which was elevated to program office status in December 
1965). But the secretariat ccuid assist in policy making in morc direct ways. The 
Executive Secretary could, for instance, r-mind eaw of the prograrn office to co- 
ordinate an impending action with the functional office; hc could say in so many 
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words, "Have you swn the General (:ounstl? Have you t idkd  with P w u r e -  
ment?" And he cnuld mrdini\tc the policies of the progmnr ottiws with ewh 
other. It sometimcs happened that two stticus, ignorant of what the other was 
doing. would p rvp rc  separate pl icv statements on thr stnre matter. 'l'he different 
approaches of OSSA and OMSF on the quarantine of outbound spacwrirft t u n  
verged only at the level of the Rxcc.utive Swrctirry. who intcrvencd to bring thr 
matter to Seamans' attention and to gain ;r tinal resnlution.'" Ohvio~~sly. a great 
deal dcpcndcd on the pnlganr otticus' willingness to crwperittc, for exunrplc. to 
providc the sccrctariat with cnpies of interrrnl cuwrcspondencr, to irllow assistirnt 
executive sccrtturies to sit in on their stirti mwtings, and to toler;rtc :\nother level 
betwwn thcnrselves itnd general mimagenlent. 
These ch;vlgrs were nre;rnt to rrciutv still firrthw Webh's burden of routine 
business. Scanlans was now cumpletcly responsible for the intcrn;rl m;ungcnrcnt 
of NASA end for many ol' its extcrn.il relictions its well. hlorwver, wen those 
groups lodged in the Ottitr of the Adnrinistrirtor did not irlways report directly to 
Webb. 'l'hc F:xcc.utive S ~ r t t i t r ~ ,  k r  exirnrplc, repwtcul to Willis t l .  Shaplry, wlro 
hadpincd NASA in September I9bS ;rs hsswi;rtc lkputy Atlnrinistrntor. Shirplcy 
came to N.4S.4 from the arilit;rry division of the Hurciru of the tJudgct, wlrcw he 
had btrn involvnl in sp;rw policy nrirking sincu N:\(:A d;rys. t lc wars one of the 
drafters of the Spircu :\c.t it11d h;rd wnrkcri (+wlv with Se;rm;rns to resolve issues 
bctwccn NASA and 1K)l). Arriving just before 1)rvdrn dicrl. Shirplcy hid tint 
been assign4 responsibility lirr intcr,rpnc.y rclat W~rs. Hut tidlawing the 1)rtunr- 
bcr rcorgirnizirtion, it wits Sci\al;rns' notion to work out ;I thrrc- or four-w.w divi- 
sion of l n h r  .rnlong himself. Webb. Shaplcy, .rnd K;rrI 1). tlilburn. the Ikpirtv 
Asswiatc Adnrinistrirtor. In the broadest tcrnrs, Wclh ir~rd Sc,urr;rns would tw the 
top two otticials runnina NASA. ;urd Shirpley i d  1 liltrurn were to r111r the .igcwv 
on ir hy-to-day hi&. Atwrding to Se:r~n.rns, "hlr. Welrtr ;r~rd 1 woi~lcl h;rw ;rv;ril- 
able to us two senior p p l e ,  ;in(! vo\~ woirldn't h ; ~  ,I vcrv (letitrite rule ,IS to whirl 
Shaplcy did or w h ; ~  tli lbwn did, hut ;r gmcrd  .wnr dctincci. .rnd then I woi~ld 
work very closely with twth of than."'" In that sense. Sc;\ar.rns' pl.rn ncvcr ~ o t  ott' 
thc gnrund. Webb would not buy i t ,  prcl'crring to hi\w one person rcsponsilrlr hw 
A given ,\re;\. t 1e saw to  it thitt Sh.rplcy w,rs pl;r(wl in i~nmcdi;rtc (hrrgr  of the 
s~retirrii i t ,  with .I kind of overdl rcsponsihility tiw the "policv pl;rnning" I'un1.- 
tion, to which the entire .qcncy would tw cx~rc~tcrl to tuntribute. In sum. Wcht) 
was dclc~irting his authority for dirily oiurirtions in the hopc th;rt he c~ruld tot;rllv 
involve himself in thc kcv prohlcms f.wing NhSh.  
'I'his acwunt ritthcr u~~dcrs t i t t~s  the tnmplcxitv of wh.rt Webb tr;rtl in mind. 
At onc end, he would dclcg.rtc .ruthority to Se.~nl;\ns ;rnd Shaplcv (tlilhurn h.rving 
left in the summer of 1966) to run N:\S:\ on ;I didy h.rsis; .it the other end, he 
was dclincirting a syhrrr of p l i q  plirnning that would tw his own tririliwic4t. 'l'his 
division of authority cwuld ncvcr hc Iirid down with ;my tinirlity Iwr.rusc no one 
knew p w ~ s e l y  where "m,~n.rgcnrrnt" tp tc  w;ry to "pol i r 'v  pl;rnning" or "pdirt 
analysis." Lither nright lw used to Irrcirlr the dctern~i~r.rticrn of whether pr~viousl\ 
est;\hlished p4icics were twing cxrricd c w .  the tCwi~~rrent;rti~,n of spwitic polit.\ 
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critical of NASA personnel management, and a General Accounting Oflice in- 
vestigation of NASA support service contracts. Even without the Apollo fire and 
the ensuinp publicity, NASA officials would have had reason to worry about the 
future. Questions asked at congressional hearing had a disttxbing way of recur- 
ring. What was NASA df,ing about post-Apollo planning? Why did NASA spend 
comparatively little on aeronautics and applications on the one hand and so much 
on manned spaceflight on the other? How could NASA guarantee that it could 
handle its contractors instead of becoming their captive? By the end of 1966--one 
month before the fire-Webb and Seamans were sufficiently worried about the 
NASA management structure to ask Harold B. Finger to head a task f o m  to study 
the full spectrum of functional management with a view to restructuring it. He 
was invited to recommend how changes might best be implemented, how they 
would affect the program offim and the centers reporting to ti$em, ~ n d  whether 
they should be phased over time." By February, Finger was preparing the charter 
for an "Office of Management," and on 15 March Webb named him the Associate 
Administrator for Organization and Management-ushering in the last major 
reorganization of the 19609. 
Webb chose Finger because he had sucweded as a research and development 
manager; he was the very type of line operator Webb wanted to bring from the 
field to headquarters to understand the agency as a prelude to running it. As 
director of the NASA-Atomic Energy Commission Nuclear Propulsion Office 
since its establishment in 1960, Finger had done remarkably well in handling not 
only the usual range of project management problems but the added burden of 
working with another agency, with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as 
well as with Senator Clinton Anderson (D-New Mex.), a member of the Joint 
Committee and chairman of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, 
which authorized the NASA budget. Finger had the experience and the ability to 
win the respect of those program offices with which he wcclld have to work to 
restructure the agency in the aftermath of the Apllo fire. 
The changes of 15 March can only be summarized here. As %m 3- 12 
indicates, the following functional offic~s would now report directly ts -cr: the 
M c e  of Administration headed by William E. Lilly; the Office of i itv Af- 
fairs under Bernhardt L,. Dorman; and the Offices of 'Technology U!i!izat:on and 
University Affairs headed, respectively, by Richard Lesher and Francis B. Smith. 
The other major change, by which Wyatt (who reported to Sepmans) bccamc 
Assistant Administrator for Program Plans and Analysis, was perhaps just as 
significant, in the process, the budgeting and programming functions previously 
under him were transferred to the Office of Administration (which reported to 
Finger) as part of an agencywidc system "for resources management, includin 
programming, budgeting, personnel management, and financial reporting."" 
Within the year several more offices were bm~ght  within Finger's control: the 
Office for Special Contracts Negotiation and Review, established in May to 
monitor certain important rwntracts, particularly the North American Aviation 
contracts for the S-I1 stage of the Saturn launch vehicle and for the Apllo 
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command and service modules; the Audit Division; the Inspections Division; and 
the Headquarters Administration Office. By the spring of 1968, the role of 
management and supervision had passed from Seamans, who left NASA at the 
beginning of January, to Finger (figure 3-12). 
In certain crucial respects, however, Finger's assignment differed from Sea- 
mans'. Finger was brought in because self-plicing had not worked and because, 
in Webb's view, there had been too much emphasis on programs and not enough 
on administration. In the past, he argued, nobody minded how the job was done 
so long as it got done. The Apollo fire and the attacks by Congressmen hitherto 
favorable to NASA changed all that. The agency had been caught unprepared. 
Webb wanted the job done, but done properly and through the approved chains 
of command. The management instruction that established Finger's office stated 
that "all officials with leadership and executive responsibility are expected to 
accomplish agency programs . . . within the prescribed systems and procedures." 
Furthermore, it wmld be Finger's responsibility to develop criteria "for selection 
upward of R&D personnel who also demonstrate administrative competence . . . 
and the transfer to non-administrative specialties of those who cannot grow in 
both program and administrative areas."55 
In private Webb was even blunter. Finger's office would be to the rest of 
NAs:. what the Bureau of the Budget was to the Federal structure. 
We gave this Office of Organization and Management police authorities over.the system. We 
say, "You've got to prescribe the system, you've got to monitor the system, you've got to audit 
performance under it, and these fellows can't get the money to go forward without you." 
. . . I am giving them real teeth. I am saying to Harry [Finger], "If thex fellows don't satisfy 
you with respect to the components to the system, cut off the water. Don't give them any 
money." He's got the authority to allocate the money, he's got authority to issue in his own 
right a modification of a project approval document and say, "Boys, you used to think you're 
going to do it this way, and even when you don't like what I'm proposing, here it is-signed. 
Go do it this way."" 
Along with the Office of Program Plans and Analysis and the secretariat, the 
Office of Organization and Management would provide Webb with multiple 
layers of feedback; under Finger's leadership it was expected to penetrate almost 
every facet of administration. Now the heads of the program offices had to work 
through Finger in preparing and seeking approval for their project approval 
documents (PADs); tt.at is, Finger was expected to certify to the Administrator 
that a draft PA!? ;V,S sound-for example, that it not only had an updated launch 
schedule attached but also a reference to the research and ongoing projects that 
should feed the project. But Finger and his assistants were expected to do more 
than this. During 1967 and 1968 they planned and carried out several important 
studies of NASA management processes: an April 1967 report on the "functional 
review process," that is, the self-evaluations and internal reviews of the functional 
offices themselves; a task force review of those "action and decision processes" 
leading to mission assignments and approved PADs; and the preparation of 
detailed guidelines for phased project planning. The power to review, inspect, 
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establish management systems, deal with the General Accounting Office, and allo- 
cate m u m s  for mearch and development made Finger the most powerful staff 
official at headquarters. Reporting d i m l y  to Webb, a member d the NASA 
Management Council (see below), and the conduit through which all PADs had 
to pass before arriving on Webb's desk, Finger was both line and staff. 
The creation of the Office of Organization and Management was only part 
of a larger strategy, a wider frame of reference. It assumes importance only in 
relation to the other functions and roles that comprised "NASA management." 
Where the t h m  top officials of 1961-1965 had been able to substitute fnely for 
each other, the key officials at headquarters after 1967 were charged with broad 
functional responsibilities delegated by the Administrator. Finger was, so to 
speak, both inspector-general and administrative housekeeper. Shap'ey, whose 
offin was "subject to the overall administrative system established. . . by 
Mr., Finger," was once more in charge of the offim clustered around external 
affairs. especially relations with Congress and DOD." Newell, who became 
Associate Administrator in September 1967, was charged with organizing and 
coordinating NASA's long-range planning.w At the same time, the heads of the 
program offices were expected to become more like group vice presidents; the more 
they had to deal with one or two officials like Finger and Shapky, the more they 
were to shoulder responsibilities for getting their work done. And that work was 
principally coordination: coordinating their long-range planning with Newell, 
their project planning w'.th Finger, their congressional presentations with Shap- 
ley, and their review of management pramscs with each other, "as if each were 
the Administrator having to make decisions concerning and affecting all areas of 
the Agency's program and operations."" 
The nature of the administrative changes in NASA from the beginning of 
1967 to Webb's resignation on 7 October 1968 may be summcrized as follows. 
First, Webb had a penchant for pouring new wine into old bottles-he liked to 
retain the name while changing the format. Thus the Oflice of Management 
Development, established in 1964 to enable one of his consultants to do some 
troubleshooting, was revived in February 1968 for the totally different purpose of 
reviewing all NASA management documentation."' Similarly, the Oflice of Pro- 
gramming k a m e  the Office of Program Plans and Analysis and shifted from the 
preparation and validation of the NASA budget to long-range studies (see figure 
3- 13 for the NASA organization as of 1968). Such changes tended to emphasize 
continuity within the NASA administrative system. Indeed, most of the changes 
at headquarters after 1965 represented a shift in the functions of existing units 
rather than the addition of new ones. 
Second, the changes of 1967-1968 were supposed to lead to group par- 
ticipation in decision making. One of the ways of effecting this was to have the top 
officials at headquarters meet together periodically for discussion and task assign- 
ment. The concept was nothing new: Seamans' monthly status reviews and 
Webb's attendance at an annual review of each program have already been 
mentioned. There were also various in-house reviews by the program offim (and 
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often attended by DOD representatives) and, from 1964, annual reviews of 
advanced mission studies in which each program office discussed its study plans 
for the upcoming fiscal year. But in line wi:h the administrative fragmentation of 
1967-1968, new panels, committees, and rmncils were set up to focus on NASA- 
wide problems. Webb established a Management Advisory Panel composed of 
NASA officials and part-time consultants to serve as a link with the public 
administration community."' As Associate Administrator, Newell chaired the 
NASA Management Council, which, established in January 1968 and attended 
by representatives of all the program and functional offices, was supposed to 
evolve into a top management team sharing responsibility, that is, to assume the 
functions of a general manager like Seamans. 
But the most interesting changes were those involving the program reviews. 
Each of the reviews suffered from serious flaws. The Administrator's reviews 
presented each program a segment at a time, and the monthly status reviews 
mainly covered substantive programs, although Seamans did attempt to include 
functional managers within the system. Neither considered programs as entities. 
Worse, none of the meetings made it possible to take a hard look at the total NASA 
program; none distinguished between program office reviews, which would natu- 
rally concentrate on the technical aspects of each project, and top-level reviews, 
which would examine a broader range of management problems. Such short- 
comings in the review system had been aired at several meetings, notably one 
chaired by Seamans in November 1967. On 11 March 1968 Newell announced 
that the '"project status reviews" would become "general management reviews" 
to be attended by all key headquarters officials. The impcrtant change was that, 
instead of dealing with one program at a time, the reviews would "provide a 
regular forum for the presentation of issues, problems, and policy questions" 
involving more than one element of "the General Management team." This was 
not to be an arena for decision making as such. Rather, policy would be discussed 
"in such a manner that when formal approval channels are used on that particular 
item, there is a clear understanding by all organizations involved of the nature and 
substance of that particular issue.""' The emphasis had shifted from the predict- 
able to the unexpected, from what concerned one office to what affected all. The 
NASA Management Council would stress the responsibilitv that officials had both 
to make policy and to jestify what they had done. 
Third, the changes only intensified the fragmcntation of authority at head- 
quarters. No one below the Administrator's level could even pretend to see the 
agency as a whole. In particular, the responsibilities for planning and general 
management were now parceled out to separate officials. The three-man team, 
each member of which was prepared to substitute for the others, had been suc- 
ceeded by interlocking councils and panels and by units like Organization and 
Managemen' that were not so much "offices" as conl;lomerates of smaller units. 
Take, for example, the way in which policy planning was handled from 1967 on. 
Earlier, "policy planning" and "policy analysis" were shown to be thoroughly 
ambiguous terms. If they were understood to include long-range planning, then 
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no cffice and no official could really claim full responsibiiity for that activity. This 
was as true of the Planning Coordination Steering Groups over which Newel1 
presided as it was of the analytical staffs within the program offices, the Office of 
Policy reporting to Newell, or Wyatt's Office of Program Plans and Analysis, 
which pulled together the so-called program memoranda and special analytical 
studies required by the Bureau of the Budget as part of the annual budget 
submission. Long-range planning admittedly represents a rather extreme case, 
and the difficulties in preparing a long-range plan were not only the result of 
fragmentation. Both the separation of planning from operations and the inmm- 
prehension of NASA officials as to the kind of plan to be drafted stemmed from 
the same source: The key officials, each preoccupied in his own sphere, could not 
'Lc the general managers that Webb demanded they become. 
Fourth, functional management tended to run counter to broader interests in 
two ways, one relating to the contact between the functional offices and the centers; 
the other, to the use of the central functienal staff by the program offices. In the 
former case, functional offices like Procurement or Administration tended to work 
directly through their counterparts at the centers without first consulting with the 
program ofices. As to the latter case, there is evidence showing that the program 
offices did not use the functional offices to anything like the extent that Webb had 
anticipated. At a meeting of the Management Advisory Panel in the spring of 
1968, he complained that the program directors "didn't reach upward to use the 
general staff and functional staff in the way that those of us at the top reached 
down to use them . . . each one began to have around him his own people . . . 
[and] tended to be autonomous, run things his own way, and you didn't find him 
reticent to come u when he had a problem with a Senator or Congressman to get Y help at the top."" 
Finally, the new organizational philosophy failed to "take," as new men and 
problems appeared. Seanians left the agency at the beginning of 1968; Webb 
resigned that October, to be succeeded by Thomas 0 .  Paine who had been 
appointed Deputy Administrator a few months earlier; and Finger became Assis- 
tant Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in April 
1969. A number of new faces appeared at the end of 1969: George Mueller, the 
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight since 1963, returned to private 
industry, to he succeeded by Dale D. Myers, general manager of North American 
Rockwell's space shuttle program; Ckorge M. Low, the Apollo spacecraft man- 
ager since April 1967, became NASA's Deputy Administrator. 
By 1970-1 97 1 the organization painstakingly created by NASA general 
management during the 19609 was changing into something else. The various 
omces-Industry Affairs, University Affairs, Administration-no longer reported 
to Organization and Management, which would be dissolved in 1975. Similarly, 
the various "policy" officcs and panels kept going with ad hoc assignments and 
played no central role in agencywide planning. As a third example, phased project 
planning, by which each project was broken into discrete sequential steps, was 
drastically modified in 1972 to permit the program offices to determine procedure 
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on a case-by-case basis. In sum, the concept of p u p  management, which war the 
heart of Webb's philcwophy, was never widely shared by the program offim, the 
functional offim, or the centen, 
This account of headquarters organization may seem to have answered every 
question but one: What did top management do ? T o  answer this without having 
first reviewed the organizational cycles within headquarters did not seem very 
useful. But having reviewed the organizational changes, what seemed simple and 
definable is now hedged with qualifications, and the clear patterns of the or- 
ganization chart must be replaced by complex interlocking networks of formal and 
informal relationships. Even to assert that the Administrator was responsible, for 
example, for representing NASA to the m t  of the Federal community ignom the 
fact that the program associate administrators were as much NASA spokesmen in 
their areas as the Administrator was for the agency as a whole. One must also be 
aware of the extent to which any top c-%cia1 could act for the a h e n ;  that Seamans, 
first as Associate Administrator and then as Deputy Administrator, assisted in 
making the policies that he carried out; or that Webb insisted on bringing in 
Dryden and Seamans on the most important management decisions, such as the 
review of all source evaluation board recommendations involving contracts of $5 
million or more. Further, the way in which a function changes or evolves is as 
important as its official definition at the outset. Much depended on the ways in 
which officials came to understand their assignments: whether they chose to 
concentrate or delegate their powers and to increase or narrow their span of 
control; or whether a function empowered the official to initiate action himself or 
to review actions taken on same other level. 
The role of top management was complicated immensely by the tension 
between headquarters and the field centers that was built into NASA almost from 
the start. Each side had its characteristic viewpoint. Headquarttrs, itself almost 
a kind of rival installation, had certain key hnctionr that were well understood: 
to prepare and defend the agency budget; to allocate funds for "research and 
development," "construction of facilities," and "administrative operations"; and 
to act as a central point of control. Beyond this, there were problems that senior 
management could not resolve in the short term. One was whether the centers 
should report to the agency's general manager, the Associate Administrator, or to 
the heads of the program offices. The former would appear to be the logical so- 
lution when the centen were involved in a variety of projects; the latter, when each 
center had carefully defined tasks distinct from those of other centers. Another 
problem was how renters reporting to one headquarters ofice could work with 
those reporting to another. A third was the problem of project assipment: 
whether to giv* the entire management to one center; to split it bttwccn a number 
of centers and, if so, how to select one as "lead"; or whether to put the entire 
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project mmqmcnt  team in herdquutm. A fourth problem w u  how to mvat 
the older nrurchsriented centers into man- of large devdopment contracts. 
All these prcblema were compounded by the necessity, for top m a q a m n t ,  of 
taking m agencywide paxpectiw and consi4tring NASA in relation to variables 
that, in a technological rmrc, were extraneous to the succerrful pursuit of the 
agency mission. If a program w u  canceled or shifted from one center to another, 
project managers and center dirccton might be excused for seeing politia at work. 
Just as agency management ha$ to defend the NASA budget u if enry penny 
counted, m each center director wouid m his prognnu as vital to agency needs. 
The problem in part w u  one of communications. The p t e r  the p~rrurer  of 
time, the faster the rate of significant change in the environment, the more inter- 
related the varioua erogram, the more dilhcult and nceavry adquate commu- 
nications would be. 
So much for any simple, straightforward explanation of administrative be- 
Savior. The question of what top management did remains 3pen. This is best 
answered by describing not dircrtte functim but broad areas of functional rctiv- 
itia, none of which was completely distinct from the others, and a11 of which 
saved to form the structure of the organization and to settle some oE the more 
imporunt policy issues. These activities arc the establishment of uniform organi- 
zational p d u r e r ;  resource allocation; miew and control; and the maintenance 
of intra-agency chedu and balances. 
Establishment of Uniform Organizational Procedures 
Top management, particularly the Administrator, had the prerogative of 
establishing the organization and procedures most useful to carry 3ut the NASA 
mission. When Webb lame on the scene, he found an organization young enough 
not to be hidebound by tradition and small enough to be changed with relative 
case. This chap*- has listed acme of Webb's organizational changes: the awtion 
of bureaus with agcncywide functional responsibilities for procurement, budget 
preparation, management development, public affairs, and the like: the use of 
i n t e d  task forces rather than outside consultants for management studies; the 
establishment of the Office of the Administrator with a supportinp executive 
~aurar iat ;  the inauguration of annual reviews of each program area; .ie location 
of long-range planning in the line organization; and the invention of stmotyped 
formats for management instruc, ms, delegations of authority, and (though Glen- 
nan had done some of the ptcprrralory work) project authorization. Because of the 
work of Webb and his associates, t h m  was no need to m up an informal 
organization to bypass an inherited a d  cumbersome formal bureaucracy. 
Webb's fmdom to maneuver in no way minimized the problem faced by top 
management in selling its philorophy to the rest of the agency-a problem com- 
pounded by the changing nature of the NASA mission. In the early 1960s NASA 
expanded prodigiously to develop its capabilitia for manzed spanflight and space 
science; toward the end of the decade NASA was becr~ming an aging research and 
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dcvtloprnent organization when emphmii had shifted from "the development of 
capabilitia to that of using capabilitiu a l d y  created to meet ertrbluhcd 
netb."'' The task of organization building thus had a dual aspca: The organiza- 
tion had to k able to get the job dox, but it also had to k sufficiently detached 
from the immediate task to weather any sudden expanrio~ or oontraaion in its 
murccs.  In any case, the top officials had to penwde the rut  of NASA to accept 
their con- of how the agency should k managed. One way of doing this was 
to handpick key line and functional o f f id r  and to make it clear to those already 
on board that they must either "sign on" or look for e k h m .  A ~ e o n d  way 
to achieve consensus was through ha-to-face encounters with other NASA 
officials. Uniike Clennan, Webb prefemd small recurring meetings with heah 
of program and functional officer. T h a t  gave him the flexibility to explain policy, 
to get feedback from the staff, to discuss unraolved problem, and to decide 
whether to take immediate action or to table an item for subquent resolution. 
Webb went to great lengths to enunciate the concgr behind organizational 
changes. Among those mentioned thus far are the concep13 ol' functional mnagc- 
ment, the role of program associate administrators as group via  presidents, and 
making major top maragcment decisions jointly. In essence, t h a t  concepts coula 
bt reduced to the basic principle of management by maption and collegiality, 
The former principle means that the higher levels of management were called on 
for decisions "only when something extraordinary occurred in the proccu of 
executing approved projects."" According to the latter principle, Webb accepted 
full responsibility for his agency, while delegating his functions and authority 
piecemeal to officials further down the line. Paradoxically, the option of deccn- 
tralitd decision making was available only to manaps strong enough to delegate 
responsibility. 
Resource Allocation 
NASA management had the responsibility for (1) allocating rtrourcer, that 
is, determining how much of the agency funds should go for one program rather 
than another; (2) reviewing'proposals and pnwiding the mourccl for imple- 
menting them; and (3) continually evaluating goals, programs, and the dlocations 
themselves. What this meant was that hradquartm &cials--from the general 
manager down-worked toward a system in which each pi-ogt am had its place in 
the NASA mission and in which all programs were covered hy documentation 
suffcimt to track them from preliminary studies to formal termination. The 
history of NASA projwt vthorization policies in the 1960s demonstrates that top 
management basically wanted two thing: the ability to intervene at all key 
decision points in the life of a project (phased PI@% planning) and the wc of the 
project approval document to control the authwization and funding of every item 
in the operating budget. In the last analysis, the pwer of the pwre, whether 
exercised by Seamans or delegated to Finger, was one of the molt impomnt 
internal constraints in determining the character and mpe of NASA programs. 
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Also note that the power tn allocate m u m  was also the power to say no, for 
example, to deny Yolma the additional $400 million far Apollo that would have 
had to come out of unmanned space rc ima programs. 
Review and Cmtrol 
NASA management was mponsible for cont-01, defitred by Sayla and 
Chandler as "the measurement, primady afim the fmt, of the extent to which 
funds are being spent wisely; scheduler are likelv to be met; and whether all 
federal personnel, vntrading and ;;:,a policies are being adhered to by both 
program offices an4 But to egercire control without knowing what 
agency units were doing was meaningless. Hena  trre stress placed by Webb on 
means of gathering, m n i n g ,  and disseminating informzs:s~n: the establishment 
of an executive mxetariat for internal communications; Webb's appointment of 
consultants as links to the Departments of Defense and State ,nd to the intel- 
ligence community; the institutionalization of monthly status reviews and mnual 
program reviews; and the creation of the Office of Organization and Management, 
one of whose functions was to police the agency and to see that each unit was 
measuring up to agencywide and Government-wide andards.  
Maintaining Intra-agency Checb and Balances 
Webb and Seamans sought to preserve a system of checks and balancer 
within NASA. Thus program offices such an aSA and 0.4RT forwarded mis- 
sior. concepts different fron: those of OMSF, while fuxtional rmnagemcnt served, 
supposedly, as a cneck on the freedom of program officer and mtm to pursue 
their ends at the expense of the overall NASA program. Webb's policy of manage- 
ment by exception meant that tradeoffs between one program offia rvld another 
or between headquarters and the a n t e n  had to be built i~rto the system itself. 
Hence the freedom of program directors to transfer funds between projects, subject , 
to their abiliiy to justify the transfen at management reviews. Fcnn the over- t 
lapping responsibilities of the program offices, the " s p a  science" component 
t 
within OMSF, the "manned" clement within OSSA, and their pint mpomibility 
for coordinating their rupponing rerearch and technolcgy with OART. Each i 
oflice also had agencywide responsibilities over and above its rpecific task: OART 
for aeronautics and supponir,~ research and technology, 3SSA for university 
grants, OMSF for the development of large launch vehidzs. M w h  overlapping 
and duplication was deliberate. Officials were able to rcport to two or more 
superiors if nccesry; program associat,e administrators had "line" and "staff" 
functions; and mtain  funaions, for example, thw ot an inspeaor general, were 
dispersed among four or five offices instead of bang cofimtrated in oncM Such 
overlapping forced each program or funcrional manager to undertake responsibil- 
ities in an agencywide context. 
Chapter 4 
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The NASA Acquisition Process: Contracting 
~ese&h and Development 
A SUMMA~Y OF NASA CONTRACTING PHILOSOPHY 
F rom its establishment to the present. NASA has contracted with the sector for most of the products and services it uses. Compared with 
ganizational changes discussed in chapter 3, changes in this area have been slight. 
Between .'58 and 1363 NASA developed procedures at once internally consistent 
and pol i t iu~y amptable, and which would spread NASt'. : ads  widely through 
the ?con ..ly. The greater part of the acquisition process is traditi~rlally called 
procuretnent , but that term is not used in this chapter title for three reasons: it sets 
too sharp a division between the preaward phase of the contract and its postaward 
admini tratioi~; it implies that responsibility for contracts was concentrated in a 
particular headquarters office, when in t c t  there was scarcely a key official who 
was not invclved; and something is needed to link procurement and contracting 
with the planning of NASA projects. Project planning (including listing mimion 
objectives and their rationale, preliminary estimates of schedules and costs, and 
risk asses~ment) and procurement werc the elements of a double-stranded process. 
The more general term acquisition process covers what is meant by procurement 
and has been used within NASA to signify "an orde!'>t progression of Agency 
programs from early concept through the development and operation of 
hardware . . . and [provision of] the best wurces . . . in the execution of projtcrs 
and the perforn~ance of supporting services." 4 basic feature of the process is that 
the program sets the contracting philosophy, not the reverse. 
What sort of programs are we talking about? The official NASA source 
evaluation board manual has enumerated those special featur .T that bear on :he 
process, includind "technological complexity, tight time schedules, unusual relia- 
bility requirements, a general absence of quantity, and little follow-on produc- 
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tion."' As of March 1969 NASA had bought twenty Mercury, thirteen Gemini, 
and thirty-eight Apollo (command service module) spacecraft, including "boil- 
erplate" (test) models and spacecraft modified for changed mission objectives.' 
Furthermore,'NASA often had to contract for products whose main features could 
not be precisely defined in advance, so there was no clear-cut basis on which the 
bidder could estimate costs. In such cases NASA could not use formal advertising 
and turned to negotiated p Socurtment. 
With important exceptions, NASA scientists and engineers have not built 
flight hardware. Rather, they have planned the program, drafted the guidelines, 
and established the parameters within which the product is to be developed. 
Viewed in this light, the rationale for an in-house staff has largely been to enable 
NASA to perfnrm those functions that no government agency has the right to 
contract out, functions enumerated by a former Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget as "the decisions on what work is to be done, what objectives are to be set 
for the work, what time period and what costs are to be assdciated with the work, 
what the results expected are to be . . . the evaluation and the responsibilities for 
knowing whether the work has gone as it was supposed to go, and if it has not, 
what went wrong, and how it can be corrected on subsequent occasions."* With- 
out the experience of actually building a spacecraft or performing experiments, 
center personnel could not effectively select industrial contractors or supervise 
Sight projects running to many milhons of dollars. The in-house work in advanced 
and supporting research anu technology at Lewis, Langley, or Goddard was done 
less for its own sake than because, without it, Government personnel would have 
had no prc.:pect of keeping contractors at arm's length. Nor could a center attract 
and keep the best people unless they had the opportunity, as Wernher von Braun 
put it, "to keep in touch with the hardware and its problems."" 
By separating evaluation and plduction, NASA acquisition philosophy has 
had three especially important long-range consequences: the delegation of tech- 
nical direction and monitoring to the centers, the refusal to set up a production 
capacity already cxisting in the private sector, and the refusal to create operating 
~'ivisions intermediate between public and private sectors. 
NASA has generally preferred to stand in relation to private organizations 
as buyer to seller and not to establish captive research centers like the RAND 
Corporation, the Aerospace Corporation, and the Institute for Defense Analysc: 
Exceptions such as Bellcomm and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL) &re more 
apparent than real, although, like genuine Federal contract research centers, they 
worked for a single sponsor who guaranteed stable annual f ~ n d i n g . ~  Bellcomm, 
NASA's one experiment in sponsoring an adjunct trouble-shooting organization, 
differed in two respects from most captive groups: it was established as a profit- 
making corporation, and it was dissolved when its ostensible reason for being 
ended. As for JPL, it performed a variety of functions, and work was assigned as 
though it were a NASA center. The reasons for NASA's aversion to captive 
organizations were complex, but they stemmed mainly from top management's 
desire to keep N.4SA's suppliers at a healthy distance, rather than (in Webb's 
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words) "to create w>me new kind of organism which we would then be responsible 
for monitorini~ and which would in some way become dependent on us for 
support . dnd where we would have to evaluate their work not only on the 
pmjccts assigned, but as to continued support."- When NASA contracted for 
analytical or rdvanccd mission studies it did so ad hoc, and it was not aversc to 
using those same Federal contract research centers it was loath to establish in its 
own organization.' 
NASA has generally preferred not to manufacture items available from 
private firms, even where it had the capacity to do so. Consider the choices posed 
by the problem of how best to develop automatic data processing (ADP) qu ip-  
ment, which was essential for mission control, data reduction, flight simulation, 
information retrieval, financial management, and image processing of data re- 
turned by remote sensors. NASA management chose not to build an ADP capabil- 
ity similar to what it was developing in space electronics. The computer was a tool, 
not an end product, and the research and development work of IBM, Control 
Data, and Minneapolis-Honeywell obviated the n m l  to match the private sector 
strength for strength." Instead, the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition 
compiled an annual ADP pian based on individual plans submitted by the centers. 
The plan served as the basis for reports required by the Bureau of the Budget and 
the General Services Administration, as a point of departure for negotiations with 
commercial suppliers, and as a yardstick for future planning.'" This approach 
served NASA well. By 1967 NASA had gone from first-generation quipment 
based on vacuum tubes to second-generation (transistors), and third-generation 
(integrated circuitry) quipment in less than ten years." And by letting contracts 
for the installation, programming, and maintenance of computers-generally for 
one or three years with an option to renew-NASA escaped heayy fixed costs for 
manpower and equipment. 
NASA's ADP planning also demonstrates the agency's policy of assigning the 
acquisition process to the field installations whcre engineer- and procurement 
specialists had the competence to decide the feasibility of negotiated competition 
in any given instance, prepared the initial procurement plan that served as the 
basis for a request for proposal (RFP), and made awards up to a dollar level that 
was raised from time to time by headquarters." Even in cases whcre headquarters 
made the award-where the bidding was noncompetitive or the action involved a 
competitively negotiated procurement of an amount more than the centers were 
authorized to handle-most of the preliminary steps were taken by center employ- 
m who wrote the procurement plan or served on the source evaluation boards 
reporting to the Administrator. Since the technical expertise to evaluate and the 
management skills to select were heavily concentrated at the centers, any other 
course would have been less efficient. 
However, a word of caution snms in order. Drawing the line between 
evalu itic 9 as an internal function and desip and production carried out by firms 
under contract was not easy. The private scctor has been called on to define the 
m~jor  systems of most large programs; !o integrate the interrelated parts of a 
system, such as the st- of a launch vthicle or the vehicle and the payload it was 
intendd to placv in orbit; or to do rhcckout analysis that q u i d  the impmion 
of other companies' performance. In addition, the aclcaian d the mast qualified 
bidder depended on the qualilications wught. Agency &ciala had to ddde,  for 
example, whether to nqptiate orJy with the mos! technically competent sourn or 
to enmurage limited competition to obviate NASA's becoming captive to any 
single mtravor; whether to select one firm to integrate all the systems in r 
cwnplex Hight pmjm like Apollo, to haw the wark done by w w a l  canpanits 
under NASA technical dim.tion, or to haw it done by NASA emplayns; and to 
what extent one or mare cantractors cauld share in the early planniq aJlgrs of 
appravcd prqrams. None of these problem was purely technical. In chcwuirrgt r 
mum, NASA had to mnsider nat only the mtraaor's skills but also haw the 
selection would afftct NASA's nlations with C o v ,  ather Ftderal apc ics ,  
and the atnupaw community. 
So much bv way of summary. To malyxt the mntrrcriq cycle without beiw 
swampd in mmplexitits. the wmainder of this chapter deals with the questions 
aurh a prams raises: 
1. How did the procurement (contracting) pmms develop to subscrw the ends 
for which NASA was constituttd? 
2. To what txtent did NASA staff retain full cnntml of program planning and 
management? Alternatively, what was pcmiwd within NASA to bt the 
dividiw line bttwctn functions that muld and muld not bt  delcgattd to 
outsiders, whether firms, not-for-profit lustarth rtnten, or universities? 
3. Tc. what extent did NASA's acquisition polim achieve sue*h goals as "max- 
imum mmpttition ccmsistent with the nature af the pmc.uwment," pmvidin[l 
"the tmt sourws to participate in the execution of pm:mus and the per- 
formancu of supporting servim" and other formal expressions of policy? '' 
In short, haw well did the atquisAon prim work on its own terms? 
As one student of Fcdcral contracuiy has obscrvcd. the rhih fram work dane 
ia-house to ~rmtrucuiq out wis the mult "not sa much of explicit rnnffrcssiunal 
dircction as of apncy dtcisiona, in which ~;anglyss rc.guimd, to seek the im- 
portant advantages bclievtx! to br arintd from c l w  cwntacus with the capabilities 
of the private mtor in RBI)." " One muld tracr the American bias in favar d 
private enterprise tcr at least the late 18th cmtury; but for our purpmm, we ntcd 
not p as far back as ~~amilttm's Report or) Afan~&cluw. After World War 11. 
t h m  cin.urnstnnm cnnspiml to increast enorinoudy the tdume and dollar vaiut 
of work danc k r  the Yrulcrrl servicu under cwntracu and to chanp the chrrac~er 
of that work: the virtues trf wntracting out to the private sector, the limitations of 
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formal advertising, and the demand for special skills in the management and 
integration of complex weapons systems. The advantages of contracting, especially 
for management and consulting services, were readily apparent. The Government 
could tap experience and capabilities already available in the private sector; it was 
not bound by civil service regulations pertaining to hiring, dismissal, salaries, or 
work termination; persons who would not work for the Government because of 
red tape could be hired vnder thee  conditions; and the use of contractors probably 
allowed a much more rapid buildup of a large work force where such manpower 
was needed. 
At the same time, many Federal agencies, especially the Department of 
Defense (DOD), found the limitations of formal advertising irksome. The 1947 
Armed Services Procurement Act reaffirmed that advertising would remain the 
norm, and other modes "exceptions," for Government contracting." Yet adver- 
tising had only limited application for defense and, later, for space research and 
development. To advertise for bids, one must usually be specific about the item 
required, the design must remain fixed over a long period, and the lowest bid must 
normally be ampted by the contracting officer. In practice, formal advertising did 
not lead to more competition; a 1966 RAND study showed that of some 2300 
procurements studied, 45 percent resulted in three bids or less, 32 percent in two 
bidc or less, and 8 percent in only one bid.l6 Increasingly, agencies with long-lead- 
time programs began to waive formal advertising-as the Armed Services Pro- 
curement Act allowed them t h i n  favc ,)f negotiation because it allowed them 
much greater scope in exploring their bidders' proposals and mst data. 
The only programs since the Manhattan Project comparable to the NASA 
mission were the weapon systems programs managed by the Air Force since 1954. 
Problems that became characteristic of civilian space research and development- 
the difficulty of estimating costs, the general uncertainties of the process, the long 
lead times-had already been fami by the Air Force in the management of the 
Atlas and Titxn intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1954 the Air Force estab- 
lished a Western Development Division of the Air Research and Development 
Command under Gen. Bernard Schriever to direct and coordinate its ballistic 
missile programs. The similarity between Western Development and NASA need 
not be pushed too far. The former was a blank-check outfit set up to run a crash 
pro@ am to close the missile gap. Under Schriever's philosophy of concurrency, 
production and operations were telescoped together, even while research and 
development were ; -ceding. Concurrency meant "simultaneous work on basic 
and applied researc ., vehicle design, component design, test facility design and 
construction, component and syjtem testing, the creation of production facilities, 
and t.he design, proof, and test of launch site facilities without which the missile 
.would be impotent."" 
Schriever's approach to program management was c+-ially radical. The case 
for hiring systems contractors to manufacture and integratc the components was 
not open and shut. The Army, at its Huiltsville Arsenal, was as capable of 
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developing weapon systems (e.g., Jupiter) as complex as the Air Fonx's Thor 
intermediate-range ballistic missile. In essence, the Air Fonx turned t .  private 
contractors because it had neither the depth of competence found in Army labora- 
tories nor the time to recruit engineen. For various reasons, including politics, the 
Air F o m  preferred to foster a civilian aerospace industry in peacetime. The 
research and development capabilities were there, ready to be exploited. More- 
over, many Air F o m  weapons managers were convinced that, in contrast to the 
Army's arsenal system, "intimate relations with industry did promote a significant 
shortening of the long period of weapons gestation."" While maining ultimate 
responsibility for its programs, the Air Force delegated to civilians every aspect of 
the research and development cycle. In several cases the Air Force selected a prime 
contractor for technical integration, testing, assembly, subcontracting, and the 
like; this was how the Bornarc missile and the B-58 bomber were devel~ped.'~ In
its ballistic missile programs, the Air Force worked through several associated 
contractors for components apd subsystems and hired a separate organization, the 
Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, to serve as technical director of the program. 
Ramo-Wooldridge, excluded from production of hardware, was both "line" and 
"staff'; the former iasofar as it did systems engineering and provided technical 
direction for the Westc -,n Development Division, and the latter inasmuch as it also 
did long-range planning studies for the Air F ~ r c e . ~  
The Army's arsenal system and the Air Force's use of independent con- 
tractors for systems engineering might be considered two e.:tremes in the Govern- 
ment's management of its R&D programs. Yet there is a point at which extremes 
meet. At the Huntsville Arsenal "as much or as little in-house production was 
possible as was compatible with the objective of keeping the technical team on the 
fringes of research and development work, or assuring the most rapid develop- 
ment of a specific item."2' On the other hand, the Air Force, in hiring Ramo- 
Wooldridge and, later, the Aerospace Corporztion to provide technical direction 
for its missile programs, was creating its parallel to the arsenal system. NASA 
could use features of both approaches without duplicating either. From the b n -  
ning it was NASA policy to contract out for items that could not be procured off 
the shelf (table 4- 1). 
How far NASA was prepared to go in hiring a contractor to do integration 
work is less clear. Some centers, like Goddard, occasionally integrated their own 
flight projects. In the case of the largest projects, especially Apollo, it i~ not wen 
certain that there was a single contractor or center to integrate all the systems. 
Rather, each center delegated its responsibility to an industrial contractor, for 
example, Marshall's Saturn IB and Saturn V integration to Chrysler and Boeiqg, 
respectively. With NACA laboratories, the Vanguard Division of the Naval 
Research Laboratory, and the von baun  team, NASA had the competence to 
perform thcse functions in-house that the Air Force had delegated to Ramo- 
Wooldridge and the Aerospace Corporation. The following section examines how 
NASA developed and refined its policies for acquiring and lauxhing complex 
space systems. 
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MANAGING NASA IN  THE APOLLO ERA 
How NASA LEARNED TO DEAL WITH ITS CONTRACTORS, 1958-1962 
The management of the acquisition process may be consideml as a set of 
subsidiary, interrelated problems: providing a legal framework, mating a source 
selection procedure, safeguarding the privileged nature of s o u m  selection docu- 
ments, and finding the right organizational location for the procurement function. 
With modifications, NASA adopted the Armed Services Procurement Regulations 
of 1947, which had been extended to civilian agencies in 1949 by delegation to the 
General Services Administration (GSA). The procurement regulations, which 
listed seventeen categories exempted from the rule of awarding to 4 e  lowest 
responsible bidder, including "services for which competition was impracticable" 
and "services for experimental or developmental work," enabled NASA to nego- 
tiate R&D contracts and even go to a company on a sole-source basis.' In an 
exchange of letters in 1959, GSA permitted NASA to follow the armed services 
regulations in those cases where they differed from GSA's Federal procurement 
regulations, othtrwise binding on all civilian agencies. 
Under Gktnnan, officials adopted and modified the DOD source evaluation 
procedure for proposals on large prime wntracts-those of $1 million or more. 
When NASA negotiated in such cases, the usual procedure was to set up a source 
evaluation board (SEB). By 1961 the procedure had been elaborated to comprise 
the following stages: preparing a procurement request by the responsible division 
or center; drafting a procurement plan by the appropriate contracting officer, in 
which was outlined the proposed procurement, the funding, the sources to be 
solicited, the type of contract to be used, the schedule for completing the procure- 
ment, and the negotiation determination and findings; preparing a rqucst for 
proposal if the contract was to be negotiated; and awarding the contract by the 
Administrator whenever the contract was for $5 million or more. Each stage of the 
process had its own difficulties-the precision with which procurement plans 
could be drawn, the decision to advertise or to negotiate, and fixing the particular 
stage of the R&D cycle at which to request promsals. The development of a 
standard selection procedure took several years, bu Glennan took two key steps. 
Ti e first, announced in August 1959, was the promulgation of guidelines for 
av:,rding very large contracts; this was to be done by the Administrator, assisted : 
by ad hoc boards responsible for establishing the selection criteria for each con- ! 
tract. The second, determined in late 1960, clarified the role of the boards in i 1
source selection. "Instead of the [source evaluation board] selecting contractor 1 
sources, or making recommendations, it became the primary SEB function only 
to evaluate potential sources and order rank their findings. The selection decision 
rested solel) with the ~dministrator."~' 
Yet it would h misleading to assert that NASA had a uniform selection 
prordure, even in I! 61. There was no single evah .;.ion process. "There had been 
almost as many approaches . . . as there had been NASA programs. . . . NASA 
Headquarters had provided only the broadest guidelines for source evaluation 
practices . . . thereby permitting the Centers wide latitude and ikxibility . . . in 
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this area."" Moreover, there was a real danger that the formal selection process 
might become so cumbersome as to defeat its own ends by increasing rather than 
bwering the cost of R&D. 
In addition, Glennan and later Webb had to come to terms with the sup- 
posedly privileged nature of source selection documents. They would both insist 
that certain records of contract negotiations, such as the SEB report, should not 
he available to congressional committees; that their disclosure could only damage 
relations between NASA and its contractors, jeopardizing the mode by which both 
sides transacted business; and that, in any case, nothing essential was omitted in 
those documents that NASA chose to make public. This issue, which first surfaced 
in 1959 when the US. Comptroller General and later the House Science and 
Astronautics Committee demanded the records of NASA's negotiations with the 
Rocketdyne Corporation for the F-1 engine, was to become the basis of serious 
criticism in 1967 when Webb refused to produce certain key documents pertaining 
to the North American Aviation contract for the Apollo command and service 
mod~les.~' In a very real sense, the "production sf documents" controversy was 
part of the larger question of how far NASA was willing to go in riding herd on 
its prime contractors: whether, for example, ;t was prepared to terminate a con- 
tract in midcourse because of the contractor's incompetence or go to a second source 
when a contractor was unable to fulfill its responsibilities; whether NASA was 
willing to disallow costs and penalize contractors for overruns; finally, whether 
NASA had a sufficient depth of in-house skills to prevent the agency from be- 
coming captive to its contractors. 
The question facing Webb, Dryden, and Seamans in mid-1961 was how well 
such a contracting system would serve to organize the manned lunar landing 
program. In general, they accepted, while improving on, the procedures instituted 
by G1.ennan. The principle of contracting out for R&D was reaffirmed; the role 
of in-house staff in technical direction was stressed; and headquarters officials took 
it upon themselves to make procurement policy more uniform yet flexible enough 
for NASA to obtain space hardware whose main features could not be specified 
in advance. The key organizational change was the establishment of an Office of 
Industry Affairs in March 1963, with NASA's Procurement Division placed 
directly under it.* " . . . instead of beiqg one of several divisions in the Office of 
Administration, the Procurement Division became the all-important division 
under a Deputy Associate ~dministrator."~" Procurement Director Ernest Brack- 
ett and his deputy, George J. Vecchietti, who succeeded him in February 1964, 
laid down the general rules of the process: to advise the head of the Office of 
Industry Affairs on procurement matters, to publish and coordin2te agencywide 
procurement policies, to make determinations respecting procurement matters, 
and to serve as liaison with other agencies, especially DOD's office of Installations 
and Logistics.'- Brackett's powers did not extend directly to the substanti~e nature 
An ,lutonornim I l rdqu.~rtrrs  Procurcmcnt Branch was ntabl~shtd In July 1961 
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of NASA contracting. It was the center employees' responsibility to draw up the 
procurement plan, draft technical specifications, and devclop reaiistic cost and 
budget estimates. 
The other important changes of 1961-1963 focused on two closely related 
problems: how to structure the contract to the wol k desired and how to draw the 
line between functions that could or could not be delegated to contractors. For its 
largest R&D contracts NASA had to go to negotiation; and while negotiation did 
not automatically preclude competition, attaining competition became more 
difficult. There were also two situations in whish competition was not ieasiblt, 
and the contracti?g officer recommended th ' NASA negotiate with a single firm. 
The first case is represented by the contracts for the Gemini spacecraft and for ten 
improved Delta launch vehicle, both of which were awarded to the McDonnell- 
Douglas Corporation. McDonnell-Douglas had been prime contractor for the 
Mercury spacecraft. The Mercury and Gemini designs were similar, the second 
program was intended to follow closely on the first, and the technical experience 
gained in Mercury gave McDonnell-Douglas a decided advantage over other 
potential suppliers. The justification for negotiating with McDonnell-Douglas for 
the Delta vehicles was similar. The firm had the experience and proven capability 
to do the work, going to a new source would cost an additional S 10-20 million and 
delay laurlch schedules by eighteen to thirty months, and without McDonnell- 
Douglas experience, it would be difficult even to prepare definitive specifications 
outlining the scope of the work." The kcond case was one in which, as Bracket 
explained, 
the nature and scope of the work is such that very special technical, management, and orga- 
nizational capabilities are rquird.  In such situatkns, while it cannot be said that there is 
only one company capable of performind the work, a particular company never,heleu stands 
out among all others as possessing a superior combination of the rquisite, and sometimes 
unique, ~ k i l l s . ~  
In the same category were the contracts involving the creation of Bellcomm and 
commissioning General Electric to perform test and checkout services in support 
of Apllo. 
But the difficulty in working such a system was that it tended to weaken 
NASA's bargaining position vis-a-vis its suppliers. NASA officials wanted as 
many alternatives as were available, and they wanted to bring about a state of 
affairs where the contractor also stood to lose. In 1961 the majority of NASA 
R&D contracts provided for paying a contractor for all acceptable costp plus a 
fixed amount of fee as profit, or simply cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPPF).' Wnatcver 
their value in attracting bidders, CPFF contracts could scarcely be considered 
efficient even by the most liberal definition. In a "cost-plus" contract, the con- 
tractor was not penalized sufficiently for underbidding or for inadequate per- 
formance. Nor did the cont*actor have any real incentive to economize. Quite the 
-- 
' See a p p e n d ~ ~  L)for definitions of contracts autrtorizcd by NASA. 
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contrary; while the fee was fixed, coat ovemnr would k profitable to the 
contractor. 
In effect, the problems plaguing NASA contract policy ran the gamut from 
heavy cost overruns to the expenat of preparing proposals (an atpame borne 
almost entirely by the Government), to the excessive time spent by NASA employ- 
ees in judging proposals, to firms' reliance on "brochuresmanship" to win NAEA 
contracts, For each contract, several questions had to be resolved. For example, 
should the contractor use Government-furnished equipment or provide its own 
faalities, and how much should be allowed for research and development under- 
taken at the contractor's discretion, so-called independent research and devel- 
opment? Such problems were closely related ,and had to be attacked from many 
angles, from program definition to postaward administration. The principles that 
NASA officials enunciated were the ones behind the major reforms of 1962-1965: 
developing realistic specifications before proposals were solicited, including in the 
RFP as many of the definitive contract terms as possible, strengthening in-house 
capabilities for technical direction, and screening proposals to eliminate compa- 
nies with no reasonable chance of receiving a contract. 
THE BELL REPORT AND ITS AFTERMATH, 1962-1963 
The NASA acquisition system was not solely a technical response to technical 
problems of managing the spaa program. NASA, DOD, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the three Federal agencies that spent 90 percent of the Government's 
R&D dollars, had to come to terms with a blurring of the public and private 
sectors in the late 1950s.~ When the facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission 
were operated under contract, when many of the leading aerospace firms did 
essentially all their butiness with the Federal Government, when a very large 
+.are of university research was funded with Federal grants-the line between 
private and public was no longer clear. Of all the studicrr devoted to the problem, 
one of the most searching and influential was the report to the President mbmitted 
by Budget Director ilavid Bell on 30 April 1962." The task force that &I1 
chaired included Webb, Defense Secretary Robert MtNamara, Presidential Sci- 
ena  Advisor Jerome Witsner, the chairmen d the Atomic Energy Commission 
and Civi! C m i a  Commission, and the director of the National Science Founda- 
tion. The Bell report did not set guidelines applicable to every circumstance or 
draft rules broad enough to cover all contingenck, but it did lay down a general 
rule: 
There uc artah functions which should under no armmrtuKla k amtracicd out. Thc 
mrnyemcnt and amtrol of the Federal rrrurcfr and development &arc must be htmly in 
the hands of full-time Government &aah clurly mponrible to the Resident md Congren. 
. . . dedriona concerning the typn oi \ ; rk to be undertaken, when, by whom, ud what 
ant . . . must be made by full-time Govarumnt dhcirlr." 
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The report also concluded that the effects of contracting out F e d a d  RBD work 
"on the Government's own ability to execute research and development work had 
been deleterious"; and the report's principal mmmendation-that Federal 
agencies use their laboratories to maintain knowledge of the most advanced science 
and technology-was put forwaM as a means of making Government 3 more 
sophisticated buyer.'" The Bell report ampted as settled the need for science- 
based agencies to go outside Government for scam and valuable skills; it defenclr li 
the profit motive as often the most effective way to get the job done; and it stt mgly 
dismissed any notion that the Government provide hardware or servim that w m  
available from the general economy. 
What effects did the &I1 rep:! have on the Federal structure in general and 
on NASA in particular? One of its recommendations, that pay scales for Federal 
scientific personnel shoadd be made "comparable" to those in the private sector, 
was partially met by the 19162 Federal Salary Reform Act, which also abolished 
the quota on the number of supergrade positions allotted for scientists and en- 
gineers. The rcpr t  had also warned the Government that its contractors or 
employees were too often placing themselves in situations w h m  conflicts of 
interest became unavoidable; here, tentative guidelines were set forth in a Pmi-  
dential memorandum of 2 May 1963." Most important, the report recommended 
broader use both of fixed-prim contracts and contracts with incentive provisions. 
In this case, some of the pkssure for change came from those agencies; especially 
DOD, that were repi*esented on the Bell task force. Prior to the report's publica- 
tion, DOD officials had addressed some of the problems that led to the task lorn's 
crertion by (1) publishing jointly with NASA a guide to stiffen the reporting 
requirements impoxd on their prime contractors; (2) introducing the concept of 
program budgeting, whereby the Defense budget, force requirements, and alter- 
native methods of meeting them were combined on a multiyear basis; (3) strength- , I 
ening the "hardware ban" so that no firm could act as general systems engineer 
and produce ~wmponents for the same project; (4) tightening contr:.m !nis- 
tratios; and ( 5 )  revising in March 1962 the armed services procl.c < # . , ..g+ 
lations to make the fixed-price contract the preferred type or (w'  . ,; I:,, was 
impracticable) to include incentive provisi, r with fces up to 15 p . I 
Not all DOD management procedures tauld be transferred whori; tu ?'.'& 
if only ' m u s e  NASA contracted for some products that were much morL .. 
ized than anything the military neeclrd. In [act, the contracting styles ai '.:. 
agencies differed. Unlike DOD, NASA took title to all inventions rcsulti . .:,, 
the performance of R&D contracts, as required by section 305 of the  spa^ ~ c t .  ! 
As of 1962, NASA had no "exms profits" clause in its contracts and war not 
bound by DOD's statutory requirement to terminate a contract if the contractor , 
offered or gave a gratuity to secure favored tre;..*nent." Further, program budget- 
ing, which came to be almost synonymous with Defense Secretary McNamara's 
method of working, was only reluctantly ampted at NASA when it was extended 
to civilian agencies in 1965. All the same, the innovations at DOD were bound 
to have repercussions within NASA. The Space An required both agencies to 
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codinate their programs, they shared many of the same prime contracton, and 
since its atablishrnent HASA had used antract administration services supplied 
by DOD. The 1963 changer in NASA procurement were due essentially to the 
example set by DOD, combined with technical problems intrinsic to the space 
p q a m ? '  But whatever limited step NASA took before the summer or 1962 to 
reduce the at of doing business with industry, the Bell rccport made it politic to 
intensify such changer. The fin;, middle, and last steps involved improving the 
definition of specific programs, b h  NL. ' did by revising its contracting struc- 
ture: using fixed-price contram where possib~ . eiiminating letter tor-tracts, and 
marding antractors for dcrJjled, accurate cstimtcr a ~ d  for selecting their sub- 
contractors competitively. 
The sequence of changes in NASA's c ~ n t r r r i g  system can be stated briefly. 
On 29 May 1962 Webb appuinted a study group chaired by Walter Sohier, the 
NASA General Counsel, to review the scum *valuation procedure and various 
methods of improving contractor ~ ~ O C ~ S U T  " Between the establishment of the 
Special Procurement Study a d  its final rcport in February 1963, NASA moved 
toward wider use of incentive contracts. In September a NASA circular an- 
nounced that the agency would favor "procurements that lend themselves to the 
me of contract incentive provisions" while avoiding their usc where they w m  
unsuitable. In the same month Webb named Robert H. Charles, a McDonneli 
executive, as his special assistant with responsibility for procurement. Before he 
left NASA in November 1963 to become Assistant Air Force Smetary (Installa- 
tions and Logrr . ;,s), Charles wrote several reports whose main conclusion-that 
"significant improvement in product quality . . . timeliness and c a t  can be 
achieved if the procurement proce~s is saturated with competition before contraci 
execution, and with performance and cost reduction incentives there- 
afterw--became the cornerstone of NASA contracting policy." The events of the 
following year represented the tunfolding of this principle: the final report of the 
study group, recornmarding that NASA imprwe its handling of incentive con- 
tracts and compel irs contractors to prepare better work statements; the January 
1963 bud* rrqucst, which provided for the establishment of an Clectronia 
Research Center; Seamans' memorandums of 25 February and 22 March to all 
center directors, suggesting that the RFP, including the incentive clause, "contain 
the pre<l.;sc language of the dejinitiue contract tmd'; and the direct1 c of Novem- 
ber 1963, ordering that CPFF contracts be reduced suw.antially aud that incm- 
tivu be corddcrcd for all."' 
The &I1 report was less the effective cause of these changes t h a ~  their 
catalyst. The report, signed by Webb, did not go beyond NASA practice or the 
1960 report of the Kimpton committee. NASA had always accepted in lyrinciple 
the division between in-house and contracted work. Yean later, Webb asserted 
that he had made sure that the things I considmd importmt eitker muld or 
would be incorporated in the final report. . . . It may be that on m a i n  of ti,? most 
important mattm, I played one of the man dxisive roles."" By ardorsinp the 
existing y s t m  the Bell report made i! cazter for NASA and DOD to make some 
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changes that would go down well with Congress. A w  policy intended to save tax 
money by w a r d i n g  a contractor for good performarl x and penalizing it for a bad 
one would be welcome there. To act in the spirit of the k l l  report was good public 
relations, and it was dted explicitly before congrusio~ial committea a$ justifica- 
tion for estabiishing an Electronics Research Center or writing inmtive pro- 
visions into new contracts." 
T o  F a t ,  the real basir for the 1962-1963 changes must be sought in the 
risk-bearing features of NASA p4.c @am. It is easy enough to awume that the 
risks were almost entirely on NASA's side. But from the standpoint of those 
companies that NASA invit+ rc, bid, the risk ?night not seem worth taking. Why, 
for icuunce, hould a bruinus organization invat enormous capital in building 
a plant to produce liavid hydrogen with no guarantee that it would be needed 
beyond a few mimic Contractn also tended to change as the system did. For 
R&D of this sort, NA3A used CPFF rather than competitive tdding or 
fixed-price contracts. But the p a t ,  the fatal, defects of CPFF were that profit was 
not t d  to performance ,md that for all intents and purposes the contractor co~ld  
not l w .  The firm was not penalized for overruns nor rewardd for adminbtrative 
aciency. The firm had more reason to con~xntrate on getting the ccntract-often 
by hidding low-than on managing it. 
The difficulties with incentives were of a different order, depending on 
whether a qew contract or conversiun from CPFF was involved. Incentives were 
tricky: Often little hard data were available to determine the relative importance 
of performing on time, within m t ,  and to specifications. These difficulties were 
compounded when fionverting an existing contract. The problem had a five-fold 
aspect: 
1. Seeking to make the buyer more sophisticated in defining the mission design 
and the standards for s ~ m s s f u l  performance. 
2. Determining the proper weight an2 scoring for such performance. 
3. Avoidkg unrealistic cn t  estimltes. 
4. Persuading the ccmtrictor to adjus, risk and corlvert voluntarily. 
5. Reducing the number of cases of sole-source procurement without returning 
to competitive bidding and its disadvantages. 
Thew goals were lot easily attained. To convert the North American Avi- 
ation and McDonnell contracts for the Awllo and Gemini spacecraft took from 
1962 through 1965. Few systems were as simple as the Early Bird communica- 
tions satr Jitc, which was "well-defined, requiring little or no development, operat- 
ing with little or no tech;.;, ..r direction, and procuring an essentially off-the-shelf 
item."' Others, like the 5-2 engine, were difficult to manage, let alone convert, 
because the programs themselves were changing. Originally designed for a two- 
stage vehiclr, this engine had to be modified for the S-I1 stage of the Faturn V, 
and ips firing time extended from 250 to 350 to 400 and eventually tu :itore than 
500 seconds. When the contract had been negotiated, no firm requirement existed 
for such an engine, and it involved "a minimum of facilities, a minimum of tests, 
and an argine which is conskkmbly short of the prrsent performanct."M In such 
cases, the variables affeaing NASA's ability to convert a contract from CYFF to 
somc form of incmtiw were the technical complexity of the p r o w ,  the contrac- 
tor's attitude toward conyenion, the ?ethnical competence of the NASA contract- 
ing officer, and the objective desired-whethe cost oon~al ,  prompt deliwry, or 
improvement in pcrformana. AU these criteria were ticd to the SOUIU evaluation 
proccdw by which the mtractor was sdtcted. As we shall see, thae was often 
lers competition than the system promistd because m e  companies were so dearly 
superior for a ,given system that NASA had to resort to mle-wurct prrmuanent. 
Morrover, while the SEBs only "evaluated," rarely did headquarters select some- 
one.not in dect recommended by the evaluation." Indced, one official complained 
that in certain contracts for support services Webb and Seamans concluded "that 
they could do nothing else th& to accept the judgment of the source evaluation 
board."@ 
NASA Contract Administration 
By the end of 1964 NASA had revised its contracting structure within the 
management system established by the 1963 reorganization. In general, NASA 
had brought its contracting policies into line with those of DOD and had delegated 
to the Defense Supply Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency much of 
the responsibility for administering its contracts, a development foreshadowed by 
DOD's Project 60 study, begun in May 1962. In August 1963 the Project 60 
policy committee, which included NASA representatives, recommended consoli- 
dating NASA and DOD field contract administration in a single agency under the 
W c e  of the Secretary of Defense, a recommendation first carried out as a pilot 
project in the five-State Philadelphia region bcgmning in April 1964." That June 
DOD consolidated its field administration service into eleven Contract Adminis- 
tration Service regions, which handled the vast bulk of NASA contracts, and the 
transition period was largely over by 1966. 
In substance, NASA delegated many amtract functions to Defense agencies, 
that is, the authority to handle property administration or to consent to smaller 
subcontracts. NASA retained the authority to change the terms of the contract. At 
the beginning of FY 1967 DOD was administering approximately 1700 NASA 
contracts totaling $1 1.7 billion; 1500 of these, worth $4.2 billion, were handled by 
the Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS), set up as a result of Pro- 
ject 60, while another 200, worth S7.5 billion, were managed by that military 
dep~rtment having "cognizance" of all contracts in one plant.' The Air Force, far 
-- 
In onc case NASA dcpaned lrom the principle of using DOD capability. From 1962 to 1967 NASA 
maintained a mntraa management unit at North American Aviation's ;' on* in Downcy, California, to represent 
NASA on piantwide mattcn and to provide day-to-day suppan for the Apoilo mmmand and mict modules 
and the scmnd !stage of the Sat1 n V. 
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u m p l e ,  had cogniuna d Boeing (!&attie), Racketdyne, and Doughs, while the 
Navy handled Grumman. W h m  NASA let r amtna that would not be pa- 
formed at a cognizant assigned plant, it was wnt to the DCAS regional dficc 
w h m  the contractor was located. Thc great rdvan tqp  of this m m g a m n t  were 
that it allowed NASA to work through a single Govanment yacy, DCAS, for 
Md administration; it avoided a wastdul duplication of wrvias; and it enabled 
NASA to make maximum effective \uc d DOD, while rrswiq to itself thome 
functions that it could not delegate. 
The Hilburn Task F m  and the Origins ol 
Phased Project Planning (1964-1965) 
If 1964 was the year in which NASA attained organizational maturity, it also 
marked the stage at which some of its largest projects ran into serious trouble. By 
September the delays, particularly in Apollo, had become so grave that Seamans 
warned Mueller "if present trends continue we will not achieve a lunar landing 
in this decade and the cost of the program will be in excess of twenty billion 
Why was the situation worse than it had been a year earlier? The 
answer lies partly in the peculiar technical difficulties connmed with Apollo, 
requiring as it did the simultaneous development of a launch vehicle, t h m  space- 
craft modules, and ground support quipment at the Cape. Many components 
operated satisfactorily when tested alone but failed when incorporated into a 
system, for example, the automatic checkout quipment for the Apollo 
spacecraft .4' 
The dificulty that became increasingly evident to Seamans and his staff was 
that the contractor's organization was not structurally adequate to the demands 
made upon it. North American Aviation, the prime contractor for the command 
and service modules, was also responsible (through its Rocketdyne Division) for 
the S-I1 stage of the Saturn V and fcr the F-1 and 5-2 engines that would power 
all t h r n  stages. Top management was entirely aware that "when you let the 
contract, all you've done is started a process that with the greatest of care, and 
ability, and drive will produce a bird. All you've done is put in motion form that 
have the capability but which could fail at any point along :he line."'" There were 
no easy solutions to the problems generated by Apollo or, in lesser degree, of 
Surveyor, Ranger, Nimbus, and the Orbiting Observatories. In the case of Apollo, 
management could go to a second source for the propulsion system and actually 
considered doing this." NASA could stick with North American Aviation and 
tighten the reins by more careful definition of the work to be done or by more 
frequent visits by the Apollo program manager. Finally, another corporation 
cmld be hired to integrate the three stages of the Saturn V with each other and 
with the spacecraft. Clearly, turning a program around in midcoune is more 
difficult than precisely defining a program at the beginning. 
t However, new methods like phased project planning were not introduced 
i simply because of drastic schedule slippages. The problem facing NASA was more 
t 
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simple and mon complex than one of slippages: simpler because the causes of the 
delays could probably be dealt with by improved management techniques that 
already qcisted-incentive contracts, pmjeaized management, and closcr control 
by headquarters; more complex because both the Bureau of the Budget and the 
President could be expected to "go to a greater level of detail [than beforel and 
examine all deviations In 1-ogram content, delays in launch schedules, and other 
factors which affect taa l  p w a m  cnsts."" Failures that might have been ex- 
cusable in a new agency would be of mom concern now that NASA had the 
expcricncc, the manpower, and the funds to get things done. In NASA's first t h m  
years, narc than half its launches failed, but it received little criticism. However, 
after the failure of Ranger 6 in February 1964, Congress made it clear to NASA 
that no more would be tolerated. Hence the tone of Webb's later to Scamans 
q u a d  above, a letter remarkable for its frankness and realism. Management 
would have to "learn to predict future costs more accurately" and to mlucc them 
"to an absolute minimum." a task that would involve "timely r~c.~nrnrnalions o j  
some qf our basic opmring pmdiccs. " 
Then Webb explained what he had in mind: 
We must. for example, find an cNcctiw mans to take all actions m r y  to terminate 
dntclopmmtal cws when dnrlopmental tarlts arr mple tcd lufm the time when we can 
incorporate them in a t e t  system, and not haw to mntinue underwriting a . . . team to pmtcct 
o u m l m  against tht eventuality that the pmduaion articles intrndcd for later consumptions 
may enmunter ditticultics. . . . IOlhcrwise] we will Rnd oumlvcs continually on the dc- 
frnsive with mpm to the management and budgeting of the pmgram, m n  though the flight 
missions sunrrd. 'l'hcur who art oppucd to this prqram will take advantage id rvrry 
opportunity in thrsc artrs to d i d i t  the agency nt~d the prngram. 
Phased prc,ht planning was only one method among several that NASA 
managcment used t o  h r i n ~  programs under greater control. Others included the 
revision of NASA's contract with JPL, pressure on the enters to tighten their 
monitoring of flight projects, and a series of task forcu studies by the Office of 
Programmingon NASA mt and schedule estimating that were carried out in the 
summer of 1963. The most important of these studies was conducted at Marshall 
and Id to the conclusions that "noMy knew anything beyond his specific area 
of responsibility," and that marc advancwi planning was essential-a policy that 
the task fore sold to Scamans and, through him, to Webh.'"I'hat NASA off 
wew considering the phasing of pmjcrts long before they issucd guidelines IS 
cvidcnt from a July 1964 memorandum by Seamans, rccnmrncnding that 
any nrw projwts should he planned on a p h a d  h i s  with sucxmrivt wntractr fnr advancd 
studies, p q r a m  drfinitian, pmtolypc deign, and Hight hardwart and nprations. This will 
prmit  the wnrk strtenitnts, including drvrlopmtnt engineering, to ernlw in an orderly 
manner with maximum rralim." 
At the same time Sean~ans assigned Ilcputy Asswiatc .'idministrator Earl 
Hilburn to study current methods of svheduling and estimating thc cost of projects. 
.
 
.
 
,
 .
 ,
 .
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 ,
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 .
.
 
.
.
 
.
 .
 .
.
, 
.
 
.
 
.
 
-
 
I
"
.
.
.
"
 
.
.
.
 "
.
r
.r
r
r
lr
-.
 
.rr-.+.- 
Ta
bl
e 4
-2
. 
-
 A
ve
ra
ge
 sc
he
du
le 
sli
pp
ag
e f
ac
to
r f
or
 v
ar
lo
us
 cl
as
se
s o
f p
ro
jec
ts. 
La
un
ch
ed
 
Fu
tu
re
 
S
u
d
u
l 
U
~u
cc
m
fu
l 
Al
l F
lig
ht
s 
Ca
na
le
d 
Fl
igh
t A
rt
id
a 
O
wr
rl
l 
No
. 
Av
er
ag
e 
No
. 
Av
er
ag
e 
No
. 
Av
er
ag
e 
No
. 
A
ve
ry
e 
No
. 
A
vc
ry
 
No
. 
Av
er
ag
e 
75
 
1.7
4 
28
 
1.5
8 
10
3 
1.
70
 
38
 
2.
25
 
13
4 
2.
25
 
31
2 
2.
02
 
Ca
nm
un
ia
tio
ns
 
10
 
1.
65
 
2 
1.
46
 
12
 
1.
61
 
5 
1.
51
 
-
 
-
 
17
 
1.
58
 
L
u
~
r
 
1 
I .
79
 
6 
I .
24
 
7 
1.
32
 
-
 
-
 
IS
 
I .8
6 
22
 
1.
69
 
P
~
V
 
1 
1.
05
 
2 
1.
00
 
3 
1.
01
 
2 
1 .M
I 
1 
1.
00
 
6 
1.
01
 
O
A
R
T
 
5 
1.
96
 
5 
1.
75
 
10
 
1.
85
 
1 
2.
44
 
5 
1.
83
 
16
 
1.
88
 
M
a
d
 
9 
1.
69
 
0 
-
 
9 
1.
69
 
2 
1.
84
 
3 
3.
18
 
14
 
2.
18
 
O
&
rv
at
or
ia
 
I 
2.
07
 
1 
1.
67
 
2 
1.
87
 
-
 
-
 
7 
3.
97
 
9 
3.
50
 
Si
m
pl
e r
im
tit
ic
 
sa
te
lli
te
s 
16
 
1.
70
 
7 
1.
63
 
25
 
1.
68
 
4
 
1.
58
 
10
 
2.
76
 
39
 
1.
95
 
M
an
ne
d 
sp
ao
m
af
t (
S/C
) 
an
d 
al
l s
ys
te
m
s 
9 
2.
27
 
1 
1.
93
 
10
 
2.
24
 
17
 
2.
44
 
66
 
2.
23
 
93
 
2.
27
 
La
un
ch
 h
id
e
 dc
vr
lop
m
cn
t 
1 I
 
1 .
60
 
1 
1.
64
 
12
 
1.
60
 
2 
5.
25
 
12
 
1.
93
 
26
 
2.
03
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
2 
2.
20
 
-
 
-
 
8 
1.
98
 
Bo
ile
rp
la
te
 S/
C 
10
 
1 .
60
 
3 
1.
72
 
13
 
1.
72
 
3 
2.
38
 
9 
1.
95
 
56
 
1
.1
 
Bi
or
rt
ell
itc
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
+ 
6 
1 .
U
 
6 
1.
44
 
-
 
-
 
So
um
: S
ec
on
d I
nt
m
'm
 R
ep
or
t l
o 
th
e 
As
ro
rin
lc 
Ad
rn
in
is
lm
ta
r o
n 
St
ud
ies
 R
el
ol
in
g 
to
 M
an
ag
em
en
t E
fle
ct
im
es
s 
in
 S
ch
ed
ul
in
g a
n
d 
Ca
rl 
&r
im
at
in
# 
(I 
5 
fk
c.
 19
64
). 
p.
 2
. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
THE NASA ACQUISITION PROCESS 
THE NASA ACQUISITION PROCESS EVALUATED 
Phased project planning was predicated on the assumption that NASA em- 
ployees would be responsible primarily for defining programs and providing 
MANAGING NASA IN THE APOLLO ERA 
In two reports submitted in September and December 1964, Hilburn laid the 
basis for many subsequent changes. He conduded that slippages were greatest in 
propulsion systems and in launch vehicles requiring new engine development; 
that, on the whole, slippages were greatest in the newer centers; that the largest 
cost increases were due to incomplete definition of the work at the start; and that 
delays in one mission impinged on all future missions in that series (tables 4-2 and 
4-3).5s Most sigcificantly, Hilburn concluded "that NASA's project control can 
be improved; that slippages and overruns are not inevitable . . . it is felt that 
sweepin~change in organization or p d u m  are neither nmsury  nor de- 
sirable." NASA already had the remedies in hand; all that was needed was to 
intensify their use. Align all projects on a "vertical" basis and see that all con- 
tractors do the same; conduct project reviews to identify all areas of dubious 
("soft") planning; wherever possible, put contracts on a multiple incentive basis, 
with special weighting for costs and ~chedules.~' 
By January 1965, agency policy was to define all programs as explicitly as 
possible. Phased project planning (PPP) was only one method of attack and 
perhaps not even the most important. Reserving to chapter 6 a detailed account 
of NASA program planning, several features of PPP nevertheless deserve empha- 
sis here. First, the guidelines of October 1965 applied specifically to new projects 
at a time when very few new projects were starting and several that had reached 
the advanced study phase had to be canceled. Second, the concept, if not the name, 
was certainly not new. To cite one example, the construction of the 64-meter radio 
antenna at Goldstone, California, as part of the Deep Space Network was men- 
tioned by Seamans as "almost a textbook case of phased project planning."Sn What 
he did single out as new was "the agency's ability at this point to assure that all 
new projects can be undertaken in this manner."59 Third, as a major benefit, 
NASA would be able to keep all options open as long as possible. Here, the 
language of the relevant policy directive is significant. PPP was "not an end in 
itself '; it was introduced only to ensure that research and development would now 
be conducted in "an appropriate number of sequential phases" with maximum 
competition characterizing the "phase-by-phase increments of project execution," 
and each phase allowing for "the fundamental concept of agency top management 
participation at all major decision p ~ i n t s . " ~  Fourth, the exceedingly gradual way 
in which the details of PPP took shape is also noteworthy. Only after more than 
a year-from the appointment of the Hilburn task force-of studies and mnsul- 
tations with the directors of the program offices did senior management take the 
first tentative steps toward a goal that would require another three years to attain. 
Phne reasons for the delay appear i.1 chapter 6, in which it also b m e s  apparent 
that the goal of fostering maximum competition at every stage of the R&D cycle 
was inherently unworkable. 
THE NASA ACQUlSfTlON PROCESS 
technical direction to agency C O n t n d O n .  The separation of evaluation and pro- 
duction was the key to the NASA acquisition process, and that prorrss was central 
to the way NASA worked. Any rwsessment of the agency must therefore try to 
measure the success of the acquisition pnnms. 
Before proceeding with this argument, however, some preliminary remarks 
are in order. First, " s u ~ "  is an ambiguous term, both in NASA and DOD 
parlance. Was the Air Forct's C-5A transport plane a failure because of cost 
overruns or a s u m  because it resulted in "a substantial reduction in the cost of 
Airlift ~apability"?~' In NASA, was the Syncom I communications satellite a 
sumss because it was p l a d  in synchronous orbit or a failure because it returned 
no data? In such case, even cost-effectiveness is not a reliable criterion. The C-5A 
experienced overruns of 60 pemnt, yet this was low compared with the 200-300 
percent overruns of earlier weapon systems unmwred by Peck and Schercr in the 
early 1960s. Moreover, "the early ballistic missile programs incurred large cost 
overruns and their initial performance was deficient. Yet, these early programs 
were not counted as failures but, rather, successes, because the goals pemived 
during the 'missile gap' era put overriding emphasis on early deployment of some 
kind of deterrent capability."'* 
Second, NASA and DOD aquisition pmcedures were directed to the pro- 
duction of very different systems. Compared with DOD, remarkably few NASA 
programs have been canceled because they were beyond the state of the a n  or 
because their costs clearly outweighed any possible benefits.'"' The difference is 
not to be sought in the quality of management or the techniques used for reporting 
and control. Program evaluation and review techniques (PERT) could be used for 
weapon systems and spacecraft alike, and some of NASA's most important 
projects were managed by military detailees who were trained in PERT. The 
question, rather, is what such canceled programs as the Skybolt missile, the 
nuclear-powered airplane, the Cheyenne armed helicopter, and the B-70 super- 
sonic bomber had in common that Apollo, the Orbiting Observatories, and Viking 
did not. The former were all planned as extensions of capabilities already existing; 
no one could build a "better" supersonic manned bomber unless there was already 
a bomber to serve as a yardstick for technological change and hence for cost- 
effectiveness and cost-benefit studies. With Apllo and other very large NASA 
programs, there was nothing to serve as a measure of each program's rdatiue 
success. No one had landed on the Moon before the crew of Apollo 11 did, nor had 
anyone successfully soft-landed on Mars prior to Viking. 
To put the matter differeatly, the question here is less one of effectiveness 
than it is of efficiency. Granted that NASA did accomplish its lunar landing 
miuion within the time specified, the Apollo program cannot be compared to 
* NASA m a n u  wn canceled or delayed for b u w a r y  reasons. either becauw the Bureau of the Bud@ 
disallowed them, Colycrr would MU fund them, or NASA ucrikd them on the altar d Apllo. Exampla 
include Voyam. a M a n  miuion ranceled in 1968, the A d v a n d  Orbiting Solar Observatory, and the large solid 
motor. 
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alternate approaches that were never adopted. But the acquisition process can be 
evaluated in terms of what NASA management claimed on its behalf. Thus, if the 
role of in-house stafl was to do advance planning and to provide technical direc- 
tion, how well was this accomplished? How well did the source evaluation pro- 
cedure~umed in promoting the avowed aim of fostering maximum competition? 
What benefits resulted from the extensive use of contracts with incentive pro- 
visions? The following sections are intended to provide tentative answers to these 
questions. 
THE INTEGRITY OF THE NASA CIVIL SERVICE STAFF 
What distinguished NASA employees from contractor employees was the 
complex of responsibilities subsumed under technical direction and supervision. 
But between the fabrication of flight hardware and the in-house capacity to plan 
programs was the broad grey area of contracting for nonpersonal services. Such 
contracts, by reason of the issues they raised, serve as a test case of NASA's ability 
to make explicit its criteria for contracting out.'" No one expected NASA person- 
nel to fabricate either the Saturn launch vehicles or the Apollo spacecraft. Less 
clear was the course to be followed in staffing the three main tracking networks, 
writing computer programs at NASA installations, and operating test facilities for 
simulating the space environment. A case could be made for doing such work 
internally or for hiring a contractor. 
Within NASA, the Bureau of the Budget, the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO), and interested congressional committees, there was no consensus as 
to what "support services" were, the extent of the practice, or the guidelines for 
contracting to the private sector. There was agreement that support services were 
ancillary to the agency's functions, could be performed in-house if staff were 
available, and were more temporary and intermittent than those usually per- 
formed by civil service employees. Beyond this, agreement broke down over 
costing formulas, the questions of whether and to what extent support service 
contracts were being used to evade agency personnel ceilings, and whether an 
agency was deiegating functions that should be retained to exercise technical 
direction. Furthermore, drawing a fine distinction between one kind of service 
contract and another was difficult, if not impossible. As Finger remarked in con- 
gressional testimony: 
Some of these aervim require little contractor capital invatment; others require substantial 
invatment. Some of them require little skilled labor; o thm require special training and 
highly specialized skillr. In aome caaca the function ir acparate and distinct; in others it is 
intimately related to the whole proam of rumuful  system development and flight miuion 
operations. In some cam it is a mitt to the Government oganization; in o thm it in a direct 
support of a development contractor's rcaponribility. Some of that functions are performed 
at a Government installation; o thm . . . at a contractor's plant. . . . In aome there are 
many customerr for the acrvim; in others the Government may be the only customer. In some 
cam the operation is a continuing and stable one; in o t h m  it is so cloacly related to program 
or project requitemmts that it r q u i m  continuing adjustment in n u m b  and skills of people 
auigned." 
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Finger stressed the special and urgent nature of the task that he and other officials 
were expected to manage. Given the target date for Apollo and the extraordinary 
buildup in required manpower and facilities, NASA had perforce to turn outside 
for many kinds of services. 
NASA's position was complicated by the tendency of officials to argue as if 
service contracts were only occasional departures from the general norm that 
Government provide such services in-house. Prior to 1967, NASA guidelines 
specified that the agency was to contract for support services only if the capability 
for doing the work already existed, industry itself normally contracted for similar 
work, the nature of the work made full-time employment of Government employ- 
ees impracticable, or skills not readily available within the Government were 
required,"" On the face of it, this position seemed opposed to that of the Bureau 
of the Budget, which since 1959 had asserted the general policy that Government 
should rely on private enterprise to supply its needs;'" but the difference was 
superficial. NASA officials argued that in a period during which the space budget 
had doubled and then tripled over what it had been in 1960. the agency had to go 
outside for certain rare and valuable skills-whether these involved performing 
analytical studies in support of the Apollo landing, operating the mission control 
center at Houston, or providing technical services at the Kennedy Space Center. 
Over and over they argued that it was impracticable to graft these skills onto a 
Government operation when abundant capacity for such work existed in the 
private sector. NASA, so their argument ran, did not contract for end products 
when it awarded a service contract; simply by virtue of being services, items such 
as those listed were purely means to obtain an end product designed by NASA 
employees. The reverse of this argument was that once the space program began 
to shrink, it might be necessary for NASA to build up in-house those skills for 
which it had contracted in the past. It may be significant that the strongest cri- 
ticism of these practices-beginning with a June 1967 GAO report concerning 
service contracts at Goddard and Marshall--occurred just as NASA budgets and 
manpower were beginning to decline."" 
In the area of launch operations, NASA deliberately assigned responsibility 
to the flight contractor from the design phase through chcikout, launch, and per- 
formance in flight. Whatever the benefits of a purely abstract cost analysis, NASA 
deemed it impossible either to employ civil service personnel for the job or to 
impose a moratorium on flight operations until the contractor work force could be 
converted to civil service positions. In any case. NASA did not make the mistake 
of trying to justify its contractor policies on the basis of cost alone-a position that 
would have left the agency vuinerable indeed. One official at Goddard said that 
"cost is not the prime determinant in decisions to contract. To accept such a 
premise would have . . . deleterious impact on current and future contracting 
operations of this Center and all of NASA.""" Where even the Bureau of the 
Budget could not adduce uniform cost criteria to justify contracting out, NASA 
officials could regard their own policies as being well within Bureau standards 
that were unclear to begin with. Cost was a consideration, but not the only one. 
MANAGING NASA IN THE APOLU) ERA 
Sometima, aa Finger explained, "them was a strong feeling that the function 
ought to be performed in-house and, therefore, even though for some functions the 
cast diRcrcncct would be within the 10 p a n t  [stipulated by the Bureau or the 
differential for contracting out] or less than 10 pemnt, the function could still be 
moved in-house if it was felt that the function ought to be performed that way."'" 
All these arguments assumed that support contra- did not impair NASA's 
control of its own operations. Time and again, in congressional testimony and in 
correspondence with GAO, Finger and Webb emphasized the safeguards for 
maintaining the integrity of NASA programs: the "clear separation" of Govern- 
ment and contractor responsibilities, maximum practical competition among 
qualified firms, the physical separation of Government and contractor employes 
to avoid the suprrvision of the latter by the former, the imposition of a hardware 
ban on major cupport contractors like Bellcomm and General Electric, and the 
"recompeting" of svpport contracts-seeking new competitive bids instead of 
automatic extensions-so that industrial firms could never become too 
complaisant.' ' 
But how effective, really, were these safeguards? The issue wasmot whether 
this or that center might hire firms to remove the garbage, mow the lawns, or 
provide guard service, even if Government unions were inclined to argue that a 
multiplicity of such contracts might subtly erode NASA's ability to distance itself 
from its contractors. The real test cases were those contracts for engineering 
support services that seemed directly to threaten NASA's ability to control and 
monitor its own programs. To examine the issues at stake, three such contracts 
will be described: the Bellcomm, General Electric (GE), and Boeing Technical 
Integration and Evaluation (TIE) contracts.+ Other than their large size, these 
contracts had little in common with other support contracts or even with each 
other. The Bellcomm and GE contracts were negotiated early in the Apollo 
program to anticipate or forestall problems; the TIE contract was la in the 
aftermath of the Apollo 204 firt. Be1lw:nm was a profit-making subsidiary of 
American Telephone and Telegraph that worked solely for NASA, while the GE 
and Boeing contracts were carried out by existing divisions within ,the parent 
companies. Bellcomm went out of business in May 1972 when its last contraa 
extension expired; the Boeing TIE contract was phased out in 1970." In the same 
year, NASA gave each OMSF center the option of extending its portion of the GE 
contract separately. Yet earh contract met one of the criteria of a support contract, 
in that the work "could have been done by our hardware prime contractors or 
in-house if sufficient . . . capacity were available."" The questions are, why did 
NASA decide to contract in these cam, and how did each decision affect the role 
of in-house staff. 
Frvm him h 1062 ta ttr twmlnatlnn In May 1972, the &Ilromm contract (NASW-417) and i t1  cxtcnrions 
trwt NASA abmt $91 m~llion At the end d FY 1968, the C E  (NASW-410) and T I E  ( N A S W - I b . W ) m ~ r a n ~  
hati run m $670 mdl~nn and $52 m d l m  mprcitvcly 
BeIlcomm was established in March 1962 at NASA's rcquest to do anal) rlral 
nudies in support of the Apollo landing. Unlike the CE and Bocing mntracts, it 
was strictly a Washington, D.C., operation on behalf of OMSF. Bcllcomm man- 
ufactured nothing. Among the specified t a & ~  were preparing specifications for the 
Apllo Program Office, indicating Apollo requirements for data from Surveyor 
and Lunar Orbiter, evaluating propond manned spaceflight experiments, and 
defi ning scientific objectives for lunar missions after the fint landing." 
i 
As an Apollo Program M n  report stated, the situation was unusual "be- 
cause NASA was attempting to usc a contractor organization as its line engineer- 
I 
ing directorate."" The justification for creating BeIlcomm p r o m d d  at several 
levels: the oh-repeated "unique capability" argumen~,~ NASA's general practice 
I 
I 
of contracting to private industry, and the impossibility 01 NASA's assembling : 
civil servirc manpower in a brief period, only to disperse it within six to eight I 
years. Moreover, Apllo diffctvd radically from the Mercury and Gemini pro- 
grams that ymvdcd it. The carlicr used the ~ t l a s  and Titan launch 
vehicles developed by the Air Fom,  with csscntially only one center (the Manned 
Spacecraft Center and the Space Task Group that was its nuclcus) involved. 
Apollo, howcver, involvcd all three OMSF centers and rcquircd totally new 
launch vehicles, a new spacrcraft, and new ground test and launch facilities-all 
of which had to be integrated into a functional 3ystem reliable enough for manned 
flight. "Management of the program r q u i ~ d d ]  a strong program ofiicc at Head- 
quarten with a strong systems engineering capability not then in exi~tencc."~~ 
This was NASA's principal justification for turning to the Bell System; indeed, it 
was argued that tire creation of Bellconrm would also enable NASA to tap the 
capabilities of &I1 Laboratories and Western Electric. 
Although linked with Bcllmmm in congressional testimony, the GE contract 
was otherwise distin\ '.." kllmmm was involved in systems engineering; GE, in 
"the implementation of standards to assure proper integration, reliability, and 
checkout of hardware" at Houston, Marshall, and the Cape '"GE would even- 
tually design and manage fourteen sets of Apollo Spacecraft Automatic Checkout 
Equipment rather than the t h m  originally spccificd, support the investigation of 
the Apollo 204 fire, and operate the Mississippi 'Test Facility for Marshall. As 
with kllmmm. NASA w m e  c hardware ban into the GE contract, forbidding the 
company to participate as a prime mntractor or first-tier subcontractor for Apollo 
launch vehicle or spacmaft stages or as a supplier of nonstandard components for 
launch vehicles or spacecraft, save at the d i m i o n  of the Administrator or Deputy 
Administrator. Howwcr, this restriction did not prevent GE from manufacturing 
much of its awn checkout quipment, did not applv to existing mntracts, and did 
not bar GE from bidding on "~tandard" items in managing the Mississippi Tat 
~aci l i t~ . '  
~ - .  . 
l41wrm. In r pmnml cnmmunrrclon to thr autluw. Ik krnuna has mcrd that "wr nng~nrlly p l d  
to rurv thus d m  nut pnnurilv w~th~n NASA r a  w n  d thr . b ~ I i o  &'c Whm wr  had d ~ h t t v  m r u ~ t t u  
the ml~brr d pmpk w; wanad and nkr~nrw w h t  nunp& mhna fmn the CWlirr d M&I A 
Bu@ (uc), wr rmt to A'I'A'1' and rk rd  t h  tn r* up r dcdwmd q r r u u t m ,  whrrh b r r ~ c  W W . "  I 
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Each of there contracts involved w m ~  kind of "ncrvice." Syumu engineering 
requires that the environment within which systems operate be known, that the 
objectives for which the system arc duigMd k understood, and that the m u r c c r  
available for the system be adquate to meet its goals. Integration, on the other 
hmd, means fitting things togetlrcr, whether amponmrs into a subsystem, sub- 
systems into systems, and the ryrtem-for example, the fim stage o! a launch 
vehicle-into the total launch vehicle. 
But "integration" and "evaluation" arc not synonymous. 
Technial integration ir the aa of two or more elanents, such u a bunch vehicle and 
a specwaft, fit and work together. . . . Tcchnii integration must k performed between thc 
ekmrnts for which an wgniution is mponsible, u well u the majw elements between 
different wgniutions. 
Tahnial evaluation co&ts of cuminily the minion requirements specihations and thc 
hardwuc apabilitia . . . to determine that tl.- hudwuc will work . . . to iaxrmplii its 
d e  in the performance of the pre-atrblishd rn~u ion .~  
Baing, which already had the contract for the fint stage of Saturn V as well as 
for integrating all t h m  stages of the booster, was now being asked (according to 
Webb) to artify that "the whole unit, vehicle and payload, does function together, 
is compatible, and is ready for flight."" Boeing was called in because there was 
no time to build an in-house capability; in any case, the company's role was 
"advisory." NASA's original intention-to award the contract to North American 
Aviation-was dropped after the Apollo fire. Boeiq ;*as chosen although the 
contract, fint announced by Webb in congrmsionar testimony on 9 May 1967, was 
not made definitive until 30 May 1968. NASA settled on Boeing becaw of the 
company's experience in the Saturn and Minuteman program, its mana cment 
of Lunaf Orbiter, and the management abilities of mio r  Baing ofhcials! Also 
important, although unmentioned, was the familiarity of OMSF staff, several of 
whom had worked for Boting, with the company5 mode of operations." 
Bellcomm and TIE w m  the "upstream" and "downstream" side of Apollo 
systems engineering. Put simply, Bellcomm mapped the requirements for lunar 
missions; Boting implemented the requirements in many ways-by evaluating the 
adequacy of hardware, analyzing proposed changes in flight equipment, and 
preparing backup material for the flight readiness reviews held a month prior to 
each Apollo launch. The TIE contract was as significant for what it forbade as 
for what it sanctioned. Boeing pmonnel would not supervise other NASA or 
contractor pmonnel and would only Fwform work that was not being handled by 
a specific Apollo prime contractor. Again and again, NASA management insisted 
that the TIE organization was to "assist," "advise," "recommend," and "support" 
Apollo." Like t h e  with Bellcomrn and GE, the Baing contract was established 
in rerpolw to a program whose complexity and urgency precluded a gradual 
buildu of the nteded skills. 
d w  to return to the earlier question, to what extent did the t h m  contractor 
organizations assume functions that NASA should not have delegated? This 
question is dktinct from inquiring into the contractors' dectivmcss. In fad, they 
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made substantial contributions to Apollo. When Finger visited Houston in Augut 
1968, Manned Spacraft  Center D imor  Rokrr Cilruth told him that "the best 
Ferurn MSC could get from the [TIE] contract w u  additional engineering support 
which w u  m l y  needed in many a m  of the Apollo pqrun . . . rpracrrft 
sneak circuit analyseso w m  a ma& Boeing contribution. It w u  felt d l  dong that 
thae analyk should be made, 6.. $mannel hod not &en d & W e  to do so ."*' 
Another example of work done under the TIE contract w u  the andyrir of the 
"pogo" problem, the dilations of %turn V after lift-off, and its dm on the 
Apdlo spcmaft. Similarly, Mlcomm's work in spmu engineeriv w u  more 
than satisfactory, judging by the extensions d the original contract. ' 
That contracts violated neither Government policy nor the spirit of the Bell 
n p r ~ t ,  but they tended to mpound the confusion bctwm public urd private 
sectors that the Bell task force had tried to dispel. NA9A managar could respond, 
with considerable justice, that their policy of using support amtracts was fully 
d i s c l d ,  that the agency had no alternative to contracting out most of ita dcvel- 
opment work to industry, and that the final word in pol; - - matters ~emained with 
civil m i c e  employecr. 
One can also acquit NASA of the charge that, by allowing contractors such 
as Rellcomm to define problems, the amtracton aci the terms on which decisions 
w m  made. The charge made by one critic of NASA, that Belicomm in effect 
provided the rationale for the decision to make lunar orbit rendezvous the Apollo 
mission mode, does not bear closc analysis."' A significant portion of the NASA 
community, including the entire Space Task Group, tad come to favor lunar orbit 
rendemour by tht md of 1961, almost three months before the &Ilcumm contract 
was I ~ . " "  Also, the decision of the Manned Space Flight Management Council in 
June 1962 to adopt lunar orbit rendezvous was heaviiy influenced by nontechnical 
influences-for example, the desire for unanimity and the con#nsus that the 
Saturn vehicle should be used-that wen peripheral to Bellcomm's assignment. 
The problems generated by the* contracts w m  more subtle. In all t h m  
cam, thew was a tendency for support contractors to continue working for NASA 
after their original r e a m  for being had ended. Bellcomm, which had been set up 
to do systems engineering for Apollo, went on to do studies for Apollo Applications 
and the s p a  shuttle, and in 1968-1969 evolved into an in-house entity like the 
RAND Corporation for OMSF; it had the manpower and the budget to prepare 
a post-Apollo plan for NASA and to participate intensively in the planning review 
scssioru held throughout 1969."" Mamwer, the very functions of evaluation a d  
m i m  for which kllcomm was mated and TIE was negotiated were those for 
which, it could be argued, an in-house farn w u  needed. Support contractors were 
wrd for three reasom: direct suppart, "added assurance that all possible problems 
bwe been identified arrd tolved," and to provide checks and balances, that is, to 
cnttk on the centm before the commitment to fabricate was made."' T k  
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naaons, particularly the latter two, might oeem to apply with greater form to 
headquatters, both to top manrgment and the pmgram offim. _ 
In addition, hiring contractors to do what might have been done in-house was 
welcomed neither by other prime contractors nor by the centers. According to the 
official history of Apollo, the GL contract "was wen in some circles as a matter 
of GE telling government officials how to do their jobs." And one GE official 
conceded that at Houston "they didn't want us. There were two things against us 
down there . . . it was a Headquarters contract, and it was decreed that the 
enters shall use GE for certain thing; and . . . they considered us Headquarters 
The most serious charge against support contracts was that they caused 
NASA to depend on industry for what could have been done by agency employees. 
When Mueller wrote to his center directors at the end of 1968 to ask their opinion 
on phasing out engineering support contracts, the t h m  directors were unani~ous.  
Gilruth put the matter with special force: 
We have agmd with the "surge tank" philosophy and haw recognized that an adequate 
in-house manning of Civil Service personnel was out of the question. However, we think that 
this in-house capability should haw been greater and have, from time to time, m, ~ertcd a 
larger in-house manning. We agree that the most effective management of future programs 
calls for greater in-house enginming capability. We have ken very weak in systems engi- 
neering, analysis, and trajectory work. We have developed practically no enginming com- 
paence in the held of Reliability and Quality Assurance. We have probably been too 
dependent on Philco, IBM, and TRW in cpcration or the Mission Control Center and in 
operations generally. . . . 
We are studying intensely what we can do to reduce our depcndcna on enginming suppon 
c o n t r a m .  . . . We are sure that it will not be practical to eliminate outside engineering 
support for scvsal yean. However, we do plan stronger program level systems groups and 
well defined tasks for the outside engineering  upp port.^' 
By 1969 NASA was faced with declining personnel ceilings. Thus the attempt to 
strengthen the in-house staff meant, paradoxically, that service contractors would 
remain indispensable for several more years (table 4-4). 
The case for service contracts rested on one powerful argument that was 
nwer adequately refuted: An agency with such urgent and unique assignments 
could not have done the job with its in-house staff alone. That case was not always 
well-presented, as indicated by continued skirmishing between NASA and the 
House Government Operations Committee as to whether TIE was or was not a 
support contract, whether the Boeing personnel ceiling at headquarters was 75 or 
300 persons, whether these figures were for "direct" or "indirect" personnel, and 
whether or not Boeing was being paid twice for its work on   pol lo.'" Even those 
like Gilruth who thought that support contracting had gone entirely too far 
conceded that Apollo had made such contracts unavoidable. Nor need one con- 
clude that NASA abdicated its responsibility to manage. In the Apollo program, 
NASA possessed a far greater depth of experience and talent than the Air Force's 
Western Dcvelo ment Division or the Special Projects Ofice that developed the 
Navy's Polaris."PNASA acted to control its programs in the following ways: 
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Table 4-4. - Nonpersonal service contracts: Number of Government 
and contract personnel, 30 June 1962-31 May 1968. 
1 30 June 1962 23 511 3 525 
P 
i 30 June 1963 29 488 6 758 
1 30 June 1964 31 957 10 200 
i 30 June 1965 34 049 Not Available 
i 
k 30 June 1966 35 708 26 962 d 30 June 1967 35 860 29 267 
1 Nov. 1967 34 281 33 768 
i 31 May 1968 33 202 31 511 
1 Sourm: 1964 and 1966 p w a m  reviews, h m m t  hgrarns (27 Oct. 1964, fig. 26; 31 Oct. 1966, tig. 48); 
and hearing of House §cirnrr and Anrannutics Committee, Subeommittce on NASA Ovcnight, 90th Cong., 
i 2d rera. (11 July 1968), p. 9. 
! 
1. By determining the conditions under which contracting would be necessary. 
: 2. By anticipating problems before the contractor did, who would then do 
whatever detailed engineering was nmssary. 
3. By conducting enough of the effort internally to acquire the expertise to 
judge and evaluate contract performance and, if rqu iml ,  to provide support 
or actually take over contractor work in order to complete the program. 
i 4. By terminating or phasing out the contract, although this was as much a 
managerial as a technical decision. 
In sum, several of the most controversial NASA contracts were for work that 
might have been performed in-house, but the contractor's involvement gave assur- 
ance that everything had been double and triple checked. Faced with ambiguous 
guidelines, NASA officials believed that resort to the private sector was inevitable 
and that the question of whether a task was covered in-house or by contract was 
less important than the knowledge that the capability would be there when 
needed. 
SELECTION CRITERIA ND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
Before turning to NASA's source selection procedure, wmething must be 
added about the agency's policy of fostering maximum competition in the selection 
of contractors. This must be understood in a highly qualified sense. For NASA, 
competition was strictly a means to an end. The nature ur the products for which 
NASA sought suppliers precluded competition in the classical sense for several 
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reasons: Only a small number of firms were able to compete for major R&D 
contracts because of the prohibitive cost of entry; the firms were concentrated in 
certain geographic areas; and, most of all, unique uncertainties are inherent in the 
development of sophisticated space and weapon systems. As Peck and Schercr 
observed in their study of the weapons acquisition process, in soliciting for R&D 
work "the seller d o e  not offer a finished product which the buyer can either 
a m p t  or reject. Rather, the government pays development costs before it knows 
what the ultimate performance of the product or its desirability relative to other 
products will be.""' Two additional considerations that affected the NASA acqui- 
sition process were the absence of followsn production and the uncertainties of 
the future of the space program in 1960-1961 and again in 1967, when funding 
for most NASA programs, especially ilrc: newer ones, had begun to declinrt. 
Thus NASA had to take its suppliers where it could find them. Despite 
pressure from regional associations and from Congress-year after year, NASA 
authorization acts included a clause urging NASA to distribute research funds on 
a wider geographical basis-NASA placed most of its prime contracts in those 
areas where the capability already existed. The NASA position, as stated by Webb 
and Hilburn, was that 
to base the award of contracts on geographical considerations, rather than on competition for 
all companies regardless of location, would k inconsistent with the statutory. prucurement 
authority cumntly applicable to NASA. Moreover, limiting competition to geographical 
a m  might mean that the mmpny with the best ca bilit for a project of importance would 
not k awarded a mntrart because of its location. P 
In fact, NASA prime contracts were concentrated in a few regions. Between fiscal 
years 1962 and 1969,60 percent of NASA R&D dollars were placed in only three 
States: California (42.7 percent), New York (10.2 percent), and Louisiana 
(7.2 percent)."- However, the sheer scope of NASA contracting activity led to a 
substantial dispersal of funds, principally because 40-50 percent of NASA pro- 
curement dollars for major RBD contracts were subcontracted. For example, in 
FY 1969 subcontracts on fifty-eight major prime contracts amounted to $418 
million. Of this amount, only $120 million (29 percent) remained with the States 
to which the prime contracts were awarded, while the remainder was redutri- 
buted elsewhere. A further breakdown illustrates how extensive this redis- 
tribution really was. Twelve States rmived more in subcontracts than they did in 
prime contracts, while seventeen of eighteen States with NASA prime contracts 
transferred some work to other Statcs. Indeed, many subcontracts were awarded 
to companies that were probably incapable of becoming prime contractors them- 
selves. Thus, while the dispersal of contract dollars was incidental to its mission, 
NASA did encourage its prime contractors to award subcontracts on a broad 
geographical basis. 
Analysis of the source selection procedure is in terms of the following ques- 
tions. First, what did NASA mean by "competition," and what was the actual 
degree of competition in bidding on NASA prime contracts? Smnd,  how much 
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weight did officials attach to the various criteria for sourn wlwtion? Third, how 
efficient was the selection proms itself? Finally, how did NASA management 
regard the procedure; in particular, how far did they believe it was nenssary to 
revise, ovuhaul, or do awry with it entirely? For NASA, competition was between 
firms rather than between regions, and its function was to provide the a p c y  with 
a service, component, or major system. It was in NASA's intatat to promote com- 
petition because the more competition there was, the lesr NASA would haw to 
depend on any single contractor; the more entries there were into the aerospace 
industry, the more likely the industry was to generate technical and managerial 
innovations; and by spreading NASA funds as widely as possible-as far as this 
was compatible with its mission-the agency would secure a nationwide base of 
support for its programs. The extent of competition in NASA procurements is 
shown in table 4-5. 
The entire purpose of NASA's selection process was to procure the best 
m u m ,  one that would be compatible with the agency's budget, the armed services 
procurement regulations, and external form that impinged on the agency's selec- 
tion procedures, such as Congress, industry associations, the Executive Office, the 
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, the Small Business 
Administration, and the like. The criteria NASA bscd to evaluate potential 
m u m s  varied depending on the size and complexity of the system to be developed, 
the point in NASA's history when it issued requests for proposals, and the 
agency's desire to build a capability rather than to see it concentrated in one or two 
firms. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that NASA officials weighted 
selection criteria according to the context. One consideration in many early pro- 
curements was the need to attract competition in a specific area. This was the 
justification given by NASA for awarding the contract for the S-11 stage of Saturn 
to North American Aviation rather than to Douglas, which already had the 
contract to design and build the S-IV stage.'" By placing the S-I1 contract with 
North American, NASA would have available t h m  firms-North American, 
Douglas, and the Convair division of General Dynamics-capable of advancing 
the state of the art in liquid-hydrogen technology. 
The data reveal that NASA chose competitively more frquently in the late 
1950s and early 1960s than it was to do later, Bctween 1958 and 1960 NASA held 
m u m  selection competitions for eighteen of twenty-one major programs, includ- 
ing Rover, Ranger, Surveyor, Mercury, Nimbus, and the Orbiting Astronomical 
O b s e r ~ a t o r ~ . ~  But during the period 1958-1965, in sixteen of seventy-six cases 
involving contracts of $5 million and over, a m u m  evaluation board was not 
convened, either because there was only one firm with the requisite capability or 
because the action was a follow-an to an existing contraa (tablc 4-6). Indeed, by 
the end of 1965, non-SEB actions constituted almost one-third of all contracts for 
$5 million and over."* It may be that there were fewer new programs on which 
to bid or that the high cast of entry served to discourage prospective contractors. 
It also sccms likely that there was less competition in the mid-1970s than 
there had been a decade earlier for at least t h m  reason*. First, while it was 
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Table 4-6. - Breakdown of SEB and non-SEB cases, 1958-19b5. 
Time Period SEB Nan-SEB P - Y  Toul 
12/58-2/61 10 1 9 11 
3/61 -2/62 10 2 17 12 
3/62-3/64 19 3 14 22 
4/64- 12/65 2 1 10 32 3 1 
Soum: Joseph Fcmandct, "The Origin, Evolution, and Operation of the NASA Contractor Sbum Evaluation 
Board P~occu," unpublished M.&. thais (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1966), p. 23. 
expensive to enter the space business, it was even more costly to stay in. Thus 
Grumman, which was NASA's number two prime contractor during the late 
19609, virtually withdrew from space systems after cqmpleting its work on the 
Orbiting Astronomical Observatory and the lunar module, both of which were 
plagued with overruns and technical difficulties. Second, if a company supplied a 
recurring service or standardized items such as the stages of a launch vehicle, then 
it was generally more expensive for NASA to go to an alternate source. This, as 
indicated above, was the justification given by NASA for negotiating only with 
McDonnell-Douglas for ten improved Delta vehicles, but the same rationale 
applied to the Centaur stages supplied by General Dynamics or the GE Apollo 
engineering support contract, which Houston extended to cover the Skylab and 
Apollo-Soyuz missions. Third, the structure of the aerospace industry changed in 
the 19609 in ways that tended to reduce competition further. McDonnell Aircraft 
and Douglas Aircraft, two of NASA's biggest contractors, merged in 1967. Simi- 
larly, companies like TRW or North American Aviation, which merged with 
Rockwell-Standard in 1967, were able to remain and thrive in the space business 
because they were large and diversified corporations that were not overly de- 
pendent on NASA contracts. Under these conditions, newer and smaller firms 
could enter the space industry only (if at all) as subcontractors-a situation not 
without danger for NASA's bargaining position. 
On the whole, NASA did not give preponderant weight to any single criterion 
in the selection process. Cost estimates, for example, were apt to mislead either 
1 because of underbidding by the contractor or because neither side had realistically 
appraised the costs involved. Nor was straight technical competence sufficient by 
i 
itself. In the mid-1960s many top officials concluded that a company could not 
take on a complex, difficult program without at least demonstrating by past 
I performance that its organization had adequate managerial skills to get the work done. The cost overruns and slippages that plagued so many projects in 
! 
L 1962-1964-the Centaur launch vehicle (whose prime contractor was General ? Dynamics), the RL-10 engine (Pratt and Whitncy), Gemini (McDannell), and 
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the S-IV and S-IVB stages of Saturn (Douglas)-wm problems of managerial 
as much as technical competence. And it was largely as a byproduct of rnanage- 
ment failures that NASA, in 1964-1365, moved to the principle that 
p a t * .  emphasb should k plaad on company managunent fkxibility and it, ability to 
marshal the mannga~nt plus technical competence neccasary to perform the contract rather 
than am;1 a simple technical prop04 and evaluate it on technical mait, with only amnd- 
ary evaluation of the organizational factors involved in getting the job  don^.'^' 
All things being equal-which they seldom were-NASA officials would give as 
much weight to business as to technical criteria: availability of manpower and 
facilities, preparation of a detailed management plan, understanding of the project 
management approach, and understanding of the form of the contract that NASA 
desired to write.'" 
A proposal that was both technically and managerially sound and that 
widened the scope of competition stood a better chance of being accepted than one 
whose only virtue was a low bid. Douglas, for example, won the S-IV contract 
although its proposal was $5.44 million higher than Convair's. In this case, at 
least, Douglas won because of Glennan's desire to promote "at least limited 
competition as we start off this new technology . . . [otherwise] it might well be 
the case that subyuent competitions for the other stages of Saturn would bemme 
quite one-sided." 'O The history of the Lunar Orbiter contract is a more straight- 
forward case of a contract awarded for managerial as well as technical criteria. 
k i n g ,  which received the contract, submitted the highest bid of all five proposals. 
Aside from the considerable technical merits of its proposal, k i n g  impressed the 
selecting officials because of (1) its past experience with Minuteman, the B-52, 
and Bomarc, and its willingness to use developed components; (2) its ability to 
assemble a strong project management team, owing, in part, to the phasing out or 
termination of the Bomarc and Dyna-Soar programs; (3) k i n g ' s  link with 
Eastman-Kodak and RCA as subcontractors; and (4) the desire of NASA manage- 
ment to encourage k i n g ' s  entry into the design of spacecraft systems. In such 
cases, what counted in the final evaluation was less the offeror's actual experienm 
in NASA programs than the potential revealed by its handling of other kinds of 
major systems work.IM 
As selection procedures became more elaborate, they tended to slow down the 
entire acquisition process. The matter was thought serious enough to prompt a 
"procurement lead-the" study in 1968-1969, whose principal finding was the 
existence of major delays in contracts processing. It took an average of 420 days 
t to proms a contract involving a procurement plan, 3 months for headquarters to 
review the plan, and 47 days for headquarters to approve a negotiated contract.'"' 
It may be that all this merely signified the advent of bureaucracy and red tape. Or 
i 
8 it may have reflected the learning proms NASA had undergone during the 
; preceding decade in negotiating with its prime contractors. Or, finally, what 
I" seemed to be a delay in the acquisition process may have really masked delays in 
i. the decision to fund new programs. As Finger observed, NASA had gone from "a 
I 
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large, fast-moving program aimed at a clearly identified national o b j d v e  to a 
situation in whidr reductions have been made in our program budget and, there- 
fore, to a requirement for a very detailed examination of every element of our 
program before final approval is given to promd. There is no question . . . that 
the uncertainty of the AAP [Apollo Applications] program scope and schedule and 
the delay in making firm AAP program decisions were reflected in long pro- 
curement lead times."""' In addition, the NASA budpt was tied to the planning- 
programming-budgeting cycle introduced by McNamara at DOD in 1961 and 
imposed on many civilian agencies in 1965. One effect of the new system was that 
it required that NASA submit its projected cost estimates to Congress earlier than 
good estimates could be produced. By 1969 NASA was some six years beyond the 
time when Congress had, so to speak, agreed to hand the agency a blank check. 
The uncertainty as to the future of NASA programs, the pamling of the NASA 
budget for review by many congressional committees, and the elaborate reporting 
requirements engendered by planning-programming-budgeting meant that 
NASA could not let contracts on the assumption that a program funded for one 
year would automatically be funded thereafter. Program planning and the aqui-  
sition cycle were inextricably linked. As one changed, so did the other. 
But there was another, more technical, reason for the protraction of the 
acquisition process. As a large research and development organization, NASA had 
good reasons to make its regulations as specific and as uniform as possible. 
Kaufman's observation concerning organizational change applies here. 
The more experience an organization aquira, the more numerous it discovers the complex- 
ities and the ambiguities of its work to be, and the more its leaders feel obliged to clarify 
policies and refine procedures. . . . In quest of the best and most upto-date technical per- 
formance, organizations in this way pe ta te  still more sets of specifications govcmi.?g the 
actions of their mmbm.'O' 
By about 1966 the procurement cycle showed signs of becoming a lengthy pro- 
cedure, owing to rquirements imposed on YASA from within the agency and by 
other Federal agencies. NASA procurement regulations stipulated that all con- 
tracts negotiated by the centers above a specified dollar value (as well as contracts 
for individual facilities) had to be reviewed and approved by headquarters. Con- 
tractors were encouraged (or required) to submit cost reduction plans, identify 
new technology, and comply with the Government's qua1  employment oppor- 
tunity (EEO) pmgram. Rquirements imposed on NASA from outside multiplied 
throughout the 1960s. NASA was designated a "predominant interest agency" for 
investigating EEO complaints against more than 200 prime contractors and 
subcontractors at some 450 facilities."" The agency was also assigned full re- 
sponsibility for setting aside (i.e., reserving) competitions for small business, 
rather than determining them jointly with the Small Business Administration. In 
fact, there was a substantial area of public policy that NASA, along with all other 
Federal agencies, was ,quired to implement through the procurement proccss: 
the Buy American Act, the Fair Labor Standaras Act, the Work Houn Standard 
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Act of 1962, the Copeland Anti-Kickback Act, the ruling of the U.S. Comptroller 
General, the National Environmental Policy Aa of 1969, and the like. The 
lengthening of the procurement cycle waa the sum total of foms at work not only 
within NASA but throughout the Federal community. There was the prolif- 
eration of forms and review procedures that are one sign of Parkinson's law at 
work. More significantly, perhaps, the cycle lengthened because, in the coursc cf 
planning programs, NASA program managers had come to understand the acqui- 
sition pnmss better and to know what to expect of their contractors. 
At the end of the 1960s NASA management Iooked at its selection proctss 
and found it to be good despite complaints that procurement lead time was too 
great; that losers in competition did not know why they had last or winners why 
they had won: that requests for proposals were poorly drawn, in part because they 
were prepared by different people, "so that the nml for all the material is seldom 
evident to one person"; and that a severe case of "echelonitis" existed between the 
program offices and senior management."" Thew were defects in a system that 
most of NASA considered to be basically sound. NASA officials dismissed out of 
hand the fundamental criticism of the process-that it was essentially non- 
competitive. This thesis, forcefully stated by Prof. Edward B. Roberts of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was that the process underlying R h D  
awards was "informal and highly selective" and that the formal acquisition 
process s u d e d  only "in increasing the costs of research and development, 
adding time delays, and producing other damaging effects on govemment- 
sponsored research and development.""" Part of this critique was only a more 
forceful restatement of what NASA procurement officers were saying privately. 
But they were not prepared to go the whole route and concede with Roberts that 
many large R&D contracts were in effect preselected and that the weighting9 
given to proposals only amounted to "after-the-fact representations of general 
agreements . . . justifications for decisions, rather than causes.""' 
NASA's position may be summarized as follows. The NASA task force that 
studied the NASA acquisition process in 1970-1971 concluded that it "sufficiently 
met NASA's needs and objectives." ' " The task force preferred to judge by results. 
NASA had tapped-to a degree had created-an industrial capacity adequate to 
carry out its programs. It had created safeguards, such as the recampetition of 
support contracts and phased project planning, to prevent the agency from be- 
coming captive to its contractors. NASA would conctde the delays, the vague 
criteria, the unnmssary review levels, and the tendency to use technical criteria 
when the contractor as a whole was to be judged. But to abandon formal soum 
solicitation would have been politically undesirable, not calculated to promote the 
agency's goals, and more likely to leave particular firms in sole-source positions 
for given areas than would otherwise be the case. 
NASA introduced incentive provisions into its procurement system when the 
entire subject of R&D contracting was under review by Congress and the Bureau 
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of the Ludgct. The time was ripe, judging from the circumstance that led to the 
introduction of incentives: the notoriour indfiaenciu of CPFF contracts, with cost 
prediction errors sometimes mounting to more than 200 percent; the recommen- 
dations of the &I1 report; the March 1962 revisions of the armed sewices pro- 
curement regulations that authorized DOD to make more use of incentives; the 
p m s u r a  within NASA to use incentives, upecially in the dwelopment phascs of 
large systems contracts; and a aerier of meetings in December 1961 involving 
Webb, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and contractor repmen- 
tativcs, in which they discussed the rationale for the cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) 
concept. Once the decision was made to write incentive provisions for n m  con- 
tracts and to convert older ones from CPFF, NASA moved quickly. NASA isaued 
one incentive contract in FY 1961, six in 1962, ten in 1963, and thirty-four in 
1964. By the beginnin of FY 1967 NASA was managing some 200 incentive 
I R contracts (figure 4-1). The selection of contracts for conversion was made by top 
management, the program offim, and the staff offices, especially the Office of 
Procurement. Howwer, the criteria for applying incentive arrangements in each 
situation had to be developed within the centers. 
The basic criterion in applying incentives was to not use them before both 
sides had arrived at a clear definition of requirements. In other words, project 
definition and contract negotiation went hand in hand. As a corollary, most of the 
centers, when questioned by headquarters procurement officials in 1964, recom- 
mended that NASA use a phased approach to R&D contracts. Even before the 
introduction of phased project planning, center officials had instituted a phased 
contracting cycle. They began with a CPFF contract for research and initial 
development, converted to cost-plus-incentive-fee as requirements became firmer, 
and to fixed-price-incentive as cost prediction became more accurate. It was 
essential, however, that both NASA and its contractors understand how incentives 
worked. Or, what amounted to the same thing, "you've got to negotiate the 
contract all the way through or you're hung.""' It was the lack of experience in 
handling incentives that led to most of the problems, such as placing incentives on 
final mission performance without includina incentives for important technical 
subgoals. 
Granted that early definition was imperative, what improvements did NASA 
program managers have in mind? Consider, for example, the OfFice of Manned 
Space Flight (OMSF), which was spending more than two-thirds of NASA funds 
obligated for RBD. Meeting in executive session, the OMSF Management Coun- 
cil resolved to give primary emphasis to schedule, then to cost, and third, to 
performance.' I '  In the opinion of Council members, emphasis on schedule was the 
best or even the only way to force both parties to define the end product because 
there would be "a premium on getting the specifications correctly written in the 
first place, because the Government personnel realize that the contractor is going 
to insist that thry a m p t  the hardware based on these specifications in order to 
earn the schedule incentive fee." "" For OMSF, there was good reason to stress 
schedule over costs. Schedule and cost control were very closely related; Mueller 
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Figure 4-1. - Number of incentive contracts under administration by type of 
contract, FY 1961-1966. 
believed that the only way to keep costs down was to keep on schedule. The use 
of schedule incentives worked better than any other means to create "hard" 
communications between the project manager and the hardwart producer, to get 
the contractor to deliver its hardware in order that NASA might conduct early 
ground testing, and to give OMSF added insurance against unforesein difficulties. 
Not that schedule and performance were identical; as one program n!anager put 
it, "There's no point in delivering a product that's unsatisfactory on time.""' To 
improve performance NASA and the contractor had to define the discrete tasks, 
or work packages, into which the work was divided; without such definition 
neither side could communicate with the other. 
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Almost as roon as NASA introduced incentives, it began to study their 
effectiveness. Just before the Hilburn task f o m  submitted its reports on schedule 
slippages, the Office of Procurement asked the centera to report on their experi- 
ence with incentives and subsequently contracted with the management consulting 
firm of Boot, Allen and Hamilton to study the effectivenus of NASA incentive 
contracts. The final report was submitted in August 1966, and it furnished a 
detailed balance sheet of the benefits and disadt.mtages of inccntivea.""It did not, 
perhap, provide conclusive evidence on their long-term results. But it WM b a d  
on a study of fifteen contracts that totaled $1.5 billion, or 62 ~ m m t  by dollu 
value of NASA incentive contracts at the time the study bqan in July 1965."' 
The task f o m  diecovered that, properly applied, inccntiva were more 
effective than CPFF in improving delivay on echedule and performance accord- 
ing to rpecifications. Incentives did not cost more to adminirter than CPFF and 
reduced the need for day-today surveillance of contractor operations. Finally, 
incentives led to better program definition, although more as a byproduct than as 
a stated objective."" On the other hand, there was little apparent relation between 
the intensity of contractor motivation and the UK of incentives. Typicalv, the 
contractor was under pressure to secure new business or followsn work or, in the 
case of the Manned Space Flight programs, to perform well in the face cf the 
publicity that these programs, above all others, engendered. 
The task force also concluded that in at least four cases incentives w m  
introduced under pressure from headquarters and that in three cases incentives 
were used to control cost growth. The center personnel had not been enthusiastic 
about incentives. They believed incentives required more controls, not less, and 
lengthened, rather than shortened, the overall procurement cycle. Incentives 
placed a heavier administrative burden on the technical staff. And by inmasing 
the element of risk, incentives prompted the contractw to ask for higher fees-say, 
8 percent rather than 7 percent. Only recognition that incentives had improved 
mntractor performance in a number of cases caused center employees to change 
their minds. Also, by the end of FY 1964 almost 700 center personnel had received 
some training in the management of incentives. By then-and certainly by the 
conclusion of the Booz, Allen and Hamilton study-NASA procurement policy 
had moved beyond the experimental stage. By 1966 NASA was able to define with 
some precision four "desired conditions" to be considered in designing incentive 
contracts: the procurement should require no significant technological break- 
throughs; there should be no overriding need for intensive technical dirwion 
during the life of the contract; it should be possible to estimate the cost of getting 
the job done; and, within constraints, the contractor should be given almost 
complete freedom to perform.. "I Moreover, NASA had at its disposal a variety 
*Onr fnrmrr NASA &c.ial gave an cxamplc nf thr  nn d lrrcdam that NASA y v c  to 118 prim contrxtm. 
Onr vrdr NASA h m d   hat Hcr~ng n d c d  $10  millinn for Lunar Orbiter :Lt was noc pmgt~mmrd in thr 
t~udgu To k r r p  from b r r r k t n ~  h t  cnntraci and, n m  irnpntimtlv. fmm uputcin# &ring's nunagrmmt plans. 
!U:\SA nprclyr.tn~mnl thr $10 m~llinn from other )wop-ts 
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of techniques that ranged from incentives directed to a single variable ( a ~ ,  
schedule, performance), to multiple incentives, to contracts employing inter&- 
pendency, that is, "the amount of penalty or reward . . . under m y  one incentive 
element in a multip1e-incentive contract will vary according to the achievements 
under the other incentive element;." "' 
And yet, while NASA had learned much in handling incentives, it had not 
reaped the full benefit of their we. NASA employees continued to monitor con- 
tracts even when incentives made such surveillance unnecessary. Alw, while 
NASA had improved its method for processing contract changer, it had not done 
enough to reduce the number of changes. The Boot, Allen and Hamilton team 
concluded that the bendits of incentives w m  not yet well understood within 
NASA. Incentives w m  u d ,  so to speak, to communicate N-MA objectives, but 
not to convey the relative importance of cost, performance, and schedule. On the 
other hand, the task force members w m  well aware that the structure of NASA 
contracts au ld  go only so far to eliminate bottlenecks. As they put it, "certain 
objectives . . . appear to be largely beyond the control or 'influence' of the contract 
structure," especially a t  growth." Incentives might reduce but they could not 
eliminate the technical uncertainties dogging most R&D programs. Nor was the 
sort of technical definition required by incentives already in use available when it 
was needed most-at the b + n i n g  of the program. A contract designed to cover 
everything from early deveiopment phases to smallquantity production was not 
flexible enough for the kind of program (which cwmd most of NASA's RLD 
work) w h m  the end item itself changed wer the life of the program. The 
contradiction between fixed targets and charrging programs remained insoluble."' 
In sum, the mmmendations of the Booz, Allm and Hamiltc.1 study group 
w m  directed toward attainable goals. Incentives were not to be wed as a curt for 
unavoidable uncertainties, nor could they compensate for the lack of program 
definition that their use p m u p p o d .  Within that assumptions, the study group 
mmmended continued use of incentive contracts for RBD and support services; 
use of a phased approach in contracting, in which the final fee would reflect the 
oontractor's accomplishment in all phases; introduction of "steeper" (higher) 
incentives as technical definition impwed; and NASA's implementation of addi- 
tional case studies on recent cl~ntracts."~ The basic conclusion, however, was that 
NASA's use of incentives had been justified by the m u l a .  And though the study 
group did not say so explicitly, its drift was that incentives w m  the most effective 
way in which NASA could sinulate market conditions in what was essentially a 
nonmarket environment. 
The canclusions of the Booz, Allm and Hamilton report suggest a final 
observation. In the mid-1960s NASA was mwing toward more rather than less 
technical direction of programs. The introduction of incentives and their wide- 
spread use influenced and was affected by the establishment of phased project 
planning guidelines. It was the essence of p h d  project planning that it kept 
open naany technical options, allowing management to intervene at almost any 
point before the final devclopmentai phase. And by reammending that incentives 
i 
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be phwd to stress those subgoals that collectively made up the program obicctive, f Booz, Allen and Hamilton clarified what hu ken implicit thmugbut thu du- 
i cusrion: While procurement and program planning w m  two ways of q@ing 
a unified acquisition process, the latter w u  logically prior to the former. 
Chapter 5 
NASA Manpower Policy 
N o matter how brilliant NASA planning might have been, it would have come to nought without the manpower to implement it. The success of NASA 
management in transforming a small research organization into one of the largest 
Federal agencies within five years of its creation depended on the assembly of 
scientists, engineers, and managers who made the transition possible. That NASA 
grew rapidly is undeniable. Starting its official life with the nucleus of engineers 
in.-erited from NACA, the new agency soon added personnel transferred from the 
Vanguard program and the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. But after acquiring 
the von Braun team in July 1960, NASA had to recruit manpower directly, a 
problem made emren more oncrous by President Kennedy's commitment of the 
nation to a lunar landicg before the end of the decade. The 1960s 'began with a 
tremendous increase in the aqency's manpower, followed by a contraction as 
marked as the expansion that preceded it. The number of contractor employees 
alone doubled in 1961-1962 and again in the following year' to the point where 
420 000 persons (contralor and civil service) were working direct!y or indirectly 
for NASA at the beginning of 1966.' This marked the turning point; from a total 
of 396 000 employees at the end of June 1966, agency employment fell to 307 000 
in 1967, to 268 000 in 1968, and to 218 000 in 1969.3 
But these Sq~~res  alone do not explain the mix of skills the agency n d e d ,  the 
reasons for usins sc 'ligh a proportion of contractor employm, or the problems 
created by Government-wide standards to which the agency must conform. NASA 
officials had to n;xt internal requirements while conforming to the policies of four 
other agencies: the F lreau of the Budget, which approved or took exception to 
NASA personne: ceilings; the U.S. Civil Service Commission, which established 
Federal standards for personnel management and position classification; the U.S. 
General Accounting Ofice, which, as the watchdog for Congress, was frequently 
to investigate NASA's use of support service contracts (and by extension, its 
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conduct of research and development programs) in the later 19609; and the 
Department 01 Defense, which supplied NASA with military detailees experi- 
enced in managing complex development programs. 
The questions addressed in this chapter include the following: How did the 
agency's manpower policies contribute to the success of NASA programs? What 
specific features of NASA manpower management would account for the success 
it had in building the agency's work force? Where and by whom was personnel 
policy made? Was NASA as successful in scaling down as it has been in "tooling 
up"? Finally, were NASA installations aggregationsof manpower and equipment 
that were to be dispersed once the mission fo~. which they were assembled was 
completed, or were the centers organized to taae on scientific work other than the 
kind for which they were created? Each of these questions is considered before 
arriving at more general conclusions. 
THE MAKING OF NASA MANPOWER POLICY 
How was NASA manpower policy made? Given the dmntralized structure 
of the agency, there could be no uniform policy imposed from above. Instead, there 
were competing interest "nodes" with various conceptions of the problem and 
various p re fe rd  solutions. Below the lcvel of top management, the Personnel 
Division was charged with developing and administering NASA's personnel pro- 
gram within the framework of civil service regulations. Established as a division 
of the Office of Administration following the 1961 reorganization, the Personnel 
Division h ~ d  two Directors during the period under consideration: Robert J. 
Lacklen, who served from October 1958 to the end of 1964, and Grove Webster, 
who was Acting Director and then permanent Director from January 1965 until 
his death in 1972.* In line with Webb's concept of functional management, the 
Director of Personnel was authorized to "establish standards, procedures and 
operating guidelines . . . review and advise on proposed allocations of person- 
nel . . . participate with Headquarters and Field officials in the selection of key 
personnel."' But the Division's powers were sharply limited in several ways. It 
had relatively little visibility since it was only part of a larger functional office and 
lacked the quasi-autonomy of Procurement within the Office of Industry Affairs. 
In the gritty bureaucratic prose of one internal report; Personnel was not in a 
position 
to participate in formulation of policy and high-level implementation in critical mattm, such 
u aalary, budgets idnd] allocation of top positions. . . . the organizational plimnent of 
Pmonnel is too low in the NASA organization to deal with total pcnonnel management 
problems on an agency-wide basis. The . . . Director of Perwnnei is apparently able to 
discuss personnel matten with a Deputy or Aasistant Director at a Center level but not with 
the Center Director himself.' 
Befm thc 1961 reorganization, Penonncl waa a division of the Ollim of Busincu Administration hcadcd 
by Albcn Siepcn. 
NASA MANPOWER POLICY 
Headquarters Personnel Division did not manage and had little control over 
personnel offices at the centers. In effect, each center worked out its own problems 
in its own way. Not the least of Personnel's problems was due to the program 
offices' practice of dealing directly with the centers rather than working through 
the functional offices. The great and evident sumss of NASA personnel manage- 
ment owed something to the fact that headquarters did not interfere with what the 
centers wanted to do. 
T o  the extent that there were uniform personnel guidelines, they were due 
to the logic of NASA programs and to periodic investigations by the Civil Service 
Commission and the General Accounting Office. Policy was made at headquarters 
not only by the Personnel Division, but also by standing committees of which the 
Director was a member ex officio, by ad hoc task forces, by the NASA Manage- 
ment Committee, and by Webb's intervention from time to time. Webb's interest 
in recruiting executive managers was well known, and he was prepared to take 
exception to any policy proposal that went counter to his experience in private 
industry, at the State Department, and at the Bureau of the Budget. He disagreed, 
for example, with a 1964 report of the Committee for Economic Development 
recommending that the task of improvkig executive management in the Federal 
Government should be assigned to a separate office within the White H o ~ s e . ~  
Webb thought that management "must always find a way to marry substance and 
administration at each level and . . . the senior leaders in the departments and 
agencies arc the focal points to which the President must look to get this done." 
One example of Webb's interest in personnel management illustrates how 
policy at NASA was not made, and the example applies beycnd the personnel 
issue. A recurring problem in most large organizations is how to select skilled 
executives: how to strike a balance between promotion from within and re- 
cruitment from without, how to determine the characteristics sought in executive 
managers, how to persuade prospects to join, and how to screen candidates for 
positions. This problem has arisen from time to time since NASA's establishment 
and has been resolved in several ways, ranging from informal recruitment by the 
first Administrator Glennan and later by Webb, to systems dev:loped by the 
program offices and centers on the basis of their experience and needs. In 1965 
NASA introduced a system for recruiting executives from outside the agency and 
later adapted it to cover internal selection. The system, regarded as comparable 
to the one used for selecting astronauts, was used to fill vacancies at the Ekctronics 
Research Center and at Goddard. In March 1965 Deputy Associate Adminis- 
trator Jack Young, after clearing the matter with Associate Administrator Sea- 
mans and his deputy Hilburn, authorized a task force to study NASA executive 
personnel administration, and this group, headed by Young's executive assistant 
John Cole, issued a report on 29 November. The Cole report was an example of 
complete staff work down to the draft NASA Management Instructions provided 
to carry out its recommendations. But nothing came of the report, chiefly, it would 
seem, because Webb shot it down. The task force had neither sought his guidance 
nor solicited his views, and its principal recommendation-that the executive 
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personnel administration function be organized directly under the M a t e  
Administrator-awned to fly in the face of all that Webb believed. He was 
reported to have asked, "Where would this leave the Personnel Director? If he is 
to be a high level official he needs this function. This tends to go against the 
concept of joining . . . substance and administration at each level." The report did 
not recognize what Webb and Seamans had done to bring talent into NASA: 
"How could we have done more in . . . recruitment of George Mueller-whm 
did his people come from? Who got Mueller? Nmell? Bisplhghoff? Adarns? 
Promoted Nmell? What we want to do is teach them how to do what they do not 
know--change when a Goett or Holmes stops the kind of management re- 
sponsiveness we want."' Cole's recommendations would have placed more re- 
liance on a system than on the judgment of senior management. 
In short, the moral of this story seema to be that no important changes in 
personnel policy could be made without involving top management. No agen- 
cywide penonnel policy could s u d  without being a mixture of systematic and 
informal recruitment; and functional officials had to do their staff work and 
submit their findings without, as it were, presenting top management with accom- 
plished facts. 
NASA EXCEPTED AND SUPERGRADE POSITIONS, 1958-1 968 
Any account of the role of top management in making policy must examine 
excepted and supergrade positions because they were among the most potent 
means by which the Administrator shaped the agency.' To understand the im- 
portance of the excepted position, one must consider NACA's position vis-his 
private industry at the end of World War 11. Along with other Government 
laboratories, NACA found that it could no longer compete with industry for the 
best engineen; the situation was such that it threatened NACA's ability to operate 
effectively, if at all. In 1947 and 1949, Congress enacted legislation of the utmost 
significance to NACA/NASA. The act of 1 August 1947 (Public Law 80-313) 
authorized the Secretary of Defense to fill forty-five scientific and professional 
positions at salaries from $10 000 to $13 000, a range equivalent to that of the 
highest ranking Government officias; this authority was extended to NACA in 
1949 when it was allotted ten "Public Law 313" positions. Congress intended the 
positions to be used for recruitment rather than retention. They were to be filled 
by the head of the agency with the concurrence of the Civil Service Commission 
(CSC). Moreover, the agency head was empowered to determine the appropriate 
salary within the bounds set by legislation. In a word, the 1947 act was intended 
to give mtain agencies, especially thow doing R&D, a flexibility within the 
bounds of the civil service system. P~iSlic Law 313 was in no way intended as a 
blank checl, and such positions were not to be filled as a matter of course. Each 
expansion of Public Law 313 positions was the result of tough bargaining between 
NACA and CSC. 
NASA MANPOWER POLICY 
The 1949 Classification Act served to bring civil service salaries in line with 
thosc in the private setor. As the fint major reform in classification since 1923, 
it established the job classification qstenl that prevailed until the civil m i c e  
reorganization of 1978. Briefly, the 1949 act accomplished four thinga. It ~ 0 ~ 0 1 -  
idated the old "professional and scientific" and "clerical-administrative-fiscal" 
categoria into one common structure, added t h m  new grades popularly known 
as " s u ~ d e s " ,  (GS-16 through GS-la), established numerical limits on the 
number of supergrades that could be established by CSC (the so-called "general 
quota"), and authorized t..e Commission to set standards for supergrade pi t ions 
as well as the right to withdraw allocations from agencies not confonnin~ to t k  
standards. The supcrgrada established in 1949 were an addition to, not a replace- 
ment of, the Public Law 313 positions created cv,.~ years earlier. However, with 
each increase in salaries in the supergrade range, Public Law 31 3 positions have 
been more or less reduced to those in the GS-16 to GS-18 range. 
Thee  two measurn alleviated but did not nsolve the p, oblem of competitive 
salaries. From 1950 to 1958 Director Dryden and Jerome Hunsaker, chairman 
of NACA's Main Committee, urged Congress to extend its allotment of Public 
Law 313 positions. In 1956 Congress authorized thirty such positions (NACA 
had rqumted sixty), and on 20 June 1958 it authorized a ceiling of ninety Public 
Law 313 positions in anticipation of the creation of the new span agency. But in 
a curious way, this legislation only amntuated the problem. In 1949-1950 Dry- 
den, Hunsaker, and the members of the Main Committee had decided that these 
positions ought to be filled from within. They had reasoned that the persons they 
might recruit would probably not be as qualified as the branch chiefs in the 
mearch divisions of the laboratories, "and that to bring such men uf lesser quality 
into the agency under P.L.4 13 appointments, while leaving the deputy laboratory 
directors and chiefs of major research divisions at 'P-8' would be indefensible and 
would precipitate numerous rnignati~ns."~ 
But this consideration did not arise when NACA asked for further extensions 
of Public Law 313 authority. By 1956 "the salary crisis was XI critical that NACA 
was seeking any measures to retain its key personnel . . . from 1951 through 1958 
NACA fought steadily for higher grades, P.L. 313 authority-any measures by 
which it could retain its staff through recognition and the prestige that the new 
supergrades and the P.L.413 positions afforded." '' Yet none of this stemmed the 
inexorable leakage of top personnel to industry. Between January 1955 and early 
1960, NACA/NASA lost more than 250 GS-11 through GS-16 personnel with 
a median service of 11 years, 73 of them to 3 companies. The median salary 
increase for NACA executives moving to industry was $1,000-$3,000." Such 
losses made it more difficu!t for the agency to perform its mission. As one author, 
assessing the problem in 1961, observed, "the government [was] indirectly paying 
these people what it [would] not pay them directly."'* . . 
Such was NASA's position from its establishment to mid-1961. Congress 
sought to give NASA a much greater flexibility in filling science and engineering 
positions. Section 203(b)(2) of the Space Aa provided that the offcers and cm- 
ploym of NASA 
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shall be compensated in amdance with the civil-service laws and their cornpasation fixed 
in accordance with the Classification Act of 1949, except that (A) to the extent the Adminis- 
trator deems such action nccewaq to the discharge of his mponsibilities, he may appoint and 
fix the compensation (up to a limit of $19,000 a year, or up to a limit of $21,000 a year for 
a maximum of ten positions) of not more ;ban two hundred and sixty of the scientific, 
engineering, and administrative personnel of the Administration without regard to such Iawr. 
Unfortunately, the intent of this clause was partially nullified by a ruling of the 
US. Comptroller General on the day that NASA began its official life: NACA's 
Public Law 313 positions were included in, not an addition to, the 260 positions 
authorized by the Space Act. Nevertheless, NASA managed to have the ceiling 
raised twice within the next 3 years, from 260 to 290 in June 1960 and to 425 in 
October 1961. The first increase was needed to accbmmodate the top-level person- 
nel transferred from the Army Ballistic Miesile Agency to the new Marshall 
Space Flight Center. In addition, twelve Pu t~ ic  Law 313 positions were trans- 
ferred from DOD to NASA-the so-called "German positions"--and the number 
of all positions permitted above $19 000 was raised from ten to thirteen. The 
second increase, from 290 to 425, was in response to the imperativesof the manned 
lunar landing; included was a proviso that not more than 355 were to be estab- 
lished prior to 1 March 1962 and not more than 390 prior to 1 July 1962. 
To understand how NASA used its supergrades and excepted positions, it is 
well to round out the picture with a brief account of the 1962 Salary Reform Act. 
Earlier it was shown that lack of comparability, or qua1 pay for equal work, had 
been one of the problems NASA inherited from its predecessor agency. By 1960 
one of the major problems within the Federal structure was how to retain, let 
alone attract, executives who could make considerably more money for compara- 
ble work in the private sector. Over the next two years, pressure for change built 
up within the Government, beginning with a March 1961 CSC report showing 
just how large the discrepancies between the public and private sectors really 
were.* This was followed by a Bureau of Labor Statistics report in November 
1961 to much the same effect. These reports, along with that of an Advisory Panel 
on Federal Pay Systems, were the bases for the legislation introduced by President 
Kennedy on 20 February 1962.+ The 1962 act further enhanced NASA's ability 
to get the job done; indeed, it was the one major p i m  of legislation during the 
1960s to allow NASA the increases in executive positions that top management 
believed to be essential. The act increased the rate for GS-18 positions from 
$18 500 to $20 000; identified the earlier $19 000 limit for all but thirty excepted 
positions (the number having been raised) with "the highest rate for grade GS- 
18"; and, while raising the quota of supcrgrac'e positions in the Government to 
The results were w startling "that the White Houv established a special committee of consultants to m i c w  
the 'matches' made, to auure that the finding w m  valid." Among the consultants war Jamer Webb, then a 
member ofthc board of several companies, including McDonncll Aircraft. Braithwaite, "The Exrmtivc Pmon- 
nel Program. 1958-1962" (Jan. 1967), p. 48. 
' Note alao that the &I1 report (pp. 75-78) appeared at the nghf time in May 1962. 
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2400, established a nonquota category of scientific and research positions to be 
filled by agencies with approval by CSC. The act did not remove all numerical 
limitations nor did it fully accomplish making Federal salaries above grade G S l 5  
really comparable to the private sector. But for NASA in particular, it afforded 
an opportunity to recruit executives in the f aa  of the continued denial to NASA 
of higher excepted position ceilings. In October 1962, for example, Webb re- 
quested the Bureau of the Budget to increase the number of such positions from 
425 to 750. In July 1963 the Bureau denied the request, suggesting that NASA 
meet its requirements through applying to CSC for nonquota pitions. This is 
what NASA had perforce to do; thus by the beginning of FY 1967, NASA had just 
over 700 supergrade personnel on board." 
One of the difficulties in evaluating so complex and technical an area as 
NASA's use of supergrade and nonquota positions is the lack of precision with 
which these terms were used. A GS-16 position could be supergrade, excepted, 
nonquota, or Public Law 313, depending on the context. Another potential pitfall 
is to make too much of NASA's uniqueness. In seeking to attract the most highly 
qualified engineers and administrators, NASA was doing no more than any other 
RLD agency. When Webb and Dryden tried unsuccessfully to raise the excepted 
position ceiling to 750, they coordinated their program with the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering and the Director of the National Institutes of 
Health." 
With these caveats, the question remains: What difference did the avail- 
ability of excepted and nonquota positions make to NASA? The most important 
administwtive mult was the leverage gained by Glennan and then Webb for 
structuring the agency. Only the Administrator could "establish an Excepted 
Position, change the assignment of an incumbent, change his title, or his rate of 
compensation."" Glennan and Webb thought of these positions as a resource 
personal to themselves, a m o u r a  that might be used to structure the agency at 
the higher levels without the need to seek congressional approval. But from about' 
1962, a number of constraints began to restrict the Administrator's ability to allot 
excepted positions. Within the agency there was pressure from the program offices 
and the centen to retain the excepted positions they already had. The an ten  and 
program directors would, as it were, "associate their 'total' . . . as a 'quota' 
guaranteed to them, so that with loss of any one individual, they felt free to 
'replace him' with some other position."I6 From being the Administrator's per- 
sonal resource, the excepted position became a budgetary resource to be divided 
witbin the agency. In effect, every such position tended to be committed o n a  CSC 
authorized it. 
The real thrcat to NASA's use of excepted slots came from outside. First tne 
number of excepted positions was frozen at 425; then the Administrator lost 
authority to place certain top-level positions in the excepted category; finally CSC 
began to approve fewer nonquota positions, even though the numkr of such 
positions was unrestricted by law. The Federal Exmtive Salary Act of 1964, for 
the fint time, named those positions beyond the $21 000 limit (raised from 
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$19 000 in 1962) that the Administrator could fill; these were tire positions just 
below the level of the Administrator and Deputy Administrator. In the view of one 
official, 
The limit of $21,000 for "not more than 30" of the Excepted Positions had permitted the 
Administrator to re-establish the mapr program offices of NASA as he deemed neces- 
sary. . . . With the top positions in the Agency now set forth by precise title in the Exeuctive 
Salary Act, he must seek prior approval of further mapr changes through formal legislative 
proposal and debate. The element of "flexibility" and quick response to new management 
conapts and strcuturcs was lost." 
As NASA manpower and funding peaked, the agency was under much 
gr .:. :r pressure from CSC to justify its nonquota positions. In October 1966, for 
example, CSC advised the heads of executive agencies that further requests for 
positions at grade GS-16 and above "must show how the needed positions are 
essential to the accomplishment of Great Society  objective^."'^ It would not suffice 
for NASA to claim that it supported the "Great Society" in some general but 
undefinable way. Agency heads now had to cite specific legislative or executive 
authority for the programs for which they sought new positions. Nor were such 
positions, even if approved, to become in any sense the property of the agency 
requesting them; whenevtr a slot was no longer required for an approved position, 
the Commission would consider Government-wide needs in deciding what to do 
with it. 
The more NASA sought an increased number of nonquota positions, the 
more chary the Commission became in granting them. In August 1966 CSC 
Chairman John W. Macy, J r .  wrote to Webb: 
It is very difficult for us to rationalize the increase in the number of high-lrvel positions in 
an agency when the program of the agency is not changing significantly. . . . it appears 
questionable that the increases since 1962 fully support the increase which has taken place 
in the nvmber of high-level positions. . . . I am afraid that you and we will be subject to severe 
criticism from the Congreu if the number of high-level positions continues to increase at the 
rate at which it has been inmasing for the past several years.'v 
Unfortunately for NASA, the dollar level of its programs was not a reliable index 
of its requirements. NASA spent comparatively little on salaries; the bulk of its 
funds went for contracted hardware systems. This meant that as NASA's capital 
quipment increased, the agency would continue to need highly trained personnel 
for the kinds of scientific programs that such quipment made possible. In 
1966-1967 NASA programs continued to grow beyond the capabilities envisaged 
by CSC and the Bureau of the Budget in 1962-1963. The new Electronics 
Research Center was still only partially staffed, and planning for Voyager and 
Apollo Applications was under way, while in Oaober 1965 the transfer to the 
Kenqedy Space Center of responsibility for unmanned launches meant that a new 
block of positions would be needed there. The upshot of the matter was a compro- 
mise. NASA agreed not to seek more GS-16 personnel; instead it would use some 
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of its forty excepted slots on the understanding that they would be converted to 
grade GS-16 at the beginning of FY 1968. However, the mabrity of these ex- 
cepted slots had not been utilized when Scamans, who had handled negotiations 
with CSC, left NASA at the end of 1967. 
If this account of NASA's authority to fill excepted positio~~s shows anything, 
it is the great importance that top management attached to them. Webb, Dryden, 
and Seamans fought hard to extend that authority by persuading Congress to raise 
the level of excepted positions, hiring nonquota personnel where excepted person- 
nel were unavailable, reserving as far as possible a certain number of excepted 
positions for "quick hires" of executives from outside the agency, and doing what 
they could to keep the center directors and program associate administrators at the 
highest levels authorized by the various salary acts. In some ways, NASA's record 
in justifying its supergrade positions was outstanding. One ranking CSC staff 
member advised Macy that, of all the supergrade positions, those from NASA had 
"the least water in them, of any of the agencies and  department^."^^ Yet the 
success of NASA's use of except4 personnel mostly depended on a balance of 
forces outside the agency-principally the willingness of Congress to raise the 
salary structure in order to attract engineers and administrators on whose talents 
the future of NASA would depend. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NASA WORK FORCE 
Despite their significance for top management, excepted positions comprised 
a small fraction of the NASA work force, seldom more than 2 percent. One must 
turn elsewhere to derive some usefd generalizations about NASA employees as 
a whole and to consider the more general features of agency personnel policy. Four 
features seem noteworthy: the generous allotment of supergrade and excepted 
positions for the agency's top managers; the unusually high proportion of scientists 
and engineers in relation to the total work force; the use of military dctailees as 
project managers, support staff, and, of course, astronauts; and NASA's extensive 
use of support service contracts at its newer centers. The first and last features 
have already been discussed; the next section considers the ways in which centers 
like Marshall Space Flight Center and Manned Spacecraft Center (or program 
offices like Tracking and Data Acquisition) made use of support contract person- 
nel. This section considers the makeup of in-house personnel. 
A high proportion of NASA personnel were scientists and engineers, a higher 
proportion, perhaps, than in any other Federal agency doing research and devel- 
opment work.2' Between 1960 and 1968 their share of the total NASA work force 
was fairly constant, ranging between one-third in 1961 and two-fifths in 1967 
(table 5--1). Moreover, if the figures for in-house and contractor scientists and 
engineers are combined, the total was a constant one-fourth throughout the 
period. 
But these figures must be examined before their significance becoma appar- 
ent. First of all, who are scientists and engineers? Are statisticians and computer 
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programmers included in this category; arc persons trained in science or en- 
gineering who were employed in positions that did not require such training 
included? The lack of widely ampted definitions may be one reason why statis- 
tical breakdowns that would compare NASA employment of scientists and en- 
gineers with other R&D agencies are so hard to come by. The matter is further 
complicatedbccause scientists and engineers were grouped by NASA under t h m  
separate occupational codes. NASA defined scientists and engineers as "all per- 
sons primarily engaged in the performance or dirmion of scientific, engineering, 
mathematical, or other technical professional work requiring a 4-year college 
major . . . in engineering or in physical, life, or mathematical science."22 This 
would exclude persons trained in the social sciences, include statisticians, and 
leave open the occupational group to which computer programmers belong. Of the 
total, all but an insignificant number of scientists and engineers were grouped 
under occupational code 700 (scientific and engineering positions), a classification 
that included persons with aerospace technology qualifications. This qualification 
was important chiefly because of'the special examination that CSC authorized 
NASA to employ, beginning in 1962. This examination was for NASA's use 
alone; and part C, "for work in Research and Development Administration," was 
hailed by NASA officials as an "advance in selective examination and re- 
cruitment." What made the examination, especially part C, unique, was that the 
applicant, in addition to the required educational background, had to demonstrate 
"understanding of research and development organizatioris and their specialized 
problems, organizational structures, functions, operations, and characteristics." 2' 
The beauty of this requirement was its openendedness: NASA could add special- 
ties, give the examiner discretion in interpreting requirements, and generally 
make use of a hiring freedom unmatched by any other agency. NASA personnel 
controlled the examination at the critical points: they administered it, they rated 
it, and they gave it much of its specific content. The aerospace technology exam- 
ination "provided a means for NASA to fill almost all of what could be termed its 
'professional' positions. This, combined with the power of the Administrator to 
make 'excepted' appointments, gave NASA almost complete control over whom it 
hired."" 
Where did NASA obtain its newly hired scientists and engineers? The mapr 
hiring campaigns occurred in 1961-1962 and 1962-1963; the results are shown 
in table 5-2. Approximately 70 percent of newly hired scientists and engineers 
came from either industry or Government. In 1963-1964 the source of new 
technical hires shifted significantly from Government to industry, while re- 
cruitment from colleges and universities stayed constant at 23 percent. All this was 
in marked contrast to contractor experience: Most of their new hires came from 
other industrial organizations or other plants and divisions of the same company, 
with an insignificant percentage rmuited from Government. 
Where were in-house and contractor scientists and engineers employed? 
Table 5-3, which gives the essential figures as of 30 June 1964, reveals that 85 
percent of the scicntists and engineers in the NASA work force were employed by 
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Table 5-2. - Organizational sources of NASA in-how dentists and engineen. 
" .  
Soum lWl-62 l %MI DiCerrne~ 
Other' 3.7% 7.0% +3.3 
Graduating audmu account tor 20.8% in 1963-64 and 22.1% in 1%1-62. 
l d u d a  Nonpdit orynirrtiau, unrmployed, d other. 
Swrcc: Reply b Sen. Gaylord N e h ,  ubk 111-A. NASA SUfT Study d R c a u ~ u n a t  Sourm and Sckaed 
Charactaiaii of Scimtiru a d  Enginem H i d  by NASA (1 Oa. 1%2-30 Scp. I W ) .  
private industry, including JPL; 83 percent w m  working on NASA pmgrams 
funded by the research and development appropriation; 62 percent w m  employed 
under the direct st!pcrvision of OMSF and that, of there, 10.8 percent (5450) w m  
NASA employees. There figures also show that while 38.2 percent of total NASA 
civil service employees were scientists and engineers, only 19.8 percent of con- 
tractor employees Contractors performed a major shan of NASA work, 
and NASA rquim! qualified perrons to d i m  and monitor these activities. At the 
same time, each NASA scientist or engineer had more contractor employtccr to 
supervise: where there was 1 NASA scientist or engineer for 1.5 contractor 
rcientists and engineers in 1960, t h m  was only 1 for every 5 in 1964, and 1 for 
every 5.5 in 1966.26 
How did NASA rquirements for scientists and engineers compare with 
national requirements in the same categories? Table 5-4 shows that NASA 
manpower rquirements w m  4.6 percent of national requirements in 1964, rising 
to only 5.4 percent in 1965. The issue of national manpower requirements for 
specialists was a source of some confusion during the mid-1960s. Joumlists, 
scientists, and Congressmen who criticized the space program accused NASA, 
among other thing, of siphoning off scientific manpower from areas with greater 
need, of possct.'.:g a disproportionate share of the nation's scientific manpower, 
and of attracting to iwlf a greater number of scientists and engineers than its 
programs warranted. But such criticisms sl nply ignored the lack of a national 
policy to coordinate the distribution of scientists and engineers. To be sure, the 
NASA Administrator was a member of the Federal Council for Science and 
Technology, established in 1959 to act as such a coordinating body. Thee w m  
also congressional cammittes in abundance, ad hoc panels of the National Acad- 
emy of Sciences, and various coordinating mechanisms involving NASA and 
DOD. Nevertheleu, t h m  was no formal agency to coordinate or to make a unified 
national ncience policy; therefore, each agency was free tr, m i t  personnel to 
met  its own needs, subject only to budgetary restrictions. In the absence of 
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Table 5-4. - NASA requirements for scientists and engineers compared 
with national rquirements, 1963-1970. 
NASA Rquimncnts  
Year National NASA as a Pcmnt d Natiaui  
(' .Ian.) Rquirrmcnts' Rquircmmtrl Rquimmnta  
' The data on nattonal q u t r c m m t s  arc from prcltminary n t imata  ~ ~ p a r e d  by the r-panrncnt of Labor, 
publ,rhed in 7Rr M a n p u n  R r p r l  uf lhr P ~ r n d r d  (Mar. !963), p?. 100, 125, as follows, tmaI mcnttsts, 1960, 
335 000, total engineers, 1960, 850 000; local ricntists, 1970. 580 000; tacal cnginmr. 1970, 1 375 000 l h t s  
tabk pmcnts a linear intcrpolatton bctwccn thc kcy d a t a  of 1960 and 1970 For 19GO through 1964. thcv  d; 
arc atirnatcs of pcnona employed In cxining poattionr. For 1965 through 1970, the data arc projmions of 
rrqutrrmrnfs, nol supply 
' i'ht cattmatcrof NASA rqu~remcnts  for 1967 through 1970 a n  projtacd at a mnrtant lwei auuminga budga 
prcgram of appmximattly $5.2 billton annually 
Sourcv NASA Mana~cmcnt Informatton Syatcmr lhvwion ( 0 % ~  of Admtn~stratton), Sl~rnltrts and E n p n r r n  
and Total Emplc~vrnrnl orr .VASA hoprams as r!/ Jurir 30, 1964, table I V  15 Dcc 1964. 
yardsticks to determine "how much is enough," no one could say that a certain 
percentage of rcienc;sts in an R&D agency was enough or too much. Projections 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics or by NASA had to reckon on the existcnce of 
variables external to the system. For what they are wort' , . figures in table 5-4 
show that NASA rquirements were neither as great as n~ ,ritics feared nor as 
small as its defenders anticipated. 
One feature that the tables do not indicate is that in the 1960s the NASA 
work fore  was mostly white and male, especially at the higher levels. The issue 
oi equal employnmt opportunity (EEO) was not yet the source of difficulty it 
would later become, when the imperative (for NASA) of recruiting and retaining 
highly trained personnel collided with the demands of blacks and women Ibr a 
greater share of Federal jobs. EEO, as a challenge and as a battle cry, originated 
with President Jol.nson's Executive Order 11246 (24 September 1965): This 
- ..- -. -. 
Extended by Excrut~vr Order 11 175 ( I  \ odwr 1967: to cwcr womm 
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declared the policy of prohibiting discrimination in Federal employment, and it 
enjoined the head of each executive agency to "establish ar.d maintain a positive 
program of equal employment opportunity for all civilian emplbyees and appli- 
cants for employment within his juri~diction."~' In addition, each agency became 
responsible for ensuring that its contractors took "affirmative action" to promote 
q u a 1  employment opportunity. 
This and subsequent executive orders were ambiguous in a crucial sense. It 
was not enough for NASA to show that it did not discriminate against its employ- 
ees nor that it permitted its contractors to do so. The  burden of proof was now on 
the agency to show that minorities and women were adequately represented as a 
percentage of full-time employees. But there was no basis for arguing that one 
group was or was not represented adequately until one answered the question, 
"compared to what?" In 1973, 3.4 percent of all NASA scientists and engineers 
were black, while the Government-wide average for black employees was about 
20 percent. On the other hand, since 3.5 percent of srielrtisis and engineers in the 
United States were of minority groups, the NASA figure was very close to the 
average. Many of the difficulties faced by NASA in implementing EEO were not, 
of course, of the agency's making. The procedures could not be worked all at once 
but only on the basis of accrued experience. Moreover, NASA faced the problem 
of comparable pay in hiring the relatively few black scientists and engineers who 
were coming on the market in the early 1970s; most of them could go into industrv 
at salaries considerably higher than NASA wap authorized to pay. In any case, 
NASA had all it could do to keep the engineers it already had, much less hire new 
ones. 
In a sense, NASA's problem was how to give EEO proper organizational 
location and visibility. Until 1971, EEO was handled by two separate divisions on 
a part-time basis. The nirtctor of Personnel was responsible for handling internal 
EEO policy, while the Office of Procuremrnt enforced campliance of contractors 
operating at or near NASA centers. Since both offices had many other re- 
sponsibilities, EEO was relatively low on their list of priorities. Furthermore, 
there were genuine difficulties in coordinating these programs on a Government- 
wide basis. On the one hand, CSC was charged with implementing EEO in the 
Federal Government, and the Labor Department was charged with establishing 
rules for contractor compliance. On the other hand, each agency was responsible 
for establishing and maintaining its own program. Thus the potential overlap 
between NASA, CSC and the Labor Depzrtment created a zone of uncertainty. 
In Septemtxr 1971 NASA consolidated its EEO activities by establishing an 
Equal Employment Opportunity Office that reported to the Associate Adminis- 
trator for Organization and Management. 
NASA policy has always been to make the maxi, lum use of DOD capabil- 
ities. Thus NASA used DOD support in contract administration, procurement of 
launch vehicles like the Titan 11, and tracking and capsule recovery in the Mer- 
cury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. One of the more important of these services 
was the detailing of military officers to NASA for extended tours of duty-usua:ly 
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for three years with a one-year renewal option. When NASA was established, the 
only persons with experience in the kinds of projects the agency was expected to 
implement wer? officers involved in weapon systems development. A short list of 
military detailees form the Air F o m  makes itc own point: Lt. Gen. Samuel 
Phillips, Apollo Program Manager from 1964 to 1969; Maj. Gen. James W. 
Humphreys, Jr., Director of Space Medicine, Office of Manned Space Flight; 
Brig. Gen. Edmund O'Connor, Director of Industrial Operations at Marshall; 
and Brig. Gen. C. H. Bolender, Program Director for the lunar module. An in- 
cidental advantage of using detailees was that they did not count a ainst the 
numcrkal ceiling imposed by the Bureau of the Budget on personnel. 89 
The detailee system was governed by agreements between NASA and DOD, 
especially the agreement approved by President Eisenhower in April 1959. This 
established a procedure for coordinating NASA requests with what DOD was 
prepared to furnish; set the tour of 'duty at t h m  years, although either agency 
could terminate an assignment earlier; stipulated that NASA supervisors prepare 
military effectiveness reports; and required that NASA reimburse the military 
departments for pay and allowances. The increase in the number of detailees 
assigned to NASA coincided closely with changes in the scope of NASA's manned 
spaceflight programs. There were 77 detailees with NASA at the end of 1960, 161 
at the end of 1962, and 323 at the end of 1966, after which the number gradually 
leveled off.w The number declined after NASA had developed a pool of cxperi- 
e n d  managers capable of taking over many of the jobs to which officers had been 
assigned. Many detailees resigned their commissions after completing their tours 
of duty to take jobs with industry, and it was considered common knowledge in 
the services that "when they detail an outstanding [flag] officer to NASA, that is 
the last they see of him."" Not the least of NASA's worries was that there might 
be a sudden withdrawal of officers for urgent military needs, as in Southeast Asia. 
While NASA continued to call on the services for manpower, from 1966 on 
positions were not filled with detailees until a reasonable effort had been made to 
obtain a civilian. 
The selection of the astronauts deserves fuller treatment than the brief 
summary offered here, but a paragraph must s~ffice.'~ Millions who could not 
have identified the NASA Administrator or the Associate Administrator for 
Manned Space Flight knew who John Glenn and Neil Armstrong were. Between 
1959 and 1969 NASA selected seven groups for astronautic training. Over the 
decade, there was a trend from military detailees to civilian recruits and a shift 
toward the utilization of scientists in addition to test pilots. In this sense, the 
history of astronaut selection reflects the changing nature of the manned 
spaceflight program. In the beginning what counted was the physical and mental 
stamina of the candidates, as well as their coordination and reaction time. Manned 
spaceflight first had to be-shown to be feasible before the later Apollo missions, 
whose main purpose was scientific investigation, could proceed. Astronauts were 
also expected to assist in developing future spacecraft and advanced flight simu- 
lators, and their experience and judgment were essential in changing or freezing 
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the deriwn of existing flight equipment. The  recruitment and training of the 
astronauts was, without doubt, the most taxing and successful of NASA's person- 
nel development programs. 
SUPPORT SERVICE CONTRACTS AND THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 
The  reader might suppose that since NASA was committed to contracting out 
for most of its operations, all the centers (and program offices) used contractor 
personnel in the same way and to the same degree. This was not the way support 
contracting worked. In 1968 Langley, with 4200 civil service personnel, had only 
450 support contractors actually working at the center. Lewis, with 4600 civil 
service employees, had about 350 support contractors, almost all of whom were at 
the center's Plum Brook Station." In general, the newer centers made the most 
extensive use of support services, but even they followed no set policy from above, 
save for the vague formulas of the NASA circular (NPC 401), "Contracting for 
Nonpersonal Services." The  three Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) cen- 
ters, for example, had individual contracting patterns.." Following the August 
1963 reorganization, Marshall consolidated its contracts into two groups. In the 
first were the "mission support" contracts negotiated for each of the center's nine 
laboratories; these were in research, test, design, and "special maintenance and 
operation." Marshall then planned two master contracts-one for technical ser- 
vices and one for mdnagement services-each of which was designed to support 
the center across all organizational lines. At Marshall (and also at Coddard) there 
was one prime contractor for each laboratory or division for which support was 
provided, each contract covered one or two years with an option for renewal, and 
the contract was normally cost-plus-award-fee. A noteworthy point, and one that 
distinguished Marshall from the older centers, was that most contract personnel 
were stationed on-site in such a way that they were not always segregated from 
civil service employees. 
The  contracting patterns at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC) were slightly different. At Kecnedy there were five 
master contracts that supported the center across the board: (1) launch support 
(including advance storage, shop operations, and Complex 39); (2) instrumen- 
tation support; (3) base communications (operation and maintenance of all 
communications except administrative telephones); (4) administrative service (in- 
cluding printing, photographic support, and automatic data equipment oper- 
ation); and (5) base operations (including guard, janitorial, and motor pool 
services), which, under a consolidated contract, was provided by Trans-World 
Airlines. Incidentally, NASA's multicontractor approach was the opposite of that 
used by the Air Force at the Eastern Test Range, where Pan American World 
Airways was prime contractor for operation and maintenance. As a cbr~gressional 
study noted, 
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NASA deliberately avoided the single-contractor approach used on the Eastern Test Range 
because it did not want to get "locked" into a situation where it had to rely on one contractor. 
Thc agency was convinced that several contractors . . . would provide more campetition and 
thus lower costs. . . . NASA also contended that a multicontractor pattern minimizes labor 
problem? by not risking the totality of the operation to a single contractor who might be 
struck." 
At MSC the pattern was midway between Marshall's "one contract per labora- 
tory" approach and Kennedy's five master contracts. MSC used six master con- 
tracts for the samt number of functions; within the mission support contract there 
were subsidiary contracts, one per laboratory. 
Since the policy issues in contracting for support services are fully discussed 
in chapter 4, only the main points need be summarized here. NASA defended 
contracts for noripersonal serv 3 s  for the following reasons: (1) the rapid buildup 
of the Gemini and Apollo programs precluded reliance on civil servants alone, (2) 
it was NASA policy not to develop in-house capabilities that were already avail- 
able in the private sector, (3) NASA emplnyees were needed for technical direction 
rather than for hardware fabrication or routine chores, (4) NASA had developed 
safeguards for policing its contractors, (5) it was better to let the up-and-down 
swings in manpower take place in the contractor, rather than the civil service, 
work force. and (6) the practice of using support service contractors had been fully 
disclosed to Congress and the Bureau of the Budget. However, these contracts 
were not in the same category as the Bellcomm and Boeing TIE  contracts. Support 
service contracts were for functions that were repetitive, continuous, and routine, 
such as computer programming, data processing, and general maintenance. The 
Bellcomm and Boeing TIE contracts were for engineering support that, some 
Congressmen held, NASA had no right to contract out. But relying so heavily on 
the private sector lor maintenance services laid NASA open to all sorts of criticism. 
First, there were no cost studies to prove that contracting for services was less 
expensive than doing the work in-house. Second, because many contractor em- 
ployees were located on-site, there was the danger that they would be intermingled 
with the civii service work force and that NASA employees might find themselves 
supervising contract labor, which whs illegal. Third, some Government labor 
union officials suspected that NASA was using support contracts to circumvent 
personnel ceilings imposed by the Bureau of the Budget. And this suspicion might 
have drawn support from Webb's correspondence with Budget Director Kermit 
Gordon, in which Webb protested manpower restrictions imposed by Gordon. 
Webb flatly stated that NASA wirs using support contracts because NASA, with 
its limited manpower, had to turn outside for certain kinds of ~ o r k . ~ ' '  
Outside the Federal Government, most of the opposition to support contracts 
came from organized labor, especially the American Federation of Government 
Employees, Within the Government, NASA manpower and contracting policies 
were closely watched by several agencies, notably the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO). Established by the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, and headed 
by the U.S. Comptroller General, GAO is an independent agency of the legislative 
branch. Its principal function and the reason for its importance is the authority 3 1 
vested in it "to examine the manner in which Governmmt agencies discharge their 
financial responsibilities and to make reports to the Congress on the financial 
operations of the Fdera l  agcncirs."" The  reports are normally of two kinds: 
survey reports, which serve as the basis either for a draft report or a decision not 
to pmwd further; and draft reports, which are submitted to the whole Con~rcss, 
individual members or mnrmittcts (especially the crmgressional Government i 
Operations mmmittccs), or oftirials of the agency beins reviewed.'* ~ u c h  of 
GAO's influence rests on its authority to approve asencywide ;rcwwnting systems, 
to audit and settle the arxwunts of executive otticrrs. nnd to nrake comprehensive 
reviews, in which "emphasis is not on the individu;d trans;rctions but on the 
soundness of the agency's iuununting and financial man;~gnrrent system and fhc 
cflfic.rcnc\l (!f tfs oprrnttotts gcrrctnllv. ""' In other words, the Comptroller General 
has crwtrued C;AO's ;ruthority !I) inspect an i~gent,y'~ rrcwrds as one of pnera l  
oversight, nmp;ir;rl?lc to that enjoyed hy the legislative crmmittcts of Con~ress. 
NASA's relations with (;A0 hiwe followcd 2 well-dctind pattern. l h r i n g  
NASA's early yc;m C:\O prid it crmpar;rtivelv little ;rttention, si\vc for the 
"prdurtion of dtnmrcnts" crmtroversy in 1959. .As I,ue as FY 1904, when (;A0 
made 147 ;ridit reports to Congress on DOl) n1iItl;\~CIIICllt, it made only 3 on 
NASA."' Hut inevitahlv (.;A0 would turn more of its ,\ttcntion to NASA; the 
i\gcncy was simply tcw visihle, ;rnd its w n t r ~ ~ t i n p  prartilus w r r  too nrurh like 
those of 1)OI). W hcn Klmer St;rirts \m.;rmc (:on~ptrollcr (;cncra! in hl;rrch 19bk 
the pr(husses of ; r i d i t  ;rnd crmrprchcnsivc review were intcnsiticd. hlorwver, 
CAO has two spwitir p w r r s  that were I ~ u n d  to ;Nwt its relations with N:\SA. 
It is authorimi to ccmsidcr protests by unsucrussful bidders on C;overnmrnt 
cnntmrts, ;rnd it has the r i ~ h t  o audit the r m d s  of cr~ntr;wtors h;rvirrg (hvern- 
mcnt inntr.irts ncscrtiatcd without ;~dvcrtising. ;rn ;rutirority whosc significmtr for 
NASh is obvi:w." (;:\O interprctcd thcsr powers hrondlv as ;ruthoriz;rrion tn 
revlcw K& I )  .rrtivitics. including wmplrtc propr;rnrs. 'l'hus (;A() rcvirwcd sup- 
p e d  cnst overruns on thc drvelopmcnt of scicntitic. insrrunrcnts for Survcvor, the 
manapnrrcnt of the S-ll program hv North hmcric.;\n .i\vi;\tion, anti thr s.l~rrc 
crmrpany's m;~n,~pmtcnt of its :\jwllo tunrmand ;rnd scrvitr nrtdulr crmr;rt*t 
(drawing on cxtrrpts fronr the l'lrillip rclwrt\; I I I I ~ C ~ I ~ M ~ ~  to CX;\III~IIC the Orhitins 
Astronomi(~;rl ()hswv.rtorv prosr;rnr .lt thc rrcpcst of tlrc c.h.rirnr;rn of the t h s c  
Committec on Sc,iclicr irnd :\stron;rutics; .rnd rcvicwd sctrcdulin~ pr,r .( ' t '  IWS rc- 
lated to t he dcv r lo~~~nr~r t  01' t he Ninrl)w spirtuc.r.rft .' ' 
The clYwts of (;:I0 ;\lldit reports v.rricd. In sonrc ~ r s c s  (:ongrcss tcwk 110 
irction; in othcrs (;:I0 tcrnrin.ttcul .r report, cithcr IW;I\ISC of in;rdeql~.rtc wtn-  
p w r r  to h.tndlc the study or hw,\usc thr studv itsclf did not sccm wcwtlr pursuing. 
And in ;I surprising nutrlhcr of c..rscs. (;:\(I c.rnc.elcd or mtdiflcd dr;rft r r p r t s  
I~c.;rusc of N:\S;\ trm~rrrnts." 'l'lris )wtrh.thlv o\ws less to ttrc ilrn.rtc. rc.rso~r- 
. h l c~~css  of K:\S:\'s psition t l ~ r n  to thc rxpericncr gi l rrd I)v ofticirls in tunst.rnt 
touch with ti:\(). I t  11.1s lwcn N:\S:\ plicv s~nc.c the e.rrlv lcWb rot to invoke 
c x ~ u t i v c  pr~vilcgc 111 rcspnsc lo (;:I0 requests for dcwumc~~ts; his h,rd I w n  tlrc 
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issue between Clennan and the Comptroller General when the latter reviewed the 
negotiations leading to the Rocketdyne contract for the F-1 engine (see p. 73). It 
was consistent with NASA policy that relations with CAO should not degenerate 
into adversary p d i n g s .  More important, NASA took steps to coordinate its 
replies to CAO draft reports. Prior to 1967 agency rey!ies were normally pre- 
pared and dispatched by the "cognizant" official or program office; a report on 
Surveyor would be answered by the Associate Administrator for Space Science 
and Applications or his deputy. Under the 1967 reorganization, all replies had to 
go through the Office of Organization and Management, which coordinated the 
facts and memorandums compris,ing NASA's position. In this way, the agency 
could speak with one voice. 
Yet it is undeniablz that, starting in the mid-1960s, GAO began to take a 
close, hard look at NASA. By 1975 it was reviewing NASA activities like the space 
shuttle almost on a "real time" basis. The review of R&D programs was by no 
means the only area to which GAO's audit pwers  extended. It intensified 
its revicw of NASA financial management systems, including the planning- 
programming-budgeting system mandated for executive agencies in 1965. It con- 
tinued to review Government-wide use of automaiic data processing crluipment, 
especially the rental versus purchase issue. It began to address more of its audit 
reports to agency officials than to Congress. Finally-and this is where the 
discussion began-it turned to NASA's use of contracts for nonpersonal servim, 
from bid proposal expenses to contracts for base support at NASA laboratories 
and installations." Basically, CAO found such contracts suspect, either because 
they set up what appeared to be an employer-employee relation or were costing 
!!x Zvernment more money than the use of civil service personnel would have. 
And here NASA was vulnerable because it could not readily show that such 
contracts were less expensive and because NASA had few criteria to determine 
whether certain kinds of work should be done in-house or contracted out. 
One such GAO report on contracts at Marshall and Goddard in June 1967 
helped to touch off an evaluation and overhaul of NASA personnel policies. To 
be precise, the GAO report was the first in a chain of events that included 
reductions in the NASA budget, which led to program cancelations and concom- 
itant layoffs of personnel; a Civil Service Commission "Evaluation of Personnel 
Management," which criticized the ways in which NASA used its manpower; and 
a decision in October by a CSC administrative judge that most NASA support 
contracts were illegal. All these factors led to a NASA-wide review. This combi- 
nation of budget cuts, reductions in force (RIFs, or dismissing personnel) and 
across-the-board reviews had an effect on top management that may be called 
tonic by some and purgative by others. The next section examines the changes that 
review, reduction, and RIFs forced on NASA. 
Review, reduction, and RIFs must be understood in terms of a broad mntext. 
NASA had its interests to defend, but so did GAO, CSC, and the Executivc Oflice. 
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For the reasons given above, GAO eventually was bound to pay more attention 
to NASA contracting and manpower practices. CSC had to mediate between an 
agency that needed (but could not easily request) more nonquota positions and a 
Congress that was inclined to question the number already on hand. As for 
relations with the Executive Office, Webb summed them up with his usual 
frankness at a meeting with center directors in September 1966. Referring to 
President Johnson, he said that 
we are not dealing with the guy who said, I am your champion, 1 will go out there and fight 
your b a t h ,  I will get Kennedy and his Congress to give you the money. He is saying, by God, 
I have got problems and you fellows are not cooperating with me. You could have reduced 
your expenditurn last year and helped me out, you didn't do it. 
At the Bureau of the Budget, 
Elmer Staats is gone, even Kermit Gordon is gone and the guys that are there now are 
intmstcd in this cost-effectiveness program. . . . It is the byword over there. . . . I must say 
that all 1 get is a cold, stony demand that we act like the Post Office when I go over there." 
Webb and the others conceded that there would have to be changes, but the 
meeting broke up without consensus on the nature of the changes. 
In the area of manpower management the agency already had begun a 
blueprint for the future. Three weeks before Webb's meeting with his center 
directors, a NASA task force submitted its "Considerations in the Management 
of Manpower in NASA." This task force, established by Seamans and chaired by 
Wesley Hjornevik, the Director for Administration at MSC, included representa- 
tives from other NASA centers; its report provided a penetrating analysis of the 
agency's manpower problems and some recommendations for resolving them.' 
The task force gave special attention to "possible methods by which Center 
complements could be adjusted by management to meet the needs of changing 
roles and missions."46 This adjustment problem existed in two forms. One was the 
relation between space sciences and manned spaceflight and the changes in center 
roles that this relation would bring about. The other was the so-called "Marshall 
problem," the belief throughout NASA that Marshall "was the sourcc: for man- 
power needed elsewhere and the place where surplus manpower wodd occur as 
the Apollo Program phased down."" The Marshall problem extended beyond the 
future of Marshall itself to embrace a host of other questions: What should be 
done with centers whose primary role and mission (in Marshall's case, booster 
development) was changing or disappearing? How could headquarters mediate 
between two centers reporting to the same program office-like Marshall and 
MSC-with different attitudes toward this problem? Was manpower a resource 
available to the entire agency, one that could be shifted freely between centers? 
And was there any method by which NASA could determine how its work force 
Thc Hprncvik rcport was submtttcd on 8 September 1966. k i d -  H p r n w ~ k ,  thc task force inrludcd Hcnry 
Barnctt (Lcw~s). 1'. Mclvm Butler (Langlcy), Harry Corman (Marshall), Sarnrlcl Kcllcr (Coddard), and 
Mcrrill Mcad (Am-) 
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was utilized, the nature of that work force, and its availability as programs were 
terminated and others were begun? The last question is logically anterior to the 
others since, without accurate figures, no agency manpower plan could be 
realistic. 
The  Hjornevik task force found that existing techniques for tracking man- 
power were inadequate, whether because headquarters ignored them, or because 
the program offices only presented their needs one year at a time, or because the 
various manpower reports did not match excess manpower with new programs. 
The  task force report emphasized that this was not enough and that "a continuing 
effort should be made . . . to formalize and . . . standardize methods of justifying 
and validating manpower requirements at all levels.""' This could be done by 
making three-to-five-year projections based on actual and proposed future pro- 
grams and the requirements for new starts being considered at each center. Such 
a system might ttll NASA management how manpower was really used. More to 
the point, such a systen~ could be effective only in proportion as it related each 
center and program to the other centers and programs comprising the total NASA 
effort. 
T o  use such information, the agency needed techniques for matching man- 
power with program requirements. In turn, their usefulness involved two assump- 
tions: that each center's manpower complement would rtmain stable and that 
contractor manpower would remain available to free civil service employees for 
more important tasks. Granted these assumptions (both of which were overtaken 
by events), the task force identified seven ways to match manpower with pro- 
grams: functional transfer of groups (e.g., the transfer of the Space Task Group 
from Langley to Houston); individual transfers; RIFs in one area coupled with 
increased hiring in another; attrition either among organizations or skill groups; 
retraining personnel; reassigning work from an overloaded to an underloaded 
area; and 1.1s~ of the vacant-position "float," that is, the gap between authorized 
and filled positions.4v These options were available ta NASA but not all to the 
same degree. The  task force dismissed out of hand the possibility of mass transfers; 
the conditions that had led to the transfer of the Space Task Group to Houston 
or the Naval Research Laboratory scientists to Goddard no longer existed. Trans- 
fers or individuals were even less likely to s~rceed  because of the morale problems 
such .,~oves usually created. Reductions in force were to be viewed as a last resort, 
"where a function, office, or discrete facility is being eliminated . . . its results are 
usually unsatisfactory."'" Retraining personnel was valuable as a means of 
"changing the skill mix or enabling a Center to move from one step in technology 
to the next." But the task force rejected retraining as a way of redistributing 
manpower for the same reason that it viewed personnel transfers as impractical. 
In the end, the Hjornevik report endorsed three methods of matching personnel 
to programs. It very cautir>usly approved the concept of assigning tasks where the 
manpower was available. Such endorsement had to be cautious because each 
center had developed its own special capability and because "the prime interest of 
a center can properly change only very graduallv."" The  task force also approved 
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'of using attrition to move slots between centers and the "float" of unfilled positions 
to handle emergency requirements. 
In sum, the Hprnevik report provided NASA with three things. First, it 
diagnosed the agency's manpower problems: the lack of reporting systems to 
determine the agency's n d s  as related ta present and future planning, the 
absence of tradeoff studies to establish how far personnel at one center were 
available to another, and the failure of officials to coordinate manpower informa- 
tion with the budget and programming cycle. Second, it made specific m m m e n -  
dations for the short term; mmmendations that on the one hand called for the 
assembly of information needed by management for an agncywide view of civil 
service manpower, and on the other hand, for the centers' participation in the kind 
of planning that would have to cross institutional and program office lines. Third, 
the report attempted to demonstrate that attrition and reassignment of work 
between centers were the two basic methods for matching civil service manpower 
to program changes. All thesc recommendatiim assumed that NASA could main- 
tain its in-house work force at a iairly stable level. 
The Hjornevik report was a warning that NASA would have to prepare for 
major changes within the near future. Yet the events of 1967 seem to havc taken 
the agency almost unawares. The CAO report of June 1967 on support contracts 
at Goddard and Marshall concluded that NASA could have achieved additional 
savings by using civil service employees." At Marshall, CAO auditors reviewed 
three contracts at three laboratories and concluded that NASA could havc realized 
savings of 19 percent; at Goddard, of 7.4 percent.* The thrust of this and other 
CAO reports of 1967-1 968 was that NASA had not developed adequate costing 
standards to justify mntracting for support service, whether for engineering 
support at Goddard or guard and fire protection services at KSC. Besides CAO's 
failure to recognize the pressure from Congress to maintain personnel strength 
below authorized levels, what especially troubled NASA officials was the report's 
conclusion that the principal rationale for such contracts no longer applied: "in 
contrast to its past rate of growth, NASA has now achieved a relative dcgrec of 
stability and should be able to better consider relative costs in assessing the extent 
to which it should continue to rely on the use of support service contracts."" 
The GAO reports did not go the whole route and conclude that support 
contracts as rrrrh were illegal. But following its review of six Goddard a ntracts, 
GAO turfid them over to CSC for further study. And it was the CSC decision, 
based on a study of two of thesc contracts, that NASA's use of contractor personnel 
was illegal. This decision, handed down in October 1967 by General Counsel Leo 
Pcllerzi, threatcncd NA.'IZ with serious disruption at a time when it was already 
reducing its own work force. Pellerzi ruled that the contracts wcrc illegal because 
they involved on-site performance by contractors, bccausc they set up an 
employer-cmployec relation between Government dnd contractor personnel, and 
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because "contract personnel arc performing the regular work of the agency. . . . It 
s n m s  clear that what Goddard has dcne in this situation is to create federal 
positions."" The  question then was not whciher NASA would havc to lay off 
contractor personnel, only how soon. 
Coming on the heels of the GAO report, the Pcllerzi decision was enormously 
troubling to NASA officials. Yet neither had any dramatic effect-not immedi- 
ately, anyway. On the eve of the Pellerzi decision, NASA employment was down 
mori. than 100 000 from what it had bccn at the beginning of 1966. Furthermore, 
the practice of support contracting was so widespread, in DOD as in NASA, that 
it was unrealisticto suppose that it could have bccn eliminated. In any case, neither 
CSC. GAO, nor the Bureau of the Budget wanted to f o m  a showdown. Rather, 
they began to work with the Office of Organization and Management, which 
k a m e  NASA's liaison with these agencies, to hammer out a uniform policy on 
support mntracts. Between the announcement of the Pcllerzi dccision and the 
spring of 1968, Finger issued guidelines that, taken together. signaled a move to 
bring such cnntracts under much tighter central control. No function then pcr- 
formed by civil servants cnuld bc cnnverted to contract, all new support contracts 
;tnd extei~sions of old ones over S t 0 0  000 had to bc approved in advance by Finger, 
rquests  for cnntriict irpproval would havc to include mst comparisons for all 
functions where cnst was a consideration in cnntracting for services. and service 
m n t r m s  were to bc limited to one ycar. Also. support contract manpower was to 
bc i.duL-d at ia rate at least twice as great as that for Government employees. 
These gu~detincs were in addition to a joint study that NASA mnductcd with 
CSC. GAO, and the Bureau of the Budget to develop a mutually amptable cost 
model for support services. The issue was so fraught with uncertainty that NASA 
had perforce to remain in a holding pattern until clear Government-wide stand- 
ards muld be brought into play." 
In fac.t. i t  is surprising that so much sound and fury should have led to such 
incnnc4usivc, short-term results. NASA developed tighter t~ntr i i l  cnntml and took 
steps to providc for periodic rmm~pctition of such cnntracts. As for the reviews 
that Id to the (;A0 reports and the Pcllerzi decision, the outcnmc was neither 
simple nor final. After more than a ycar of nqotiiitions. NASA a n n a u n d  at the 
end of 1968 that it would cnnvert $10 contractor positions at Coddard to civil 
servicu status.'" At KSC, NASA mcditied curtain practicrs in cnntracting for fire 
protection and photographic support, as rccnmmended by GAO." The  cuntcr 
mnsolidatd its photographic work with that done at the Air Forcu Eastern 'l'cst 
Range, rcducuci the expenses involvd in having its prime support contractor 
(Trans-World Airlines) suhvntract for p a r d  and tire protection service, and (at 
KS(: and hl;irshall! cnnsolidated many engineering suppirt (nntracts info large 
rniister cvntrncts. The result of ;ill the pressure from GAO and CSC was that 
NASA devrlopcd more rigorous cnsting standards and. in general, used such 
contr,ws much more scltitivrly. Hut as long as N.4S.4 WAS cxmmittcd to spending 
1nos1 of its i>rtw.urenwnt dollars in the private stitor, support ivntracts would 
remain esscnti.11 to the trmduct of its operations. 
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In the long run, NASA's view of its authority to enter into s u p p r t  service 
contracts prevailed in the Federal courts. When NASA ordered a reduction in 
form at Marshall in 1967 (see p. 134), a Federal district court found twenty-two 
support service contracts invalid and declared the RIF  null and void. This led to 
an eleven-year legal battle between NASA and the American Federation of 
Government Employees, which ended in October 1978 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court refused to hear a challenge to a decision by the U S .  Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia reversing the 1967 decision. In its dccision the court of 
appeals construed the Space Act broadly to give the agency maximum flexibiii*~ 
in contracting for and administering support services. The  implications, not only 
for NASA but for other Covcrnment agencies, arc immense. NASA's position, 
that Federal agencies havc open-ended authority to contract for services, has bccn 
sustained; and it now seems that these agencics will use thcir contract authority 
tc circumvent any hiring freezes imposed by the White House. 
However, in the summer of 1967 this outcome was more than a decade away. 
NASA officials f a d  the immediate prospect oi  defending the agency on two 
fronts. Not only did they have to justify support contracts to a C ngress that was 
increasingly sceptical about their current use and future necessity, they had to 
justify their in-housc personnel management as well. The  Hjorncvik report had 
made several rmmmendations, but it had been an in-housc r e p r t .  Although 
managemcnt authorized followup studies and began to implement some recom- 
~nendations in picc . ' fashion, there was not the same urgency that would have 
rcsultcd from a rcvlrw ~ l y  an outside body. This was precisely what befell NASA 
when CSC submitted its "Evaluation of Personnrl ?Aanagcment" to Webb in 
October 1967. 'The Commission's earlier review of NASA in 1962 had disclosed 
certain deficiencies-in merit promotion, position classification, and lack of 
definite agcncywidc policies-but that rcport itself had not been made public. The 
Commission, it seems, was prepared to make allowances for a new agency as- 
signed an enormously demanding mission. Consquently, CSC seems to havc 
given NASA the benefit of the doubt.'" 
The  1967 report went further in identifying the sumsscs and failures of 
NASA personnel managcmcnt. It gave NASA credit for progress in many areas 
since 1962, notably in recruiting outstanding research and engineering personnel. 
But the report pointed to four problem areas that NASA would havc to set in 
order. The first problem was that many supervisors did not understand thcir 
personnel managemcnt responsibilities in areas such as merit promotion and 
cmplovrr-management cooperation. The s m n d  problem was that "employees arc 
uninformed about and lack confidence in . . . personnel practices such as merit 
promotion, c x w r  development, and position classification that operate differently 
than described in NASA publications and include criteria which havc never bccn 
called to thcir attention."'" The third problem was the lack of managemcnt 
support for equal opportunity programs or for increased hiring of women; the 
fourth problem was the lack of headquarters leadership in areas such as super- 
visory training and promotions. 
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This kind oi outside review placed NASA in an awkward position. While 
NASA offic~als criticized the conclusions as too sweeping, they conceded privately 
that the report was correct in many details. As head of the aeency, Webb had to 
hold a middleground-accepting the thrust of the report without alienating center 
directors and program managers. CSC, he argued, did not "wish to be punitive 
in their reports unless it is absolutely essentia!." If NASA could develop an 
effective personnel management program during the next five years, CSC "will 
glad]. forget the sins of the past." What bothered him more than the report itself 
was the role that CSC was assuming. Instead of "detailed policing of agency 
personnel matters," CSC's role should have been one of "promulgating broad 
policies and then auditing the agencies to assure that these policies are properly 
carried out.""" NASA had to convince CSC-and Congress-that it took its 
problems seriously and was doing something to correct them. 
The first and principal step was Webb's establishm*,it of a Personnel Man- 
agement Review Committee on 21 November 1967.' There is good reason to 
stress the importance of this step. Unlike a flight program, which usually h a  a 
definite beginning and end, personnel management is a continuing function. To 
be effective, a review panel must be a standing committee whose members have 
a stake in the matters they are inspecting. Through the Committee NASA man- 
agement tried to shift from "policies" to "policy" and to end the lack of coordi- 
nation between headquarters and the centers. In 1968, for example, therc were 
inftallations with high separation and low accession rates (Amer, MSC), high 
separation and high accession rates (Electronics Research Center, headquarters), 
and low accession and low separation rates (Langley, Lewis)."' The problem was 
to create an agencywide personnel management policy without imposing a spuri- 
ous uniformity. 
The Personnel Management Review Committee was charged to review 
NASA's personnel management process, identify problems, and "recommend to 
the Administrator any changes considered a,ppropriate . . . and provide feedback 
to the Administrator as to the efficiency of . . . policies and practices throughout 
NASA."" Authority of the standing committee cut across the normal program 
and functional lines. Its immediate business was to respond to the CSC report, but 
over the next two years it carried out a very thorough survey of the agency's 
personnel structure. To Webb, the Committee was something more. It was of a 
piece with the other management changes he made to bring problems to his 
attention: the creation of the NASA Management Council, the revival of the M c e  
of Management Development to prepare agency management issuances, and the 
establishment of group to develop a catalogue of agency policies. Webb was 
* 11 w.n I i ~ r m ~ ~ l l y  r s ~ . ~ h l ~ s t ~ d  hy N h l l  1 1  52 26 ( 3  Jan 1068) 'l'hr chalrman was Harry Gorman ( I k ~ u t y  
Ihrmtor. . \dn~~n~ut r .~ t~r r ,  n  %ldrshall), who hdd urvrd on rhr t lprnrwk C o m m ~ ~ ~ u  Othrr mrmbrs wrrr 
(;row Wrhrlrr. N.9SA Ihrmtor of Prru~nnrl,  tkrnard Mor~ tz ,  Ass~s~nnt Adm~n~strator lor Spcc~al (htracis  
N r ~ n t ~ . ~ t ~ o n  .tnd Wrr~rw.  tnd ,Jdm 'I ownwnd. I k p u ~ v  Ihrrtior of Goddard 
NASA MANPOWER POLICY 
especially anxious to bring in R&D managers from the centers for a tour of duty 
with the Committee to give them an overall view of the agency. 
What did the Committee acwmplish? Merely by its establishment, Webb 
advertised the importance he attached to personnel management. And by re- 
cruiting managers from the centers to serve on the Committee, he hoped to bring 
about a consensus in favor of uniform policy-a consensus not to be achieved by 
executive fiat. The Committee began its work by visiting six en ters  and taiking 
to key functional and program officials, discussions that were to be the basis of the 
Committee's April 1968 report. In the report the Committee agreed with CSC's 
analysis to the extent that "its conclusions can . . . be supported by a careful and 
sometimes isolated selection of substandard performance cited in one . . . of the 
individual NASA installation reports.""" But the Committee denied that what 
might hold for one center in one area could be extended to the whole of NASA. 
Instead, thc report recommended certain steps that, applied over the long term, 
would tend to bring NASA more into line with CSC demands. The Committee 
found that personnel management needed to be made visible at the headquarters 
level, and it recommended that the function "be elevated organizationally" within 
Finger's office."' It also recornmended that NASA con!inue to review its use of 
support service contracts and to define precisely what such a contract was; that 
NASA adopt a ranking system, which would enable the agency to retain the top 
25 percent of its professional staff in the event of a reduction in force; that NASA 
lower entrance-level standards in certain cases to recruit minority employees; and 
that more attention be given to improving employee-management relations."' 
Finally, the members recommended that the Committee be continued in order to 
effect "greater involvement of top officials in personnel management.""" 
This last phrase explains why the Committee was relatively successful. It 
was not a panel of outside conwltants with no responsibilitv for the problems on 
its agenda. By bringing in oficials from the centers and by staggering Committee 
appointments, a nice balance was struck between the two bureaucratic concepts 
of flexibility and continuity. The  Committee worked closely with Finger and 
Webster, the latter of whom was a member ex oficio. It established subcommittees 
to tackle such problems as career trainee programs and reductions in force. Its 
biet~d of line and functional ofkials was in kecping with the agency's way of 
getting things done; that is, it provided for maximum delegation of powers to 
oficials wh \ would have to carry out the policies they helped to make. 
Ultimately, the issues of personnel management were those of long-range 
planning. But in 1967 NASA had no formal agencywide long-range plan. With- 
out it, NASA could produce no justification for keeping agency manpower at the 
30 000-plus level, where it had been since 1963. Webb believed that an agtncy 
had to be able to phase down as well as to "tool up." One week before he left 
NASA in 1968, he delivered the Diebold Lecture at Harvard and said that 
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in the projccr-type mdavor, aculaation wwld haw to k follovt4 ?,y d d a i t i o n  md that 
many operatiom invdviry both pcmmcnul  md noryowmmntr! manpowa and facilitia 
I 
would haw only r limited wdulncn. We b ~ w  rrrcped the need to end thwr dtftc tldr 
purpoKI haw been mcc. . . . 
We havc already . . . duced t b  d c  olour toul a c h d a  to about om-hdi the perk i m l ,  
1 
which w u  attained t h m  ytan yo. . . . We uc in a p i o n  to opmtc at this lcwl or to 
i 
incrruc or dcaur u dccirian, generate tither trend. ! 3 
But the p h d o w n  was neither as orderly nor as well planned as this statement 
would indicate. The dismissals and hiring fma that began in FY 1968 signaled i 
a reduction in manpowcr that continued well into the 1970s. The rtductions 
shaped and t+ ere shaped by thr absence of some long-range plan for NASA to 
place before Congress. The initial reductions did not merely ha;: a ripple effect 
on the NASA work force; they also seu the terms on which fu!sre programs, if 
approved, would have to he caxied out. 
The reduaions in permanent civil service cmploym (FY 1968-1970) are 
shown in table 5-5. Howevci, the figirres conceal the variations betwnn centers, 
where there was no sing!: pattern of accessions and separations. Rather than 
discuss thcz ~ i i ,  it is more uscful to concentrate on one center to understand what 
a reduction in force is, how it workd at NASA in the late 19601, how the center 
adjusted to its losses, and how skills lost in one area might (or might not) be 
replaced in another. 
Except for the Elcctronia Research Center, which closed on 30 June 1970, 
no enter was more severely affected by manpower reductions thm Marshall. 
Mection was made earlier of the "Marshall problem"-the wideiy held conviction 
that there was a manpower surplus at Huntsville that might be tapped by the rest 
of NASA. By 1966 Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight hfueller 
was reducing manpowcr at Manhall in order to inmavc it at MSC and KSC and 
still remain within his personnel ceiling."" At the same !:--c a debate was going 
on within OMSF on the future of Marshall, a debate hinted at in the Hprnevik 
report."" Rasically, MSC: offirials wanted Marshall to develop the new booster 
systems that they believed would be needed for manned missions in the 19ids. 
Marshall officials disagreed, feeling cpnstraincd by their lack of manpowcr in 
a d v a n d  research, compared with that for hardware development and testing. 
Further, Lewis had already staked out a role in a d v a n d  prnpulsion technology 
that Marshall could not expect to emulate. In short, Marshall had to cope with 
three clowly rclatd problems: commitment to a prograq that was about to t a y r  
off, a high proportion of facilities deigned to serve spec~fic programs rather than 
institutional n d s ,  and what was perrvived at Houston, the Cape, ana headquar- 
ten as an e x m s  of manpowcr in relation to future assignments. 
At the end of &ober i 967 it k a m e  apparent that Marshall would havc to 
reduce its manpower considerably. Congress passed and the Pmidcnt signed an 
appropriations bill that eliminated the Voyager and Advand  Missions pro- 
grams, i.cduccd most other non-Apollo programs, and cut back the administrative 
operations appropriations rquest by $43.3 million. This meant that Marshall 
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wodd h i ~ v ~  to r d i w  its ~wrsonnel by 700, ii move that wiis sucuussfully chirllengt-d 
in the Fdrritl  cnurts by the American Ftdtmtion of Gover~rment Employrcls.' 
When the inju~r:-tion ;rg,rinst the RIF wits lifted in April 1968, the c;tref:rl phase- 
down plitnncd by wntcr otticiirls wits no longer p)ssible. The  KIF prcxvd\~res Id 
tc: ;in cxtrenrcly high turnover of personnel, even of those who wcrr no! i \ f T ~ t t d  
dirwtly. The turnover of K& 1) personnel wits three tinrcs higher thirn it had k n  
;II the sirntc tinre in 1967. And those losses were cstwiirlly heavy ;rnrcag thr 
younger st-icntists ; I I ~  nrginnrs. possibly k i t u s e  there wcrc.bb opp)rtunitics ilt 
the Huntsville :hrni \ l  nearby. 'l'hc worst ett'wt of the KlF, iis it n p i ~ i t ~ w l  to van 
Hr;tun, wits th;rt it disrupted work tr;rnrs thiu had t;rkni years to dcvclal\.'" 'l'hc 
d;rnr;rgc wrought by such prtwwlurcs rc.rc-hd twyond their short-tcrnr ctTcc'ts to 
more profo\~nd sccvnd- .rnd third-order tvnsccpwtrs. hl;tni~gers i~nd  supervisors 
wrrc "bunrped" into nonsupcrvisory positions .rnd found themselves "rclcg;rtcd to 
the ranks (11' tlic workers they Ih;rdl bwn superv;sing." ' 'l'hc ;rvrrit#t itv of 
c~~rployccs ~ o s c  ;IS younger j q d e  were dis~nissci or left to scck work e I s c : ~ f ~ e .  
And ;IS the .wr,\Kc ;tpc of scientists ;rnd engineers rose. i t  Im..raw aruch less likely 
tlrnt thr ;rdv;rntrci resr;rrch then t;ru~trt ,it tire uniwrsities would tw reHwtd in 
NAS:\ l.thoratorics ' 
In suni. KII:s .~nd  hiring frectcs ~ t k t d  tlrr N:\S:\ trntcrs in nr,tnv w y s ;  
sonre wcrr obvious .~nd  inr~necii;rtc. tnd others wrrc nrorc suhtlr, ;t!though i n  the 
1011g run rvcn I I I O ~ C  devirstirti~rg. On the whole, N:\SA wits t~n;tblr to i~itplenrent 
the ordcrlv plrnscdown that Wchh dcsvribcd in the I)ictwld 1.rc.turc. I t  wits tcw 
much to ask N:\S:\ or ,tnv other .rpcnc*y to nr;rkc unil;rtrral reductions in funding 
;tnd nr,tnpwer. Hut in the 11;1111c 01' ri\~nonrv, the (rr~;tt  S~wietv. and t Ire w;rr in 
Vittn;tnr, the Hurc;~u of the Hudp-I t u r n 4  what might h i \ v~  hccn ;In orderly 
tctrcitt into sonlcth~np rcscmhlinp ;t rout. Hrtwccn NASA's pc;A (in-lrousc) en)- 
plovn~cnt in July Ii)6: ;~nd  the end of V\' 1060, N:lSA .rtndislred 2850 ~urnr;~ncnt 
positions. In tl:r !:I' 1'170 budge[ cycle c~lanc. rhc ,rpcncy sust;ti~rrd&trr septr.rtc 
rcdwtions~ initi;~lly 3711 positions were ;rhdiuhrd; under pressure l'rrm thr Hure;tu 
of tht Hiidpet t l u t  nunlhcr csc;tl;rlcd to 452. then to 552 ,  m d  tin.rlly to !052 
' I .  positions. I'hcsc gross tigures only hint ,rt the n~rsccluenccs of wn t inu4  Ii~rgc- 
sc;tlc rcduc*ticurs. First. N:\SA wits given very l imit4 iruttroritv to repl;rtu jwrson- 
ne1 wl~o h.rd Iwcn srp,tr.rtcd. In F\' IObH N:\S:\ rcpl.rved only one out 01' two 
scpiw;rtcd ,~nd  in 100') ,~lwut two out of tivc. :\I sonre r ~ n t c r ~  the rcpI;ttrn~ent 
.4  
r.rtios wrrc nruch snrSrllcr c w  in five .it I,.~nglcy, one in fourtwn ;it hlnrshidl. 
Hg IIW t hr "critiv;rl maw" ;I( tlrrsc trrrtrrs was getting d;ingrrousIy low. At Anrrs 
there w.rs no longer ";~ny rcnr,rining tksihilitv to t ~ k r  reductions in nr;~n- 
p w r .  . . :\nv pro r;tt,r sh.irc of nr;rnpwer reduction $11 :\n~rs ,tppe,trs improper 
in view of the sar.dl sire of th;~t i~rst.~ll;rtio~r."" 
NASA MANPOV:ER POLICY 
Second, the effects of mass separations went far beyond the number of those 
actually dismissed. The long-range consequences included the departure of many 
younger professionals to look for greater job security and the concomitant rise in 
the average age of those who remained; a sharp drop in the number of college 
students hired from 925 in FY 1966 to less than 200 four years later? and a rise 
in Federal rmployee union membership, especially at Marshall and MSC. The 
sumss of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) in tempo- 
rarily blocking the RIF imposed on Marshall convinced many employees that 
AFGE might be able in 1969 to repat  what it had done in 1968. In the long term, 
center officials had to deal with unions that were a good deal larger, more militant, 
and better organized than in the halcyon days of the space program. The actual 
number of persons separated might be only a fraction o: the work force, but the 
ripple effect touched every center employee. As an internal MSC report observed, 
A RIF is a symbol to all employes that the Center or the Agency have serious prob- 
lems. . . . Although by far the vast maprity of employes . . . were not in any way touched 
by the proposed RIF, many of them'viewed it as another symptom of an uncertain future. It 
should be pointed out, howwer, that the RIF did not create uncertainties, it merely reinforced 
them." 
Finally, this pattern of reductions and low replacement rates seems to have 
convinced top management that agency manpower must be defended and justified 
as a national asset. If all these skills had been assembled simply to get a job done, 
there was no cause for complaint if they were to be dispersed once that job was 
completed. Obviously, this was not how Webb, Paine, or Finger viewed the 
agency. In principle, they conceded that a "less-than-best" laboratory might be 
closed if it had served its initial purpose, if there was no likelihood that a new role 
for the laboratory could be found, or if closing the laboratory would not leave a 
significant gap in the national capability to perform RBD. But, they maintained, 
there was no reason why a center with a capacity for research in aeronautics or 
propulsion systems could not expand to cross-service other Government agencies, 
as NASA had been doing for DOD for many years. Furthermore, the centers were 
morr ilexible than was generallv realized. At Lewis, for example, the altitude 
wind tunnel used to test the B-29 during World War I1 had been converted into 
a space environmental test fkcility during the 1960s. The same center shifted 
emphasis and manpower from propulsion systems to aeronautics following the 
cutbacks of 1967-1968. Even Marshall had been able to make the transition from 
one kind of development work to another; the Apollo Telescope Mount, assigned 
to the center in the summer of 1966, was very different from the launch vehicle 
development work for which Marshall was known." 
With no mrdinating agency or advisory body to establish national priorities 
for the use of scientific manpower, the issue of which agencies were allocated such 
manpower had to be fought out in the political arena. This had been the case even 
during the relative:y prosperous days of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, 
when Presidential advisors like Killian and Wiesner had the power to make 
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science policy rather than serve as more-or-less neutral umpires among competing 
agencies. By 1970 research priorities were established almost exclusively by the 
President working through the Bureau of the Budget. NASA priarities had to 
compete not only with other scientific priorities but with the priorities of other 
Federal programs generally. And such a process could only be inimical to the 
long-term interests of NASA R&D programs. 
This chapter has examined some of the reasons for NASA's successes-as 
well as its problems-in attracting the mixture of scientific, engineering, and 
managerial talent that it needed. NASA's success was neither complete nor per- 
manent, but it was adequate to the need. NASA in the 1?6Os had the kind of 
niission that attracted some of the best engineers in the country; it had a large 
block of excepted and nonquota positions, which the Administrator consciously 
used to structure the agency; and it was given an initial period of grace by CSC 
to work out its manpower policies to fit its programs. But none of these things 
would have availed much without the continued interest of top management to 
recruit the best talent from outside, ensure rapid promotion for those within, and 
involve the most capable engineers and project managers in running the agency. 
Management's interest in personnel matters can be illustrated by the history of the 
NASA Management Committee from October 1963, when it was established, to 
November 1965, when Seamans dissolved it. Of the sixty-six meetings held by the 
Committee, two-thirds had at least one personnel item on the agenda, ranging 
from the use of military detailees, to a ccnsideration of employee-management 
relations at the centers, to security waivers for summer emp~oyees.'~ 
This interest in ptrsonnel policy revealed itself differently at the level of top 
manzgement, at the program offices, and at the centers. Webb's interest centered 
on selecting the best men for executive training. During the early 1960s he had 
perforce to find executives on the outside, and there was always L need to fill 
certain positions with men who had not come up within the agency. It was the 
practice to appoint a retired military officer to head the Office of Defense Affairs 
and a former aerospace executive to direct Industry Affairs; also, Webb had a 
self-imposed rule that appointments to "sensitive" positions, such as Associate 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, were to be cleared with DOD.RO But by 
1965 NASA employment had stabilized and was not likely to increase. It was no 
longer necessary to go outside for the scarce talent the NASA mission required. 
For Webb the problem, rather, was to find and train the managers who would run 
the agency in the post-Apollo period. The problem had to be approached from a 
number of angles: by assigning project managers to headquarters for a tour of 
duty; by establishing in 1965 an executive recruiting service or talent bank for 
selecting NASA personnel to fill key positions; and by moving top officials from 
NASA MANWWEW PCOLICY 
headquarters to the cent. rs, ds when Edgar Conright, then Deputy Associate 
Administrator (OMSF), h a m e  the I>inctor of Langlty in May 1968. 
The  program afticrs and rcnters had the same intertst in personnel managc- 
ment but it diffirtnt focus. At OSSA, for instrtnw. program ofticials singled out 
t h m  problem as critical: How muld OSSA eliminate p p l c  who were not 
performing as thcy should? How muld program officials recruit an adequate 
numbtr of scientists who could stay in touch with their fields while working for 
NASA, particularly in headquarters? What should bt the rtlation of the head- 
quarters pwgram manager to the field pnlject manager, and by what standards 
should the pcrfornrancr ol' the former bt mersurcd?" 'The snmc issues ayplitd to 
the other program otticus and the centers that r t p r t cd  to them. 'They had thcir 
own problems, their own managtnrent and reporting systems, and thcir own ideas 
RS to what SU~\YSS~UI pcrsonncl managtleent involvttt. Webb itnd Scamans Iwktd 
to uniform agencywidc standards; the pmgr am associate administrators and tun- 
ter dimtors  were swpticitl of thcnr. In effwt, this is what the history of NASA 
prsonnel policy rcveals: 'The agency was too dnuntraliztd for tight heitdquarters 
contml of ptrsonnel management ; such ivnscnsus as t here was-for eximyle, 
q u r d i n g  personnel data banks or shifting mitnpwcr bttwttn r tnt~r~--wits  
arrivtd itt through stitnding cwmnitttcs like the Personnel Management Kcvicw 
Committee or the tusk forcr thi~t wmtc the Hjornevik report; and major shifts of 
work or manpower from onc cuntcr to anotlrcr muld only o c u r  gradually. ir' 
i n d d  thcy cwuld cwur itt itll. Finitlly, prsonncl nritnagmlent wiis not, nor cnuld 
it bt, ;t disr.~te, isolattd ;\reit ;\pitrt from the bnxd policy issues that NASA 
nranagearcnt b d .  H o w  to rwruit end train cnainttrs, how to determine the mix 
of skills ar each crnter. how to turn engineers itnd scientists into adnrinistratws- 
these were the esscniu of NAS:\ program planning. 
Chapter 6 
Program Planning and Authorization 
PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL PLANNING 
B e it Government agency or private firm, every large organization must be able to plan in order to act. Planning implies that there is an authority to decide 
what is to be done, how, by whom, and over what period of time. Confusion easily 
results from a failure to specify the sort of planning that is being discussed and 
whether it is for the short-term, intermediate, or long-term future. The annual 
budget submission of a Federal agency is a short-term planning exercise of sorts, 
since it involves projecti~lg the agency's needs agiinst what the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget and Congress are likely to authorize. At the other extreme are 
those grandiose ten-to-twenty-year projections of what an agency or corporation 
might undertake if and when resources become available. 
This chapter is about how NASA planned and authorized its intermediate- 
range programs (the logical, not necessarily the chronological sequence): the 
missions that were flown, the systems that were developed, and the aeronautical 
research concepts that were proved by test models. These were the programs with 
lead times of five to seven years, most of which were conceived between 1958 and 
1961 and which were accomplished during the following decade. The emph-sis 
then is less on review than on program approval, although it must be added , tt 
any distinction beiween planning, approval, and management review is inherer! ly 
artificial, since all are part of a single process. The same procurement plan that 
was the basis of a request for propsal  also represented a step in project definition. 
Moreover, planning was seldom complete at any stage in the life of a project up 
to actual hardware development, if then. Major research and development projects 
were always liable to change; examples include weight reductions in Surveyor, 
elimination of the Gemini paraglider, postfire modifications of the Apollo space- 
craft, and extensions in the firing time of the 5-2 engine. The  separation of 
predevelopment from development planning in this chapter is mostly one of 
convenience. 
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The thesis of this chapter is that NASA had many of the prerequisites for 
successful intermediate-range planning. Planning for the medium term is co- 
terminous with the earlier stages of the NASA "programming" function: the proc- 
ess of formulating proposed missions; reviewing and approving such proposals 
and committing the resources to implement them; monitoring progress; and read- 
justing goals, missions, and resource allocations. Why and how was NASA able 
to develop a medium-range programming structure? First, NASA planning was 
emphatically not a series of forecasts; it was a course of action, an attempt to make 
things happen, almost after the fashion of business planning. NASA plans served 
as bases for current decisions. Second, at least one program office during the 
1960s-the Office of Advanced Research and Technology-engaged in defensive 
research, which aimed not at a breakthrough but at staying abreast of the latest 
technology. NASA management felt it disadvantageous to link research too closely 
to current operations. As James Webb explained to one Congressman, ". . . it is 
definitely not our policy to demand a mission requirement as justification for thc 
expenditure of development funds. . . . If we are to feel sufficiently frtc to initiate 
this kind of program in the first place, we must not expect each development to 
find a mission use, nor restrict ourselves by a policy that would require every 
program to be carried to a full demonstration."' In this view, defensive research 
was amply justified if it highlighted possibilities for future projects, if it identified 
a new spectrum of technologies, if it fed into existing programs as supporting 
research and technology, or if it assisted agencies like the Federal Aviation Agency 
in meeting requirements--for example. in understanding the physical phenomena 
associated with sonic boom and turbine noise. The Office of Advanced Research 
and Technology was effectively charged with preparing a shelf of research pro- 
grams, only some of which would lead to improved flight hardware. The others 
would define the state of the art against which future missions would press. 
Third, the NASA organization had one division during the mid-19605, the 
Office of Programming, that could provide management with independent tech- 
nical advice. The importance of this small office was out of proportion to its size, 
owing to the combination of fiscal and technical review in the same ofKw until the 
1967 reorganization and to the expertise of the staff, many of whom (like De- 
Marquis Wyatt, William Fleming, and Bernard Maggin) had worked in Abe 
Silverstein's Office of Space Flight Programs before transferring to Deputy Ad- 
ministrator Seamans' staff. Until 1967 the Office of Programming was probably 
the closest thing NASA had to a central planning staff. By iis functions of review, 
project authorization, and development of cost models for flight programs, it did 
much to ensure that NASA had a single, coherent program. 
Fourth, planning was made easier because the main bottlenecks were only 
techfiical and fiscal. The problems that dogged Apl lo  and Gemini were prin- 
cipally of this kind: Has it been properly tested? Will it fly? How can the 
spacecraft be integrated with the launch vehicle? I n d d ,  most NASA programs 
in the 1960s were undertaken when circumstances had made them technically ripe 
and when the principal constraints were either the higher priority of other pro- 
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grams (say, Apollo in relation to the Orbiting Observatories) or lack of funding. 
Thus, NASA's planning problems were minimized considerably by the lack of 
institutional constraints. But it is in applications and, above all, in aeronautics that 
such constraints made themselves felt. NASA's aeronarltical programs have usu- 
ally been planned to support R&D in the civil aviation industry and in the 
Department of Transportation (DOT). And the problems in aeronautical R&D 
are not primarily technological at all. As a joint DOT-NASA study noted, 
"Technological advances are subject to a variety of institutional constraints which 
can be categorized as regulatory and legal, market and financial, attitudinal and 
social and organizational."* Problems such as aircraft noise, congestion in and 
around airports, and the feasibility of low-density, short-haul service cannot be 
treated solely as technological limitations, as NASA managers treated their space 
programs. 
Finally, the organization of the program offices (and to a smaller extent, the 
centers) explicitly recognized the in:crdependence of NASA programming. The 
1961 and 1963 reorganizations attempted to group the centers in related fashion. 
An obvious example of the connectedness of NASA programming has t : the 
authorization and construction of facilities in advance of the programs they were 
intended to support. Consider, for example, the role of the Office of Tracking and 
Data Acquisition, whose mission was almost entirely one of supporting the other 
program offices. Tracking stations had to be built; radio antennas had ta be 
designed to cope with the extremely weak signals transmitted by deep-space 
probes; continuous coverage had to he available for spacecraft in highly elliptical 
and synchronous orbits; and some means had to be devised to handle the ever- 
increasing rates of data transmitted by such advanced spacecraft as Mariner 9, 
Viking, and eventually, the space shuttle. These capabilities had to be available 
when needed, and it is a tribute to NASA programming that they were. 
Equally important to the success of NASA planning, the agency had to create 
mechanisms for "cross-servicing," by which a center reporting to one program 
office could work for another.* This presupposed that some centers already had 
a high proportion of "institutional" facilities, like the wind tunnels zt Langley and 
Ames and the data processing equipment at Goddard, that could be used by more 
than one center (or agency) for more than one program. Cross-servicing cut across 
but did not negate the equally important concept that each project, except for 
Apollo, should be lodged in a lead center with responsibility for overall coordi- 
nation. The official position was that each center had its mission within the total 
NASA mission and that the agency's objectives were "not amenable to clear and 
easy separation one from the other. . . . the view that the agency program 
and . . . resources are each to be managed in total provides significantly greater 
flexibility to . . . agency management than would otherwise be the case."" 
Each NASA installation repond to a d a ~ p a t c d  program offificr from 1963 to 1974, when they were all 
placed, for administrative purposes, under an Asrociatc Admin~strator for Center Operations. 
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These elements of the NASA organization-especially the establishment of 
a central office for technical review, the interdependence of agency programs, the 
long lead times characteristic of R&D missions, the relative lack of nontechnical 
constraints-encouraged the agency to plan. But they neither forced nor dictated 
the actual structure of NASA programming.* The remainder of this chapter 
examines the NASA program planning structure, first by considering the agen- 
cywide guidelines for review and authorization, and then by taking a closer look 
at the planning philosophies of the four program offices: Tracking and Data 
Acquisition (OTDA), Advanced Research and Technology (OART), Space Sci- 
ence and Applications (OSSA), and Manned Space Flight (OMSF). 
Chapter 3 includes an account of the Office of Programming that examines 
the need for an independent staff arm in the Associate Administrator's office; the 
studies of February-April 1961 conducted by Young, Siepert, and Hodgson; the 
establishment of an Office of Programs under Wyatt before the November reor- 
ganization; and the subsequent creation of a Planning Review Panel to coordinate 
the agency's advanced studies programs. This chapter offers a fuller account of 
Wyatt's office in operation, what it did, and how it did it. The number of functions 
within the office kept shifting; some, like responsibility for publishing the material 
presented at program reviews or for coordinating facilities planning, were trans- 
ferred elsewhere? But three divisions in particular were the core of the NASA 
programming function: Resources Analysis, Budget Operations, and Program 
Review. The first was responsible for "the overall review and assessment of the 
planned and actual utilization of all resources available to the Agency and for the 
development . . . of improved . . . evaluation-validation techniques for all NASA 
appropriation categorics." The Budget Operations Division implemented all pro- 
gramming derisions approved by the Associate Administrator and was charged 
with submitting all budgetary data to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress.' 
But it is the Program Review Division from 1961-1967 that is of chief 
cmcern. Director William Fleming was one of the key officials in the author- 
izaricn process. As head of the Planning Review Panel, he coordinated advanced 
studies with the program offices; as a representative to the Aeronautics and 
Astronautics Coordinating Board, he coordinated NASA facilities planning with 
that of DOD; and as head of Program Review, he reviewed and approved project 
proposals under all three appropriation accounts (research and development, 
administrative operations, construction of facilities) before sending them to 
Notc thc diffcrenm between budge formulat~on and programming. Thc former reprerents NASA facmg 
outward to thc cxccu~ivc branch and thc Congress, the lattrr involver internal debate and rwicw of agency goals 
' Rapons~bility for prcparlng Seamans' program rwlcws and for publishing their raults was auigncd to thc 
cxmutivc mctariat  in Dmrnbcr 1965 Thr Offict of Programming's Facilities Standards Division was trans- 
fcrrcd to thc Faril~tia Managcment Offim (Offim of Industry Affairs), also ertablished in Dmmbcr 1965. 
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Seamans. O n e  signed, each proposal became a project approval document 
(PAD), which authorized the program office and its field installations to p& 
and to let contracts; the PAD approved, in principle, the scope of the project and 
the means for getting the work done. 
Only in the last analysis was the authority vested in Wyatt's officc the 
authority to say no. Typically, a proposal would bc revised, modified, and dis- 
cussed until something amptable to both sides emerged. Fleming's division had 
to bc an independent sourcc of technical advice to Scamans, while maintaining the 
cunfidencr of the prograt.. offiivs in its objectivity and technical competence. 
Furthermore, the kind of review mnducted in Fleming's office was not entirely, 
or even mainly, concerned with the tcchnical soundness of proposals. It could be 
assumed, for one thing, that the program officus knew their business. Instead, the 
Program Review staff asked such questions as the following: How does this fit in 
with the agency program? Docs it duplicate facilities? Arc schedules realistic? 
Can the inst estimates for the project be validated? Was a "liuntsvillc proposal" 
a proposa! of the Marshall center or "a Huntsville mntractor proposal that had 
flowed through" hlarshall?' 
Let us examine two cases of the review proccss in action: the first involved 
a proposal to build a Huid mechanics laboratory at Marshall; the second, a 
proposal to cnntinue funding a space science data center at Cloddard. In the 
summer of 1964 hlarshall requested that its proposal for a fluid mechanics 
laboratory, already refuscrl by Scamans, be included in the FY 1966 budget." After 
a thorough review, Flcnling approved the proposal.* He began by assuming t h m  
possibk approaches to the rqucst .  hlarshall could iwntinuc its arrangement ol 
tcsting hardware in Lewis facilities; it muld use the nearby Air Forcc facilities of 
the Arnold Engineering I)cvelopnwnt Center, with the Lewis facilities to bc used 
only for final innfiguration tcsting; or it muld develop test facilities at a new 
laboratory, with Lewis' supersonic wind tunnels again to bc used only in the final 
tcsting phase. In a sense the dccision to be made was technical; a dccision to 
p romd  would rcprcscnt Seamans'judgmcnt that a new facility would not dupli- 
cate any other facility in NASA or 1101). But it was precisely for this reason that 
Marshall's first rqucs t  had been denied: The Air Force had claimed an existing 
capability at the Arnold Enginccring 1)cvelopmcnt Center. If  NASA p d e d  to 
authorize the hlarshall laboratory. Scamans and Fleming would bc f a d  with 
reversing their original decision and justifying the warranted duplication of an 
existing facility. Just as important, the laboratory, if approved, muld not possibly 
bc built in time to support the early Saturn IB and Saturn V flights, which would 
have to bc supported by facilities already in existence. Thus Marshall's proposal 
was twicr vulnerable: Not only would it duplicate an existing facility, it would not 
be ready when needed. 
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Despite such persuasive reasons for refusing Marshall's request, Fleming 
argued that the justification for pramding was even stronger. By authorizing a 
fluid mechanics laboratory, headquarters would give Marshall the same in-house 
comjx::nc= in fluid mechanics as it already had in guidance and control systems 
or in static testing engines and stages. Moreover, the desired competence in fluid 
mechanics could be used to round oul the center's launch vehicle development 
capability. Fleming conceded that such 2 laboratory would not be ready before 
1969 at the earliest. But this, he argued, was precisely when the center would be 
ready for a new launch vehicle development assignment. And unless construction 
began well in advance of the assignment, it would be unavailable "for the pre- 
liniriary fluid mechanics test which plays an important role in the early design 
and development phase of a launch vehicle stage." Once the proposed facility had 
been completed, it might also reduce the amount of testing that Marshall required 
in the Lewis supersonic wind tunnels. The decision to approve the Marshall 
proposal was not made on narrowly technical grounds but rather on a consid- 
eration of NASA-DOD relat~ons, the need to strengthen in-house competence of 
a major development center, and a review of future programs for which the facility 
might be needed. 
Similar considerations were involved in the decision to continue work on the 
National Space Science Data Center, established at Goddard in April 1964 to 
collect and maintain an inventory of data from soundmg rockets and spacecraft. 
Unlike the Marshall proposal, the problem was not whether to approve the 
concept in principle-that was already settled-but how to bring it in line with 
other NASA policies. In November 1965 Fleming, after reviewing the pro* 
approval dxument submitted by OSSA for continued fmding of the data center, 
recommended that Seamans sign it.' Again, there were considerations other than 
the technical feasibility of the data center concept itself. In his covering letter of 
approval, Seamans observed that "the ultimate development of a NASA Space 
Science Data Center has far reaching implications which become deeply involved 
with agency policy."Vrom this letter and Fleming's staff paper on the subject, 
it becomes apparent that these implications were broadly political. NASA had to 
coordinate its policies for data exchange with those agencies that would prove to 
be heavy users: DOD, the Commerce Department, the National Science Founda- 
tion, and the National Academy of Sciences. Within NASA, the program offices 
would have to consult with each other. OSSA, the manager of the center, would 
have to consult with OMSF on the data obtained from manned flight and justify 
to OART the absence of facilities for storing and disseminating OART data. 
OSSA would also have to prepare a plan for development and funding of the 
center itself: the mimated workload from all NASA installations and other agen- 
cies, the options for running the center efficiently, and the types of data to be stored 
and disseminated. In essence, the decision to go ahead with a space science data 
center represented a fairly major policy statement. The considerations that Flem- 
ing had in mind in recommending continued approval impinged on NASA's 
interagency relations, relations with the scientific community, and his perception 
of the kinds of research the center was designed to support. 
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The two programming decisions were neither particularly large in relation 
to total agency resourm nor particularly well known outside NASA. Yet a 
number of thcse decisions tended to shape the agency over the long term. The 
Office of Programming made the assumptions underlying such decisions explicit 
and presented the options available to top management. Needless to say, the policy 
considerations in relatively minor decisions were also present in more important 
ones, such as the decision to assign the management of a major project to this or 
that center. Consider the policy elements involved in assigning the management 
of the launch vehicle for the unmanned Voyager spacecraft designed to land on 
Mars. In December 1964 NASA issued a PAD for Voyager, assigning project 
management to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL) and stipulating that the 
launch vehicle would be the Saturn IB/Centaur. This still left open the choice of 
program office and center charged with launch vehicle management. A decision to 
assign responsibility to GSSA and the Lewis Research Center would give one 
result; a decision to assign it to OMSF and the Marshall Space Flight Center 
would give another. The advantage of going to Lewis was that the project would 
have a minimal impact on Apollo; of going to Marshall, that the responsibility for 
overall design and testing would be placed at a single center. In October 1965 
NASA officials reversed themselves and decided to use the Saturn V for Voyager. 
There were several reasons for this reversal, but the main one seems to have been 
the conviction of Marshall officials that "the Saturn V would relieve payload 
constraints. . . and the launches were scheduled for the late 60s and 709, just 
when Marshall's work for Apollo would be slackening off."" The Voyager de- 
cision suggests the complexity of NASA's program planning and indicates why a 
divisior. like the M c e  of Programming was needed. 
One category of decision, authorizing advanced studies, was peculiarly sensi- 
tive to nontechnical considerations. The Planning Review Panel was created in 
October 1963 to pass on study proposals, particularly but not exclusively those 
generated internally. It is important to explain just what these studies were and 
why they were such a headache for top management. 
By definition, an advanced study pertained to "flight missions beyond those 
currently approved or studies of as yet unapproved spacecraft, launch vehicle, or 
aircraft systems that may lead toward such future flight missions or studies 
leading to significant changes on an already approved configuration of spacecraft 
and launch vehicles."'" ,So broad a definition could encompass almost any kind of 
study, and the results of an advanced study or even the decision to authorize one 
could invrhe NASA management in various difficulties." Such studies were not 
particularly expensive; although OMSF receiv d $20.3 million in FY 1965 for 
studies of advanced manned missions, the annual cost to the program offices for 
advanced studies was normally i~ the hundreds of thousands rather than in the 
millions of dollars." T i e  d~fficulties alluded to were of a different son. For ex- 
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ample, if a program office let a study contract, there was danger that the contractor 
would be in a particularly favorable position to win the contract that might result 
for flight hardware. Short of banning study contractors from bidding on hardware, 
NASA could resolve the issue either by making the results of a study contract 
available to all prospective bidders or by letting multiple study contracts, either for 
parallel efforts or to consider separate aspects within one study program. I' As with 
in-house studies, every proposal for a contractor study first had to be reviewed in 
Fleming's office before it was sent to Seamans, with a recommendation to sign, 
re@, or keep on the back burner. 
A much more serious problem was that the award of or even the amounce- 
mcnt of a study contract seemed to commit NASA prematurely to certain pro- 
grams. The decision to authorize a manned space station study was construed by 
Congrew as an attempt by NASA to present it with an accomplished fact. Indeed, 
i t  was to fend off such suspicions that the Planning Review Panel was established 
in the fint place. Webb specifically asked Seamans to prevent studies from goin 
ahead without his knowledge and causing trouble for him on Capitol Hill. 
Judging by subsequent events, even this was not enough. In July 1967 the 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) issued invitations to twenty t .yht firms to bid 
on a study of a manned Mars and Venus flyby in 1975 and 197 .'. MSC could not 
have picked a worse moment to announce such a contract, and the request had to 
be withdrawn. At an August meeting to discuss the NASA budget, Webb com- 
plained of rumors that 
people at Huntsville and other placa . . . say ti.-y'd like to keep the image before the country 
that somehow man is going to go to Man and Venus. But 1 do think that the image of NASA, 
ivhen we're fighting for our liva here in the mapr programs ought to be one of controlling 
those things, or at lean not make them a mapr matter of publicity on the theory that maybe 
they will elicit support. . . . it just Kcms to mr that this is not the right atmosphere to be 
emphasizing that or having people my that if we just cut out that kind of money we could 
get along better, therefore . . . cut 10 perrent off our budget, which is what the tendency in 
Congress is." 
Five weeks :ater Voyager was canceled; it was eliminated in conference by the con- 
gressional appropriations subcon~mittees that approved NASA funds, partly, it 
seems, because the committee nlernbers believed that the unmanned project was 
a first step toward a m;l:lned voyage to Mars.'' What applied to approved projects 
could be said to q p l y  with uncFminished force to advanced studies. Thcy were 
essential building blocks for agency planning, but without some kind of coordina- 
tion-with Seamz..~~, Fleming, Wyatt, and the heads of the program offices-no 
other element was more likely to be misunderstood. 
Another difficulty in preparing advanced studies was the potential conflict of 
bureaucracies. That conflict n: ight be internal, for example, OSSA and OMSF 
competing for the right to carry out studies on manned space stations." Or it might 
kt NASA in jurisdictional conflicts with DOD, whose interest in space stations 
overlapped that of NASA. The issue surfaced in 1963 and involvcd t h r n  distinct 
questions: Were advanced studies included in the Webb-Gilpatric and Gemini 
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agreements, by uhich NASA an2 DO0 agreed not to underttke major spacecraft 
or launch vehicle development without first seeking the hpproval of the other 
agency? How far did existing study programs duplicate each other? If the Presi- 
dent approved a manned space station for the military, what role would NASA 
have in supporting the program? At a meeting of the Aeronautics and Astro- 
nautics Coordinating Board Maqned Space Flight Panel in March 1963, the 
cochairmen rqua ted  the panel to make recommendations for NASA-DOD coor- 
dination in this area.'' NASA's rationale "n~r a space station was straightforward. 
First, "men and equipment had to bc testa for long duration in the weightlessness 
of space, looking toward the time when trips would be taken into outer space and 
the planets. Second, a space station would be an ideal scientific laboratory in 
which to conduct . . . research into the basic physical and chemical characteristics 
of matter in space. Third, it would be easier and cheaper to assemby .* mmponents 
for launching planctary and celatiai voyages in space rather than . :arth."" ln 
short, the space station concept was basic to NASA's po~f -Apollo pianning. For 
DOD the military value of a ma:md space station was very much u L p  to 
question-and a Nwember 1963 study by the President's Scienc Adviso\,y I :om.. 
mittee did question it. 
NASA's positions in exchanges with DOD were that adv;inced studies were 
not covered by previous agreements, that a pint-concurrence npproach wou!d lead 
to delays that NASA was not prepared to ampt ,  and that Nt'ISA could not a m p t  
an effective veto power by McNamara over its study prog?ams. For his part, 
McNamara tried to pressure Webb into signing draft agrseri: rnts that he sent to 
NASA before r5e agency had the chance to study them. (Accor,ding to the former 
Director of NASA's Office of Defense Affairs, this "was a gambit used more than 
once by Mr. M~Nan;ara.")~O T w i n  he sent Webb signed agreements, and twice 
Webb refused tc. cosign. NASA was already proposing a $3.5 million study of a 
Manned Orbital Research Laboratory; and while Webb was willing to "go more 
than half way" in mming McNamara's requirements, he did not rule out uni- 
lateral action in case of di~agrement.~' The NASA-DOD agreement of 14 Scp- 
tcmber 1963 was at most a compromise. The drdt  agreement, prepared by the 
Office of Defense Affairs and signed by McNamara with reservations, provided 
that advanced studic~ on a manned staticn would be coordinated through the 
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board; after pint evaluation studies 
Webb and McNamara would make a recommendation to the President, incl~ding 
a recommendation as to wh~ch agency would direct the project; and if the Presi- 
dent gave his approval, a NASA-DOD h a r d  would map out objectives and 
approve experiments. 
But this agreement raised more questions than it answered. On 10 Dcwrnber 
1963 McNamara canceled the %na-Soar (X-20) orbitzl giidcr progam and 
announced that he was assigniag to the Air Force the development of a near-Earth 
Manned Orhting Laboratory (MOL). DOD officials chose to r ~ a r d  M o t  as 
something other than a space station, hence not covered by the Septcmb& agrce- 
m a t .  The upshot was that in 1964, as a congressional report acidly notd, "the 
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separate NASA and DOD efforts . . . appeared to be suhjea to only a minimum 
of coordinati~n."~~ NASA continued its advanced studies of space stations and 
began to let contracts for studies of ;ollowsn uses for Apollo hardware. That there 
was an element of duplication betvreen the NASA space station and the MOL 
seems obvious. That NASA did not wish to be fettered by prior DOD approval 
seems equally clear. 
The moral seems to be that, short of the Space Council, whose mrdinating 
authority was shadowy at best, and the President, there was no mechanism for 
meshing NASA policy on advanced studies with its only direct competitor. Within 
NASA, top management used scveral strategies to keep advanced studies under 
coctrol. There was agreement in the agency thzt exploratory and feasibility 
studies were best done in-house, that they could be accomplished at minimal cost, 
and that the more detailed the studies were, the more important it became to call 
in industrial know-how. But there had to be some authority to coordindte studies 
and ;o prepare guidelines to resolve the problems they raised. Was it necessary, 
for indtance, that a given study run continuously in order to keep abreast of the 
state of the art? Which studies were to be in-house and which contracted out? 
Should follow-on studies be authorized before the studies of which they were a 
continuation had been evaluated? Should NASA award development contracts 
only to those firms already awarded study contracts or to any qualified bidder? 
The last question is investigated in the account of phased project planning. 
A task force sti-dy conducted j u t  before the 1963 reorganization showed that 
NASA needed a policy on st-dv contracts. Of 114 studies considered, which to- 
taled $30 million, the task force oncluded that 3 were appropriate but not as 
ad-panced stl-dies; 27 appeared to be duplicative or "premature"; 3 were more 
appropriately done in-house; and another 17 required guidelines from manage- 
ment. The task force also noted that, while each program office had its own re- 
views of study results, "a uniform procedure for assessment and utilization [did] 
not exist."23 There was no uciform review, no definition of the kinds of studies 
the agency ought to be doing, no indication of study priorities. Many advanced 
studies were not submitted for review because they were funded separately as 
supporting research and technoloby. . 
It was to meet these needs that the Planning Review Panel was created. Its 
mission encompassed not only a review of each study but a l s ~  the preparation of 
an agencywide study plan. Studies to be contracted out would be approved by 
Seamans on PADS; the panel wm!3 then review specific studies to see that they 
conformed to requirements. Fdi-rhern;ore, each review would serve as a point of 
departure for the next round of studies. Thus, in the fall of 1964 Seamans wrote 
to the program offices, asking them to state the guidelines for studies contracted 
for FY 1965. The time was past, he noted, when the program offices could paint 
with a broad brwh. Based on the panel's Advanced Study Mission Rtview, he 
announced that the 1965 contract studies would focus "on a few flight mission 
areas. . .. . -ather than being as widely dibersified as in the past."24 OMSF would 
concentrate rlmost entirely on "the definition of a program for manned earth or- 
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bital operations that will best utilize the Apollo, Saturn 1B and Saturn V capabil- 
ity currently being developed." The emphasis would be more on using existing 
hardware than on using p s t S a t u r n  launch vehicles. OSSA would define Voyager 
and develop programs for unmanned planetary exploration. In applications, 
OSSA was expected to define the ncxt generation of advai~ced technology satellites 
and to csntinuc work on an operational meteorological ~atekl i tc .~ OART would 
work to define the ncxt generation of research and technology programs. 
The  annual review uncovered many weaknesses in the program offim' 
advanctd studies. In June 1967, for example, Flcming wrote to OMSF about its 
proposal for a manned spaw station study. He noted that the study plan dupli- 
cated about 50 pcrcunt of a study being conducted by an agcncywide working 
gmup, that it was based on a single assumption, and that it made no comparison 
of the advantages of manned versus unmanned ~tations. Even if viewed as an 
OMSF exercise, the study proposal left something tc be desired. Some studies 
would be carried out by Marshall. some by Houston, and one by OMSF itself; it 
was not clear whether OMSF or some lead center would coordinate and relate the 
studics to an overall plan. Also, the procedure whereby headquarters would direct 
the studics while a contractor carried them out would not work. Such work 
"NASA can and must do in-house. If we cannot find the time or people to carry 
out such work then there is ii real n d  for a reassessment of how well our human 
resourcus are k i n g  utilized."" How could a development crntcr like MSC be 
expected to acuupt the results of these studies without doing a complete evaluation 
of its own? Why should OMSF turn to a contractor for space station configcra- 
tions when hlSC had the most highly qualified group of engineers in the world 
for such work? "A gmup such as this would finish with a product that is usable 
by NASA since, bein8 the creation of a development center under the direction o,' 
Headquarters, it would be amptablc to both." Flcming ended by strongly urging 
thnt OhlSF canivl the proposed studies. If NASA management found it difficult 
to control its a d v a n d  studies progrims, it was not for lark of expert technical 
advice. 
In sunrmiiry, ;~dvancwl studics were of basic inrpcmanct to NASA planning 
because thcy marked the beginning of the R& 11 cycle. Whether thcy pertained to 
laur,ch vchiclcs, missions, or spacwraft, advanced studics tended to set the dircr- 
tion of long-run ilgtncy planning, although thcy seem to have had little direct 
impact on hardware dcvclopnwnt. For this reason, milnagemcnt had every reason 
to keep a tight rein .In what the agency would authorize and fund. The  Planning 
Review Panel drafted an annual study plan; PADS were issued thilt cnmmpasscd 
each progrim offitu's studies in the six mission categories;' while study contracts 
had irlso rG !w apprcwcd by the Associate Administrator, whose authority to 
' For OSS.\ thr rrr  ICH. W A S  an Iinprc.tnt ~w!trr  0SS.i annu.tlly puh l~shd  a thm-volun~r "pnulm~us"that 
wuicl hC u w l  In short-trrm .tnd lntrt .nnilatr plannln# hi:. undrr thr trrnls of an crpcnlv rxprrssnl agmmrr.. 
ktwrrn thr o f fw  .rnd \Vrhl~. WAS ntr dmignatd 3 "plm " 
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withhold such approval was formal. On the basis of a recommendation by the 
Planning Review Panel, Seamans in August 1967 mcinded approval of twenty- 
two study PADs not yet placed under contract because they were untimely and 
inappropriate in relation to the current operating plan and to the budget position 
NASA had staked out for the ensuing fiscal year.26 The  agency could not do 
without the kind of planning that preceded detailed project definition. But man- 
agervnt's efforts to keep advanced studies under central control were a mixed 
sumss,  owing to the lack of center-program office coordination, the absence of 
guidelines for study contracts, the seeming inability of some program offices to do 
their studies in-house, and the necessity as late as 1967 to withdraw study PADs. 
Few aspects of NASA planning were new. DOD had faced most of the 
problcms of advanced systems development several years before NASA was cre- 
ated. How to determine the element of risk in developing a new system, how to 
choose between alternative systems, how to select system characteristics in advance 
of competitive exploration, how to present program goals independently of a 
proposed solution-all these problcms were inherent in R&D planning, whether 
military or civilia.1. The  Air Force approach to systems management-conceptual 
phase, definition phase, acquisition phase, operational phase-showed more than 
a passing rescmblancc to phased project planning. However, the similarity of 
appearance matters less than the difference in results. The differences in NASA 
and DOD planning for R&D have been discussed elsewhere: the NASA emphasis 
on one-of-a-kind rather than serial production, the relative absence of costing 
models for NASA programs, and the use of agency installations rather than 
contractors for technical direction and systems integration?' 
Given such conditions, NASA management faced two ~rincipal  problems: 
how to make programs visible and how to direct on an annual basis programs that 
spanned several years. R&D program normally received "no-year" funds; that 
is, the money remained available to NASA until it was spent. Agency proposals 
normally had to be matched against agency funds and missions; this was the 
problem of deriding which programs to authorize. Once authorized, R&D pro- 
grams had to be funded. and officials needed projections of how much the centers 
were spending and proposed to spend; this was the problem of financial manage- 
ment and review And any plan had to allow for changes in current programs. Put 
differently, the chief planning and approval documents--the PAD, the program 
operating plan, the project devclopmcnt plan, and the forms authorizing and 
allotting resourcus-were NASA's attempt to resolve problems inherent in doing 
R&D. 'The problems included the following: Given the <strent state of the art, is 
such-and-such a realistic proposal? T o  what level of detail should the center be 
rquired to explain how it intends to carry out the projccr? How can NASA absorb 
the major changes that can be expected to occur during the life of the project? 
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Chapter 3 discusses the origins of the NASA planning system. The following 
is a summary of the major developments in chron~logical sequence from the 
system approved by Glennan in Januar-. 1961 to the revised system of 1968. 
Glennan had established a system that, although far too complicated and soon to 
be su.mseded, had at least the germs of a uniform planning system. Changes in 
1962-1963 simplified the process: the creation of the PAD, which described the 
scope of the plan approved by Seamans; and the revision of the project devel- 
opment plan, which, instead of prmding approval, became the single author- 
itative postapproval summary of how the program office proposed to accomplish 
its objective. These documents in turn served as bases for NASA forms (506,504) 
that ma& funds available for a project. In fiscal terms, "the PAD establishe[d] rh 
purposes for which funds might be spent: the 506 authorize[d] the writing of 
checks for these purposes; and the 504 [made! ;he deposit in the bank account 
which [made] these checks good."2" 
This was the official planning and approval system that obtained until the 
1968 reforms. Not that the format remained unchanged during this period-far 
from it. The PAD format was revised several times. In 1963, for example, it was 
changed from being reissued annually to issuance on a "cradle-to-grave" basis by 
tile Associate ~dministrator."' The phased project planning directive of October 
1965 added a project definition phase to the cycle and slowed the process by which 
management moved almost directly from feasibility studies to approval of full- 
scale hardware development. However, no detailed guidelines were published 
until the summer of 1968. By then, Webb and Finger had moved closer to the 
point where planning, authorization, R&D funding, and budget formulation 
would dovetail into one system. Each PAD would correspond to one line item in 
the NASA operating budget, would be updated annually, would be signed by the 
Administrator or another official (e.g., the Associate Administrator for Or- 
ganization and Management) who was delegated signoff authority, and would 
constitute a contract between headquarters and the center designated as project 
manager. 
Even in a chapter on predevelopment plann *mething must be added 
about NASA's financial management reporting systc :. First, program author- 
ization was a continuing process; thus, headqudrters needed reports of actual as 
well as projected outlays. Second, NASA needed yardsticks of cost-effectiveness to 
assess the costs of future programs. In other words, the agency needed current data 
in order to evaluate future programs. The data normally appeared in two different 
formats. The program operating plan (POP), a quarterly submission by the cen- 
ters to Seamans, showed actual obligations through the previous quarter and 
estimatd ftiturc obligations through completion of the project. The POP served 
as a benchmark for measuring performance and R&D budget estimates, and as 
a basis for resource authorizations. In a sense, "pieces of the POP [were] approved 
by individual executive actions" taken by Seamans.'" 
The other reporting format was the contractor financial management sys- 
tem.." It was intended to provide NASA with a financial tool for planning and 
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controlling project funds and with a basis for reports used by headquarters for 
overall planning. The cifectiveness of such a system depends on the accuracy with 
which financial data can be reported, the avoidance of unnecessary detail, and the 
use of a common baseline for elements such as cost reports and change updates. 
Origiirally, NASA used a single format, form 533, which was approved by the 
Bureau of the Budget in April 1962 and was revised in 1964. But it would be 
another three years before NASA had an integrated financial management system. 
A 1965 survey by the Financial Management Division (Office of Administration) 
revealed a sad lack of uniformity: "personal choice of 'home-made' devices; little 
comprehension of the real purposes . . . of the system; nonuse by contractors or 
outright game nanship . . . very major downstream restructuring of entire pro- 
ject reporting levels and data specifications to accom[m]odate false starts . . . 
inadequate cross-communications between Centers and Contractors, Centers and 
Centers, and within Headquarters."32 The survey's findings led to revised pro- 
cedures, which were published as two manuals in March and May 1967. The 
new system differed from its predecessor in three important respects. It replaced 
the single-format 533 system with four monthly and qua..terly 533 reports; it 
permitted the contractor to use its own accounting system and time periods in 
preparing reports, so that NASA and the contractor would possess the same 
information; and the "blank stub" of the 533 forms (i.e., the absence of prescribed 
line item entries) enabled project managers to use whatever work breakdown 
structure they wished, provided that it was compatible with the NASA agen- 
cywide coding structure used to classify all agency activities for reporting and 
budgetary purposes. Thus the revised system became an effective tool for pre- 
paring estimates of NASA's current and long-range nerds. 
Intermediate-range planning, program authorization, and financial manage- 
ment all sowed into one another, but the ability to plan and to budget depended, 
in the I.~st analysis, on NASA's ability to prepare accurate cost models of its R&D 
ory-ams. The larger the program, the more difficult this was; and what NASA 
learned from its costing studies was, only too often, that their main value was 
retrospective. In the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, Orbiting Geophysical 
Observatory, Surveyor, and Nimbus programs, which were begun in 1959-1360, 
costs grew by a factor of four to five subsequent to project initiati~n;~' the principal 
reason was the lack of a well-defined spacecrah design or a clear definition of 
experiments to be developed (see table 6-1). 
As a 1969 report noted, "one might have predicted the cost increases that 
were experienced as the spacecraft designs became better defined, the tech- 
nological problems identified, and the experiment development and allied 
supporting effort e~tablished."~" There were substantial cost benefits where tech- 
nology could be transferred from one system to another with little design change. 
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When such changes were rquired to adapt a technology, as for Lunar Orbiter, 
they could be enough to nullify any gains. With Orbiter, there were two sets of 
technology transfer: the spacecraft design itself and the camera system based on 
Air Force camera technology. To  adapt the camera system required major changes 
in storage, film developing, and remote readout, changes that contributed greatly 
to Orbiter cost increases. 
Ignoring the small projects that used proven technology, there werc three 
cases in which it was possible to make accurate estimates of planned or current 
programs: when spacecraft and experiment design were established before the 
start of the project; when NASA bought production-line items, especia!ly sound- 
ing rockets a d  certain launch vehicles; and when NASA compared current 
programs with the funding levels originally authorized. In the first case it was 
possible to reduce design changes during the development phase. In projects such 
as Relay, Syncom, and the Applications Technology Satellite (ATS), the cost 
increases were only about 1.1 to 1.3 times the original estimate. Each was designed 
before NASA began the project, and in the case of ATS "a substantial amount of 
design and demonstration of critical subsystems was conducted . . . prior to its 
definition.'"n the case of serial production most of the early estimates for launch 
vehicles and propulsion systems seem to have been quite unrealistic; one official 
called them "totally ridiculous." Here, the agency stood to gain much by accurate 
estimates. The tendency of the program managers was to make estimates based on 
what vehicles should cost and to ignore many of the hidden costs of development, 
especially the cost of assembling and maintaining the team that would produce the 
launch vehicle. The key was to separate more precisely the nonrecurring cost of 
producing the first unit-whether the motor, the airframe, the guidance system, 
or combined components-from the recurring costs of serial production. Despite 
the original cost overruns and schedule slippages, a launch vehicle stage like the 
Centaur could be p r o d u d  serially once the hardware met design specifications. 
Today, Centaur and Delta are funded under R&D only because no other category 
seems to fit. 
Because of the size of the programs, it is the third category that is of most 
concern. The concept of a cost overrun has meaning only in relation to some 
baseline of funding. The management information systems used by NASA were 
specifically intended to make thcsc overruns visible. Such werc the 533 reports, the 
manpower utilization report, and the NASA PERT/COST system that most 
prime contractors were rquired to use in reporting summary time and cost data. 
These systems were not invariably effective or welcome within NASA. A r m n t  
study of Polaris, where PERT-program evaluation and review technique-was 
first used, concludes that 
PERT did nnt build the Polar~s, but it was cxtnmcly uscful for thosc who did build the 
weapon system to have many pvplc  believe that it did. 
. . . the program's innovativeness in management methods was . . . as cKwtivr tcrhnially as 
ram dancing. . It  m a t t e d  not that management innovations rontr~butcd I~ttlc directly to 
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the technical d o n ;  rt was enoueh that those outside the program wetv willing to believe that 
management innovation nad a vital role in the techniral achievements of the Polaris." 
The effectiveness of PERT on NASA programs is also open to question; in many 
programs PERT was intrcduced too late to make much of a dent in funding and 
~chedules.~' The  point is that by 1964 the Office of Programming had in hand 
sufficient data and experience to analyze some of NASA's major programs. A 
study of Gemini conducted in June 1964 uncovered a deficit of $83 million for 
completing the spacecraft alone, an estimate based entirely on information avail- 
able to management-particularly the monthly Project Gemini "OMSF Program 
Status" reports (also known as SARP charts). The  program was broken into five 
major categories, and program schedules were examined from incep t i~n .~Vrom 
these, the programming task force discovered that the program was overrunning 
both cost and schedule, that OMSF set about solving problems at the expense of 
time, and that total costs wer likely to grow by a multiple of at least four. The  
evidence was sufficiently persuasive to lead to a drastic overhaul 01 Gemini design, 
management, and scheduling. In particular, the intervals between launches had 
been lengthening; MSC wanted launches two to three months apart, later four, 
before Mueller reduced the interval to two months. 
The  1963- 1965 period marked the maturity of NASA cost analysis. Besides 
the Gemini survey, the OAice of Programming carried out several major joint 
studies: the Hilburn task force reports of St,xember-December 1964, mentioned 
in chapter 4, which established the relation between schedule slippages and cost 
overruns; a study by the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board of 
launch vehicle costs, which was based on the distinction between recurring and 
nonrecurring costs, and the unit cost for developing the first article in a production 
series; and a "cost validation" study at Marshall in the summer of 1963, a study 
that influenced the decision to implement phased project planning. The  cost 
validation study was carried out by staff drawn from the Office of Programming, 
the Office of Administration, and OMSF. 'The study was ordered because Sea- 
mans was uncertain that centers like Marshall had a master plan for "pacing 
items"' in the Gemini and Apollo programs. The task force wanted to know the 
depth and status of mission plans and the basis for schedule and cost estimates; as 
one team member wrote in his daily lop, Wyatt wanted to be able to tell Seamans 
that "there is d master plan-Behind :he master plan are s hedules-Behind the 
schedules there are work plans-That the work plans have been prired out."3' 
The studies were useful to the extent that top management vanted them, the 
Office of Programming had the staff to do them, and all concerned could agree on 
what they were trying to do. For officials to be at': to plan at all, they had to 
understand the relations between schedules and co or between the direct and 
indirect costs of launch vehicle production. No stul could be effective unless 
officials at the highest operating level to which the smdy was addressed were 
P a c q  Items were thtw c\cncs or cnnipnmcs [ha[. I[ dciavcd, would raux  an equal dclav In the enun 
prqram or In 4 plannrd Irunrli 
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interested in seeing its recommendations carried out. Some of the most successful 
reports, like the Booz, Allen and Hamilton study af incentive contracts 
(pp. 103-105)) did not claim to make policy as much as point the way toward 
carrying out a course of action that had already been decided. Similarly, the 
costing studies of Gemini or the cost-validation analysis of the Satun V and 5-2 
programs took those programs as givens."' The studies sought to reduce, if not 
eliminate the uncertainties inherent in the R&D process-uncertainties attacked 
in different ways by the PAD system and phased project planning. 
T o  summarize the discussion to this point: the structure of NASA pro- 
gramming was intended to make planning more realistic, to test the validity of the 
planning, to "harden" concepts into development projects, and to serve as a mode 
of continuous review. Therefore, a document like the PAD could serve many 
purposes. It authorized projects at every stage of the R&D cycle from advanced 
study to advanced development; it served as the basis for the detailed project 
deve;opment plan, which was the prerequisite for hardware development; it 
preceded the issuance of every resource allotment; and it was the foundation for 
periodic financial management reports, such as the quarterly program obligating 
plans submitted by the centers thrcugh the program offics to Seamans. Since each 
phase of the R&D proms (which in 1964 included advanced studies, project 
definition, and hardware development) called for a separate PAD, Seamans had 
three opportunities to intervene in the cycle. 
Viewed in this light, phased project planning (PPP) appears to bc what it 
was, the normal sequence in management theory for R&D. NASA had actually 
teen phasing planning all along (see p. 84); PPP was introduced at a time when 
NASA had very few new starts, and the main reasons for enunciating the concept 
were to make actual practice more uniform and to give management at least one 
additional point at which to intervene. The issues that require explanatinn are the 
internal debate that preceded even the first tentative statement of policy, the delay 
between the policy directivc of October 1965 and the detailed guidelines of August 
1968, and the failure of line officials subsequently to understand or use PPP. A 
brief account may reveal something of each program office's approach to or- 
ganizing complex programs. The difference between the 1965 and 1968 directives 
owed something to the three-year intervrl in which the agency tripd to make PPY 
work. But it owed even more to the context in which the 1968 guidelines were 
drafted: They were only part of a system intended by Webb to channel resource 
authorization, planning, and program review through his office. 
The 1965 directive established four phases in the life of a project: advanced 
studies (phase A), project definition (phase B), design (phase C), and devel- 
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opmcnt/operations (phase D).' In general, the program offins took exception not 
to the concept itself but to the t e rm in which it was couched. The draft guidelines 
did not recognize the need for establishing a project organization at an early date; 
thty said little about the relative responsibilities of the program offices; they did 
not show how the concept related to the budgetary, POP, and procurement cycles; 
they did not distinguish very clearly between each of the phases; nor did they 
justify four decision points rather than the three that had previously been used. 
Most of the specific criticism was reserved for phases A and C. It was (and 
remained) unclear how advanced studies should be carried out-whether directly 
by the centers, under contract, or by a mixture of the two. One program manager 
criticized the phase A concept because it would involve several centers studying the 
same objective. 
If thac studies arc to be of any value, thty will awntially bc in competition with each other. 
If they are not competing, it kcoma doubtful that the m t m '  more competent personnel 
have been assigned to the task. . . . Additionally, each NASA center appears to k saturated 
with work and no relief in sight. . . . it is doubtful that large quantities ofgood studies will 
k generated from which to k selective. This ir the foundation upon which the entire 
procedure waa atablirhed." 
Although the avowed purpose of PPP was to foster "maximum competition," 
mither the preliminary drafts nor the published directive worked out such a 
procedure. One of the problems in planning a major R&D program is to find firms 
with the capability to serve as prime contractors; in some very large projects 
NASA has had to rely on a single source or face the alternative of creating, at 
enormous expense, competition where none existed. Followed strictly, the 1965 
directive would have mandated full competition at every stage-an unrealistic 
state of affairs when one firm was the obvicus choice for followsn development 
work. It left open the question of whether competition in phase D should be open 
to any firm or only to phase C contractors, and it ignored the real difficulty in 
having the program offices work with bidders who had not been involved in the 
earlier phases of PPP. It was common knowledge that a firm not involved in the 
first two phases had no real prospect of competing successfully in phase C. In fact, 
the program offices continued to do things the old way, even after 1965. In June 
1967 when NASA had to select contractors for phase C of the Voyager spacecraft, 
competition was limited to phase B contractors. As one center director put it, 
"nothing significant would te gained by attempting at this time to enlarge 
c~)rnpetition.'*' 
Thus the 1965 directive went too far, yet not far enough. It was very specific 
in listing the benefits of PPP and quite vague in explaining how the process would 
' 'l'hc prqramming ryrlc lor laril~tict ronstrucrion wa: sl~ghtly different. I t s  lour stages werc mnmptual 
study, prclimlnary design, final design, and projm execution. Unlikc R&I) projms, facilities projcar w m  fully 
funJcd; that is, a11 thc funds for one year w m  budgeted at ona. Scc NHB 7330.1, "Approval d Facility 
Projed~" ucly 1966), p. 8. 
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work. For the program directors, agreement "in principle" obscured disagree- 
ments over detail. The directive omitted or g l d  over many significant areas of 
planning: It set no cutoff point between large projects and supporting m a r c h  and 
technology; it left open the possibility of limiting competition in the final phase to 
contractors already involved in detailed project definition; it said nothing about 
science, experiments, or payloads; and it did not specify how much time might 
elapse between phases. It is no wonder that the job of preparing detailed guide- 
lines, originally assigned to Wyatt, went nowhere. The sheer difficulty of getting 
nine or ten headquarters offim to agree on anything was enough to stop Wyatt's 
people in their tracks, and agreement, when reached, was at a lowest common 
denominator level. 
That PPP was implemented at all was due to Webb's determination to regain 
the control over NASA that he believed he had lost sometime before the Apollo 
fire. Chapter 3 summarizes the changes of 1967-1968: the creation of an Office 
of Organization and Maraagement to bring the program and functional offices 
under Webb's control; the separation of technical review from budget preparation; 
the reorganization of the Office of Facilities to bring about master planning for the 
agency; finally, t11c overhaul of the system by which programs were plan~ed, 
authorized, and reviewed. Webb wanted to know-because he did not think that 
he knew-what he was approving whenever he signed a PAD. By the summer of 
1967 Harold Finger's Office of Organization and Management, especially the 
Planning Division, had prepared detailed guidelines, most of which were issued 
piecemeal the following year." The new systcm would emphasize supervision, 
whether directly by Wcbb or by delegation to Fingcr, and make it possible to track 
every approved pro-ject down to its smaliest work package." 
The basic features of the system were outlined in a memorandum dated 
27 January 1968 from Wcbb to the agency's key officials. First, there would be 
a NASA operating plan to serve as "the official consolidated statement of NASA 
resource use plans for the current year." Each item in the plan would have its 
PAD, which would set the objectives, and would specify funding and work 
authorizations. "Together, the operating plan and the PAD systcm [would] pro- 
vide a double entry type of approvai, mntrol and audit system within which both 
program and administra!ive objectives [cnuld] be achieved." The program direct- 
o n  had to assume several responsibilities in submitting a PAD: "first, to approve 
and endorse its substantive and technical merit; second, to take into a m u n t  all 
related administrative and functional rquiremcnts; and third, to rcflca thew 
considerations in the documentation he sends forward thmugh the Associate Ad- 
ministrator for Organization and Management." Before the PAD reachtd Webb's 
desk it would first go to Finger for his signaturc. Wcbb wanted to "cut out the 
concurrence mill, which sometimes took a yeat, with 25 or 30 mncurrenm 
rquired to prove something.""' By delegation from Webb, one signaturc would 
be enough. He also hoped for visibility; he wanted to know the right things so that 
"no one muld bury a problem and keep it buried."'" It was of the greatest 
importance that the Office of Organization and Managtmtnt was built around- 
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almost mated for-an R&D person, someone who could meet the program offim 
on their own terms. The Apollo fire had shown just how much had been hidden 
in the organization; and Apollo Applications, with its budget stretchouts and 
reprogramming, had made the need for tighter fiscal controls even mow obvious. 
Finger had to be able, if necessary, to say no; to refuse to sign a PAD if in his 
opinion it did not mesh with the NASA budget." There was always a temptation i I . fi for such an official to let the program offim do as thcy pleased. But as Finger 
1 noted, "if you do ha:  very often you completely confuse your system. You no i longer have a system." " 4 
$ The PPP guidelines, when finally issued, were not superimposed on the 
system just described. If anything, thcy wen a sort of commentary, in which the 
PAD, the project plan that supplemented it, and the request for p r o p 1  all fell 
into place as parts of an encompassing system. Phase A was now preliminary 
analysis; phase B, definition. Each phase would be covered by a PAD, and every 
current year portion would be revised as necessary. The PPP guidelines clarified 
those matters that had led to so much disagreement. For exan~ple, competition in 
phase C (design) would be restricted to firms capable nf going on to phase D 
(development/opcrations). Other details included the in-house nature of the prc- 
liminary analysis phase, the type of contract to be used (fixed-price or cost-plus- 
fixed-fee in phases B and C, incentive contracts in phase D). and the role of the 
centers and program offices in monitoring contractors during the final devcl- 
opment stage. Thc system did not lessen responsibility below the Administrator's 
level; it was not intended to make R&D work self-regulating or mechanical, 
which would havc beer. self-defeating. In simplest tcrins, its purpose was to 
inform Webb or Painc or Newcll of what it was he was signing, hence what he 
t ~ d  to defend before the Bureau of the Budget and Congress. 
The foregoing account of NASA's formal approval systems ntccssarily leaves 
many questions o p n .  For all the ovcrlap that existed, the program offim were 
created and maintained for different but complcmen:arv purposes. This section 
provides brief surveys of planning strategies in each of . ,~e four program offices, 
w hct her its function was support (OTDA), defensive m a r c h  (OART), disci- 
pline oriented (01 'A), or mission oriented (OMSF). 
The Office of 'I'racking and Data Acquisition (OTDA)'" 
Elevated to program office s ta tu~ in iitvmbcr 1965, OTDA had neither pro- 
grams nor centers. In most respects, its role wt it apart from the other program 
offices: the requirement that it support all NASA programs, its extensive intcr- 
national activities, its almost exclusive use of support service contractors to operate 
an; maintam its tracking stations, and its unbroken s u m s  in meeting its srhed- 
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ules. OTDA's reliance on improvements in the state of the art was no greater than 
that of any other program office; yet the connection between txhnology and 
mission rquirements is perhaps molt obvious in OTDA. What has been most 
apparent in OTDA planning since the early 1960s has been the office's ability to 
keep funding requirements level and PI-ediqable. The office hos largely accom- 
plished this by closing many of its overseas tracking stations, consolidating its 
manned and unmanned networks, using fixed-price and award-fee contracts for 
facilities construction and operation, and developing a Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellite System to supplement its ground networks. By such means it has been 
possible to reduce the Deep Space Network (DSN) to three stations spaced at 
intervals of 120 degrm along a longitud%al axis and quipped with 64-meter 
radio antennas. More than any otilcr program office, OTDA has managed to 
reduce the element of uncertainty inherent in R&D. 
OTDA's s u m s  has depended largely on developing a mphisticated ap- 
proach to planning. It must anticipate the needs of the centers, other program 
offim, and principal investigators. It must work out its rquirements for support- 
ing research and technology. It must have people stationed at the centers to assist 
in preparing the requirements documents that are the basis of OTDA pldnning: 
thc system ~nstrumentation rquirements docament, the network support plan, 
the work authorization document, and the like. Such planning demands a con- 
tinuing dialogue between OTDA, program managers, and JPL and Goddard, the 
two installations responsible for almost all network support. Or rather, what one 
sces are two planning groups working side by side. On the or r hand, OTDA has 
always planned its long-range network requirements. On the other hand, the 
centers must document the kinds of support they need for particular missions. On 
the OTDA side, the cycle begins with advanced studies to review and updzte 
network planning: new facilities, automatic data processing equipment, funding, 
and the like. This i? followed by systems definition, which brings together OTDA 
and center personnel who negotiate rquirements and draft a project plan. At 
every point, a complex flow of documentation is generated. The program offices 
provide a formal requirements document; this is validated by OTDA, which 
prepares its support plan; and JPL or Goddard then prepares additional material 
to justify the network support it is best able to provide. 
The conspicuous feature of OTDA plannin~ is that each case is determined 
by the characteristics of the mission to be supported. In general, unmanned 
deep-space probes have proved the most difficult to support, but the data rates of 
most spacecraft have increased by several orders of magnitude since the days of 
Explorer 1 and Mariner 4.' Particularly in the past decade, OTDP. plaming has 
involved trai!> off considerations, for example, the advantages of plscing additional 
tape recorders on orbiting spacecraft w s u s  augmenting the supporting ground 
Mariner 4 transrnlttrd 8 1.1 bio pcr -d (BPS) When it  b e r m  operational in 1983, thr shuttlc/spmlab 
will m u m  -hcrc bctwccn 250 XQ and 50 mdlron BPS Thc tor( per bit of data war r e d 4  by 90 pcm . 
bctwcm 1965 and 1973 Src Rrcwu~ oj  Tracklnd and Data A~qutrrtron, pp 103-101 
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network. The relevant point is that OTDA must, to an extent, plan independently 
of specific future requirements. Once the general characteristics of future pro- 
grams become known, the office begins feasibility studies. Formerly, OTDA let 
study contracts, but it now does most of the preliminary work itself. Consider, for 
instance, wnat was involved in designing the DSN 64-meter tadio antenna at 
Goldstone;California, which was put into service in April 1966. Once the features 
of lunar and planetary programs were understood--extremely weak signals, long 
cruising periods, an anticipated increase in dat- rates-it became possible to plan 
network support. To bui!d the earlier 26-meter antennas at Goldstone and else- 
where had been difficult enough; to build the iarger one meant resolving Kvae 
technical constraints, once it was showl that one Lig antenna would be rnon 
cost-effective than several smaller one."'!3armous steel castings had to be built 
to take the weight of the dish-snaped awenna; a!lowance had to be made for wind 
velocities and distortion caused by gravitational pull (both sides pulled in different 
directions when the antenna waw no* pointed at zenith!; and the dish itulf was 
made to rest on a thin film of oil, which served to c r L o n  the mass of the an:enna 
and to shut it down if the film's thickness decreased." JPL let parametric studies 
(see note 11) and followed them with a preliminary en,ineering report and a 
daign validation study. This was phased project planning hefore that term was 
made official, and Seamans singled out the construction of this great antenna as 
"almost a textbook case" of the system he rccommendcd fcr the a p c y  as a 
whde." 
In sum, CTDA planning was guided by three principal considerations. First, 
the characteristics of the mission dia~ted,  within rather broad limits, the kind of 
support that OTDA provided. Was the mission manned or unmanned, Ca3h orbit 
or deep spaccp If in orbit, was it synchronous or elliptical, ar,:! how many contacts 
per orbit were n-ded? Were the data reeded on a real-time basis, or au ld  they 
be stored for later rcrrievsr.l? Second, OTDA was not simply a passive witness to 
decisions made elsewhere. Planning involved a three-way exchanee between 
OTDA, the program office rrqucsting support (and in the 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  DOD, which 
provided tracking support for Apollo), 2nd JPL and Goddar-d. Third, OTDP has 
coped successfully with the vastly increased data transmission rates of the newer 
spacecraft systems because it has been able to use and build on existing capability. 
The first 64-meter dish was a majcr breakthrough; the .uvo that followed, at 
Madrid and Canberra, were almost routine by comparison. It has been OTD.4 
policy to increase "existing capability . . . only after thorough analysis of r.;y;ro:: 
requirements." By insisting on coordination with program offim "from project 
inception until achievement of mission obiectives," the office was able to anticipate 
the facilities 2.3d technology needed a decade later.-' 
The Office of Advanced Research and Technology (O.'.RT) 
It has been said that OART, more than any other program office. carried on 
the NACA tradition of doing advanced research ~n-hol~se. But this is only partly 
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true, since what had once been the mission of an entire agenq. was now a 
subordinate part of the much larger entity that s u d e d  it. Like NACA, OART 
was charged with conducting research into the undcrlying principles of aero- 
nautical and space technolow, reducing "mmplex theory to design procedures," 
and testing systematically "to obtain design data fcr . . . vehicles of .he fut~re."~'  
But OART had to go beyond NACA practice by "proving" a concept, that is, by 
building hardware to test it, wbether or not the actual hardware found its way into 
future systems. The special features of OART wor!: included a relatively large 
number of open-ended or continuing pragrams with no specifit 1 completion datr, 
the n l e  of the Associate Administrator for Advanml Research and 'Technology in 
revit ing supporting research and techno:~,gy proposals by his own and ~ t h e r  
progrAm offices, and the creation of a Mission Analysis Division-located at 
Ah~es, although attached to headquarters-in February 1965 to do advanced 
plan~ing in order to identify future technology requirements. 
All these features tended to change the role of the older centers. Some 
offcials, notably Dryden, objected strenuously to the reseerrh centers' mvolvement 
in project management, which he preferred to leave to the newer development 
mniers. Other NACA vetclans, like Silverstein, believed that the older centers 
nmleci some development p1ojws in order to o;tn new research possibilities; if 
the centers had a few projtx*~, they would inevitably spill into the center's research 
programs. In this, Silverstein's vitw prevailed, but there was a price to pay. At 
Ames, for instance, the changes of 1941, -1 965 had a profound effect: the transfer 
of many research division heads to headquart -is, thc c~ganization of research 
divisiom around disciplines rather than specific facilities, the increased use of 
wind tunnels for development work rhther than research, the establishment cf a 
Life Sciences Directorate in a center hitherto devoted exclusively to research in 
the physical sciences, and an increase i? manpwer to cope with the management 
of those projects (and the inevitable contrxilng for hzrdware and services) as- 
signed to ~ m e s ? '  In all this, much was undoubtedly gained; what was lost is 
hardel to describe. The dilemma for OART planners was to justify the kinds of 
research done at the centers. Formerly, research in cryogenics or structural dy- 
namics could be justified on the ground that it was worth doing for its own sake. 
But OART was cre? ~ e d  to foster research that could be justified on its merits and 
that would feed into NASA programs. Thc question posed was this: How cmuld 
OART coordinate a number of small-scarc efforts and organize them in related 
fashion, yet not tie each research task to a specific mission or completion date? As 
Finger, himself a product of Lewis, warned, 
Any effort to dcfinc the c~pcrimentai engineering as m m o n  research and technology . . . 
weakens the entin basis for OART and for the O A R T  provanl. It  makes that program 
suwptiblc ;o aucssment of the missions and data defi~,, rather than to tt.c basic advances 
in capabiiitv to be generated by that work.% 
T h ~ s  background serves to explain the difficulty, for OART, of sponscring 
research that was at once independent of mission objectives iind tied to NASA 
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planning. How, then, did OART plan, and how sumssful was i t?  Before its 
reorganization in October 1970 OART consisted of a Program and Resources 
Division (established from preexisting units in July 1964), seven program di- 
visions,. and Mission ~nalysis." Mission Analysis functioned as OART's long- 
range planning group, and it was deliberately located at Amts to provide the 
group w ~ t h  more of a research atmosphere than would have k n  possible in 
Washington, 9 .C.  As with OTDA, the flow of information was two-way: a give 
and take between the division, other parts of NASA, research advisory committees 
like the Advanced Research and Technology Board of OART, and other agencies, 
especially FAA. The  purpose of Mission Analysis was to identify options for 
future planning and to estimate the time in which a Lertain technology would be 
n d e d ,  what was called the technology readiness date. Not that such work had 
to await the creation of the Mission Analysis Division. Earlier, Langley had been 
studying the feasibility of an orbiting Large Spa- Telescope; Lewis was working 
on advanml propulsion systems; while several centers carried on work in short- 
haul transport aircraft. What set Mission Analysis apart was that it functioned 
as a planning staff for the entire program office; it concentrated on missions rather 
than on state-of-the-art improvements; and much effort Has spent on mode anal- 
ysis, that is, the choice btwccn alternate means of conducting a mission." 
A second planning area was 0.4RT's review of the agency's supporting 
research and technology (SRT). Related to this was the creation of the Program 
and Resources Division, which was to bring in-house research under some kind 
of management control." Besides the director, there were thrcc subdivisions, each 
under a deputy director: Program Coordination, responsible for analyzing OART 
programs "for proper balance and for program overlaos or omissions"; Resources 
Management, which dealt with budgeting, funding, and reprogramming; and 
Administrative Management, which oversaw personnel, technical reports, con- 
gressional liaison, and the like."" The  division gave OART program balance, even 
at the cost of going over the heads of the program division directors. 
The  maim problem in coordinating S R T  was the shccr quantity of the work. 
The Officr of Space Science and Applications alone was spending over $80 million 
on S R T  in 1908, most of it tightly linked to near-term programs. OSSA prr?;ects 
ran into the hundreds: large unfurlable sparecraft antennas; impro:ci pointing 
accuracies for orbiting observatories; guidance, corrtrol, and navigatioi~ sv. tcms for 
lar:nch vehicles; lunar and planetary roving vehicles; sensors for applicatmn . 
satellites-to mention only a few. Besides the work carried on in his own ofice. 
the Associate Administrator for Advanced Research and Technology had to be 
aware of such programs and the potential for wast~ful duplicatinn. He  was 
supposed to revicw agencywide plans for SR'I'; revicw the technic~l content of 
each SRT task, as these programs were called; and recommend a total agency 
program and the .issignment of tasks to each program office."' Internally, he had 
-.- - - 
Bloc-hnlqy and Iluman Rcxar*:h. Elmmn~cs and (:onrml. Chem~cal P~npulswn. Sparr Power and 
Elrcfr~ral I'ropulzlon. Spcv Vrhlrlrs, Aemaur~zal Vehlrlrs, and Kcxarch 
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to have the staff work that would enable him, if nmssary, to say no to his division 
directors, or that would give him independent support where divisions refused to 
cooperate. 1 his twofold problem-reviewing agencywide SRT and meshing his 
office's Itragrams with those of other program offices-was in some ways the 
oppc~. e of that of OMSF: Where OMSF hat! a few very large programs, OART 
had a plethora of smaller ones, some of which, undoubtedly, had been authorized 
because they were "nice" to do. 
If OART had a specific problem, it was lack oi mrdination between its own 
programs and those of other officts. There were too many PADS required for 
OART tasks; too little flexibility in allowing the centers to reprogram; and no 
ntechanism for linking technology disciplines in one area, like avionics, with 
aircraft technology, which was in a separa't category." This problem was aggra- 
vated by two others: the a b s c n ~ ~  of a fixed percentage of the NASA budget for 
research programs, so that dollar levels remained constant or actually fell; and the 
absence of management continuity. OART had five successive directors between 
1962 and 1969. This state of affairs, a chronic one in the upper levels of Covern- 
ment, was especially damaging to R&D management. Writing in 1969, one 
observer noted the "continuing short-term shifts of objectives . . . inadequate hor- 
izontal communications between centers . . . a thin middle management" and the 
tendency to label people as "NACA types," "aerodynamics types," or "vehicle 
types.'"" This was the time when NASA began to adopt the program author- 
ization system described earlier in this chapter. Partly to accommodate the new 
system and partly to handle its internal problems, OART made several changes 
between 1968 and 1970. It I educed the number of PADS from 30 to 8, the number 
of congressional line items from 8 to 3 (aircraft technology, space technology, and 
advanced research and technology), and the number of work units-the basis for 
OART reporting by the centers-from 5000 to 500 "Center Technical Objectives 
Resumes.""' The 1970 changes were intended to give OART programs a focus 
and a consistency they had sometimes lacked. Aside from changes in nomen- 
clature, these reforms included establishment of a research council to ensure a 
b a l a n d  research program and authorization of the progl ~m division directors to 
issue instructions to the centers over their own, rather thar, the Associate Admin- 
istrator's, signature. 
Interagency studies, OART's third planning area, are best represented by the 
joint NASA-DOT Civil Aviation Research and Development (CARD) Policy 
Studv, begun in 1969 and completed in 1971: The specific recommendations of 
that study are of less concern here than the manner in which it was carried out 
and the reasons for its success. The study group had a specific objective and precise 
terms of reference: The House and Senate committees that authorized the NASA 
budget wanted to know the bentfits accruing from a @en level cf R&D. Here, 
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NASA's role was almost a throwback to NACA's support for the military. Fur- 
thermore, the study group had a literature of policy studies on which to draw, 
from the 1948 "Finletter report" to thc: 1969 report of DOT'S Air Traffic Control 
Advisory Committee. Thus the interagency working groups and the consultants 
who participated had some notion of how their work would tie in with and 
comment on previous policy studies. What made the coordination of NASA and 
DOT ever. tighter was the role of thvc  NASA employees, including many top 
OART officials, who had gone to work for DOT. Moreover, the two agencies set 
up a joint office in January 1972 to handle followup work in three areas-aircraft 
noise abatement, airport congestion, and the need for improved short-haul 
transport-singled out in the report as high-priority items. In other words, the 
interagency team viewed its study as only a first step toward implementation of 
its major recommendations in civil aviation. And the final repori was noteworthy 
in recognizing the importance of nontechn dogical constraints, such as regulatory 
systems, the social impact of airport congestion, and the cost-benefit effects of 
various levels of R&D funding. 
The Oftice of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) '' 
In turning from OART to OSSA, certain differences of program size and 
advisory structure are immediately obvious. OSSA sponsored programs much 
larger than those of OART, while the content of the programs--much more than 
in OART-was determined in part by outside advisors to NASA. But the term 
"advisory" scarcely does justice to the role of the Space Science Board of the 
Nation61 Academy of Sciences or the Space Science and Applications Steering 
Committee (SSASC), which, established in May 1960, assisted OSSA in selecting 
scientific payloads for flight missions. SSASC and its subcommittees served many 
purposes: they strengthened contacts between NASA and the -cientific commu- 
nity, gave representation to various interest groups, and acted as source evaludtion 
boards in choosing principal investigators. Their functions were legd as well as 
advisory, since NASA could ilot negotiate exclusively with a university inves- 
tigator without SSASC appioval. 
The relation of OSSA to its advisory committeev was one of thr T O S ~  serious 
policy issues facing Newel1 z:~d John E. Naugle, who succecdetl Newell as 
Aimciate Administrator for Space Science and Applications i ~ .  September 1967. 
To  say that the problem involved diflerences between NASA and outside scientists 
over the scope and functions of advisory ronimittns is to underestimate the com- 
plexity of the issues. First, agency officials sought to avoid setting up boards so 
structured that NASA would be bound by whatever advice they offered. This had 
been an issue between NASA and the Space Science Board as early as 1959, when 
NASA acted to make the board "less of an independent advisory group with a role 
in initi~ting policy and more of a service entity responding within carefully 
prescribed limits to tasks specified by NASA.""" Thus, when NASA proposed 
developing arl Orb~ting Astronomical Observatory (OAO) in 1959-1960, the 
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board recommended that NASA instead support rocket- and balloon-borne cx- 
periments in astronomy. Only in 1962 did the board bow to an accomp!ished fact 
and endorse the OAO.* Similarly, NASA rejected the recommendation of an ad 
hoc Science Advisory Comxittee in 1966 that the agency establish a general 
advisory committee of non-NASA scientists reporting to the Administrator. Webb 
had a history of rejecting this proposal because he thought a committee of outsiders 
might intecfere with his authority to make policy for NASA. If established, such 
a committee would blur the lines &tween advising and policy making, assume 
some of the functions of the Space Science Board, serve as a crutch for a weak 
Administrator, a~ ld  take over functions already delegated to the Deputy Adminis- 
trator and the heads of the program offices."' To Webb and Newell, the pros and 
cons of a general advisory committee reduced themselves to purely administrative 
terms. To  the members of the Science Advisory Committee, its proposal was 
justified by frustration in serving on committees chaired and dominated by NASA 
employees. 
Another problem was the relation between the various advisory groups on 
which OSSA drew. The complexity of the advisory process more than matched the 
complexity of the programs for which advice was sought. By 1967 the system of 
the early 1960s was no longer adequate. There were no guidelines explaining why 
or whether NASA needed such groups, how they were to be used, or the jurisdic- 
tions of the Space Science Board, the Missions Boards composed of non-NASA 
scientists and established in 1967 to map out overall strategies for NASA science 
programs and the'SSASC subcommittees. In administrative terms the structure 
of NASA advisory boards looked backward "to the days of discrete programs 
rather than forward to flight and research environments characterized by high 
degrees of interdependence between disciplines, between science and engineering, 
and between techniques of flight investigation."""To NASA, the way to make the 
system work was to bring in the most capable scientists to shape the content of 
space science, while keeping control of programs in NASA hands. But to many 
scientists, the advisory process could not be a dialogue between equals because as 
outsiders they co-Ad have no authority for final decisions and could not know as 
much about NASA programs as NASA employees did."" 
Outside scientists assisted NASA as advisors, as principal investigators, and 
as members of boards to evaluate proposed experiments. How did OSSA, building 
on their work, rrganize and plan its programs? Organizing space science was no 
simple matter, since each program was a combin?tion of scientific payloads, the 
spacecraft that flew them, and the vehicle (developed at non-OSSA centers, prin- 
cipally Lewis) that launched them. When considering a potentia! mission, it was 
necessary but not sufficient to ask, "Are the scientific objectives worthwhile?" 
OSSA officials had to go three steps further: "Is it technical!y feasible?" "Are 
there sufficient people to do it?" " L n  we get the funds to support it?"'" Tke 
-- 
Two ~ ~ h e r  constraints furtltcr dimin~shed the board's ctfcctiveness I t  met hfrequently (three io four times 
a year), and after 1964 11 was supported exclusively by NASA funds. 
169 
PROGRAM PLANNING AN Z) AUTHORIZATION 
OSSA program structure was designed to resolve these questions; its purpose was 
to combine the evaluation of proposals for basic research with the management of 
programs calling for engineering skills of a high order. Figure 6-1 illustrates some 
of the mcst important features of the OSSA organization. 
The fundamental organization; . principle was "the establishment of a man- 
ageable number of technical office. 7 handle separate program areas."" Each 
division was intended to be as self-contained as was practical; each contained flight 
programs related to common objectives; and, without exception, scientific disci- 
pline groups were located in the divisions they were primarily intended to serve. 
Three other features, not clearly brought out by the chart, are also noteworthy. 
Each division contained a small Program Review and Resources Management 
group to provide administrative support; and except for Voyager, each had its own 
Advanced Programs and Technology group to assist in future planning. Further- 
more, it was OSSA policy to pair scientists and engineers at each operating level; 
where the head of one division was a scientist, the deputy was an engineer, and 
vice versa. This practice, which Newell t.,ansferred from his experience at the 
Naval Research Laboratory, was designed to avoid the pitfalls of a strictly 
discipline-01 'snted approach, in which neither side had the ability to see the total 
picture. For this reason, OSSA management insisted that scientists named as 
principal investigators had to be prepared to get their hands dirty. The payload 
had to meet several criteria, as indicated earlirr cost, compatibility, and com- 
petence. The outside scientist had to become an insider, had to learn the engineer's 
language, had to grapple with the unavoidable tradeoffs in turning a research 
concept icto flight hardware. 
Another important OSSA concept was the distinction between the headquar- 
ters program manager, who was "the senior . . . staff official exclusively re- 
sponsible for developing the Headquarters guidelines and controls," and the 
project managw, who was "the senior . . . line official exclusively concerned with 
the execution of his project."7' This distinction was not hnknown elsewhere, but 
OART tasks rarely rose to the level of projects, while OMSF project managers 
tended to be systems managers within very large programs. The program manager 
reviewed the effectiveness of center management, identified alternate courses of 
action, and developed a close working relation with the project manager re- 
sponsible for the effective day-to-day management of the project at the field 
installation. Moreover, the installations' roles and missions were quite distinct. 
Wallops Station managed NASA's sounding-rocket program; Goddard handled 
Earth-orbital and applications satellites; while JPL, a contractor-operated facility 
working for NASA, managed the Deep Space Network as well as a significant 
part of the agency's lunar and planetary programs. 
The existence of these installations once more raises the issue of the purposes 
for which NASA research centers were being maintained. At Godddrd, with some 
twenty flight projects in 1967, the maintenance of sc much scientific and en- 
gineering ta!ent in a Government laboratory could be defended on several counts. 
The Government could not conmct out its responsibility for determining that it 
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was ?Wing good science for its money. It needed people who could build at least 
one - .hystem of the spacecraft they had designed to fly. Goddzrd management 
chose to run flight projects in one of three ways: designing and building a space- 
craft in-house (e.g., the Small Scientific Satellite); monitoring a coniractor who 
designed and integrated the subsystems (e.g., the Orbiting Observatories); and 
following the procedure used in certain advanced systems, like the Nimbus 
weather satellite, in which the center "actually bought the subsystems and acted 
as spacecraft contractor and hired an integrator. . . . The Nimbus approach was 
twofold, to not only monitor, but you get up there in their plant a rd  you are right 
over their sh~ulder ."~ '  Once the center had developed sel- .a1 strong discipline 
areas, it was even better equipped to do its work, as scient~sts in one discipline 
began to work with and consult with people in related disciplines. For example, 
people in planetology worked with people in Earth resources, or scientists in 
optical astronomy worked with colleagues in meteorology, since the different 
divisions used the same general type of instrumentation. Moreover, the scientists 
wh- worked in these discipline groups performed important services for the whole 
of IYASA. They evaluated research proposals for headquarters, advised other 
Government agencies on the ~ a l u e  of the space program in fulfilliq their pur- 
poses, and were detailed as experts to the program offices for limited periods. 
Finally, by attaching project scientists to each flight project, Goddard management 
tried to ensure that the spacecraft mhnagers and the principal investigators would 
understand what the other was doing. The function of the project scientists was 
to bring a b u t  a "cross coupling and understanding of the needs of the experi- 
menter . . . a rd  what the project's problems are."" 
So far the presentation has been limited to a still picture of the OSSA system 
of program planning. 'The results of OSSA planning presupposed the following 
elemerits within the organization: the existence of a strong in-house capacity to 
design p,.ograms, combined with the ability to integrate experiments with flight 
hardware; the establishment of a manageable n u m k r  of technical divisions to 
handle separate program areas within OSSA; the -ross-fertilization of scientific 
and engineering skills at each operating level; the creation of a Program Review 
and Resources Management Office to handle budgets, reports, and proctwement 
policy; the establishment of separate program review and advanced mission 
groups in each division; and the corollary policy that planning, rather than being 
something imposed from the top, flowed upward from the centers, contractors, and 
advisory groups wiih which OSSA worked. In addition, with the adoption of a 
management information and control system in October 1965, OSSA had both an 
information system and a set of instructions that extended downward from the 
program division to the project offices. 
T h i ~  is a somewhat idealized version of how OSSA officials did their 
medium- ange planning, or thought .i: -v did. Some ground rules, like that of 
pairing sc-cntists and engineers, dated from the early 1960s. Other features, such 
as the establishment of advanced mission groups in 1966, owed something to 
planning for the post-Apollo period, when OSSA m d  OMSF would both he 
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staking claims to a piece-a rather large piece--of the acticn. And many of these 
principles had to be imposed over the stiff resistance offered by Goddard and JPL. 
At Goddard the differenm between Director Harry Goett and hepdquaners 
officials became so serious that he was dismissed in July 1965. Here ihe issue 
seems to have been G o d s  reluctance to accept supervision by headqbaners 
program managers or to allow OSSA representatives to attend meetings between 
Goddard officials and center contractors." 
At JPL the situation was male more complex by the laboratory's status as 
a contractor-operated facility that behaved, for most purposes, like a NASA 
center. The disagreements between JPL and NASA, which were intensified by 
the string of Ranger failures, were touched on in chapter 2. The s'mutuality 
clause" was an irritant, but the underlying differenm had more to do with 
program management than with anything else: OSSA, in particular, insisted on 
a tighter, more projectized organization than the one to which JPL had been 
accustomed. 
To state the purpose of OSSA program planning is to emphasize both the 
difficulty of the task and the office's sliccess in reducing it to almost manageable 
proportions: "the coupling of the undisciplined scientific activity into a highly 
disciplined engineering and administrative activity-the design. preparation, and 
conduct of a space mi~sion."~" 
The Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) 
The foregoing analysis of how OART and OSSA conducted their planning 
accentuates the distinctive features of OMSF ~lanning. '~ The obvious differences 
between OMSF and the other piogram offices pertain to size and the kinds of 
programs that OMSF managed. Indeed, OMSF did not plan in the sense that 
Newell's or Bisplinghoff s office did. There was no similar structure of large and 
small projects, some under way, others phasing down, and others moving from 
design to development. At OMSF planning was as much within as between 
programs. At the end of 1961 all three of OMSF's major programs-Mercury, 
Apollo, and Gemini-had been approved or were ongoing. No new program was 
approved or introduced as a budget line item until FY 1967. In this sense, there 
was very little to bridge the gap bc!:veen current and future programs. 
The size and share of NASA funds and manpower enjoyed by OMSF put the 
organization in a special category, one not reflected in the organization charts. 
Although superficially similar to other program offices- -it too was headed by an 
Associate Administrator and had to submit PADS for each program-the sheer 
size of manned spaceflight programs made control by Webb, Seamans, or Dryden 
difficult, or at least incomplete, compared with the other program offices. OMSF 
was semiautonomous within the agency structure, whilc the OMSF waters were 
semiautonomous, almost baronies, within the OMSF framework. Muellcr, as 
well as the center directors, had independent ties with Congress, the aerospace 
community, thc press, and, through the Science and Technology Advisory Com- 
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mittee, the scientific estate. The  real key to understandiag .he OMSF program 
structure is the high priority of Apollo and its special claim to NASA resources. 
If the responsibility for the development of the Centaur launch vehicle and its 
RL-10 engines was transferred from b4arshall to Lewis, it was because, as a 
former NASA official explained,   marsh all officials had much more interest in the 
Saturn vehicles that they had designed than in the Centaur vehicle, and for that 
reason h e y  were prepared to see Centaur canceled. If in October 1965 Webb 
decided that the Saturn V would be user1 to launch Voyager, it was in part because 
he wanted to retain the Marshall capability once Apcllo phased down. Because 
of the . erriding claims of the lunar landing, NASA management arid Congress 
were prepared to accept, tolerate, or encourage practices they might have disap- 
proved of elsewhere, like the creation of Bellcomm, the extensive use of support 
service contracts, and the construction of facilities-Marshall's static test stands, 
the crawler-transporter at Kennedy Space Center-that were peculiar to one 
program rather than to the continuing needs of the agency. At the same time, once 
the large programs began to phase down, NASA would face grave problems. 
What would happen to the contract and in-house work force assembled to carry 
the lunar landing program to completion? What would become of centers lilte 
Marshall that were organized around a few very large development projects? 
What would become of OMST; after the first lunar landing? Did the Apollo 
hardware have uses beyond the program for which it was developed, was a 
launch vehicle like the Saturn V a technological dead end? Insofar as the other 
program offices rode on the coattails of the Apollo program, they too were involved 
in its fate. The  size and sunk costs of Apollo were such that a serious mis- 
calculation in OMSF might drag the agency down with it. 
For a clear understanding of the nature and purpose J!' OMSF planning, it 
is necessary to concentrate on two areas: the management approach of George 
Mueller, who succeeded Brained Holmes as Associate Administrator for 
Manned Space Flight in September 1963, and OMSF's Advanced Mission Stud- 
ies program from its inception shortly after Mueller's arrival to the fall of 1965, 
when NASA submitted Apollo Applications as a budget line item. 
Under Mueller, who ca~ne  to NASA from Space Technology Laboratories, 
the manned program reached its "classical" phase. One might even argue that the 
most important administrative changes at OMSF occurred in a little more than 
one year, from September 1963 to the end of 1964. Mueller knew about Holmes' 
troubles and from the beginning expressed a desire to work closely with top 
management."' But, although he was more diplomatic than Holmes had been, he 
was no less bent on having his way. During his first year at NASA, he devised 
technical and management approaches that were to dominate OMSF planning 
until well into the 1970s: the organization of OMSF along program lines instead 
of having one office working on launch vehicles and another on spacecraft; the 
division of each program into discrete "work packages"; the concurrent devel- 
opment of the vehicle and groun*' support equipment; the greater use of redundant 
(duplicating) systems in the launch vehicle and spacecraft; the introduction of the 
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concept of the "open-ended" flight mi~sion;'~ arrd the all-up mode of flight testing 
and, with it, the delivery of complete systems to the Cape. Mueller knew of the 
Air Force's experience in the all-up testing of Minuteman." Despite the initial 
resistance of his cetxer directors, Mueller was able to sell the concept to them 
because the logic of the situation-the "end of the decade" deadline for the lunar 
landing, the knowledge that p rwams  were slipping dangerously, the inefficiencv 
of the current mode of flight testing-made some son of change inescapable. 
NASA could not afford to repeat the Saturn I testing experience, in which four 
launches of the first stag* were followed by launches of coupled second and first 
stages." The centers, Marshall in particular, had to take a OolJer approach. 
Mueller believed that NASA no longer needed and certainly could not afford a 
step-by-step advance. For this reason he also decided to cancel all manned Saturn 
I flights and to man-rate only the Saturn IB and Saturn V launch vehicles. 
Mucller was equally radical in handling headquarters and center operations. 
He restructured the Apollo program so that every functional clement at the 
headquarters program office had a corresponding element in the center ~roject 
office. The several systems comprising the Apollo spacecraft were defined through 
the subsystem level, and for each of the major systems he required that one person 
be responsible full-time for performance, costs, and. scheduies. In short, Mueller 
acted to stratify his organization to the lowest level. As Associate Administrator 
for Manned Space Fligh*, he defended his programs before tcp management and 
Congress, set and interpreted policy with his program managers and center 
directors, and set the terms on which long-range planning would proceed. To 
Apollo Program Manager Brig. Gen. Samuel Philiips, USAF, who had been the 
Minuteman manager and, more important, Vice Commander of the Air Force 
Ballistic Missile Division before being detailed to NASA in 1963, Mueller dele- 
gated responsibility for planning schedules, budgets, systems engineering, and 
other functicns needed to carry out the program. Below Phillips' level were the 
center program offices, the prime contractors, and the intercenter coordination 
panels that knit the program together. What Mueller succeeded in creating was 
a "manned space family" with a stronger voice in policy making than any other 
program o%cc. By meeting frequently with Apollo prime cowactors (organized 
as the Apollo Executives Group), by intens.ive briefings of the House Science and 
Astronautics Committee (cspeciall) its Manned Spact Flight Subcommittee) at 
Manned Space Flight centers, and by creating his own long-range planning group 
in conjunction with Bellcomm, Mueller developed lines of commu lication with 
external groups that could make or brzak the Manned Space Flight program, He 
also werlt far toward making the OMSF Management Council a more effectil e 
policy-making body. He reduced it to include himself and the three ceriter d i re-  
tors, mmbined the monthly council meeting with the monthly program schedule 
review, and carried a resolution by which decisions could be deferred if they re- 
quired extended discus4 . 
Organizational changa at the centers Soth preceded and paral' -d these 
reforms. Each case was a r tspnse to the logic of programs with In? ,cad times, 
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geographic dispersal of prime contractors, and the need to integrate the flight 
hardware and the ground support equipment in one place. As shown in chap- 
ter 3, there was not even a mnso:!dated Launch Operations Center until May 
1963. The subsequent history of what became the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
bears witness to the Importance attached by OMSF and t .o management to 
concentrating launch operations in one center. In December 1964 KSC absorbed 
the Florida Operations of the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), thereby as- 
suming control of "all manned spacecraft upon arrival at the Center and total 
responsibility for manned space vehi~les."~' In October 1965 KSC assutiA re- 
sponsibility for NASA unmanned lal~nclrcs as well, over the bitter protests of 
Goddard, which had previously managed them. At Marshall the August 1963 
reorganization reflected the transition from a center whose roots were deep in the 
arsenal traditior! to one whose principal function would be to manage large 
contracts for developing and producing complex launch vehicles. This reor- 
gaiization established an Industrial Operaticins Division "as the . . . element 
responsible for multi-program managenrent with Research and Development 
Operations providing technical support and management of in-house . . . proj- 
e~ts.'"'~ Concurren:ly, center management extended its use of support contracts on 
a one-contract-per-laboratory basis. At MSC in Houston there were two reorga- 
nizations in 1965. The first, in May, divided operations from developmental 
activities, with separate ofices for preflight program management and for mission 
operations. The second, in November, gave Direaor Robert Gilruth and his 
deputy, James Elms, pint responsibility for four assistant directors and for the 
Apollo Spacecraft and Gemini program offices." All these changes-the coxwli- 
dation of responsibility for launch operations, the separation of development from 
operations at the development centers, and the transition from organization by 
systems to organization by program-provided a foundation for the Manned 
Space Flight program that was sturdy enough to last the decade. 
Yet Mueller's success in thc medium t.erm may scr c . dain the wmpara- 
tive faiiure of OMS? in :he long term. Althollgh Mac'. &ed an Advaxed 
Missions Office under Edward 2. Gray as esrly as : .:. ., 1 1963, it would be 
almost three years before brF ,A was sufhcirntly CI . .. in ;. . ost-Apollo 
P, phming to present Apollo ~pplichions (AAP) as a buYD? 1;:: . . ~ i v m  the 
nature of ongoing OMSF p r g a m s ,  the reasons for thc *'. , .r.c under- 
standable. First, there :t; an inherent tension between malls * , .I rograms 
and planning programs for the long term. If one office has .: I I , ~  for both, 
current programs will generally take precedence over future ,. .)grams b t c w ~ c  of
the difficulty of planning as if there were no nronetary constrahts while carrying 
on in the real world. 
Second, there were gcnui-2 differences ktween Mueller and his center 
directors over mission possibilities after the lunar landing. There were three op- 
tions: missions to the near planets, such as Mars; expanded lunar explor ,ition; and 
manned Earth-orbital laboratori~s.~ Despite its fantastic expense, Mirellcr was 
attracted by the idea of a manned expedition to Mars, while Gilruth at MSC and 
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von Braun at Marshall were convinced "that the majvr effort of NASA in the 
post-Apllo period nust be directed toward full explclitation of near Earth sport 
capability and, thus, the follow-on lunar activities, if they are required, can be 
carried out at a more scientifically efficient pace."'7 T k  difficulties with the space 
station concept are discussed earlier in thischapter. NASA could not commit helf  
prematurely to an Earthsrbital station (or anything else) for fear of bringing 
down on itself the \ I ath qf Congress and-what was equally to be dreaded-the 
antagonism 4 W D .  Her, 'he hesitation in definicg the sequel to Apollo. What 
began as a program of lunar exploration had shifted by 1967 to Earth-orbital 
operations. 
Third. OMSF's planning trercises left the role of space science equivocal. At 
least up to ! 966 science was something added on, rather than integral to, mawled 
spaceflight. It sometimes seemc.8 as if OMSF management based its planning for 
science on the existence of \url;!us hardware rather than on a felt need for 
science-bascd explor driun ;,i a n j  case, the development centers wtte not equipped 
to the same de~rec  to do research. Marshall had magnificent engineering cap&& 
ities but few facilities for doing research, whether basic or applied. MSC, on the 
other hand, had a numbcr of laboratories, like the Jaunar Receivin, Labc;atory, 
that could accommodate reqearch in the life sciences and lunar geology. The real 
problem facing OMSF was how to work with OSSA in any follow-on to Apollo, 
3 problem that Seamans' "roles an+ missions" memorandum of 26 July 1966 
failed to resolve."" OMSF was given full responsibility for Apllo and AAP mis- 
,Ions, while OSSA was to be resporrsible for the scientific corltent of NASA 
spaceflight programs. However, the approachesof the two ofices were so different 
that cooper~tion would have to he the result, not the precondith, of any joint 
action. OSSA officials were privately sceptical of OMSF's ability to do long-term 
planning, they regretted the selection of Saturn V rather than the Saturn 
IB/Centaur as the Voyager launch vehicle, and they differed sharply with Muel- 
ler over the design of experiments and the ways in which flight hardware would 
hc used. For these reasons, OMSF found it exceedixgly difficult to submit a 
program that could be made to follow logically from programs actually in 
progress. All too often, OMSF planning seemed prompted by inquiries from 
Congress and the President, rather than by any co5. ,Action that "this is the way 
we ought to go." * 
To show that NASA had the means for successful wdium-terrn planning, 
as was asserted at the beginning of this chapter, is not !he same as showing 110::' 
NASA did it. The strategies of project approval and re~ i rw so far discussed were 
Thus thc 16)60 .%pollo Prngram I'* dopmcnt Plan slated that no a d v a n d  m t u m  would k tncludcd "unr~l 
such rtmc as rhr advrnccd programs arr defined and approved" (p 17-1) 
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useful in chan:;cling ideas and propos~ls upward and the decisions of the program 
directors downward to the enters  and project managers. But the project approval 
documents, the phased rrojcc.t planning directives, or the controls on advavced 
studies were not planning documents iq any real sense. Rathti, they set the t m  
on which planning took place. Thry were approaches by top management toward 
controlling rn:,.i.owcr and resources throughout NASA. Webb and Seamans 
could not defed  the agency budget until they knew what it was they were de- 
fending. NF nould they administer programs if each PAD rquired conmrrencer 
by two dozen officials before it reached their desks. T o  put it differently, tne DAD, 
the project development plan, and similar documents were tools of management 
col: :; they recorded, at several removes, program decisions made elsewhere by 
other officials. 
T o  unuerstmd how program planning really took p h w ,  one must examine 
each p:ogram office, its areas of responsibility, and how it related t? the others. 
Each of the three substantive program offices had its own plannirrg staff, as well 
as control divisions to review the planning of .he several divisions comprising each 
office. But no program officr. dcvc!qwd a system :a handle its R & 3  projects: not 
OMSF, because there was nothing in the Apollo program to aiaate what the 
follow-n~ to the l ~ n a r  landing would be; not OSSA, because programs like Viking 
and the High Energy Astronomical Observatory were not routine extensions of 
capabilities developed for earlier program-, and nirt 0.4RT, because of the 
d;'iiculty of doing research that was at once detached from s p ~ i t i c  missions, yet 
. ;how expected by top rnanagemcnt to help define the tecbnicai paramtiers of 
NASA flight programs. Yha t  the offices could do was to refine management tools 
within the approval syster.1 represrnted by the PAD. Top management could do 
e great deal to eliminate paperwork, to make decisions -vplicit, and to get program 
directors to justify their decisions, year by year and project by project. On the 
evidence. ;; seems tha! they could do little to determine thr technical content of 
specific programs; program planning was not just a reflection of choim made on 
the seventh floor nf FOB-6. 
The ways in which Voyager or Lunar Orbiter or the test facilities and 
l a b  stories at Houston and Marshall took shape owed much more t- engineering 
than to administrative considerations. One need cn!y recall such examples as the 
conviction of center d i ~  cctors that projects or facilities were techoical!y ripe;"' the 
ambition of the directors to retain certain capabilities even when their leason for 
being ,;-,- gone; the knowledge that many of the uncertainties dogging earlier 
programs (e.g., in the developmeni of launch vehicla) no longer exi~ted; and the 
existenn, by the mid-1960s, d subsystems like the Suiveyor wft lander or the 
pointing devices of the orbit in^ Geophysical Observatnries, that could he 
recombined for entirely different spacecraft syster. in short, the planning tech- 
niques described in this chapter represent the interplay of sophisticated tech- 
nologies with the convictions of NASA management and line officials about the 
kinds of pr%rams the agency ought to have. The decision to go to the Moon gave 
NASA one kind of prcgrzm, to which unmanned planetary probes and supporting 
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'research and technology must contribute. The decision dating from 1967 that 
space must be treated as a resource to be exploited as well as a region to be 
explored gave NASA another program with other ends in view. Program planning 
was the point at which technical constraints, political pressures, and adminis- 
i 
trative solutions converged. 
I 
i ; 
Chapter 7 
The NASA Budgetary Process 
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 
T he budgetary process accounted for the difference between what NASA wanted and what it ultimately received. In the strictest sense, the Federal 
bldget is "the proposed annual financial plan . . . which the Congress considers 
and approves or modifies. . . . This is the medium through whict an agency 
determines, requests, and obtains the financial authority needed to carry out 
contemplated programs, and the mec3anism . . . for . . . control of operations 
within the limits of funds made available by the Congress."' This definition 
explicitly recognizes that the Federal budget is rather more than a financial doc- 
ument. It enunciates goals, serves as a benchmark for comparing actual with 
expected accomplishments, is the basis for authorizing and appropriating legis- 
lation, and (as the mechanism by which programs already approved are funded) 
is a record of past negotiaticns and a preview of programs not yet approved. The 
budget, in short, translates substantive programs into dollars and cents. 
The absence of coordination, of 1egisla:ive review and approval by a single 
body accounts for some of the distinctive features of the Federal budget. As 
Wildavsky notes, budgeting is fragmented because congressional subcommittees 
are semiautonomous units that concentrate on limited areas of the budget; special- 
ized because the full congressional committees assign budget review to their 
subcommittees; nonprogrummatic because most committee members view their 
task as making marginal adjustments to existing programs; and incremental 
insofar as Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) take the 
previous year's budget, rather than the worth (in both senses) of the total program, 
as their point of depar t~ re .~  Particularly in the 19609, critics of Federal budgetary 
procedures seized on these features because they made the establishment of prior- 
ities within the total budget impossible. Or-what came to the same thing-the 
division of budgets into smaller and smaller parts made overall evaluation exmd-  
ingly difficult. According to this view, "the overall budget tends to emerge as the 
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accidental outcome of a number of specialized dc~isions."~ Hence the number of 
proposals, dating from the first Hoover Commission (1947-1949), for reform. 
These included proposals for performance budgeting, that is, incorporating state- 
ments of output in agency budgets; for program budgeting, by which agencies 
would make their operating assumptions explicit to the Bureau of the Budget; for 
projecting multiyear costs; for examining alternatives to a given approach and for 
considering needs and costs together; and for introducing improved financial 
management systems according to guidelines prepared by the U.S. Comptroller 
General.' 
The principal agent in preparing a unified national budget was the U.S. 
Bureau of the Budget (BOB). Long before it was reorganized as the Oflice of 
Management and Budget in July 1970, the Bureau's role transcended that of 
adding each agency's figures to get the c o r m  sums.~ubstantive programs cost 
money; and the Bureau's power to review and adjust agency estimates amounted 
to policy making, whether intended or not. The Bureau and its successor had 
powers, some of them statutory, others assigned by executive order, to deal with 
a variety of Government-wide issues. It had (and still has) the authority to set 
personnel ceilings for most agencies, including NASA. It prescribed standards for 
agencies to use in contracting for services. It was responsible for supervising meth- 
ods of financial reporting by Federal agencies and for promoting Government- 
wide procurement policies. Since 1939, when it became part of the Executive 
Otfice of the Presidcnt, it has had the function of clearing 311 remmmended 
legislation, whether or not it involved appropriations. In brief, BOB and OMB 
had policy-making functions, some assigned or delegated explicitly, others gained 
almost by default. The Bureau coordinated programs that involved more than one 
agency; appraised pcnding legislation in terms of its compatibility with the pro- 
grams of the Presidcnt; required departments to include cost projections of pro- 
grams they wished to fund; and informed the President of executive agencies' 
performance. The questions examined here are, how did NASA work through the 
budgetary process, and how did the process itself affect the planning and conduct 
of NASA.programs? As a corollary, to what extent did BOB coordinate Federal 
planning for science and technology in a period when NASA was spending one- 
third of the Federal R&D dollars?' 
Three features that NASA shared with other R&D agencies made external 
review difficult. First, there were no guidelines for a unified national scienre 
policy; second, BOB was at a disadvantage in reviewing NASA programs; third, 
the nature of the programs made them difficult to justify in quantitative terms. 
These were not ncrcssarily disadvantages in the abstract; one might argue, for 
example, that there was no conlpclling reason for a unified Fcderal scienrv policy. 
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Indeed, the diffuseness of publicly sponsored research, the sector-by-sector ap- 
proach, could be justified on the ground that it rescued publicly supported R&D 
agencies from a system of rigid centralization. Alternatively, the multiplicity of 
bodies for reviewing and coordinating Federal science policy tended to become 
self-defeating, especially in the absence of staff support. Congress in the 1960s 
lacked both the staff and the central review of the budget that would appear to be 
essential to legislate for science. The same weaknesses were evident within the Of- 
fice of Science and Technology, the President's Science Advisory Committee, and 
the Federal Council for Science and Technolow, all of which were chaired or 
directed by the President's Science Advisor. The effectiveness of a science advisory 
system depended on a conjunction of events and personalities that rarely occurred. 
The President had to want independent advice; Eisenhower gave his advisors an 
effective voice in shaping policy, Kennedy less so, and Johnson and Nixon least 
of all. There were, besides, structural defects built into the system. Thus Dr. Don- 
ald Hornig, President Johnson's Science Advisor, was limited by the small size of 
his permanent staff; by the direct access to the President enjoyed by the heads of 
DOD and NASA, the two agencies that accounted for the bulk of Federal R&D 
spending; by Johnson's preoccupation after 1965 with the Vietnam War; by the 
absence of yardsticks for determining priorities within the science budget; and by 
the ability of NASA or DOD to set their own policies-for example, establishing 
the Electronics Research Center or choosing lunar orbit rendezvous as the Apollo 
mission mode-while ignoring or circumventing the formal coordinating mech- 
anisms of the Executive Office and its science policy staff.6 The Science Advisor 
and the committees he chaired could advise, persuade, issue reports, and appear 
individually before Congress. But neither Hornig nor the Science Advisory Com- 
mittee could do very much to set policy within NASA. 
The absence of advisors in the Executive Office who were at once effective 
and disinterested reinforced NASA's tendency to limit the scope and range of its 
planning. NASA planned in terms of substantive programs and did little to relate 
manpower to programs. BOB was the only agency that could, at least potentially, 
mesh NASA programs with each other and with the Federal community. But the 
dificulties of appraising the NASA budget went beyond the competence of Bureau 
examiners. Bureau officials knew that the size, not just the technical nature of 
NASA programs, made detailed oversight difficult. NASA R&D programs were 
funded incrementally; in other words, allotments were made by the program 
ofices to the field installations more than once a year. This, along with NASA's 
cantrarting structure, made "the relationship of specific end items and annual 
funding requirements almost impossible to establish."' Bureau examiners also 
had to contend with the uncertain nature of estimates for current or future 
programs, since unforeseen problems might render the estimates almost worthless. 
Finally, the number of examiners was very limited; as late as 1965 the Military 
Division, whose forty-three staff members oversaw the NASA, DOD, and Atomic 
Energy Commission budgets, had only three examiners working on the NASA 
budget." 
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Moreover, NASA progrms by their very nature were peculiarly impervious 
to cost-benefit analysis. It was one thing to choose between two methods of 
attaining the same goal; it was another, considerably more difficult task to choose 
among competing goals. Few NASA programs produced benefits that could be 
incawed in dollars. To study cost-effectiveness, NASA had to p d  on as- 
sumptions that were themselves open to question. Even when NASA tried to 
quantify the benefits of a specific program, other, noneconomic considerations 
eluded analysis. When NASA used cost-benefit studies to justify the decision to 
develop a reusable space shuttle, the General Accounting Office (GAO) pointed 
to issues that were not reducible to quantitative terms. Whether a space shuttle 
was or was not economically justified, NASA had to take other matters into 
account: whether the value of technological spinoffs was sufficient to justify the 
program; whether the shuttle offered the U.S. space program unique capabilities; 
whether the United States was prepared to use the shuttle indefinitely and not just 
to some predetermined date; finally, whether the nation should make so heavy a 
commitment to manned spaceflight, when unmanned vehicles might reap most of 
the benefits and avoid most of the risks of a manned system? The specific conclu- 
sions of the GAO report need not detain the discussion. What matters is that 
NASA officials were quite ready to concede the difficulty of making cost-benefit 
studies of space systems.'0 For that matter, such studies, especially when con- 
tracted out, might have little influence on decision making at the highest level, or 
they might be commissioned simply to justify decisions already taken for other 
reasons.*" One official frankly conceded that NASA found it "extremely difficult 
to quantify such elusive economic considerations as they affect research and devel- 
opment efforts in the space environment."'* 
Given these problems, what resulted from the annual budget reviews? The 
following sections involve a closer look at the review procedures of BOB, an 
a~xount of the planning-programming-budgeting system from its introduction in 
1965 to its demise in 1970-1971, and an analysis of the ways in which NASA's 
internal long-range planning tied to the external reviews of BOB and Congress. 
First, however, it is necessary to explain the categories under which NASA 
programs were funded. 
HOW THE NASA BUDGET WAS FORMULATED 
NASA Appropriation Accounts 
From fiscal years 1963 through 1969, NASA was funded under three ac- 
counts: research and development (R&D), administrative operations (AO),' and 
The decision to build a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System may have owed more to NASA's desire 
to d u c c  its depcndmcc on tracking stations located on foreign soil than to any presumed mst benefits. 
' From 1959 to 1962 this amunt was "salaries and expenses"; for FY 1963 it was merged with R&D as 
"research, development, and operations", and sinrc 1969 (FY 1970) it has been "research and program 
management " 
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construction of facilities (COF). These titles should not be taken too literally. 
Many items in R&D had little to do with research, while the COF account 
omitted some of the most important construction work when it invtlved the 
installation of "severable" quipment. With these caveats in mind, two features 
of the NASA budget are evident. NASA budgeted on a "program" or performance 
basis; and.the requirement for an item, rather than the nature of the item itself, 
primarily determined the funding category to which it belonged. 
R&D and COF had more in common with each other than they had with 
AO. Both were funded on a no-year basis, with funds available until spent; A 0  
was an annual apprapriation, with unspent monies lapsing to the U.S. Treasury 
at the end of the fiscal year. Moreover, NASA was permitted under its annual 
authorizations to reprogram internally within COF and to transfer funds from 
R&D to COF with authority to construct. The principal limitations on transfers 
and reprogrammings were the extension of the'pw& of the congressional au- 
thorization committees from about 1963, the imposition of the rmuirement that 
NASA give the committees prior notice fir certah kinds of reprogr'amming in the 
R&D and A 0  accounts, the reduction in 1965 of NASA's transfer authority from 
3 percent to 0.5 percent of the total authorized for R&D," and restrictions on 
dollar amounts reprogrammed within COF.'" Some of these changes ensued from 
the shift in power from the appropriations to the authorization subcommittees, 
where the most intensive reviews of NASA took place. Others stemmed from the 
belief of committee members that NASA was not doing an adquate job of 
planning for its facilities; that much of NASA's capital spending duplicated 
quipment available at DOD installations; that NASA was using R&D money 
directly to Cund its facilities projects; and from tiif rtxentment directed by Con- 
gress at NASA's practice of changing the quantitative scale of projects without 
actually changing their intended purpose, and of presenting requests for capital 
plant improvements as a lump sum amount. 
Thus the NASA appropriation categories meant more and less than their 
titles signified. R&D funds could be used for facilities, provided the money was 
spent on "collateral" (or "severable") quipment; that is, equipment "placed in 
use in a facility but is not permanently attached thereto except for operating 
purposes and is removable without significant damage to the real property." '' In 
other words, the shell of a building that cost S 500 000 (and that was funded out 
of COF) might house equipment worth millions of dollars that was paid for by 
R&D funds. Administrative operations was more than an administrative overhead 
account. It included the direct expenses for operating the NASA centers, the 
salaries of all NASA civil service personnel, payments to support servicc con- 
tractors, and the funds for the operation and maintenance of the agency's capital 
plant."' 
Two other features of R&D not revealed by appropriation titles should be 
noted. R&ll included certain items that were produced in quantity and as such 
hardly qualifies as research or development. This was especially true of launch 
vehicle procurement: Once the uncertainties in the production of Centaurs and 
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Deltas were eliminated, those vehicles continued to be funded under R&D as a 
convenience. Also, a substantial portion of R&D (and AO) funds was used to pay 
non-NASA personnel, whether they worked directly on projects or in general 
support; NASA employees, on the other hand, were paid out of A 0  regardless of 
the activity in which they were engaged. With this exception, there was no 
hard-and-fast demarcation of categories. R&D included equipment funding, unit 
production costs of launch vehicles and overhead costs, as well as the costs inherent 
in research and development. 
Accordingly, NASA appropriation titles and their line item entries can be 
seriously misleading if taken at face value. There is nothing to show that construc- 
tion projects and other capital expenses were fully funad,  that is, that the total 
funds were requested and appropriated within a single fiscal year; or that operat- 
ing expenses were budgeted one year at a time; or that major R&D projects were 
funded incrementally. Furthermore, annual appropriations only represented new 
obligational authority, which was quite distinct from actual disbursements. As 
table 7-1 shows, during fiscal years 1965 and 1966 NASA's obligations were 
greater than its appropriations, and its expenditures were greater than either. 
This was possible because of the lag between obligation of funds on a contract 
(authority for the contractor to work) and expenditures (payments for work 
actually performed). 
To  compound the confusion further, the NASA budget included only those 
programs for which funds were both authorized and appropriated. What did this 
omit? It chiefly omitted those programs in the definition phase for which NASA 
had not yet sought authorization. Fo?. years h e  NASA authorization acts included 
the following provision: 
No amount appropriaicd pursuant to this Act may be used for any rogmm which has not 
been presented to or requested of either [authorization] committee.' P 
Yet when NASA presented its 1966 budget request to the Senate Aeronautical and 
Space Sciences Committee, members were surprised to learn that nearly 
$8 million in 1965 funds had been spent on one unauthorized program-Voyager. 
Seamans explained that Voyager was a "project," not a "program"; that the funds 
for Voyager had been reprogrammed fro~ii Mariner following the decision to start 
conceptual studies of Voyager; and that NASA would re uest authorization once 
management determined to go ahead with the program?8 Thus to thc question, 
"When is a program not a program?," NASA could reply, "When it is a project." 
In short, a line item entry for a major R&D program could not inciude all 
direct and indirect costs. 'The total expenditures for a single program would have 
to include funds reprogrammed, funds for facilities in support of the program, 
~ n d ,  in particular, it would have to account for the differences between the amount 
appropriated, the amount obligated, and the amount spent. The following sec- 
tions examine how these sums were determined. 
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Table 7-1. - NASA rquests, authorizations, appropriations, obligations, and 
disbursements-all appropriations, 1959-1968, in millions of dollars. 
Fiscal Budget 
Year Requat Authorization Appropriation Obligations' Expcndit urn 
Total 34 156.1 33 100.4 32 399.8 32 082.2 30 446.4 
1959 146.6 146.6 146.6 
1959 280.0' 259.2 184.3' 298.7 145.5 
1960 508.3 490.3 523.6' 487.0 401.0 
1961 964.6 970.0 964.0 908.3 744.3 
1962 1 940.3 1 855.3' 1 825.3 1 691.6 1 257.0 
1963 3 787.3 3 744.1 3 674.1 3 448.4 2 552.4 
1964 5 712.0 5 350.8 5 100.0 4 864.8 4 171.0 
1965 5 445.0' 5 227.5 5 250.0' 5 500.7 5 092.9 
1966 5 260.0 5 190.4 5 175.0 5 350.5 5 932.9 
1967 5 012.0 500C4 4 968.0 5 011.8 5 425.7 
1968 5 100.0 4 865.8 4 588.9 4 520.4 4 723.7 
' Actual obligations and disbursements during the fiscal year. 
Rquests for NACA/NASA amounted to $280 054 000. Rquests for transfers from M)D raulted in the 
transfer of $146 619 532 in obligational authority to NASA. 
' Iacluda $101 100 000 approp&atd to N A C A , ' $ ~ ~  186 300 to NASA, and $146 619 532 transferred from 
DOD. 
' $38 500 000 b a d  on FY 1959 authorization Public Law 86-12. 
' Includcs $71 000 000 supplemental for COF for which existing authorization was available 
' Includa $141 000 000 supplemental r q u a t  for FY 1964 R&D program. 
' lncluda $72 494 000 R&D supplcmentd against FY 1964 authorization. 
Source: NASA Dofa Book, table 4-4. 
The Preparation of the NASA Budget, 1958-1966 
Between 1958 and 1970 NASA drafted and submitted its budget requests to 
BOB within two different sets of Bureau guidelines. The first procedure was 
employed from 1958 to the end of FY 1966; beginning in FY 1967, NASA was 
required to submit program memorandums and special studies conforming to the 
planning-programming-budgeting system mandated for executive agencies by 
President Johnson in August 1965. What, specifically, did BOB demand of the 
agency in justifying its request? How did NASA submit requests for R&D 
programs, few of which could be fully funded and thus had to be spread over 
several years for budgetary purposes? From 1958 to 1966 the cycle began with the 
semiannual spring and fall previews. Although the spring preview was not a 
formal requirement, and actually preceded the letter from the Budget Director 
that began the cycle, it held certain advantages for top management. As "a 
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tentative and generalized first approximation," it eliminated marginal program 
elements, brought policy questions to the surface, and produced "a feedback into 
program implementation then ~nderway."'~ Wyatt's Ofice of Programming as- 
scmlled the materials sent by the program offices, prepared a first draft of the 
preliminary budget, and reviewed it at some length with top management. 
The spring preview took place in March, fifteen months before the start of 
the fiscal year for which the budget was being prepared. Thus the review of 
March 1964 concerned fiscal year 1966, which began on 1 July 1965. The 
preliminary budget went to BOB in May, and it led to negotiations between 
management and the examiners of the Bureau's Military Division that continued 
until late summer, when the Bureau provided budget targets at two levels of effort. 
This concluded the first phase of the NASA budget review.20 
By then NASA had begun to flesh out the details of its upcoming submission. 
In August and September top management sent instructions to the program offices 
for detailed estimates. On 30 September NASA formally submitted its request to 
BOB; during October and November Webb, Dryden, and Seamans met with the 
Director of the Budget and the President; and by January the President's final 
decisions had been converted into material for justifying the budget request before 
the authorization and appropriations committees. On the basis of various BOB 
staff papers, it does not seem that top management was deeply involved in the 
details of the budget submission until the final stages of the cycle. In 1967 one 
examiner thought it noteworthy that "unlike past years Mr. Webb has personally 
reviewed in great detail a variety of program alternatives . . . and has made all 
major program and planning decisions himse~f."~' Taken in context, this means 
no more than that he wrote and signed certain program memorandums enunci- 
ating his views on items in the 1968 budget. As a former Director of the Budget, 
Webb was aware that he could do more for NASA by establishing his agency's 
general posture toward the President's budget than by captious criticism of every 
detail. Webb contributed to firming up the budget by meeting with his program 
directors during the semiannual reviews, by meeting with the Director of the 
Budget to resolve any differences before the budget went to the Hill, and by using 
his right of appeal to the President to settle those matters that could not be settled 
between the Director and himself-a right that was itself controlled by guidelines 
issued by BOB.22 
Three points about the budgct review cycle deserve emphasis: the source of 
NASA's budget estimates, the multiyear character of NASA prcgrams, and the 
Bureau's role in paring down the NASA budget. First, how did NASA officials 
match current expenditures against their requirements for the ensuing fiscal year? 
Estimates were made from the program operating plans (POPS) submitted quar- 
terly by the field installations to the program offices and, through them, to the 
general manager. The POP was a financial plan that served as a basis for budgct 
formulation, particularly when the greater part of the budget consisted of outlays 
for programs approved earlier; as a check on overobligating and overspending, 
both forbidden by the so-called Anti-Deficiency Act; as a basis for the current year 
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operating pian; and as the baseline of "planned financia.1 activity" against which 
actual financial performance could be meas~red .~ '  The  POP system was an effec- 
tive tool for measuring actual expenditures, although it had to be adjusted to the 
everchanging demands of complex programs. Thus in 1966 the Management 
Committee chaired by Deputy Administrator Seamans made changes designed to 
leave the POP system more flexib!~ than it had been. The  committee confirmed 
the practice of fully funding fixed-price contracts, recornmended an integrated 
financial management plan for c-mparing approved with actual funding levels, 
and authorized the centers to deviate from planned funding levels, provided they 
cuuld justify their  action^.^" 
Second, NASA had to consider three budgets simultaneously: the current 
operating budget, the budget for the ensuing fiscal year, and the preliminary 
budget for the fiscal year after that. The  interrelations of the budgets were im- 
portant because a deficiency in one year might be made good by reprogramming 
or diverting funds the following year. The NASA budget submissions explicitly 
recognized these relations. Even before the agency was required to adopt the 
planning-programming-budgeting system, NASA was sending up budget esti- 
mates with five-year cost projections. T o  that extent, drafting preliminary esti- 
mates constrained NASA officials to do some kind of long-range planning: to 
decide, for example, which year would provide a suitable launch window for an 
interplanetary probe; to determine whether a new tracking station that would 
support several spacecraft should be started this year or next; and generally, to 
establish some order of priorities. 
Third, the detailed negotiations between NASA and BOB went far to shape 
the content of the operating budget. For all the rhetoric and talk of "economy," 
Congress did little to alter the agency's requests before the 1967 session, and even 
then it followed the Bureau's lead. Between 1961 and 1967 Congress cut the 
Administration's request by more than 10 percent only once: In 1964 it reduced 
the NASA request from $5.712 billi to $5.100 billion (table 7-2). Unlike the 
Bureau's artion, this was an across-the-board reducrion rather than the elimi- 
nation of entire programs. 
Actions of the Bureau, not Congress, led to canceling the last two Apollo 
flights; closing the Electronics Research Center; reducing Surveyor flights from 17 
to 10; freezing NASA excepted positions at 425; and eliminating certain programs 
before they reached the development stage, such as the Advanced Orbiting Solar 
Observatory canceled by NASA in December 1965.+ The Bureau's strategy 
consisted of forcing NASA to make hard choices, to choose between programs that 
were merely desirable and those essential to the agency's mission. With only three 
or four individuals assigned to evaluate a $4 to $6 billion submission, and with 
several dozen budget officers in NASA prepared to justify every penny, the Bureau 
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Table 7-2. - NASA budget rcquestr and appropriations, FY 1 9 9  i Y ~ I ,  
in millions of dollars. 
Final 
Year P m t  Cut 
1965 5 445.0 5 2M.0 3.6 
1966 5 260.0 5 175.0 1.6 
1967 5 012.0 4 "8.0 0.9 
1968 5 100.0 4 588.9 10.0 
1969 4 370.4 3 995.3 8.6 
1970 3 715.5 3 696.6 0.5 
1971 3 333.0 3 268.7 1.9 
- 
Saurcc: Thomas P Murphy, Scrmcr, Cmpol~ttcs, and Federal Spmdtng (Lexington, Ma.: H u t h  Lexing- 
ton, 19711, p. 364. 
could force reductions only by concentrating on a few large programs. Secure in 
the knowledge (after 1967) that the White House would not intervene to restore 
major cuts in the NASA budget, Bureau officials wasted no time in cutting back. 
The history of the NERVA* nuclear rocket program is a good example of how 
BOB/OMB tactics worked. When Congress eliminated the vcry ambitious 
NERVA I1 program in 1967, NASA kept the program alive at a more modest 
level. Sensing that the program was vulnerable, BOB/OMB pared down NASA 
budget requests over the next three years. By FY 1972 the program was barely 
alive; OMB reduced the NASA request for that year by nearly two-thirds, as the 
NERVA funding level dropped from $32 million to $9.9 millior,. Since no pros- 
pect of an operational nuclear rocket remained, in January 1372 NASA elected 
to terminate NERVA in favor of a smaller nuclear rocket system. 
However, in some cases programs were kept alive when Congms restored 
funds eliminated by the Bureau. In January 1965, for example, NASA, under 
pressure from the Bureau, announced that it would not request funds for the M-1 
liquid-hydrogen engine, the SNAP-8 nuclear power system, or the large 
, (6.6-meter-diameter) solid-fuel rocket motor. Webb and Seamans were very care- 
ful to avoid the words "cancelation" and "termination" in referring to these 
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development progranrs. Aa it happened, Congress restored funds sufficient to keep 
the large-solid-motor program alive for two more yean, through the s u ~ f u l  teat
firing of June 1967.' 
The de facto cancelation of the three programs was important because it was 
the first major cut by the Bureau and the President since early 1961. By 1965 the 
advantage of managing programs that did not have to compete with equally 
compelling alternatives was almost gone. By then, the most important Great 
Society p rwams  had been enacted, and the war in Southeas* Asia was c!aiming 
a growing percentage of the budget. NASA submissions were beginning to came 
under the cold, hard scrutiny ot Budget examiners, who were demanding that 
NASA offer alternatives to existing programs, quantify the noneconomic benefits 
of space exploration, show that a program like Apollo Applications did not du- 
plicate DOD's Manned Orbiting Laboratory, and, generally, adopt a level of 
analysis that would have been unnecessary a few years earlier. Until then NASA 
had seldom been "nickeled and dimed" by the Bureau; now there would be little 
else. There seems little doubt that Webb was no longer able to influence the 
President to restore budget cuts to the NASA prcgram. That had not always been 
the case. Webb's meeting with President Kennedy on 22 March 1961, when 
Webb appealed for restoration of cuts made by BOB in a supplemental appropri- 
ation request, initiated Kennedy's "involvement in space policy which was to 
culmiuate . . . with his announcing his decision that rhe United States should 
attempt to send men to the moon."*" In 1966 Johnson was no longer "the guy who 
said, I am yow champion, I will go out there and fight your battles, 1 will gct 
Kennedy and this Congress to give you the money." Instead, JoClnson was telling 
Webb, "by God, I have got problems and you fellows are not cootcrating with me. 
You could have reduced your expenditures last year and heiped us out, you didn't 
do it."?- 
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System and the NASA Budget 
The budgetary cycle just described was superseded in 1967 by a system that 
was controversial out of all proportion to its effect 'on Federal budgeting. The 
planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS), already used by DOD for its 
budgeting cycle, was extended to many civilian agencies in 1965.'" The reasons for 
its sucms in shaping the DOD budget may anmunt for its failure to "takr" 
outside the Pentagon; in 1971 OMB quietly dropped the reporting requirements 
that were an essential part of PPBS. " The following section considers to what 
extent NASA's budget was "programmatic" before 1965 and why NASA failed 
to use the system in its internal planning. 
Taken in isolation, the basic concepts of PPBS were neither new nor revolu- 
tionary. The purpose of the system was to combine analysis with budgeting in 
order to determine the output for specific programs. The system was intended to 
make goals explicit, to estimate total program costs (direct and indirect) over 
several years, and to present alternative paths to the same objectives. Stme of the 
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analytical tools incorporated in PPBS had been available for yean before its 
introduction: the 1921 'ludget and Accounting Act had given GAO broad powm 
to review Federal programs, and an act of 1956 had called on agenciu to provide 
long-range cost estimates and to maintain their accounts on an annual accrued 
expenditure basis.'" What wa , vvel was combining these and other budgetary 
concepts in the Defense Dcpat tment, when Robert McNamara became Defense 
Secretary in 1961. PPBS tools were refined by a team of analysts, many of whom 
wcre recruited from the RAND Corporation; and it was such former RAND staff 
members as Charles J. Hitch, who became Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp- 
troller), and Alain Enthoven, who headed the Pentagon Office of Systems Anal- 
ysis, who introduced DOD to the rigors of program budgeting. Few agmcies 
r d e d  it more. The contrast between McNamara and his predmssors ma, have 
been overdrawn; for all his cost-reduction programs and canalation of weapons 
systems like Skybolt and the B-70, there is little doubt that PPBS in the 1960s 
would have been impossible without the administrat;- reforms of the preceding 
decade, especially those embodied in the 1958 Reorb,.,;zation Act (discussed in 
chapter 8). Nevertheless, prior to 1961 there had been an almost complete divo. .*e 
between budgeting and military strategy within DOD. Budgeting had tended to 
be by service rather than by mission. Financial planning had been done on an 
annual basis, which led to premature commitments (and overwmmitments) to 
weapons systems, as well as to considerable unnecessary duplication in the ballis- 
tic missile programs. Finally, there had been a "lack of reiiable information on the 
costs of weapons systems. . . . new weapons systems generally ended up costing 
two to three tin,&s as much as they wcre estimated to m t  when the program was 
originally appr~ved."~' When McNamara b m m e  Defense Secretary about 
40 percent of DOD development fmds went for overruns on existing  contract^.^' 
None of these problems coui.: be considered apart fror.: the others. For 
cost-estimation of military program t,, he successful, several elements that were 
lacking would have been required: clear identifications of task, valid data, estimate 
update, standardized work breakdown structures for estimates, independent re- 
views of estimates, and the like. The newly instituted DOD program budgeting 
procedures were designed to assemble everything nmssary to track the real costs 
of program. The Secretary of Defense was to be served by a central analytical 
staff, the M c e  of Systems Analysis, which reported directly to him and was 
independent of service interests. Financial planning was to be done on a multiyear 
basis. In addition to the annual budget, DOD officials would present Congress 
with a Five-Year Defense Plan, which included eight-year force projections and 
five-ycdr projmions of cost- and manpower for the ten mapr military programs 
into which the Defense budget was divided." The plan combined costs and 
h e f i t s ,  linked force with financial planning and, in Enthovcn's words, "provided 
a vehicle by which the Secretary of Defense could make program decisions and tie 
them into the preparation of the annual budget."" PPBS, in sum, led to a more 
integrated budget structure than DOD +ad yet known; with its emphasis on 
comparison of alternatives, the quantifyi~ 3 of outputs, arid the use of cost- 
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t 
i effectiveness techniques, it seemed to offer a revolutionary planning system for 
r Governmentwide use, 
This was not to be. PPBS disappeared; it "became an unthing" before it had 
really been tested outside DOD." The history uf PPBS in NASA may explain 
7 
why the system failed to make much of a dent in the bureaucracy, especially since 
NASA seemed more disposed to use it than did other agencies. The NASA budget 
anticipated some featum of PPBS: five-year cost projections, organization by 
broad program categories, and a budget structure that iden tkd  and considered 
costs for a specific project together. NASA had a multiyear budget. In addition, 
aside from military interest in space, there was no division of responsibility for the 
conduct of the U.S. space program. Because the space program made use of 
systems like spacecraft and the vehicles that launched them, it seemed tq lend itself 
especially well to program budgeting. In nther words, "the space program consis- 
t[ed] mainly of a number of efforts to develop, test, manufacture and operate 
aggregations of physical equipment that perform clearly defined iun~tions."'~ So 
confident were BOB officials of NASA's willingness to accept the system that one 
examiner confided that "it will not be a matter of selling them on a new approach, 
but more a matter of developing suggestions for worthwhile  action^."^ 
Yet PPBS seems to have had very little effect on NASA budgeting. There 
were just enough similarities to make the reporting requirements of PPBS seem 
redundant, just enough differences to make it appear to be a threat to the stability 
of NASA program planning. The emphasis of the Pentagon Office of Systems 
Analysis on concentrating similar programs in one place suggested that PPBS 
might lead to amalgamation of NASA and DOD programs under single agency 
management. But the reasons for the failure of PPBS to take root in the Federal 
commu~itv in general and in NASA in particular go deeper. For one thing, it was 
oversold. President Johnson's endorsement of the system was enough to create 
suspicion that PPBS was too true to be good, that the system was nothing more 
than a gimmick. At the press conference in which PPBS was instituted, Johnson 
said that 
under the new system each Cabinet and agency head will set up a very apecia! staH of experts 
who, using the most modern methods of program analysis, will define the goals of the de- 
partments for the coming year." 
PPBS would "make our decisionmaking proms as up to date . . . as our space- 
exploring programs." The thrust of Johnson's message was that program bud- 
geting would be imposed from the outside and, by implication, that most executive 
agencies were not quipped to understand the objective, scientific basis for decision 
: making. The result is 110 surprise: Many of the agencies affected were quietly 
hostile to PPBS, although some were more than others. Agencies like the De- 
partment of Agriculture and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(DHEW) needed the integrated planning that PPBS purported to supply far 
more than NASA did. In the former, the principal constraint on program manage- 
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ment was the difficulty of discovering what the various bureaus and semi- 
autonomous divisions actually did. DHEW and Agriculture had incentives to use 
PPES that simply did not exist for NASA. Unlike NASA, neither agency had any 
kind of planning apparatus, especially for long-term planning. PPBS seemed to 
open the way for the Department Secretaries to gain some control over the 
bureaus-which were ostensibly subordinate but in reality semi-independent- 
that comprised their departments.3v Additionally, a rigorous system of policy 
analysis might establish the costs and benefits of the programs supported by, for 
example, the U.S. Office of Education, or it might establish the continued need for 
the Rural Electrification Administration, at a time when 99 percent of all U.S. 
farms were connected to regional power grids. 
In general, PPBS could not be implemented where the agency head gave it 
no support. In cases of agency indifference or hostility, the system k a m e  merely 
one more reporting requirement imposed by BOB'S Circular A-1 1. Webb's atti- 
tude was colored by his experience as President Truman's Budget Director. 
Moreover, he consistently opposed the delegation of responsibility for making 
decisions to any group of experts; this was the basis for his rejection, in 1966, of 
a proposal that NASA establish a general advisory committee of outside scientists 
to map a policy for the agency's space science programs. Whatever he might have 
said publicly, Webb was fundamentally sceptical of any system or technique that 
promised a "quick fix" to the uncertainties of research and devclopment. As he 
explained to Budget Director Charles L. Schultze, one of the prime movers in the 
development of PPBS, the system promised a delusive certainty for programs with 
long Fad times; NASA programs were not usually amenable to cost-effectiveness 
analysis; and the requirements of multiyear planning, "if literally insisted upon, 
could serve to deprive the agency head, the Bureau of the Budget, and the 
President of much of the flexibility they need." 
The problem, as I see i t ,  is to devise a procedure which will provide for essential and useful 
long-range planning of alternatives, and with the nmss3ry information . . . communicated 
to the Bureau of the Budget for review, without rquiring either the agency or the Bureau 
to give official status prematurely to a particular plan or action. T o  set such priorities too 
firmly in advance also invites constant and ingenious pressures to enlarge areas of special 
interat .?' 
Webb's lack of enthusiasm, the prior existence of a programmatic budget, the 
reluctance of officials to commit themselves in advance to programs of uncertain 
duration and funding, and the nonquantifiablr: nature of NASA's output 
sufficiently account for the insignificant role that PPBS played in post-Apollo 
planning. The essential difference between DHEW and NASA was that the for- 
mer was, so to speak, the sum total of numerous quasi-autonomous divisions, 
while NASA was organized around projects whose successes or failures were 
obvious and unambiguous. In short, "much of what [Agriculture] or HEW gen- 
erated in the form of information for use by man;rP-ment under PPBS was 
something NASA already had."" 
T H E  NASA BUDGETARY PROCESS 
Consider the failure of PPBS from another perspective. Why did PPBS ap- 
pear to s u d  at the Pentagon, only to fail elsewhere? Principally because the 
Defense Secretary u m t d  independent analytical support and because he used 
the results of the analysis in preparing the budget requests that went to the 
President. Only superficially were the draft Presidential memorandums (DPMs), 
prepared by the DOD OfEre of Systems Analysis, the same as the program 
memorandums (PMs) required of civilian agencies. "The critical difference was 
that the DPM was sent to the President, while the Program Memorandums went 
to the Budget Bureau. . . . The DPM was a decisional document; the P M  only 
an intermediate step in the long process of budgeting. . . . The DPM was pre- 
pared by systems analysts to reflect McNamara's views; the PM was composed by 
analysts removed from the centers of The  concept of PPBS assumed a 
central "steersman" who directed and shaped agcncy policy. But as the analysis 
of headquarters organization in chapur 3 shows, and as other studies of public 
administration confirm, "the chief problem of the central administrator is to pick 
and choose a limited n u m k r  of places and situations for strategic intervention, 
rather than seriously trying to 'stccr the ship' in any detailed way." Had PPBS 
k n  rigorously applied within NASA, it would have seriously limited the dis- 
cretion of the cvntcrs and program officvs in carrying out the agency's mission. 
The  NASA Budgetary Cycle, 1967- 1970 
The intrtduction of PPBS did not immediately lead to any formal changes 
in shaping the NASA budget. 'l'hc first, rather tentative guidclincs, issued in 
October 1965 by HOB, explained the purpose of the system and described the 
three documents that agencies wouili hencvforth submit: t' program mcmo- 
randum, which would cvvcr each of the agency's programs, mmpare it with 
various alterndtives, outline its ;rssumptions, and list projected msts; special ana- 
lytical studies in sclctzcd areas; and the program iind financial plan (PFP), which 
would set forth projected funding in tabular form." 'I'hc program categories to be 
used would be determind by the Budget Dircctor in consultation with agcncy 
heads who, in turn, would asstmblc q staff to handle PPBS rquiremcnts. 
How did these guidelines impinge on NASA? In organizational terms they 
had almost no effect. Wtbb established no new division to deal with PPBS. In- 
stead, the work of drafting program memorandums, spccial studies, and PFPs was 
parceled out to ofticus burdened with other responsibilities. Indeed, the 1967 rcor- 
ganization went cvmplctcly against the grain of PPBS by splitting budget prepar- 
ation from technical review. Webb virtually assured that there would be no 
division below the lcvcl of the Office of the Administrator to coordinate budget 
i preparation. More precisely, the 1967 changes mnentratcd the responsibility for 
prcparine( the budget in 1,illy's Offie of Administration, not in Wyatt's new 
Officr of Program Plans and Analysis. 1.illy k a m e  the NASA Comptroller dc 
facto tivc ycilrs bcforc that position was created to take acmunt of budgetary 
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realities. The  fate of the Office of Program Plans and Analysis illustrates a 
familiar pattern in NASA administration: No planning office has had much 
influence in shaping policy once it was divorced from daily operations. So far as 
one can tell, the creation of Program Plans and Analysis had nothing to do with 
BOB requirements and almost everything to do with power shifts at headquarters 
in the aftermath of the hpollo fire. 
The  first cycle in which NASA was required to use the PPBS approach was 
in 1966-1967, for the FY 1968 budget. T o  complicate matters further, this was f 
when NASA at last set into motion its apparatus for post-Apollo planning. By the 
spring of 1967, several groups were working concurrently on different segments 
of the budget. Wyatt's office drafted program memorandums; the Resources 
Analysis Divisiorl of the Office of Administration prepared the PFPs; and the 
program offices made the special analytical studies requested by BOB. By then 
PPBS and the agency's own internal planning were so intertwined that it was 
hard to know where one left off and the othcr began. The  program offices, after 
all, were commissioning thcir own advanced studies; one on large space stations 
even was accepted by the Burcau to meet the analytical studies requirement. In 
addition, a Planning Coordination Steering Group had been created by the pro- 
gram directors at the end of 1965 to do long-range planning in selected areas; 
much of its work, and that of its supporting working groups, paralleled the reports 
demanded by the Bureau. One finds the sanle elements in either case, particularly 
the emphasis on analyzing options for specific programs. Yet there was little, save 
for the staff support of the Office of Program Plans and Analysis, to link the 
planning teams with each othcr. 
By the fall of 1967 NASA had had some experience of the system mandated 
by BOB, yet that systcm was not widely understood within the Bureau itself. The  
staff papers of the Bureau examiners reveal that PPBS was not working as 
intended: NASA officials were not meting budgetary schedules and the Bureau 
was not working with NASA planning groups to validate thcir cwst estimates. In 
any case, the events of that year, including the Apollo fire, made coherent planning 
very difficult. During 1967 NASA (mi the Bureau wcre rmrganized, making this 
the first budgetary cycle for many in both agencies.. ?'hi internal reviews of the 
Apdlo fire preoccupied every key official for months, affecting msts and schcdulcs 
in areas that used two-thirds of NASA's funds. Congress had reported, and the 
President had agrml to, a $ 5 0  million appropriation cut in August, thus forcing 
ma-jor program changes on NASA. For the first time since 1961 (except for the 
1964 reductions noted above) Congress rather than the Burcau cut the NASA 
budget request: Voyager and Advancud Manncd hiissions wcre deleted in cwnfer- 
ence, and NASA did not define its current year operating plan until November. 
Finally, the simulti~nmus hearings on the Apollo firc and the 1968 authorization 
ticd up the agency for months; sonwthing had to givc, and that something was the 
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agency's planning structure. Both sides, NASA and BOB, were accountabie for 
the shortcomings of the 1967 budget cycle: BOB because it did not develop 
methods refined enough to evaluate the benefits of alternative space missions; 
NASA because it allowed itself to be overtaken by events and because of divided 
counsels and the loss of morale throughout the agency. A BOB examiner summed 
up the situation just after NASA received its appropriations for 1968: 
Morale is bad throughout NASA because of its first beating at the hands of Congrew in the 
agency's history, the lack of Presidential support . . . the Apollo fire and other severe tech- 
nical problems and schedule delays, and the stria guidelines for the 1968 budget. Mr. Webb 
is under siege by his staff for not fighting as hard as they think he should for their programs, 
by Congressional critia for a variety of assumed slights and irritations, and by the trade press 
which tends to blame him for all NASA's current problems, both internal and external." 
The instinct of the Bureau examiners was to cut, pare, and slash requests they 
deemed wasteful. All too often, what was meant as program analysis ended up 
indistinguishable frorn plain old economizing. 
In truth, there were events external to the space program that made it 
impossible to evaluate proposals on their merits. NASA requests were cut back 
steadily by the Bureau after 1966, not because they lacked virtues that earlier 
requests possessed, but because of the Vietnam War, a balance-of-payments 
deficit, an overheated economy, and the higher priorities of Great Society pro- 
. grams. Johnson wanted to reduce spending without sacrificing the substanceof his 
social commitments. When the NASA authorization bill was sent to the White 
House in August 1967 for Johnson's signature, Schultze and Presidential Assis- 
tant Joseph Califano listed the pros and cons of the President's issuing a statement 
before signing the bill. In signing, Johnson would in effect accept a $517 million 
reduction already voted by the House Appropriations Committee. Schultze argued 
that by issuing a statement, "it will help avoid later charges by supporters of the 
space program of a double cross. Eventually we are going to have to cut at least 
this much from the space program. If supporters of the program . . . fight for and 
get some restoration of this cut only to be faced with an administration-initiated 
reduction, they may charge bad faith."'" Hence Schultze's warning to Webb: 
"Avoid making commitments . . . for increases above the levels at which you are 
operating. . . . Exercise special prudence in filling vacancies. . . . Except when 
major Presidential items are concerned -wid appealing for restoration of con- 
gressional cuts in recommended appropriations."4i 
The changes in PPBS after 1967 should be considered in terms of NASA's 
long-range planning rather than its budgeting. In any case, the future of program 
budgeting became less certain once Johnson announced his decision not to run for 
reelection in 1968. Thus the program decisions generated by the Administration 
could have, at most, a provisional validity. More important, neither President 
Nixon nor his Budget Directors had much faith in the assumptions on which 
PPBS was based. By reorganizing BOB as the Office of Management and Budget 
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(OMB) and by establishing a Domestic Council within the Executive Office, 
Nixon separated budgeting from program analysis as thoroughly as Webb had 
done for NASA in 1967. The formulation of policy would take place outside the 
budgetary proms. In Schick's words, "budgeting would operate alongside pro- 
gram coordination. . . . and other administrative functions. It would not be the 
central rocess for shaping the President's program and analyzing policy alterna- l' tives."' The separation of the Domestic Council from OMB and the subsequent 
elimination of the reporting requirements developed by Schultze and his staff 
effectively killed PPBS. 
So much for the formal and procedural aspects of NASA's budget prepara- 
tion. Zhapter 9 offers a consideration of the substantive content of NASA's 
program memorandums and special studies and of their effect on the agency's 
long-range planning. Now the discussion turns to Congress and to the fate of the 
NASA budget request once it was approved by BOB and sent to the Hill. 
The Authorization and Appropriation Cycle 
For NASA the critical program choices were made and reviewed in the initial 
phases of the budgetary cycle. As discussed above, most of the substantial cuts were 
made by the President or the Budget Qirector before the NASA budget went to 
Congress. Until 1967 the sheer complexity of legislative review tended to work in 
NASA's favor. The process of review might, with luck, timing, and political skill, 
lead to appropriations that were at best higher and at worst no more than 10 per- 
cent lower than the original submission. 
The following were the principal stages in the cycle of congressional review: 
1. Initial hearings before the House and the Senate authorization committees, 
followcd by passage of House and Senate authorization bills after debate on 
the floor of each House. 
2. Similar review by the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees 
responsible for the NASA budget. 
3. Convening conference committees to resolve differences in the versions of the 
authorization and appropriations bills passed by each House. 
4. Passage of the final authorization and appropriation acts. 
The important features of the cycle were, first, that NASA had to seek annual 
authorizing legislation before it could secure appropriations; second, that the locus 
of power tended to shift from the appropriations subcommittees to the legislative 
committees once the annual authorization requirement became permanent; third, 
the lengths to which NASA went to avoid friction with its committees; finally, the 
temporary erosion of some good will in Co~~gress, owing to the disclosure of the 
events leading to the Apollo fire, NASA's reluctance to submit a complete copy of 
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the Phillips report, and the agency's failure to present Congress with a coherent 
post-Apollo program. 
The annual authorization requirement stemmed from the "Johnson rider" 
to NASA's first appropriation act in 1959, a requirement extended indefinitely a 
year later. Before 1959 most agencies were permanently authorized, and their 
only recurring hearings were before their appropriations committees. In that year, 
the authorization requirement was extended not only to NASA but to all ex- 
penditures for "aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels"; in 1962, to all new military 
research and de7-*,lopment programs; in 1963, to the Coast Guard's construction 
and procurement programs; and by i966, to the Peace Corps, the Atomic Energy 
Commission, and the Agency for International Development."' The authorization 
requirement doubled the number of annual reviews of NASA programs. But it 
signified more; the leaders of both Houses wanted "control" and "oversight" 
authority before administrative action was taken, as well as review after the fact. 
The authorization committees, especially the House Science and Astronautics 
Committee, developed staffing and review procedures to keep informed of every 
phase of the civilian space program. The House committee was divided into 
subcommittees corresponding to each of the NASA program offices; and these, 
especially the Manned Space Flight Subcommittee chaired by Representative 
Olin Teague (D-Tex.), expected to be fully briefed at the centers by key pro- 
gram  official^.^" They, rather than the full committee, reviewed and passed on 
NASA requests. 
The authorization committees acted to shape NASA programs in three 
closely related ways. First, the hills reported out of committee set the ceiling, the 
maximum, for NASA appropriations. Second, the committee reports accompany- 
ing the authorizing legislation imposed limitations and preconditions on how the 
funds made available could be spent. Third, the committees prescribed the condi- 
tions under which NASA could reprogram or transfer between accounts, as well 
as the percentages and do!!ar sums involved. (Of some 130 reprogramming mo- 
tions made by NASA between 1958 and 1969, virtually all were approved.) And 
the committees were extremely sensitive to any sign that NASA was trying to 
outflank them. In 1969, for example, the members of the Senate Aeronautical and 
Space Sciences Committee learned that the MSC Lunar Receiving Laboratory, 
originally authorized at $8.1 million, would be completed for approximately 
$16 million, most of which was accounted for by equipment provided out of R&D 
funds. They also discovered that NASA had built a neutral buoyancy facility at 
Marshall-a gigantic water tank to simulate weightlessness-using over $1 mil- 
lion of R&D money after the committees had denied funding under COF. To 
prevent this from recurring, the committee reaffirmed and wrote into the 1970 
Authorization Act a provision that required NASA to notify the authorizing 
committees of intent to use R&D funds for any facility whose cost (including 
collateral equipment) would exceed $250 000. They further requested that every 
facilities project include "the total estimated costs necessary to provide for a 
completely operable facility." The same act also canctled unfunded authorizations 
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for fiscal yeam 1967-1969, that is, funds for which no appropriations were vrted; 
committee members suspected that NASA was requesting more money than was 
necessary.'' 
By virtue of their authority to review the substantive content of NASA 
programs, the authorization committees were best able to mnsider the agency as 
a whole. The appropriations committees had to review numerous independent 
agencies, while the authorization committees reviewed at most two or thrte, 
including NASA and agencies like the National Science Foundation and the 
National Bureau of Standards. There were certain differences between the mm- 
mittees, differences subtly reHccted in the language of their reports. Where the 
House Sciencv and Astronautics Committee "recommended," the Senate Aero- 
niwtical and Space Sciences Cominittee "concurred." Because the House commit- 
tee generally initiated the NASA authorization hearings, the Senate committee 
could act as a court of appeal to restore cuts made by the former. Since the Senate 
committu had no subcommittees, its review was less'exha~iz!ivc than that of the 
House, which was doubtless a welcome relief for NASA officials who had to make 
the trip up the Hill. 
Aside from limitations written into authorizing legislation, the many recom- 
mendations included in the reports, although not binding, tested NASA's respon- 
siveness to congressional advice. Thus the 1964 act and subsequent authorization 
acts urged NASA to distribute R&D funds on a geographical basis." A 1966 staff 
paper listed occasions when NASA took action "consonant with" advice contained 
in reports of the Science and Astronautics Committee." The mmmittec doubted 
the nml for a lunar roving vehicle experiment for Surveyor; NASA discontinued 
the development. The committee instructed that the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif- 
teenth Ranger spacecraft be dropped; NASA deleted the last six, which suggests 
that NASA would have discontinued the program even without prodding from the 
Houw. The committee further rqucsted that NASA not p r d  with the Elec- 
tronics Research Center until the agency had submitted a detailed report justify- 
ing the center and the site selection p rodure ;  NASA submitted the report on 
1 February 1964 and did not promd with the center until after the report was 
submitted. As a final example, the committee recommended reducing the Mariner 
program by $15 million to eliminate a 1965 Venus flyby; NASA ca..nled the 
mission. 
However, NASA did not invariably conform to cangressional rccommen- 
dations. In its 1964 report, the Science and Astronautics Committee suggested that 
NASA seriously consider closing its Flight Research Center, since there seemed 
to bc no reason for its mntinued existence beyond the X-15 program. NASA 
replied that the X-15 was an ongoing program and that research on high-speed 
aeronautical flight called fcr the center's continued operation. Moreover, NASA 
would not mmply with committee recommendations where it believed itself bcttcr 
qualified to pass on the technical merits of programs; lor this reason, the agency 
did not follow the suggestion of the S iencc and Astronautics Committee to favor 
solid-fuel over liquid-fuel propulsion r~search.~' NASA took note of but did not 
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a strictly comply with the committee's expressed wish that R&D funds be distrib- 
uted on a geographical basis. Although NASA officials pointed to the use of 
subcontracts for distributing R&D money, there is litrle to show that contracts 
were let in order to maintain the regional parity that both Houses encouraged.* 
Thus NASA complied with Congress where it could safely do so, and it 
reserved the right to determine its needs in other matters. Until 1967 NASA could 
count on strong support in the House and the Senate. All four of the committees 
that reviewed the agency's budget were chaired by members from districts (or 
regions) where NASA had placed large contracts. Representative George Miller 
(D-Calif.) was chairman of the Science and Astronautics Committee from 1961 
to 1972. Senator Clinton Anderson (D-New Mex.), of the Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences Committee from 1963 to 1973, was also a member and sometime chair- 
man of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Albert Thomas (D-Tex.), the 
powerful chairman of the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcom- 
mittee, was succeeded in 1966 by Tennessee Democrat Joe Evins; his Senate 
counterpart was Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.). Yet it would be as foolish to 
overestimate the importance nf regional influences as it would be to ignore them 
entirely. For one thing, there were supporters of the space program, like Senator 
Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine), who represented regions with which NASA 
did very little business, even indirectly. For another, many field centers and a 
goodly portion of the aerospace industry were already in place when NASA was 
established; for reasons predating NASA, it would have been exceedingly difficult 
for the agency to place prime contracts, say, for Apollo, outside those regions 
where the capability already existed, which were mainly, although by no means 
exclusively, southern California, Texas, the Southeastern States, and the New 
York and Boston areas. But most important, the so-called "political" decisions, 
like the selection of Houston as the site of the Manned Spacecraft Center, were 
no more (or less) political than the programs that first led to the decision to 
transfer the Space Task Group to a new installation. Granted that the Vice 
President (who was also the Space Council chairman), the Speaker of :be House, 
the chairman of the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, 
and the chairman of the House Manned Space Flight Subcommittee were Texans. 
There were other good reasons for selecting Houston: it was well located in re- 
lation to Marshall and the Cape, and it had some of the best port facilities in the 
country.55 As Murphy notes, "there were some powerful political figures in 
virtually every major metropolitan area where NASA might have put a facility. 
The series of location decisions led to an integrated system of facilities and in none 
of the cases involved did NASA select an unlikely or unsuitable site." Moreover, 
the kind of political support gained by these decisions was emphatically a perish- 
able good. As President, Johnson had other constituencies to satisfy than when he 
had been chairman of the Space Council. Nor did NASA's accumulated good will 
NASA had more funding flcxib~lity in its univers~ty programs, since supportable work could usually k 
round In any large geographical reglon 
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survive the Apollo fire, BOB cuts, and the establishment of other priorities in the 
mid- 1960s. 
T o  understand, then, how NASA worked with and through Congress, one 
must recognize other strategies that were more important than the major site and 
source selection decisions; the latter were essentially nonrecurring. One tactic was 
thr exceptional thoroughness with which NASA prepared for its annual hearings. 
No more than other agencies could NASA afford to come before Congress ill 
prepared. But sometimes the very thoroughness of the presentations tended to 
obscure the pcirrrs being made. During the 1968 authorization hearings, members 
of one Science and Astronautics Subcommittee "received a lengthy lecture on the 
effect of control lag on the dynamic stability of aircraft, saw slides de,?icting the 
failure data for alkaline batteries under simulated space use, and learned the effect 
of heat stabilization on battery separator  material^."'^ Without technical staff 
support, it is unlikely that Congressmcn could make much of such briefings; too 
often, it seemed as if NASA wanted to win committee votes by the sheei bulk of 
the information it supplied. NASA's congressional hearings could cut both ways. 
The committees were impressed by the thoroughness and tidiness of NASA's 
budget requests, a thoroughness intended to leave no doubt of the rightness of the 
agency's position. But that same thoroughness also irritated those Congressmcn 
who had to pass on the NASA budget. As one frustrated subcommittee chair- 
man-who was by no means unfriendly to NASA-told NASA Director of Space 
Sciences Newell: 
Another real problem . which makes it difficult for the committee to function properly is 
that we nwcr get two sides of the argument. It is fairly easy for me to make up my mind as 
to who is right or wrong . . . on thc question of medicare, or tax reduction . . . because I have 
someone else doing my research for me . . . there are thosc who arc o p p s t d  and who will 
mention all of the reasons why this act should not bc allowed, and there are those on the other 
side who give all the reasons why it should bc allowed. . . . We don't have people appearing 
before this rommittcc in opposition to thc manned lunar landing program . . . or the Surveyor 
program, or whatever it is. . . . o n e  1 think the committee should lose confidenct in the 
judgment or in the veracity of the statement that is being given . . . I think probably it would 
be extremely disastrous.'' 
It was crucial that NASA's top officials bc selected for their ability to get 
along with Congress. Glennan and Webb were careful to observe several rules of 
the game: keep the committees fully informed, even beyond statutory rqui re -  
ments; never present Congress with accomplished facts, such as "foot-in-the-door" 
programs that might commit the legislature to huge and continuing appropri- 
ations; repond to the mood of Congress by taking timely administrative action; 
and live within the funds voted, that is, not request supplemental appropriations 
unless ~ u c h  requests were unavoidahle.' All tnese rules might be summarized as 
follows: The head of the agency had to bc able to sense what Congrcss would and 
' Cnngrrss was rnorr than normavv unprrdmahlr In passlnK on supplrmrntals NASA's rqucst for a $141 
rn~ll~on supplrmrntal lor F\' 1964 was ~.ut by hall 
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would not accept. As discussed, NASA tried to bring its advanced studies under 
some kind of control, lest Congrew interpret them as studieil of programs already 
approved by top management. This is why Seamans withdrew his approval of 
twenty-two studies in August 1967 and why NASA canceled an ill-timed study 
proposed by MSC for a manned Mars and Venw reconnaissance spacecraft. In 
other cases, NASA tried to anticipate the inclination of Congress. After being 
criticized for spending tor) little on aeronautical R&D, NASA established the 
position of Deputy Associate Administrator for Aeronautics (OART) in May 
1967. To forestall a congressional investigation of the Centaur program, NASA 
transferred the prugram from Marshall to Lewis in Oaobtr 1962. When the 
House subcommittees pressured NASA to spend more on unmanned space sci- 
ence, NASA created the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board, ostensibly to 
involve outside scientists in tactical as well as strategic decision making. And in 
one case, the 1964 investigation of the Ranger 6 failure, NASA seems to have tried 
it both ways: It used the hearings both as a forum for justifying its relations with 
JPL and as an implied threat to JPL to imptove its managerial and technical 
performance. 
All these examples were, so to speak, actions at a distance. Although it was 
a response to an internal need, the decision to transfer Centaur was reinforced by 
the mood of the Congress. Needless to say, top NASA officials had to know their 
way around the Hill and how to deal directly with Congress. The Administrator 
not only had to speak on behalf of the agency but alsc had to anticipate budget cuts 
and to use personal influence either to avoid them or to restore whatever had been 
eliminated. One example that may stand for many occurred when the NASA 
appropriations bill reached the floor of the Senate in August 1966. Senator 
William Proxmire (D-Wis.) introduced two bills to cut the 1967 authorization by 
$500 million and $156 million. Webb and 's allies acted promptly. Senator 
Anderson "bolr4 his back and said, '$5 billio,, is the psychological level and I am 
going to do everything in my power to keep you from dropping below $5 billion.' " 
Webb 
had to round up Senators out of the boondocks . . . and get a live p ~ i r  not to  lo^ the Proxmire 
amendment. . . . I have to tell [Stuan] Symington, who is the senior Democrat on the 
[Aeronautical and Space Scienca] Committee that I w u  going to interpret his vote as a 
personal vote of confidena or a vote of no wnfidenw in me pmonally becaw he was 
prepared to support (?) us on the $500 million cut and to vote with Dl& Ruwll . . . to cut 
us $160 million on the rccond Proxmire amendment. 
. . . You have got to estimate this situation as accurately u we estimate the other elrmmts 
of sucmr in our buaineu and 1 don't think that 1 am giving you anything except cold reality." 
Both motions were defeated.* 
On another orasion, when thc chairman d the Hour App:-priations Committee cried to reduce thc NASA 
budgn by close to $ I  billion. NASA officials managed to kill thc mow by going to all thc subcommittee chairmen 
and impmain8 them with thc faa that if this could happen to NASA, then it could happen in their own areas. 
Ip this way, thc various mcmkn of thc main Appropriations Committee were able, in a sense, to "take it away 
from the chairman " 
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NASA could woo Congress with briefings at the centm and special 
presentations for the benefits of the committm. But the ability of NASA's top 
officials to twist arms or sumssfully threaten the collapse of the space program 
in the absence of funding was no small asset either. 
What has been said so far applies mainly to events preceding the Apollo fire. 
Had there been no fire, the NASA budgct would probably have tapered off as the 
Apollo mission was completed, construction was ended, and the c a t s  of stand- 
ardized launch vehicles became more predictable. T o  exaggerate, the fire was the 
great divide; for the first time since 1961 Congress began to question NASA 
budget requests, to eliminate (and not merely reduce) line items, and, in general, 
to make the NASA budget very austere indccd. T o  this poiat, the discussion has 
concerned the procedural aspect-the "how" of the budgetary process. It is now 
time to wnsider the substantive changes within the NASA budget: how total 
outlays grew and then declined rapidly, how NASA fitted into certain more gcn- 
era1 patterns of Federal R&D spending, and how other Federal programs im- 
pinged on NASA's programs. 
FEDERAL R&D SPENCING I N  THE 1960s 
Broadly speaking, there are three ways to look at the NASA buGiet. One can 
regard it as a percentage of thc Federal budget, especially of the portion for R&D; 
one can chart the growth rate of specific program categories; or one can take the 
entire NASA budget and consider the most important changes from the Kennedy 
administration until 1970. A useful analysis may begin by eonsidering total R&D 
spending during the period under consideration. As a proportion of the gross na- 
tional product (GNP), total K&D funding rose to 3.0 percent in 1964 and dc- 
clined to 2.6 percent in 1970.~' The ratio of R & D  expenditures to total Federal 
budgct outlays declined from 12.4 percent in 1965 to an estimated 7.4 percent in 
1972."' Although these figures are useful indicators of gross trends in Federal 
spending, one must look at specific programs to see what the trends really 
amounted to (figures 7-1 and 7-2). 
First, from 1960 to 1966 the stupest growth rates were influenced by the 
expansion of the space program; the decline of the program led to a corresponding 
drop in Federal R&D spending. The  history of NASA funding, i!s dramatic rise 
and fail, was u~iique among R&D categories, most of which either remained 
stable or showed steady growth. What one sees in the late 1960s is a rise in 
absolute dollars for R&D, a drop in R&D spending as a percentage of total 
Federal outlays, and significant increases in R&D for programs or agencies that 
had previously spent little in this area. Some of the largest yerivntage increases 
in R&l) spending after 1966 occurred in community development and housing 
programs; education and manpower programs, mostly sponsored by the U.S. 
OAce of Education and the National Science Foundation; transportation, includ- 
ing pint  NASA-DOT programs such as the supersonic transport and the quiet- 
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Figure 7-1. - Federal RBD expenditures, FY 1960-1972. 
Figure 7-2. - Ratio cf R k D expenditures to total outhys, FY 1960-1972. 
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engine program; and envimnmental and national resources programs that, while 
constituting only a modest percentage of Federal R&D spending, s h ~ w d  the 
iargest relative growth from about 1971. In a sense, the increases for these 
programs can be considered independently of the fate of the NASA budget. 
Agencies a v h  as the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the 
Office of Education are not R&D agent, 9 in the sense that NASA and the 
National Institutes of Health are. Rather, therc was a shift in spending from 
R&D to social welfare programs, whether or not they had R&D components. In 
this context, it is worth noting that although health outiays between 1966 and 
,970 rose at a much higher average annual rate than any .a-:,er function, almost 
all of the increase was attributable to funding the Me&we and Medi did pro- 
grams, beginning in 1966.~' 
The issue is not that funding for space declined in order to provide for social 
services. Features that were built into the space program, like the complet~on of 
facilities projccts or the standardization of launch vehicles, would have reduced 
NASA spending even without competing programs. This is not to deny that 
Johnson and Nixon intended to cut the space budget In order to save their social 
welfare programs. But did the former decline because \.,c latter increased? To  
prove that it did, one would need to know the extent to which funding for social 
programs simply marked a redistribution of existing dollars. If a causal relation 
existed, tne space budget could be expected to resume its growth as tne growth rate 
of domestic spending began to level off. However, independently of any shifts in 
domestic spending, the NASA budget declined for nine consecutive fiscal years, 
beginning in 1967. 
The decline of NASA spending as a percentage of Fcdcral spending was the 
result of many concurrent :rends Olr oiie hand, NASA continued to claim a large 
percentage of R&D funds; in 1972 defense, space, and atomic energy ~ccountcd 
for 86 percent of federal R&D spending."' But R&D itself declined steadilv as a 
percentage of the budget. To a degree this was because BOB/OMB and Congress 
began to question not only the kinds of research being funded but the rationa!~ for 
doing such research at all. Hence the rider to the 1 970 military authorization till 
(the so-called "Mansfield Amendment"), which forbade the use of appropriations 
for research projects or studies "unless such prob? or study has a direct or 
apparent relationship to a specific military function or operations.'"' Although 
Congress viewed NASA and DOL) requets much more sceptically than i! had five 
years before, there is little evidence that cithcr Congress or BOB/CkiB had any 
comprehensive scheme to redistribute R&D funds to domestic programs. The 
budgetary process did not work that way, nor were social investment and services 
all of one sort. Rather, the social programs-instituted by Johnson, continued by 
Nixon-have claimed a larger percentage of the budget s ine  1965. The principal 
increases were in retirement, disability and unemployment compensation, the 
creation of new low-income assistance programs for the pox, and the expansion 
(1965-1970) of social service programs in education, health, and manpower 
training. Together, the last three categories accounted for nearly 11 percent of 
G N P  (nonrecmsion) in 1970,"' lncunc security dune msc fmm 21 prcunt of the 
budgct in 1960 to an estimated 29 pcrcunt in 1972."" By mmparison, NASA's 
share of the budgtt, which peaked at 4.7 p r w n t  in 1966, declined ro 1.5 Iwrcurrt 
in 1972."' 
The agency's program rategories rcHcrtcd the rise nnd firll thirt rhirr:rctcrizcd 
the hudgrt as a whole. The  term "programs" is usmi lwrc rather ttrirn rrpprol)ri- 
ation acwunts hccrusc of disadvnlrtagcs in using the latter its yardstirks, indudin8 
the use of K& 1) money for facilities pwjects. which distorts the real cx~wnditures 
for K& 1) programs; the cvntinual reprogranrmings within accounts; t he difticult y 
of discriminating twtwccn new obligational authority and itctuial nutlirys during 
the tiscid year; ,rnd the use of funds for both NASA irnd tnntracm eqrloyccs. A 
cirtcpririrl breakdown gives same idea of where tlrc money went. 'l'hc N;rtionirl 
Sciencr Voundatio~ (NSF) has classified ;)I1 NASA artivities nu "sp;rtu rcscirrclr 
and twhnolo~y."' Aecntdin~ to the NSF cdcgorics, NASA was the only Frdcrirl 
agency to cnnduct nctivitirs that involved either K I  I )  or crmtruction of Kt4 I )  
facilities. Mormver, the latter cateRory declined strirdily ibs major iu)nstrurtion 
projects were crmqdetcrl; hy the I;rte 1960s the I~ulk of NASA fiwilitics q u n d i n ~  
WGS for ~i~l)ltitl rquipmcnt rather than Kt4 1) plant mnstrw~ion. Hy 1070 suc.h out- 
lays representd less thiw 2 ~ u r t r n t  of totd rx~)enditurts, irnd they were irt no timc 
more t h;rn 14 iurcmt ."" 'I'rctltls in H& I) cxpnditurcs irrr shown in tigurc 7 3. 
'I'hc pritrciprl trends in NASA o~ilitys ;\re readily irppnrnrt: thc high projwr- 
tion of funds spent on manned spstvfli~hl irnd the drirrp and steady tirtline in wch 
funding itfter 1906; the p;rr;rllel fund-18 patterns for spitcu scirntr and applicir- 
tions, with il renewed spurt in 196H- 1%') as Viking. Pioneers Y and (:, ;rnd 
Mariner 107 1 pot under way; the leveling-OH' for suppwting spim tc.c.llnolngy. 
principally in trackin8 s h i p  ; I )  d irirwrft for .4p)llo; and the stcirdy grc)wtlr in 
i\ircrirft twhnoiogy sintr 106.3, eslwially in the form of nonrciinh\~rq;rblc sup~n)rt 
for programs sp)nsorrcl by FAA i\nd 1)Ol). Extrpt for tlre I.rnt mtcgory, lOb0 w:rs 
the turning lxint, its m e w t r d  hy ;rlnrost ilny st;rnd:rrti. 'l'hr drclitre of nrittrlwi 
spirtdlipht (after tnmplrtion of (knrini irnd with i\pproi~c,hing coalplrtion of the 
heaviest investment in !:;rti.i 11 irnd Apdlo), wh~c.h in 106($ ,rcur)u~wd for .7 1 1ur- 
cuni of NASA outl;rys, wits mainly rcsp)nsible for the cutbirck in the irvrr.rgc 
itnnual nrowth rate for A& l )  spending irftw 19th.  
A related question lw;,.vrns the r l h l  of thr f l ~ n d i n ~  lrvels on clill'erent 
agency functions. Hy definition, supp)rting sp t t r  twhnoln~y would tend to rise 
;rnd fall with the programs it supported. Hut the relawn lwtwer~\ tlrc funding 
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Figure 7-3. - Space research and technology expenditures by function. 
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levels of the three substantive program offices-OART, OSSA, and OMSF-is 
surprisingly difficult to ascertain. One almost has to fall back on impressions, 
hints, and occasional remarks in memorandums, since there are no detailed studies 
of, for example, the effect that ApoIlo had on the other o f i d  programs. Pro- 
grams like Ranger and Surveyor were approved p io r  to Apollo, but their original 
purpose was subsumed in the greater glory of the lunar landing. Beyond such 
program changes, only a few tentative conclusions are poesible. pending further 
research in this field.b9 First, the introduction of Apollo appears to have had "only 
a very secondary beneficial impact" on OSSA funding growth from 1961 on; while 
the continued level of Apollo funding in fiscal years 1967 and 1968 seems to h e  
contributed to a major slowdown in OSSA activities, beginning in FY 1967. 
Second, Apollo stimulated to some degree the growth in OART spending after 
1961, principally in supporting research and technology; bat even this influence 
is uncertain, because OART at the time was moving beyond NACA practice by 
not only doing applied research but by building hardware to "prove" the research 
concept. Also, the funding of all four program offices grew steadily until 1966. It 
seems likely that many research programs, particularly at the older centers, were 
approved because they were considered as direct or indirect support for Gemini 
and Apollo, but to demonstrate a causal relation, without a case-by-case evalu- 
ation of programs, is impossible. There seems to have been a more direct relation 
dating from 1967, when basic research and unmanned programs were cut to 
support Apollo. 
PHASING DOWN THE SPACE PROGRAM, 1965-1970 
The discussion in this chapter has tended toward one question: By what 
criteria did BOB and Congress decide whether and how much the NASA budget 
rose or fell? Obviously, NASA was not a closed system; one cannot entirely 
discount the budgetary impact of the Vietnam War and Johnson5 policy of 
combining a tax cut with continued social service spending. Clearly, there was no 
grand scheme to shape the agency from outside. As far as it is possible to isolate 
internal from external causes, one of the major reasons for the decline in the 
NASA budget was the agency's failure to plan effectively for the long term. There 
were three kinds of programs for BOB and Congress to consider in the period of 
concern: approved programs that were nearing completion (such as Apollo); 
approved programs for which continued major funding was sought (Voyager); 
and new programs like Apollo Applications that NASA wished to initiate, with 
the implication that Congress would continue to fund them after the first year. But 
these categories were never watertight; much of NASA's work, especially in 
advanced research, would strongly influence future programs. Thus the future of 
NERVA hung on the decision to continue production of the Saturn V, of whirh 
NERVA was to be the upper stage. And the production of Saturn V depended in 
turn on the uses to which the vehicle might be put after the first lunar landing. 
'I'he srnre ~mnsiderations applied to the large-solid-motor program t h u  
NASA took over from the Air PONY in 1963, almost had to terminate in 1965, but 
mnt inud until 1967 with funds restored by Congms. 'She p rq ram led to 
remarkable advirnccs in propulsion technology; on its final test firing, the SL-3 
nmtor grn&atcd 25 million newtons of thrust, far more than any other m k e t  
motor developed to that tinw.'" Hut no program in 1967 r e q u i d  technology of 
this order.' O r  cnnsider the M-1 liquid-hydmgn engine. initiated when NASA 
planners wem thinking in terms of n d i m  aswnt mode for the lunar landing. 
Onw Saturn V wplacwt Nova as the Apollo launch vehicle, no such engine was 
ncccled. Yet it was kept alive for nrorc than another two years. 
'I'hrrc features of aacnry policy mntributcd to. perhaps rausd .  rutbnrks in 
NASA programs. The tirst was the inability of the agency's top oftirials tc nrit 
or prepare an otkiid long-ritrrge plan for post-Apllo nrissions. 'l'hcrt was no lark 
of planning within NASA, cxmsiderin~ the pmspwtuscs by the program otticus, 
center pmpos;rls. irnd advirncwl studies. Hut Webb was extre~ncly reluctant r13 
conwrit NASA to i~nytlring specific beyond Apllo, prrtly lwcrusc thew were 
serious dis;rgmnrents rvcn in OhlSF over the future of manned sprwHight, 
partly lwausc any formal plan would, in Webtr's view, mmnlit the itgtr.cy to 
programs th;rt it would not tw able to runounw. Signitican:ly, the one ;rttnrrpt 
between 1963 and 1968 to qWifv pm#ri\nlS after Apollo was not even cirlled n 
plan. The Yucure Pmgrams 'l'iisk <;roup, cstirbiishnl in Jirnunrv 1964 after 
t'residmt ,Johnson rcclwstni of NASA .a statrnrrnt of objwtivrs byond thosr 
i~lr~;\dy ap~rrclvrd, suhnrittcd a report in April l%5.-' Hut it nlcrrly enunrer;rttul. 
without chtwosinn Iwtwcrn, the kinds of options availatdc oncr ivrtirin assumptions 
werr g r a n ~ d .  'l'he Scni\tc Conrrnittcc on Armnirutic;rl and S p c u  Srirncrs crit- 
icized the rrprr! for just this reason: It did not explain trow o; whrn ir sclcction 
bctwtcn priorities would b nride, indic.irte the funds n d c d  for various altrrn;r- 
tivea, or nvnticrn nrilitary tunsiderations and the rolr of 1)01). In ;r scnsc, these 
criticisms wcrc beside the p i n t .  As chapter 9 details, WcW WAS interested pri- 
marily in developing a r;rpability to operate in spi\lY, while irt least sonrr Con- 
Rressmrn were nrcm intrrestrd in the uses to which that caprhility would be put. 
Thus NASA and, to ;I dcgrcc, Congress, were at rmss-purposes. Not Webb nor 
hluellcr nc.1 thr Plannin~ Ccmrdin~*ion Stwring ( h u p  trw~ld develop a cmvinc- 
ing pmgr;rtrr, conc thirt distinguished Iutwrcn the rcspwtive mlcs of manned and 
unmannrd proRr,rnrs or the relative nrerits of orbit ing sprcr c* :dons and applica- 
tions s;rtellitrs. '1'0 crmfuse t hr issue further, NASA o%ri;rls tended to vcer from 
onc kind of just itic;rticrn to irnnther. 'I'hc Apl lo  mission was defended Tor reasons 
of prestige. for the Iwnetit Iu,rtin~ the Kussiirns in ir raw they werr not i\lw;\~s 
w a r e  of Ircirrg in, or for the long-term Iwnrfts i t  prcwrisrrl all 11r;rnkind. Hilt 
NASA did not hew to ;rnv linr c.consistcntly or with cxonvirtian." 
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Second, the Apollo fire destroyed some of the trust that had developed be- , 
tween NASA and Congress since 1961. What angered some Congressmen almost 
as much as the fire itself were the circumstances in which NASA had awarded 1 
North American Aviation the command service module contract, as well as 
NASA's refuzal to make public the Phillips report. Support in Congress declined, 
to be regained gradually uvti ; , t sucmding eighteen months. Those who had op- 
posed the space program before the fire became more opcn in their oppsition, 
while others tended to back away from earlier positions ot support. 
Finally, NASA tended to conduct long-raagc ;I! rilning in almost purely 
substantive terms. As discussed in chapter 5, one of NASA's primary problems 
was what to do with its skilled manpower once the programs for which they were 
recruited phased down. If scientists and engineers were to re ma:^^ at one center, 
it was imperative to establish the center's role beyond its original mission. As 
mentioned, as early as 1963 the House Science and Astronautics Committee had 
suggested closing the Flight Research Center. During the next seven years NASA 
was forced to close the Electronics Research Center, place the Mississippi Test 
Facility on a standby basis, and order sharp reductions in force that threatened the 
ability of other centers to keep their most talented people. 
In conclusion, the budgetary process worked in NASA's favor when it had 
an overridixg mission to accomplish, few direct competitors, and no opposing 
vested interest. In one sense, NASA's problem after 1965 was to aevelop an 
integrated plan that would involve all its capabilities; in another sense, it was to 
attract new clients with an interest in furthering the space program. For lack of 
both, Voyager was canceled and Saturn V was discontinued after the fifteenth 
vchicle." Several missions, including the Skylab space station (Apollo Applica- 
tions renamed) and the unmanned Viking mission to Mars, were delayed, the 
former by four years, the latter by almost three. Furthermore, the agency's 
Sustaining University Program was canceled; and the nuclear rocket program, 
though kept alive as NERVA I, lacked a specific mission. The fragmented, incre- 
mental nature of budgeting worked in NASA's favor during the early 1960s 
because what was lost at one stage could be regained further down the line. 
However, this feature of the budgetary process did not prevent continually de- 
clining budget requests and continually declining appropriations after 1966y it 
merely guaranteed that the NASA budget would not be reviewed as a whole. 
Perhaps the civilian budget was never amenable to such examination. Few of its 
larger programs were susceptiblr to the kind of cost-benefit anJysis that was at 
the heart of PPBS. As $+own, the very special conditions that made PPBS work 
at the Pentagon did not hold for most civilian agencies and particularly not for 
NASA. 
Chapter 8 
The Structure of NASA-DOD Relations 
M ost of the preceding chapters touched on ways in which the Defense De- partment assisted NASA. Units such as the Defense Supply Agency, which 
administered many NASA contracts, the Army Corps of Engineers, which man- 
aged NASA's largest construction projects, and the Air Force, which detailed 
officers to serve as program managers and directors of center operating divisions, 
provided essential serviccs in support of the agency. This was in addition to the 
early, oxc-only transfers of the S~.:rn project and other launch vehicles, space- 
craft like Tiros, contractor-operated facilities like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 
and the technical skills of the von Braun team. Simply to list examples, however, 
gives only the barest hint of the significance for NASA of the totality of the 
support; the Department of Defense (DOD) was the one Federal agency with 
which NASA had to come to terms in order to carry out its mission at all. The 
essence of their relationship had far more to do with mutual need than with 
philosophical arguments concerning the existence or the desirability of one space 
program or two. The Space Act only outlined the scope of interagency relations 
in the most general way. The act declared that, while aeronautical and space 
programs would be managed by a civilian agency, "activities peculiar to or 
primarily associated with the development of weapons systems . . . or the defense 
of the United States" would remain DOD's responsibility; and it enjoined NASA 
to make available "to agencies directly concerned with national defense . . . 
discoveries that have military value or significance." ' It is as well, then, to set aside 
preconceptions. "Civilian" and "military" are not the same as "peaceful" and 
"nonpeaceful"; duplication of programs could be "warranted" or "unwarranted"; 
and much of the struggle over the military uses of space was as much between 
elements within DOD as between DOD and NASA. In short, the principles 
underlying the U.S. space program resulted from the many subordinate agree- 
ments subsisting between the two agencies. One has to begin from the particular 
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to arrive at the general because, in this sphere, "no clear-cut divisions of re- 
sponsibility exist or are possible, and it is difficult to describe the situation in 
general terms." 
What were the elements comprising the NASA-DOD relationship? In at 
least four ways their interests impinged on each other: common technologies; 
NASA's continuation of NACA's support of military aeronautics; NASA's over- 
whelming dependence in its early years on the launch vehicles and ground support 
provided by the Air Force and on the Saturn rocket and von Braun team trans- 
ferred from the Army; and the persistent attempts by the Air Force to investigate 
the military applications of space, especially of manned Earth-orbital operations. 
As to common technology, there is no discontinuity between civilian and military 
R&D, no line that one can arbitrarily draw with rocket guidance and data 
processing on one side, avionics and solid-state physics on the other. A launch 
vehicle is only a modified ballistic missile; and it cannot be overstated that for 
everything between sounding rockets and the Saturn I,* NASA relied on vehicles 
successfully developed by the Air Force between 1954 and 1959-notably the 
Atlas, Thor, and Titan ballistic missiles in their original or modified versions. 
This shared technology also signified that NASA and DOD would have to mar- 
dinate programs to avoid "unwarranted" duplication of launch vehicles and facil- 
ities. Officials of both agencies would want to exchange information in areas of 
mutual interest, such as space medicine or bioastronautics, in which NASA and 
DOD were simultaneously performing thousands of research tasks. Indeed, few 
areas of NASA's R&D were without potential military application. The Surveyor 
program-than which nothing could seem more unmilitary-is a case in point. Its 
retromotor, designed to reduce the spacecraft's approach velocity, was used as the 
m n d  stage of the Air Force's Burner I1 launch vehicle; the automatic landing 
syrtcm could be applied to vertical or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) 
aircraft; while the lightweight, remotely controlled TV camera could be used in 
military communications? Hence the crossovers between military and civilian 
programr: flying DOD experiment8 aboard Gemini; transferring NASA's Syn- 
com communications satellite to DOD in 1965; and the use, by Defense agencies, 
of geodetic and meteorological information supplied by NASA. 
The transformation of NACA into NASA did not affect its role in supporting 
research for the military, except to blur the distinction between support and 
coordination. It is useful to recall the importance of NACA applied research and 
the ways by which research concepts were translated into military h~rdu- re .  The 
concept of the sweptback wing described in a 1945 report was applied t~ be R-47 
and B-52 bombers and the century series of fighter aircraft. The concept of 
low-aspect-ratio wings to reduce atmospheric drag at supersonic speeds mnde 
pssible the F-104 and h e  X-15 rocket plane. Perhaps the best-known example 
of the military uses of KACA research was the 1953 paper of Allen and Eggers 
'The lint stage of the Saturn rockct was dtvcloped by the von Braun team at the Army Redstone Arsenal at 
Huntsville. Alabama. 
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that demonstrated the superiority of a blunt nose cone in coping with the ex- 
tremely high temperatures generated by the atmospheric reentry of a ballistic 
missile. Similar research continued after NASA's establishment and extended to 
every area of advanced research and technology, but with this difference: NASA 
collaborated with the services in refining the concept into the development phase. 
The X-15, for example, was a joint NACA (NASA)-.4ir Force-Navy project. 
Moreover, the same agencies collaborated on solid-fuel propulsion programs, 
despite the absence of near-term missions in N.4SA's case. All this was in addition 
to testing Air Force flight models in the unique facilities available at the Ames and 
Langley centers; for example, the Langley 18.3-meter vacuum sphere was one of 
the VL kw available for "dirty" tests, i- volving the discharge of contaminating 
substances such as exhaust gases. 
Between 1958 and 1966 almost all NASA launches, other than for sounding 
rockets, took place at the Air Force Eastern Test Range at Cape Canaveral, 
Florida, and at the Western Test Range at Vandenburg Air Force Base, near 
Point Arguello, California.. Even after NASA acquired land just north of the 
Eastern Test Range in 1961-1962, all NASA launches (except the sounding- 
rocket and Smut satellite launches at Wallops Island) continued on ranges oper- 
ated by and under conditions stipulated by the Air Force. The nat;lre of NASA 
programs, however, soon led to disagreements over how NASA would pay DOD 
for range and tracking support. Moreover, the "single manager" concept of range 
support ran afoul of the determination of NASA officials to decide their own 
rquirements. It might, for instance, seem like gross and unwarranted duplication 
when NASA built tracking stations "colocated" near DOD-operated facilities on 
Antigua and Ascension Island. NASA officials disagreed. The colocation issue 
could only be decided on the merits of each case, not by assertions of abstract 
principle. For all the draft and signed agreements prepared by both agencies, the 
problems of funding and range support were not amenable to any simple or 
permanent solution, whether a solution involved defining an agency's "unique 
rquirements" or identifying the free.services that each agency provided (or should 
provide) the other. 
For brevity's sake, NASA-DOD relations may be categorized under the 
headings of support, coordination, and rivalry. The body of this chapter involves 
a closer look at these categories: how they evolved, the formal mechanisms of 
interagency relations, and certain problems stemming from the dual management 
of the U.S. space program. Analyzing specific problem area4 should bring us 
closer to answering the following questions: 
1. How did the two agencies understand such terms as "coordination" and 
"single management"? How well did each adjust abstract principles to in- 
stitutional realities? 
Originally called the Atlantic and Pacific Miuile Ranger, t h y  were rederignated the Easten, and Westan 
Tert R a n p  in May 1964. 
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2. By what rationale did NASA and DOD pursue similar, overlapping pro- 
grams, and how did they control wasteful duplication? 
3. In what sense, if any, was there a national launch vehicle or range support 
program in the 19609? 
4. In sum, how well did organizational relations serve both agencies' purposes? 
THE BEGINNINGS OF A DIVISION OF LABOR: ADVENT AND SYNCOM 
The Space Act left the scope of the relations between NASA and the military 
unchartered. The general principles that evolved were a precipitate of many 
agreements, programs, and working-level relations. Certain pmndit ions for 
working together had to be met. There had to be agmment on which programs 
properly belonged in either agency, on how NASA would acquire the launch 
vehicles it needed, and on which officials were authorized to speak on behalf of 
their agency in relation to the other. Within DOD, there had to be an adminis- 
trative reshuffling to decide the role of the services in the conduct of military space 
programs; werc they to be concentrated in one, parceled out among all, or located 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense? 
But although the services might agree on little else, they were as one in op- 
posing the pretensions of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to 
become the military space agency since its authority would have been at their 
expense.' Less than two years after its establishment, ARYA had become a job 
shop for research tasks that none of the services happened to be doing. The 1958 
reorganization led to the creation of the Directorate of Defense Research and 
Engineering, whose charter gave its head the authority to "approve, modify, or 
disapprove programs and projects of the military departments and other DOD 
agencies."' Not until !he end of 1959 was the Director's authority over ARPA 
made explicit, and it was the effect, more than the cause, of the p m s s  by which 
ARPA was divested of its most important programs: the Tiros weather satellite 
went to NASA; the Transit navigation satellite, to the Navy; the early-warning 
Midas satellite and the Samos reconnaissance satellite, to the Air Force; and 
Notus, the interim mmmunications satellite system that became Advent, to the 
Army. ARPA would be a job shop, responsible only for dwcloping advanced 
systems and turning them over to one of the services at the point at which each 
system became operational. 
The Army's ill-fated Advent program is worth a closer look berausc of its 
relation to NASA's Syncom communications satellite." The independent origin of 
both programs and their ultinratc convergence may serve as a case study of 
features common to civilian dnd military programs: shared technologies; the risks 
inherent in advanced R &D, particularly where the launch vehicle, spacecraft, and 
ground support werc p r d i . . g  cwncurrcntly; the distinction drawn by NASA 
between dcvziopmcntal and operational phases of R&D; and the problems in 
w-*ting jurisdictions proper to each agency. llcfcnsc Secretary McElroy had cre- 
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ated ARPA in February 1958 with the partial objective of initiating and devel- 
oping space programs for which there was no clear service jurisdiction. One of 
these, the communications satellite pmgram, was transferred from ARPA to the 
Army in September 1959, renamed Advent in February 1960, and effectively 
terminated in May 1962. From its inception Advent was designed as a syn- 
chronous communications satellite--a satellke that orbited at the Earth's sped of 
rotation at an altitude of 35 900 kilometers and appeared as a fixed point in the 
sky. T h m  such satellites can provide worldwide coverage, need fewer gmund 
stations than a medium-altitude satellite, and do not present complicated tracking 
problems. Howwcr, the theoretical advantages of synchronous mvcrage cm be 
nullified by technical difticulties. A synchronous satellite needs a morc powerful 
launch vehicle than one in medium orbit; it needs more electronic parts and, as a 
matter of course, a backup satellite in orbit in case of failure; and a spacecraft in 
synchronous orbit can be jammed mom easily than a number of medium-altitude 
satellites, since, be in^ stationary, it can be pinpointed mom readily. 
The origins and purpose of Advcnt were such that they seemed to involve no 
duplication between IX)D and NASA. Defense had a pressing rquirement for 
an operational communications satcllitc; NASA, as an R&D agency, did not. 
Undcr a NovcmtKr 1958 agreement, ARPA was placed in charge of active com- 
munications satellites, i.c., spacecraft that receive, amplify, and send radio signals, 
while NASA would work on passive satellites-balloons, for example-which 
merely reflect signals sent from gmund stations. But this arrangement was not 
binding. "NASA was not forccloscd from mearch and dcvelopmcnt in the active 
satellite field; in fact the agmmcnt recognized that at an appropriate time, and 
making full use of the knowledge derived from the military cxperiencc, NASA 
would do some dcvelopmcnt work on components and prototypes for a nonmilitary 
mmmunications satcllitc systcm."',This is prcciscly what happened. As the Army 
pmcccdcd with Advcnt, NASA contracted with Hughes Aimaft in 1961 for r 
lightweight synchronous satcllitc. Writing to Webb in June 1961, Deputy Sew- 
tary of Ikfcnsr Roswcll Gilpatric indicated that he considered NASA's Syncom 
as "complcmcntary to, not duplicativc of, the military Advent."' By agmment 
that August. NASA undertook to devclop the satellite, with DO11 furnishing the 
ground support. Advcnt was running into serious difticulties. Not only had thf 
program overrun its original cost estimates. but thc Ccntaur u p p r  stage of the 
launch vehicle that would plan Advcnt in orbit (which was being drvtlopcd by 
NASA) had k n  dclayed for morc than t h m  years, and no earlier launch would 
bc possible until the 'Ti.an 111 then k i n g  drvcloped k a m e  available. Addi- 
tionally. the triode tube, on which Advent was based, was already obsolete. Under 
the circumstances the program had to be dropped in favor of a medium-altitude 
mmmunications satcllitc. But although such a program was approved, it ran into 
delays 1H)II oftirials negotiated fruitlessly with thc Communications Sat- 
cllitc Corprarion (ComSat) to provide scrviccs. Almost by dcfault NASA, by 
1963, had become thc only Fcdcral agcnry working on a program for il syn- 
chronous mrnmunic.rtions satellite. 
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The rest of the story may be summed up briefly. NASA launched and p l a d  
in orbit three Syncoms in 1963-1964, the first of which never responded to ground 
signals, while the second (launched 26 July 1963) and third (19 August 1964) 
operated successfully. At the end of 1964 the orbiting satellites were transferred 
from NASA to DOD as forerunners of an Initial Defense Communications 
Satellite System. In June 1966 a single Titan 111 inserted seven communications 
satellites into random, near-synchronous, quatorial orbit, creating the nucleus of 
a worldwide military communications system. 
The history of Advent and Syncom illustrates a great deal of the direction in 
which NASA-DOD relations were tending in the early 1960s. Note particularly 
Syncom's status as a coordinated rather than a joint project. NASA designed the 
spacecraft but had no Syncom stations of its own; the ground support, funded and 
purchased by DOD, was salvaged from Advent. Syncom was a program whose 
success depended "on ?he functioning of separate, co-operating systems."" It was 
experimental, and it was no! designed to handle bulk traffic. Once the rcsearch 
concept had been proved, NASA was willing to turn over the program to the 
potential user, the more so as NASA had begun to negotiate contracts for "ad- 
vanced technological satellites" designed to carry several packages of experiments 
in communications technology. In both communications and meteorology, NASA 
had to face the question of where development left off and operations began. In 
meteorology, NASA ceded the Tiros satellite to the Weather Bureau to meet its 
and DOD's need for an operational weather satellite, while continuing work on 
the more advanced Nimbus. In communications, Congress created ComSat in 
1962 as a profit-making entity for operating the U.S. portion of a future global 
communications satellite network. There was no need or justification for NASA 
to develop and operate a system that would duplicate ComSat's Early Bird pro- 
gram for an "experimental-operational" synchronous satellite.'" The transfer of 
Syncom to DOD thus served two purposes: It gave DOD access to a tcchnclogy 
that it needed, and it removed the suspicion that NASA was developing an 
operational communications satellite system. 
But the most important lesson of the Advent and Syncom programs was that 
the cancelation of one and the transfer of the other would have been much less 
likely without the agency reorganizations discussed in the following secticr,. The 
U.S. space program in 1958-1959 was a welter of projects parcel4 out among 
NASA, ARPA, and the services. During the next three years, the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering became the official charged with the ~ m d u c t  
of Defense R&D; ARPA was downgraded to the role of job shop for the Ofice 
of the Secretary of Defense; with minor exceptions, the Air Force was charged 
with conducting the military space program; while the Defense Communications 
Agency, previously created in 1960, became in May 1962 the "focal point for 
continuing integration of the space and ground elements of the communications 
satellite systems to meet Department of Defense requirements."" As Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. Harold Brown could decide to cancel 
Advent because the 1958 act created the position that charged him to approve and 
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review all major Defense R&D programs. The decision to cancel followed a series 
of reviews at the level of the Office of the Secretz. rather than at the service level. 
The Project 39 review of March 1961 "to study and review major outstanding 
problems in the Defense Establishment," was followed by the Advent Program 
Survey that December, which was chaired by the head of the Office of Electronics 
in Brown's Directorate.'? There had to be officials in both agencies who could, to 
paraphrase Matthew Arnold, see these programs steadily and see them whole. It 
is time to turn to the organizational changes that made ~1ii.h oversight possible. 
NASA-DOD RELATIONS, 1959-1 963 
The military space progl.am moved through three overlapping phases from 
1959 to 1961. First, the most promisir~g ARPA projects were turned over to the 
services; the Air Force was made responsible for ballistic missile development in 
1959, for military space development generally in 1961, and for military support 
of NASA in 1962; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense under Gates and 
McNamara began to demand that the scrvices justify programs by matching costs 
and benefits. 'The directive of 6 March 1961 grew out of recommendations by two 
of President Kennedy's task forces that DOD activities in general and space 
programs in particular be centralized. It authorized each military department to 
conduct preliminary research, but it assigned to the Air Force responsibility for 
"research, development, test, and engineering of Department of Defense space 
development programs or projects which are approved hereafter."" Since the Air 
Force was already responsible for more than 90 percent of DOD space devel- 
opment, the red force and substance of McNamara's order consisted in bringing 
the three services under tighter central control by the Secretary, the Deputy 
Secretary, and ihe Director of Defense Rerearch and Engineering. The Air Force 
could not select the projects that were to be developed. DOD officials were explicit 
about this point; the aim was to prevent interservice conflicts "by further re- 
stricting the independent freedom of action of the three military services . . . by 
limiting the latitude of the military departments to increase emphasis and funding 
for various projects." "l 
The McNamara directive tightened and clarified the ground rules for con- 
ducting mili,dry R&D in space, without explaining the requirements that would 
justify military space programs or their relation to NASA's programs. Mean- 
while, the Air Force conducted a major rearganization of its own. Since 1954 Gen. 
Bernard A. Schriever had been in charge of the Air Force ballistic missile program 
as head, first of the Western Development Division of the Air Research and 
Development Command (ARDC), then of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division 
that replaced it in 1957, and finally of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), 
established on 1 April 1961 by a merger of ARDC and the Air Materiel Com- 
mand. The 1961 reorganization consolidated the Air Force space and ballistic 
missile programs, with AFSC assuming "direct responsibility for everything ex- 
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cept the logistical support functions."" It created two new divisions-Ballistic 
Systems and Space Systems-which b"xame completely autonomous in October 
1962, reporting directly to AFSC Headquarters.* By a series of related changer, 
the nonprofit Aerospace Corporation was established in 1960 as a spinoff of 
TRW/Spacc Technology Laboratories. which wanted to bid on Air Form hard- 
ware contracts; the Aerospace Corporat~on, on the other hand, was responsible for 
advanced systems analysis and general technical supervision of Air Force missile 
and space systems. And last, though not least important, a 1962 directive assigned 
responsibility to the Air Force for support of NASA." 
Four concurrent developments within NASA strengthened the agency's hand 
in negotiating with DOD. First, NASA and DOD concluded a =r ia  of agree- 
ments between 1959 and 1963." The agreen~ent of November 1959 laid down the 
principles by which each agency would reimburse the other for servim rendered; 
and to date it has remained the only general agreement, although it has often been 
modified."' The agreement of September 1960 formally established the Aero- 
nautics and Astronautia Coordinating Board (AACB), although it had met for 
the fint time three months earlier. The Board's importance, h o  -ever, was less in 
what it accomplished for the time being than in its terms of reference. Where the 
moribund Civilian-Military Liaison Committee created by the Space A a  had no 
authority to implement its decisions, the members of the AACB and its six panelst 
were authorized to take actions "utilizing the authority vested in them by their 
respective apencier." "' The cochairmen were the NASA Deputy Administrator 
and the Director of kfense  Research and Engineering. 
These agreements were a sort of organic law for the space prograrli. The 
Webb-Gilpatric agreement of 23 February 1961 stipulated that neither agrncy 
would initiate the development of a new launch vehicle without first seeking the 
consent of the ~ t h e r . ~ "  The agreement of 14 January 1963 provided that the 
Merritt Island Launch Area would be operated as a NASA installation, separate 
and distinct from the Eastern Tat Range, although the Air Force would continue 
to provide common servim for NASA and DOD user:." This superseded an 
earlier agreement under which Merritt Island would have been operated jointly, 
and it suggests how far NASA was prepzred to go in asserting the right to 
determine its own needs. One week later, the Gemini agreement confirmed 
NASA's hard-won independen~e.~' Here, too, Webb turned down McNamara's 
proposal of a pint program. The agreement of 2 1 January affirmed NASA's role 
as program manager, while stipulating that DOD would participate under ar- 
rangements to be made by an advisory Gemini Program Planning Board. Of thee  
five sgecments, the first two established the organizational ground rules, the third 
served as the basic document in ruordinating military and civilian programs, while 
*hi  Jul) 1967 the two d~v~s~ons wrrc supcrsrdcd by the Hcadquanrn S p c r  and Mlu i lc  Systems Or- 
y n l u t u m  (S.ShIS0) 
' hfdnnrd S p a r  Fl~ght. unmanned Spm aft. Launch Veh~clcr. Spacr Fl~ght Ground Envimnmcnt, S u p  
p-rt:q Space Rrumh and 'l'mhnolgy. and \cnnuut~c.r 'I'ht ( : ~ v ~ l ~ m - M ~ l t t a r )  Llallon ( 'mm~t tc r  was 
I ~ r m r l l y  abnl~shed by the P r n ~ d m ' s  Rcnrgan~zation Plan No. 4 ,  2'7 July 1965 
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the fourth and fifth confirmed that NASA was the dominant partner in the 
manned exploration of spacc. 
Thew agreements were by no means the only examples of NASA's as=- 
tivenerr. In March 1962, for example, NASA established ib~dcpcndent field instal- 
lations at the launch faci'itics of the Eastern and Western Test R a n w .  Similarly, 
NASA sought to participate morc closcly in the dwclopmcnt of vehicles like the 
Agena upper stage, which it needed for its own launches. By a Stptember 1963 
agreement between NASA and the Air Form Systcms Command, NASA was 
assigned a role in launch vehicle planning and became a member of the Air F o m  
Configuration C c ~ : o l  Board for the Atlas, Thor, and Agena vet.icltr. 
The  second development t I affect the ccnduct of the national sp;tcc program 
was Pmidcnt Kennedy's decision to assign the lunar landing mission to NASA. 
After May 1961 ,hc Air Force h ~ d  no clcarly defined manned nliuion in spacc 
Its Man in Spait Soonest project, whcn transferrd to NASA, evolved into Pro* 
Mercury-a nonmilitary project that could not have sumcd-d without military 
support. The  Air Form Systcms Command's 1962 propsal  for a "Blu.: Gcmini" 
went nowhere for lack of support by Air Form Headquarters and by the 0 % ~  
ol the Secretary of hfensc.  When Webb and MrNamara signed tirc Gemini 
agmmcnt, the only approved manned military program was Dyna-Soar, a 
winged orbital glider first conceived in 1957-1958 and formally initiated as a 
program in 1960, whcn Bocing was chosen to design thr glider and the Martin 
Company to supply the Titan I booster.'" Ever; before the Gemini agreement, 
Dyna-Soar had run into trouble; and it is not too much to say ths: the a g m m  nt 
hastened Dyna-!;oar's demise, the more so because the :orme; could do most of 
what the latter was intended to do, and more. Thus by early 1963 proponents of 
a manned military program were caught in a merry-go-round of rquircmcnts. 'To 
justify swh a program, thcy had to cxpl~in  what a manned mission could a m m -  
plish that an unmanned satellite c-ould not; thcy had to show how a military 
project could be designed to avoid duplicating what Gcmini was accnmplishing in 
Eanh-orbital operations; and they found it useful to assen that the Sovict Union 
had gone further than thQ U S .  in the military use of spacc. But Gcmini, by 
including morc than a dozen military experiments, inevitably r a i d  the spcarc of 
unwarranted duplication should ,he Air Forw p r d  with a manned program. 
A third development in NASA-1X)D relations was signaled by .^!I* ntablish- 
mcnt of a NASA Offie  of Defense Affairs in December 1962.' As H * '  ACB, 
its establishment was more notable as an expression of policy than for any im- 
mediate ammplishmcnt. The  new ofice, headed by retired Adm. W. Fred Boonc. 
was to promote interagency cooperation, serve as "the focal p i n t  for all major 
defense-related matters within NASA, [and) sprak for NASA within the frame- 
work of cstabhshed policy."-" NASA and IXII) were already linked in many 
ways: through AACB and its panels; through ti,: Air Form Systems Command 
liaison c t t t i r r ,  located in the same downtown W~shington officr building as the 
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Office of Manned Space Flight; and throug~, the militsry d@ A!es stationed at the 
centers. Treading carefully, for there were many bureaucratic feet to step on, 
Bcrone showed discretion in adopting the operating principle that "we would not 
attempt to have all communications and interactions with the Defense De- 
partment channelled through our Office. . . . we would avoid permitting the 
Office . . . to become a bottleneck impeding the flow of informrtion and the 
conduct of NASA-DOD business."25 
Fourth, NASA moved to centralize its ground support network. By 1965 
NASA had three networks: STADAN (Satellite Tracking and Data Acquisition 
Network), sumssor to the Minitrack Network developed for Vanguard and used 
for tracking unmanned, Earth-orbital spacecraft; the Deep Space Network man- 
aged by JPL, which tracked lunar and planetary probes; and the Manned Space 
Flight Network (MSFN), which consisted in 1965 of nineteen land-based sites 
plus instrumented ships and aircraft managed by DOI?. These networks were 
complementary in certain respects. MSFN, for example, had to work with space- 
craft up to lunar distances and, like the Deep Space Network, it had a number of 
26-meter radio antennas for tracking. MSFN and STADAN were sufficiently 
similar that NASA consolidated thenr into a single Space Tracking and Data 
Network in mid-1971, although NASA management never took the final step of 
completely centralizing the range structure, which would havc been undesirable 
for two reasons. The program offices and their c e m r  representatives would havc 
been most unwilling to surrender control of mission operations and tracking, and 
a persuasive a t e  could be made that "to divorce support completely from dirwt 
program control or amss  is to endanger the responsiveness of that support base 
to the programs it should serve . . . separately' managed support resources by a 
centralized office may sometimes be more costly than program control since some 
equipment should be baed only during the lifetime of a particular program."2" 
What headquarters could do, it did. The creation of a unified Launch 
Operations Center at the Cape in May 1963 removed Marshall management from 
the scene. The new center, renamed the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) that De- 
cember, took over Houston's Florida Operations in 1964, and in October 1965 
assumed control of all unmanned launches, except for qunding rockets, on either 
coast. In like manner, the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition (OTDA) 
assumed management of JBL's Space Flight Operations Facility, once its 
prospective use by Pioneer and Lunar Orbiter made central control nmssary. As 
recognition of its coequal status, OTDA was designated a program office in De- 
cember 1965. 
Although these moves provided tighter control over launch support and 
tracking and data acquisition, headquarters continued to manage the two sepa- 
rately. The furthest that NASA was prepared to go in coordinating them was to 
create the position of Mission Operations Director with overall responsibility fw 
manned spaceflight programs 2nd to establish an Operations Support Requirc- 
ments Office (OSRO) staffed by representatives of the program offices, OTDA, 
and the centers participating in manned spaceflight. Reporting to the Mission 
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Operations Director, OSRO was charged with considering operations support as  
a wbole, particularly in cases where more than one program and morc than one 
ccntcr werc involved." Equally important, the office was intended to be a single 
point of contact with the Air Force National Range Division for all manned flight 
support quirements . 'Whetha.  complete centralization might have a m m -  
plished more is dcbatablc. What is evident is the rationalization of NASA's 
ground support activities and the creation of well-defined patterns of cooperation 
and support between NASA and 1X)D. The following section considers these 
patterns. 
Reimbursement Arrangements 
While reserving to NASA control of Merritt Island, the Webb-McNamara 
agreement of January 1963 left open the question of how NASA would pay for 
those services that the Air Force continued to provide. In 1963 much of what 
would bemme the Kennedy Space Center was still a swamp, more a wildlife 
sanctuary than a launch facility. When the first Saturn 1B flew, in February 1966, 
it was from the Eastern Test Range, as were all subsequent Saturn 1R launches 
for the main Apollo program.* Only those launches requiring the Saturn V were 
from KSC's launch complex 39, which was developed by NASA spec.ifically to 
accommodate them. So hcavily did NASA rely on Air Force facilities that the Air 
Force transferred several launch complexes-launch coniplcxcs 34 and 37 for 
Saturn, launch complex 12 for the Atlas-Agena, launch complex 16 for the 
'Titan 11, launch complex 36 for the Centaur-to NASA, since they werc already 
used almost exclusively for NASA iaunches. Indeed, i)OD supported NASA to 
such an extent that launches of the Navy's Polaris missile at the Eastern Test 
Range had to wait for those of NASA."" 
'The relationship between NASA and the Air F o r e  gave rise to certain 
issues, in themselves highly technical, yet important judged by the time spent by 
ofticiais of Imth agencies in trying to resolve them. With the 1963 agreement, 
NASA became rcsponsiblc for master planning and developing facilities at Mcr- 
ritt Island, as well as for the preparation, checkout, and launch of its own flight 
missions. This agreement left open the funding of services that DOD mntinued 
to supply, such as the use of launch pads, downrange tracking and data acquisi- 
tion, and relay, instrumentation, search and recovery ships and aircraft in the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The  differencus over funding were morc than merely 
technical; they involved each agency's conception of its role in the national space 
program. Precisely because differences went so dccp, none of the interagency 
working groups set up to resolve the problem arrived at a settlement acrtptablc 
to both sides: not the pancl established to work out the detiiils of the Webb- 
McNamara aRrccnicnt, nor the interagency task forces that studied the problem 
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from 1965 to 1967, nor the Director of the Budget, into whose lap both agencies 
finally tossed the p r ~ b l e m . ~  Basically, the task forces identified four alternative 
methods uf funding. NASA could pay the actual cost of services provided; it could 
enjoy a host-tenant relationship, paying only for "abnormal" services; it could pay 
on a pro rata basis, according to some arbitrary estimate of the proportion of the 
total workload for which NASA was responsible; or it could continue the existing 
arrangement, under which NASA reimbursed the Air Force only for those re- 
quirements that were unique to a given flight projelct. 
In practice, the four options narrowed to two: cost sharing, as DOD pre- 
ferred, or reimbursement for an agreed proportion of total costs. Why, then, was 
the problem so intractable? The reasons are complex, intertwined with political 
considerations that were not always made c:xplicit. First, there was the difficulty 
of separating the cc its peculiar to NASA programs from the total cost of running 
the Eastern Test Range as a national range used by several agencies. N4SA was 
prepared to pay for certain readily identifiable additional services incurred by the 
Air Force as part of the NASA workload. Tine agency accepted the concept that 
a national range-that is, a facility used by more than one agency-should be run 
by a single manager. But NASA officials took the argument a step further. Where 
the range was being operated on behalf of several users, it was impractical to 
charge each agency on a job order basis.)' What counted was the creation and 
maintenance of a national resource. In the eyes of agency spokesmen, NASA was 
consistent, since the same principle had been applied by NASA laboratories to 
work done for other agencies, including DOD. 
NASA desired reimbumment only for work and materials over and above the normal 
capabilities . . . of th- NASA elements involved; i.e., unique outsf-pocket costs. Only under 
such an arrangement auld NASA keep its teams of scientists, engineers, and technicians 
intact and efficiently employed; maintain effective control over the operation of its facilities 
and the flow of work; and achieve the degree of administrative . . . flexibility essential to the 
most eKcctive . . . management of its research. . . . The Administrator held that the type of 
R&D work performed by NASA under its charter could not be done on a job order bas i~ . '~  
NASA officials hinted that no other arrangement could be accepted. Or 
rather, they intimated that if McNamara insisted on cost-sharing at the Cape, 
then "NASA would feel obligated to exercise an authoritative voice in planning 
and management commensurate with its share of fundingS3) 
The history of the funding controversy does have-if not a lighter side-then 
a kind of awful predictability familiar to students of bureaucratic strategies. Above 
all, both sides seemed to shrink from any sort of final decision, even to canceling 
the outdated 1959 agreement. The task force report of December 1963, which 
recommended that existing funding arrangements be continued, only served as a 
temporary remedy for confusion. In October 1965 Defense officials reopened the 
matter by suggesting that NASA cooperate in arriving at an equitable division of 
costs. This touched off another round of studies and reports that lasted over two 
years and left both sides as far apart as ever. There were joint working groups, 
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exchanges of letters, and a budget request by McNamara that struck out $45 mil- 
lion from the Defense budget in support of Apollo-an amount promptly restored 
by the Bureau of the Budget. By February 1967 NASA and DOD were still so 
far apart that Boone, who handled  egot ti at ions for NASA, and his DOD counter- 
part "could not wen agree as to how we should report that we di~agreed."~' 
These protracted and exhausting negotiations did lead to an interim set- 
tlement, however inconclusive. In April 1967 both agencies wrote to Budget 
Director Charles Schultze, rquesting a judgment on issues pending. Schultze 
agreed to arbitrate, provided that his decision was ampted by both agencies as 
binding. When the Bureau's judgment was conveyed to NASA in February 1968, 
its conclusions left the stiitus quo virtually intact. The Bureau's decision applied 
to FY 1969 only; and no more final judgment would be possible, pending a 
financial management system at the Eastern Test Range that would "provide a 
basis for full identification of costs based upon valid accounting proctd~res."'~ In 
essence, the Bureau accepted NASA': position on funding; for 1969 NASA and 
DOD were to pay for range operations on a 60 : 40 basis, except that NASA 
would pay 85 percent of the cost of Apollo aircraft. Out of a total Eastern Test 
Range budget of $260.9 million, NASA would provide $51.4 million, DOD the 
rest. Such was the inconclusive conclusion to a controversy begun six years earlier. 
While the issue of Eastern Test Range funding laid bare fundamental 
differences over the management of the space program, otter funding agreements 
presented few problems. Where NASA procured launch vehicles from the Air 
Force, it paid only for the production item, not for development costs. Similarly, 
when NASA, in April 1964, delegated responsibility to the Defense Supply 
Agency to administer its contracts, it was agreed that NASA would pay for direct 
and indirect costs on a per-hour basis. Whatever technical problems might arise, 
there were no serious philosophical differences comparable to those at the Eastern 
Test Range. These differences arose in threc cases: when NASA believed that 
DOD support might involve technical direction of NASA programs, when GOD 
pressed for the consolidation of colocated NASA facilities to avoid unwarranted 
duplication, and when DOD officials substituted their judgment for NASA's in 
determining NASA's requirements. The issue of the operation of tracking stations 
illustrates all three cases. The agencies' positions were lucidly stated by Boone: 
DOD, as operator of the national m i s d t  ranges and their associated down-range tracking 
stations, tended to view each station aa an entity, operating under the cognizance of the range 
operations director . . . and called up by him to provide tracking and telemetry support to any 
missile or spacecraft requiring such support. 
NASA, on the other hand, 
regarded each station as an integral part of a world-wide network which was, in turn, a part 
of a c l o d - l d p  operational system encompassing the mission control center, the network, and 
the spacecraft . . . the individual network stations must be standardized as much as possible 
and integrated intc, a single network under an t r a l  operational management and control. . . . 
It was around this basic issue . . . that most of the subsequent controversy centered.% 
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NASA officials asserted that the totality of Apollo mission operations had to be 
under direct agency control; and they drew a line between routine housekeeping 
servim, which they were prepared to delegate, and the technical operation of 
facilities, which they were not. Moreover, they insisted that colomtion and dupli- 
cation were not the same thing. The NASA tracking stations on Antigua and 
Ascension Island did not duplicate nearby DOD facilities. The NASA facilities, 
which operated on the unified S-band system, were part of the Deep Space 
Network and had nothing in common with the DOD system; they could not be 
operated by part-time labor pulled from a general-purpose technical pool; and it 
would sew: no purpose and save no money to take the stations out of an integrated 
mission support system to meet the theoretical requirement of single manage- 
ment." It is mnceivable that, up to 1962, both agencies might have arrived at a 
system with similar bandwidth capacity. By 1965 NASA and DOD had gone their 
separate ways; thus single management remained a very live issue.'" 
In practice, NASA management was more flexible than a flat assertion of the 
agency's position would imply. By an agreement of 22 May 1965, NASA and 
DOD agreed to three principles in the management of colocated tracking sta- 
t ion~: '~  (1) where facilities were colocated, one agency would be responsible for 
all base support functions, such as public works, utilities, and logistics; (2) the 
single manager for base support would normally operate the instrumentation; and 
(3) where an exception to the above promised cost savings, the agencies would 
carry out a joint study to devise other arrangements. Thus NASA continued to 
operate the unified S-band instruments at Antigua and Ascension, although DOD 
managed both stations. 
Another instance in which NASA and DOD had to bend principles pertained 
to outfitting and managing tracking ships for Apollo. Here the issues were even 
more complex, since they involved the Navy's Bureau of Ships as well as NASA 
and the Air Force. In its 1964 budget request, NASA asked Congress for $90 
million to convert and equip three ships from the Maritime Reserve for tracking 
and data acquisition in support of Apollo. When it was learned that both NASA 
and DOD were planning additional ships without much regard to what the other 
was doing, the authorization committees withheld funds pending a joint study to 
resolve several issues. Who would design and operate the ships? Would NASA or 
the Air Force determine Apollo support rmuirements? Would the ships be 
manned by civil service crews or by union crews supplied by Pan American World 
Airways, the support contractor for the entire Eastern Test Range? And who 
would operate and maintain the shipboard Apollo instrumentation-NASA or 
DOD? 
After the usual lengthy negotiations-this time including an ad hoc AACB 
Committee on Instrumentation--on 1 January 1964 the two agencies signed and 
sent their agreement to Congres~.'~ NASA and DOD would work out rquire- 
ments, with the Air Force placed in charge of centralized planning and manage- 
ment; the Navy would acquire and modify the ships through a specially created 
project office; and the Navy Military Sea Transportation Service would operate 
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and maintin the ships at sea. Except in two respects, the agreement gave NASA 
most of what it wanted. NASA had insisted on ships manned by civil service crews 
to avoid the possibility of a strike delaying an Apollo mission. The Air Force, 
however, continued to use union crews as long as its Pan American antract 
remain- in effect; ultimately, they were phased out and replaced by civil service 
crews. In addition, NASA had demanded a free hand in operating the ships' 
Apollo instrumentation; as part of the 1964 agreement, NASA relinquished oper- 
ations to DOD, despite its oft-stcted goal of "a fully integrated network oper- 
ation."" Yet in virtually every other respect, NASA got what it wanted. The ships 
were to be operated by the Navy, not the Air Force; NASA, as well as the Air 
Force, would develop the plans for operating ships "a.; Range facilities in the 
Apollo network"; the funds for the ships would be kept by NASA, rather than 
turned over completely to the Air Force; most significant, "DOD would a m p t  as 
top priority the Apollo support rquirements as stated by NASA. In practice, 
NASA settled for something less than the "totally integrated network" it had 
considered indispensable. 
Launch Vehicle Planning 
One of the most critical areas for coordination pertained to the national 
launch vehicle program. Coordination studies by NASA and DOD went beyond 
the issue of avoiding wasteful duplication. The development of new booster stages 
and the phase out of older ones were involved in the long-range planning of both 
agencies, since the diameter of the vehicle, tctal thrust, and propulsion system 
determined the payloads to be launched and the orbits in which they were placed. 
Three things should be kept in mind in order to understand the NASA 
position on launch vehicle development. First, NASA began to develop its largest 
launch vehicles well in advance of a specific mission requirement. This was true 
of the giant F-1 and 5-2 engines that powered all three stages of the Saturn V, 
and Webb used those a8 examples of the value of research independent of specific 
 mission^.'^ 
Second, certain concepts relating to the national launch vehicle program had 
come to be widely accepted by 1963: that neither agency should start a new launch 
vehicle development without joint review; that the number of engine systems 
should be limited and standardized; that both agencies should cooperate in devel- 
oping "building block" components that they could both usc; and that, in the 
interest of economy, NASA and DOD should study the possibility of reusable as 
well as expendable boosters. Several of these concepts had been recommended, or 
at least discussed, in two inf uential reports of 1961-1962. The first, prepared by 
an Ad Hoc Booster Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 
was released early in June 1961, just after President Kennedy went before Con- 
gress to propose an expanded national space programd4 The other was the report 
of the Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (LLVPG) created by AACB in 
July 1961, which submitted its final conclusions in February 1962. LLVPC was 
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to consider the combination of launch vehicles that was best fitted to serve the ends 
of the manned lunar landing, manned scientific missions, and advanced military 
 operation^.^^ Neither task force arrived at specific conclusions on the course that 
the national space program should take. The members of LLVPG disagreed on 
the mission mode for the lunar landing, heuce, on the launch vehicle for   pol lo.^^ 
Yet both reports were straws in the wind. There was strong sentiment in the 
scientific and engineering communities for a thorough investigation of the civilian 
and military uses of solid- and liquid-fuel propulsion. There was also, by 1963, 
a livelier awareness of the difficulties in marking out the boundaries of each 
agency's jurisdiction. As shown, the early understanding that DOD would work 
on active, and NASA on passive, communications satellites quickly evaporated. 
The same held for the development of big space boosters, originally NASA's 
responsibility. By 1961 the Air Force was at work on a large launch vehicle, which 
would meet its requirements for sending large payloads into Earth orbit and 
would also be available to NASA. This was the Titan IIL4' 
Third, the national stable of launch vehicles in the early 19703 was very 
different from what it had been a dozen years earlier. Then NASA had had 
available seven vehicles, six of them derived from missile  program^.^' By 1972 the 
process of winnowing and sifting and standardizing had gone very far. The only 
remaining Thor-based vehicle was the Delta, which, along with the Atlas- 
Centaur, was used for medium and large payloads. The Titan 111-C (or the Titan 
111 with the Centaur upper stage) was used for very large packages. The Saturn 
booster was no longer available, although the remaining vehicies were used to 
launch Skylab in 1973 and Apollo-Soyuz in 1975. Rejected by the Air Force in 
favor of the Titan 111, the Saturn could have been retained only if Congress had 
approved an ambitious manned program beyond Apollo. Congress gave no such 
unqualified approval; NASA suspended production of the Saturn V in 1967 and 
discontinued it in 1970. Thus the most significant addition to the national launch 
vehicle program was the use of the Titan 111 for the largest payloads. The Titan 
111 had several advantages over other large boosters. It could launch multiple 
payloads up to synchronous orbit; accept a variety of upper stages, including the 
Centaur, as well as solid-fuel strap-on boosters; and it was capable of using 
"standardized major components which can be put together in various combina- 
tions to perform . . . effectively for different orbits and payload  weight^."'^ Even 
before the first launch of the Titan 111-C, on 18 June 1965, DOD was urging on 
NASA its feasibility as the booster for Surveyor and V~yager.~" NAS L engineers 
conceded its effectiveness, but they could not use it in place of Saturn. With the 
completion of the Apollo and Skylab programs, however, there was no further role 
for Saturn. Of necessity, NASA then turned to the Titan I11 for the largest 
payloads. 
At no one point did NASA and DOD freeze the number and configuration 
of their launch vehicles. Instead, they coordinated research and development at 
several levels. One such way was to narrow the options. The Nova vehicle was 
dropped when it became apparent that the Saturn would be large enough for the 
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Apollo mission. Another way was to coordinate advanced research for vehicles for 
which there was no immediate need. Take, for instance, the history of the large 
solid-fuel propulsion pr~gram.~ '  In his 25 May 1961 message to Congress, 
Kennedy designated DOD as the agency to develop solid propellant motors. 
Although NASA, for technical reasons, chose to concentrate on liquid fuels, it was 
recognized that NASA's requirement for a solid-fuel motor might be greater than 
that of the Air Force.' In December 1963 NASA agreed to fund the program and 
on 1 March 1965 assumed full management responsibility for developing the 
6.6-mzter motor, even though no money was provided for it in the 1966 budget 
request. Webb was called on by several congressional committees to explain why 
NASA was discontinuing a program developed over such a long period and at such 
great expense. The provoking aspcrt of his testimony was his steadfast refusal to 
say that the program was being "canceled" or "terminated"--only that no more 
funds would be requested.52 He also contrived to convey that NASA had to do this 
kind of advanced research in order to anticipate whatever the space program 
would require. In fact, NASA kept the program alive for another two years 
through reprogrammings and the partial restoration of funds by Congress. The 
success of the large-solid-motor program was measured less by the production of 
a new vehicle than by the demonstration of its feasibility. Nevertheless, such a 
program could hardly be continued at a time when NASA flight programs were 
being cut or eliminated from the budget. 
Also important in developing a national stable of launch vehicles was the 
joint study begun in Jvly and completed in Dmmber 1964 by the AACB Lacnch 
Vehicle PaneLS3 The study confirmed that the existing vehicles were adequate to 
the needs of NASA and DOD. The panel was invited to consider three options, 
exclusive of the Saturn V and thr Scout: continued use of existing vehicles, in- 
cluding the Titan 111; the first option less the Titan booster; and the first option 
less the Saturn IB. The panel concluded that there would be a cost difference of 
less than 1 percent among these options and that no major savings would result 
from shifting from present launch vehicles to a system based largely on the 
Titan 111. Coming near the midpoint of the Apollo program, the study confirmed 
that coordination between NASA and DOD was successful; that the Titan 111 
would be a favored launch vehicle for major programs to come in the late 1960s; 
and, most sigr'ficant, that the process of choosing a hunch vehicle depended on 
the mission that the user agency had in mind. The panel examined all the costs, 
direct and indirect, first of developing, then of producing a launch vehicle; and one 
of its conclusions was that the production cost was often the least important 
element in determining whether or not a vehicle should be used. In certain cases, 
booster costs were as little as 8 percent of total mission costs; the rest was 
accounted for by the cost of the spacecraft, the integration of the spacecraft and 
the booster, and the preparation of the mission." In sum, the 1964 launch vehicle 
True for the 6 6-meter motor but not lor smaller boosters. Minuteman war a mlid-fuel misrtlc, while the 
Titan Ill-C u d  3 05-meter solid-fuel strap-on boosters. 
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Under prnsurc from CAO, NASA and DOD carried out certain "cmnomy studin" in 1968-1969, which 
aimed at consolidating such thmg as photographic work at the Eastern 'Tnt Range and the Kennedy Spam 
Centa. 
' T h ~ s  was the justification for the Amrs Spam Scienct Research Laboratory, alth ~ g h  lome s~milar work was 
performed at the Air Form Cambridge Research Laboratory. 
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study derived more precise estimates for the cost of producing launch vehicles, for 
substituting one vehicle for another, and for confirming the NASA decision to use 
the Saturn IB for Apollo. 
Interagency Support and Coordination 
One can only skim the complex of relations between NASA and DOD. For 
convenience, "support" and "coordination" can be distinguished as follows: sup- 
port is where one agency assists in carrying out the other's programs; coordination 
is where the agencies exchange information on programs being managed by either 
or both, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication. These definitions are scarcely 
watertight. In particular cases where the Air Force supported NASA, there was 
also an element of coordination, since NASA and the Air Force used different 
contractors for common use items, wen in cases where they used the same items.* 
Also certain programs, like Gemini, took on some aspects of a joint program as 
they proceeded. Thus support and coordination are relative terms, and there is a 
spectrum of possibilities from single management at one end to joint projects at the 
other. 
One of AACB's principal functions was to detect and eliminate wasteful 
duplication. As one may have come to expect, there is nothing self-evident about 
the term. The mere fact that both NASA and DOD were sponsoring research in 
space medicine or microbiology hardly meant that half of it was unnecessary. A 
1963 joint review of space medicine in NASA and DOD recognized that dupli- 
cation was warranted, "if the research problen~s demanded more than oi~e  ap- 
proach, if there was a scarcity of support in the particular problem area, or if it 
was necessary for maintaining 'in-house' ~apability."'~ Or consider facilities 
coordination between NASA and DOD. At the annual AACR review NASA was 
represented by William Fleming of the Office of Programming, who was suc- 
ceeded in 1968 by Robert Curtin, the Director of the Office of Facilities. As with 
basic research tasks or colocated tracking stations, there were no hard-and-fast 
criteria regarding warranted duplication, but there were certain rules of thumb. 
A facility that wen! beyond existing capabilities was not considered as duplication. 
But even where one facility was similar to another, there were often extenuating 
circumstances. Duplication could be tolerated where one agency could not handle 
the other's workload,' or where one laboratory was intended to support a program 
peculiar to one agency,* or where one agency considered the other's research to be 
' E.g., the Spacecraft Instrumentat~on Evaluat~on Facility at MSC, who* capab~l~t~cs  could not bc duplicated 
by existing DOD facilitia 
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in the national interest.' In general, the annual facilities review worked by a 
process of "distillat. '; thus in July 1968 NASA initially considered somc eighty 
projects and ended by reviewing onlv f o ~ r t n n . ~ "  The final pint  review was the 
end of 4 long series of prior decisions. I n d d ,  somc pr>jects were dropped, less 
because of duplication than for other reasons, for example, because the facility was 
too far ahead of current needs. In sum, the existence or nmssity of duplicating 
projects or facilities created problems for NASA and DOD that had to be resolved 
on a case-by-case basis. 
These instances of NASA-DOD coordination should sufice to demonstrate 
the general principles. Most of the studies involving AACB panels were technical 
and noncontroversial. Some, like the 1968-1969 economy stud~es, were intended 
to consolidate base support at the Eastern Test Range and the Kennedy Space 
Center. Others, like the 1963 review of space medicine research, were information 
exchanges designed to provide a common data bank. In yet anothcr category were 
pint  studies of research that both NASA and DOD thought potentially useful: a 
1966 study of reusable launch vehicles; a 1968 study of the Data Relay Satellite, 
which could assume many of the tracking and command functions performed by 
ground stations; or a 1969 study of the feasibility of a single space transportation 
.;ystem for NASA's and DOD's use.'. These examples may stand for a host of 
others. In very few cases did these studits raise issues thzt could not be resolved 
at the working level. Where the two agencies could not agree was in the sphere 
where program philosophy and program management overlapped, particularly in 
the cases of Gemini and !he Manned Orbiting Laboratory. 
Finally, something should be said about NASA support for Don. The 
support took three forms: testing DOD prototypes at NASA facilities, sharing 
knowledge gained in NASA programs with other agencies, and conducting re- 
search on behalf of DOD. T o  exemplify the first catcgory, NASA tested 130 flight 
models between 1961 and 1969 in Langley wind tunnels." This support proved 
so valuable that officials indicated in !969 that "DOL) expects to ask for help on 
tach new system, in the future placing even heavier demands on NASA." '" In the 
m n d  category were the various explrrimcnts performed aboard Mercury, Gcm- 
ini, and Apollo; one might add communications satellites like Syncom, which 
began as NASA projects and ended up transferred to UOD. In the third catcgory 
was NASA support for the B-70 supersonic plane and for the "limited warfare" 
research project on behalf of the services in Vietnam. The Air Force had intended 
the 8-70 to bc a manned strategic bomber, dcspitc grave doubts about its fca- 
sibility or necessity. By late 1962 it was known in Air Forre circles mat McNa- 
mara would never allow the 8-70 to enter production with a new generation of 
manned bombers; and the plane, renamed the XB-70, became an cxpcrimrntal 
model that Hew instrumentation installed by NASA. In March 1967 the Air Fo rn  
transferred management to NASA, after which the XB-70 continued as a joint 
project for anothcr two years.m' The agreement was advantageous to h t h  sides, 
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since the Air Force could cut the losses it incurred in sponsoring the prototype of 
a strategic bomber that would never be built. NASA, on the other hand, wanted 
the vehicle for its own research, particularly in connection with the civilian 
supersonic transport program. This case was the reverse of Syncom: What began 
as a program to develop an Air Force weapon system ended as a joint restarch 
project mostly funded by NASA. 
A more unusual kind of technical support was provided by the NASA 
Limited Warfare Committee, established in Dmmbcr 1965 after the Air Force 
Systems Command asked NASA to develop certain kinds of hardware for use ill 
Vietnam.6t Given the nature of the terrain and the strategy of guerrilla warfare, 
the services needed unconventional technical support for a war that was not being 
fought by conventional rules. Most of the research was carried out at Ames and 
JPL, involved about I00 scientists and engineers, and cost NASA between $4 and 
$5 million a year. The limited warfare program led to some ingeniously designed 
equipment: a quick method of patching holes in inflated life rafts, a better para- 
chute steering mechanism, a helicopter that did not make a chopper noise, an 
acoustic detector that located mortars by ground vibrations, and an aircraft target 
marker. Although the specific tasks that NASA performed were class~fied, the fact 
that NASA was doing this kind of work for the military was generally known. 
Nevertheless, this support-although it was fundamentally no different from any 
other NASA research applied by DOD-placed NASA on somewhat shaky 
ground. Except for the clause in the Space Act that enjoined NASA to make 
available to DOD "t ,vies that have military value or significance," the 
program lacked clear autnurization and made T,IASA vulnerable to congressional 
inquiry. For these reasons and because it had achieved its purpose, the limited 
warfare program was phased out in 1969. 
GEMINI AND THE MOL DECISION, JANUARY 1963-AUGUST 1965 
An account of NASA's Gemini program and of DOD's Manned Orbiting 
Laboratory (MOL) brings into sharper focus all the elements of support, coordi- 
nation, and rivalry discussed so far. Gemini was a NASA program coordinated 
with DOD. Under the terms of the Gemini agreement, DOD took pan in 
planning experiments, launch operations, and flight operations. Yet the fortnight 
preceding the agreement was marked by McNamara's attempt to take over the 
program, first, by informally proposing a merger of NASA-DOD manned space 
programs under DOD management, then by formally proposing a joint pro- 
gram.''" NASA could not accept either arrangement without compromising its 
independence. Gemini had been planned to meet the needs of NASA's manned 
program; it had been under way since December 1961; it had been designed with 
military needs in mind; and it could not be transferred from NASA without 
'Arrord~ng to one rourm. McNamara p r o p d  that DOI) take over all manned fl~ght In Esnh orbit, NASA, 
all flights beyond Earth orb~t 
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causing substantial delay. Thcre were also compelling political reasons for Gem- 
ini to remain within NASA, since the arrangement by which NASA operated 
tracking stations in Mexico, Nigeria, Zanzibar, and Spain prohibited their use to 
support military programs. Ucter McNamara's terms these stations would be 
unavnilable, and the existence of a joint civilian-military program would jeop- 
ardize negotiations for tracking stations el~ewhere.~' The effect of transferring 
Gemini to DOD would be to place in doubt NASA's image as a civilian agency 
dedicated tc the peaceful exploration of space. But beyond these objections, cogent 
as they were, NASA officials sensed that they could not accede to such a proposal 
and still retain control over their programs. Just before the meeting that preceded 
the final agreement, Webb wrote to Seamans that 
I have no doubt whatever that McNamara is underrating the problems that will be mated 
with Congress if he insistr on the participation in our management or that we ozrticipatc in 
the management of the development of military quipment such as weapons systems. We can 
contribute a great deal, but when it comes to the actual development, that is not our function 
under the law.. 
. . . Under the propored arrangement, we would lore control of the mearch which we will 
do. Thc basic policy from NACA days is that we would fund it, and would do it. This made 
us independent of those who wanted us to undertake contract r e a r c h ,  but, of course, we were 
always sensitive to their needs." 
The Gemini agreement deferred for almost a year the issue of how a military 
space program might impinge on NASA. Under the terms of the pact, "Gemini 
was not to be thought of as a joint program, but rather as a program serving 
common needs, with the Department of Defense paying for the military features, 
NASA in full charge of " ~ e  program, and the role of the [Gemini Program 
Planning] board strictly advisory."65 The disagreement over Gemini had nothing 
to do with whether NASA would support the military or not. That support was 
never in question, only NASA's right to determine how it would provide it. Webb 
insisted-even more in private than in public-that NASA served the purposes of 
national security; that NASA and DOD should act in the future, as they had in 
the past, on the basis of coordination, not joint management; and that the objective 
of military control in space required the kind of research that was "being done at 
this stage more efficiently in NASA than it could be done elsewhere." When, in 
July 1963, Vice President Johnson phoned Webb to ask how much of "our 
present peaceful space program can be militarily useful," he replied, 
All of it can be directly or indirmly militarily useful. . . . All thew ground installations can, 
in time of need, be converted to, or can be utilized to handle, military r q ~ i r e m e n t s . ~  
The Gemini agreement raised troubling questions about the purpose and 
future of manned military space programs. Although I?; ;la-Soar was not dropped 
until Dmmber 1963, its cancelation had been expected for almost a year prior to 
the formal announcement. As early as March 1963, in discussions between top 
T h i s ,  howcvcr, was what NASA d ~ d  for 1W1) tn crtablrrh~ng a l~mitcd wrrfarc program 
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officials of NASA and DOD, McNamara, according to Webb, had asked what 
benefits Dyna-Soar would have for NASA "and whether or not tho= benefits 
could not be obtained from some other program . . . rather than having to spend 
the 600 million dollars involved in funding the Dyna-Soar NcNamara 
was already thinking ahead to a military space station, and the summer of 1963 
was marked by interagency negotiations on the coordination of studies for manned 
orbital space stations that led to a pint agreement in September. The announce- 
ment of Dyna-Soar's cancelation was yoked with.one to authorize the MOL, 
a program that would use a Gemini capsule to house a two-man crew for a stay 
of up to thirty days. This led to the impression that MOL was a substitute for 
Dyna-Soar, when the truth was a little more complex. Dyna-Soar had attempted 
too many things at once, among which, to develop precise reentry and landing 
capabilities and to test the capability of man in space. It had outgrown the 
Titan I and Titan I1 boosters and, in any case, could carry only one man, rather 
than the two-man crew of MOL. But the latter was not simply a tradeoff for the 
former; Dyna-Soar was aimed at maneuverability and reentry problems, while 
MOL was to investigate the uses of men working in space in a "shirt-sleeves" 
environment. 
The final authorization of MOL was piecemeal. The initial decision of 
10 December 1963 was followed by the joint NASA-DOD agreement of 
25 January 1965 and the final approval given by President Johnson on 25 August 
1965. While many details remain classified, enough is known about MOL to 
clarify the reasons that led to approval. The elements leading to the 1963 MOL 
decision included pressure from the Air Force to demonstrate the need for a 
manned military space program and from Congress (especially the House Gov- 
ernment Operations Committee) to explore the military uses of space, and the 
sentiment, not stated publicly by Defense officials, that the Air Force should 
receive something in return for the cancelation or phasedown of the Skybolt 
missile, the B-70, and Dyna-Soar.6"he significance of Dyna-Soar in this context 
is that there was not room in the Air Force budget for both Dyna-Soar and MOL, 
and that cancelation of the former was one more illustration of McNamara's 
concern for economy and cost-effectiveness. Because MOL would be based on 
proven technology, rather than on Apollo hardware not yet flown, the Air Force's 
case was much improved. By basing the program on Gemini rather than Apollo, 
the Air Force could also use its Titan 111, rather than NASA's Saturn IB. 
The 1963 decision to authorize MOL inaugurated a definition phase that 
lasted twenty months, to August 1965. The original plan called for the "Gem- 
ini B" capsule, attached to an orbiting pressurized cylinder (the "laboratory") that 
McNamara described as "approximately the size of a house trailer.""" Although 
the program would be supported by Gemini's tracking network, it would be 
totally funded and managed by DOD. Yet on certain critical matters, McNamara 
either said nothing or spoke in the vaguest terms. As DOD officials saw it, MOL 
was not a space station and did not come within the terms of the September 
agreement with NASA. Yet the reasons given for the program only raised doubts 
The contributions that an operational manned system would make . . . .ppear to have been 
sufficiently established . . . and, 'herelore, specific s p a  flight experiments, like those p m  
posed for ihc hIa3L, are not rquircd for this purpose. . . . 
An operational rysterr. for there lmilitary] u x l  would require a vehicle larger than the 
MOL. . . . 
The cost oi r~rch a manned system would clearly be far greater than that of an unmanned 
system for the same purpoacs.7' 
THE STRUCTURE OF NASA-WD RELATIONS 
as to its nmssity. How accurate was McNamara's assertion that MOL involved 
no duplication of Gemini? What, precirely, could MOL do that could nor k done 
equally well by unmanned spacecraft or by Gemini itself? And if MOL was not 
a space station (though to all appearances it seemed to be one), how would it affect 
NASA's plans for a post-Apollo space sta;.m? These doubts were not so muck 
removed as ignored by McNamara and top Air Force officials as they began the 
tedious process of specifying the details of MOL. 
In fact, this preliminary phase lasted as long as it did because the MOL 
concept raised questions of cost, timing, and, most of all, requirements. An ad hoc 
subcommittee of the Space Vehicle and Space Sciences Panels of PSAC reported 
in November 1963 that a general purpose space statio:~ could not be justified for 
military or nonmilitary purposes; that a nonremverable space station should not 
be considered by the military until it had been deciritd that the Gemini and Apoiio 
capsules were inadequate for military purposes; finally. that DOD should begin 
a test program using a one-man Gemini capsule launctid by a Tittq 11.'" More- 
over, the Bureau of the Budget, which had to authorize the program, took more 
than a year to study MOL before approving it. As late as November 1964 the 
Bureau's Military Division could find little to justify a separate MOL. A Bureau 
staff paper of that date assembled most of the objections to MOL and summarized 
them forcefully: 
And the study concluded that the MOL "did not now appear justified 2% the basis 
of the originally stated need for an experimental testing of the potential capabil- 
ities of manned space flight for high priority military purposes."7 If the Defense 
Department thought MOL nmssary, then the program should, at the leost, be 
"nationalized," that is, made the basis for experiments of both military and 
general interat. In short, elements within the Bureau of the Budget were still very 
sceptical about MOL twelve months after it had been initially approveci. 
What was the NASA position toward MOL? Webb, Dryden, and Seamans 
were told in advance of the MOL decision and agreed to it. Other Pi ASA officials, 
however, were not briefed, not even Georg: Mueller who. as Associate Adminis- 
trator for Manned Space Flight, would be the official most concerned with the 
- i project. It was Webb's stated policy not to "second-guess" the military and not 
to oppose DOD programs that did not directly oppose NASA interests, if MOL 
could be sdid to fall into that category. It would also be politic, at the least, not 
to clash head-on with the Air Force over something that the Air Force was bent 
on having. Publicly, NASA officials defended MOL up to the day of its c3nal- 
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ation in June 1969. They insisted that MOL was a military project within the 
overall national space program; that it complemented, rather than duplicated, 
Apollo; and that the two agencies were workin on the Air Force project in the 
same spirit in which they had defined Gemini.g4 And indeed, during 1964 and 
1965 NASA and DOD concluded a number of working-level agreements defining 
the MOL mission, several of which involved the good offices of the Director of the 
Bureau of the B~dget.~ '  Privately, however, several NASA engineers and manag- 
ers took a position scarcely distinguishable from the 1963 report of the PSAC 
Space Vehicle and Space Sciences subcommittee. As they saw it, the Air Force was 
maneuvering P O D  "into a position of defining the MOL program as the National 
Space Station, ' thereby putting pressure on NASA to fly its experiments aboard 
Gemini B. Furthermore, the Air Force wanted to remove the program from 
AACB coordination and start a direct relationship with NASA.'~ On technical 
grounds, they were equally sceptical; considerably less than 1 percent of the data 
obtained by MOr, would be superior to what would be obtainable from available 
systems.77 On the basis of studies conducted by NASA for DOD between January 
and May 1965, the use of Apollo-Saturn was found preferable to Gemini B/ 
Titan 111. The former could place very large payloads in orbit, which could be 
manned continuously through rendezvous resupply operations; while the Apollo 
command module could also accommodate a three-man crew, rather than the 
two-man crew of Gemini B.7qn effect, some NASA technical managers suspected 
that MOL really did duplicate NASA programs, at a time when influential 
Congressmen were demanding less duplication and more standardiL \tion. 
President Johnson approved MOL, one may assume, because the Air Force 
made a convincing case on its behalf, while those within the Government who 
opposed it fell into line. Sometime early in December 1964, the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (Kermit Gordon) and the President's Science Advisor 
(Dr. Donald Hornig) decided to support it. On 10 Dgcember Gordon recorded . e 
understanding reached between himself, Hornig, Webb, and McNamara. It was 
agretd that the program would emphasize military experimentation, assembling 
structures in space, and reconnaissance; other objectives, mainly scientific, would 
be sought in cooperatim with NASA; and NASA and DOD would define experi- 
ments to supprt  these goals.79 The studies carried out by NASA as part of t1.e 
agreement were intended to refute the contention that MOL would simply dupli- 
cate Gemini dnd Apollo. The pressure to cancel or drastically alter MOL had 
been growing since the fall of 1964; thus Senator Clinton Anderson (D-New 
Mex.), chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 
wrote to the President urging that military and civilian space stations be ~mnbincd 
to avoid waste." The joint statements of Webb and McNamara on 25 January 
1965 dismissed that possibility out of hand. Both confirmed the understanding 
arri~ed at in December: MOL would be a military program with NASA support; 
it would be directed to military purposes but also to certain broader scientific 
purposes; and NASA would compare Appl'o and Gemini systems to see which 
would best serve the ends of the program. By April DOD had decided to proceed 
with Gemini B and to let a design definition contract with McDonntll Aircraft. 
On 4 June the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Government 
Operations Committcc nleased a report that pushed the MOL in the most I 
forceful way." The  committee recommended that 1)OD "should, without further [ delay, commenw full-scale development of a manned orbital laboratory . . . pmj- 
ccr." On 9 July NASA and DOD ofticals briefed the Spaw Council on MOL and 
NASA plans for manned spacc stations. Finally, on 25 August President Johnson 
approvcd MOL. After almost two years of discussion and analysis, the Air F o m  
had its program." 
MOL was approved k a u s c  the Air Forte, barked by several congressional f 
committees, wanted it, bccaust NASA chose to support it, and bccaust the Budget 
Bureau and the President's Sciencc Advisor ultimately acvxptcd the merits of the 
cxpcrimcntal program.'" The  views of the decision makers on the merits of the 
classiticd experitrents and on whether MOL cnuld effectively implement then1 
actually mntrollcd the decision. If McNamara, Hornig, and the others had not 
k n  m n v i n d ,  the decision would have gone the other way.*' NASA took the 
position that MOL did not duplicate any current NASA proprim, was not ii spiim 
station, and iwuld be justified an its own terms. Whatever reservations NASA 
offcials had, they kept to themselves. Given the l imitd cxpcrimcntal nature of the 
final approved program, it inuld bc argued that MOL did not m ~ i ~ p c t e  with 
NASA's plans for nianncd orbital spacu stations. NASA's plans were far more 
grandiose. In any case, neither the Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory nor the 
National Multipurpose Spaiu Station nor "Apollo X" was ever approvd in 
anything resembling the original form. 'l'hc threat to NASA was that the dupli- 
cation argument cnuld bc turncd around so easily. Prior to MOL approval, the 
program was criticized I'cw duplicating NASA hardware and systems. Oncr i t p  
proved, the argument turned back on NASA. Even before final approval. one 
NASA oHicial wonder& if pressure 
would br applird to NASA . . . io Hy our expcrimmrs on M01. i f ,  i n  fact, i t  .tplwctrr that 11 
would be lmr txprnsivc to rcr~mlrnwlate there on hiOL rather than the I.4pcdlo Bxtrnsion 
Sy~t rmsj  p r q r m n  '" 
And in Mi1rc.h 1066 the House Government Operations Con1mittcc issued it 
report reinnrmcnding a nlcrgcr of MOL and Ap l lo  ~pplicatiotrs." Whatever thc 
merits of the duplication iwntrovcrsy, the exlstcncc of a manned military progriim 
in spacr was bound to impinge on NASA's post-Apllo planning. 
'l'hc iwnncctions between military and civilian spaiu programs were so ran& 
lying and tnn,plex that it is advisable to state the ~ilost lmprtant  ones as summ;iry 
ixmrlusions. 
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First, although it began as an agency that depended heavily on DOD sup- 
port, NASA succeeded in freeing itself from overt DOD control by 1963. Whether 
one considers Gemini, the management of the Merritt Island Launch Area, or the 
existence of colocated tracking stations, the pattern is the same. NASA would 
cooperate with DOD but never to the point of relinquishing its authority to meet 
its needs. The  shift from dependence began within the first two years following 
NASA's creation. NASA began to work on active, as well as passive, commu- 
nications satellites, despite an informal agreement with C O D  to work only on the 
former. NASA had moved well beyond such understandings in asserting its right 
to manage its programs, to modify military launch vehicles to serve as boosters, 
and to let contracts to firms already heavily involved in defense work. 
During NASA's first three years, the Air Force went to considerable lengths 
to become the dominant partner in the national space program. Even some years 
later, Boone observed that "the Air Force is inclined to look upon NASA as a 
competitor rather than a par!ner in the field of space."nW By 1963, however, the 
Air Force needed NASA almost as much as NASA needed the Air Force. NASA 
was doing basic research in the life sciences, in the composition of the upper 
atmosphere, and in propulsion that was as valuable for military as for civilian 
purposes. The NASA ctnters had research and test facilities that the services 
needed badly, among which were sixteen different wind tunnels, a ground-based 
flight-motion simulator, and an 18.3-meter vacuum environmental sphere. The 
framework within which the two agencies coexisted c*ould accommodate almost 
any kind of program management, whether it was a program managed by one 
agency with the other sharing in planning experiments (Gemini, MOL); a joint 
program (X-15); a program started by one agency and transferred to the other 
(Syncom, the large solid motor); a joint program primarily funded by one agency 
(XB-70); or programs "whose success is dependent on the functioning of separate, 
co-operating systems" (Syncom, Anna IB geodetic satellite). The  relationship was 
strong enough to endure almost any strain, provided it was grounded in mutual 
respect. 
Second, the inevitable overlap of two agcllcies working in the same research 
zreas was made tolerable by the conccpt of warranted duplication. There could be 
duplication in programs, facilities, and research tasks as long as they were ad- 
dressed to agency needs or represented different approaches to the same research 
problem. Two facilities or programs were seldom identical, in any case. But du- 
plication could even be defended as a positive good, insofar as it widened the 
number of options available. The ballistic missile programs of the 1950s were, in 
that sense, test cases for the virtues of duplication. As Sapolsky observes, 
Looking back i t  1s quite possible to select the 'bcst missile proposals' (or, conversely, to polnt 
to obvious mistakes), bllt thls ran be dune only bccausc the rangc of alternatives and their 
limitations are known. At the time when initial allocations had to bc made, nothing was ccr- 
tain. Centralizing decision making and ehminating competition (retrospcctivcly, duplication) 
then would only have decreased the probability of obtainmg the bcst system wlthin any given 
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Third, most of the coordination between NASA and DOD was handled quite 
efficiently by working-level groups at the centers or by AACB panels. There were, 
however, cases where agreement could only be reached by the agency heads or, 
failing that, by referral to the Bureau of the Budget or the President. In one 
instance, NASA and DOD could not agree on funding arrangements for NASA 
launches at the Eastern Test Range. The history of that controversy suggests the 
old saw that the case was "hopeless, but not serious." When one considers that the 
matter was exhaustively studied and that the Director of the Budget could provide 
only an interim solution, it suggests that NASA and DOD could survive the strain. 
Even the most explosive disagreements, such as those over Gemini and the space 
station programs, were defused, if not by general managers like Seamans or R&D 
directors like Brown, then by the heads of the agencies involved. The important 
point is that the preconditions for coordination existed. What were they? One, that 
DOD should accept NASA's definition of a "coordinated" program as one where 
concurrence was "not required as a pre-condition to further actionMw; two, that 
both agencies should have a mutual interest in cooperating; three, that NASA's 
programs, particularly in manned spaceflight, should have a priority sufficiently 
high to require support by the services; and four, that both agencies should 
centralize the organization of their space and launch vehicle programs to make 
cooperation possible. The last point refers to the NASA reorganizations of 1961 
and 1963, the creation of the Air Force Systems Command, the merger of the 
Eastern and Western Test Ranges under a single National Range Division, and 
the use by both agencies of AACB panels as standing committees to regulate the 
working-level coordination of military and civilian programs. Perhaps the most 
remarkable thing about the NASA-DOD relationship is not that it worked so 
well, but that so often practice was better than theory, and mutual interest 
overrode the funding and duplication controversies recounted in this chapter. 
Chapter 9 
NASA's Long-Range Planning, 1964-1 969 
T he purpose of this chapter is to trace NASA planning from 1964, when NASA drafted its first tentative proposals for a sequel to Apollo, to 1969, 
when it sent a comprehensive plan to the President's Space Task Group. Rather 
than enumerating the details of each plan and task report, the discussion describes 
the assumptions behind NASA planning, maps the transition from one kind of 
planning to another, and above all, explains why NASA, having promised so 
much, delivered so little. To  assess NASA planning one must break it into 
components. One must know where in NASA and by whom the planning was 
done, how the existence of certain kinds of technology (e.g., in launch vehicles) 
affected planning, and what kinds of organizational changes were preconditions 
for carrying out substantive programs. This chapter argues, first, that many 
disagreements over future programs, especially between NASA officials and non- 
NASA scientists, were really disagreements over governance; second, that the 
principal flaw of almost every agency plan-whether commissioned by general 
management or by the program offices-was the failure to describe organizational 
changes that would have to accompany the programs that officials were trying to 
sell; and third, that some of the most successful planning was embodied in the 
smali-scale, incremental changes or adaptations made by the centers, which did 
not constitute part of any agencywide plan. In the following discussion, NASA 
planning is scrutinized in the light of these assertions. 
ORIGINS OF NASA PLANNING, 1959-1963 
Certain features of the civilian space program set the terms on which NASA 
planning occurred. In the 1960s NASA was an agency with a single mission but 
with numerous subordinate goals, not all of which were consistent with each 
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other.. The  Space Act was permissive rather than mandatory as far as ends were 
concerned. It was a shopping list as much as an enabling act, which freed NASA 
to pursue those programs that were technically possible, politically feasible, and 
challenging enough to enlist the support of key technical personnel. For these 
reasons, manned spaceflight was never so dominant as to crowd out all other 
program philosophies. For one thing, aeronautics remained an important part of 
the supporting research that NASA did for other agencies. For another, there were 
always a certain number of research programs within NASA that were indepen- 
dent of the major programs. So that the agency might keep abreast of technical 
developments, NASA thought it necessary to develop capabilities independent of 
any specific mission or use. This policy lessened the danger noted in a 1966 Senate 
report that "there may be a penalty attached to the 'approved mission' p l icy  for 
advanced development. Premature obsolescence is one hazard. Commitment of 
resources before the full cost-benefit can be known is another. The  narrowing of 
component and subsystem engineering is a third."' 
The  substance of NASA planning was done by two groups, by center re- 
searchers and program managers, and by task forces and panels summoned from 
time to time to provide the agency with advice. Within NASA, the most important 
planning consisted of advanced studies conducted by or commissioned for the 
centers. The  preceding account of the study programs stressed the measures taken 
by management to avoid jurisdictional conflicts with DOD and to prevent Con- 
gress from construing an approved study as an approved program. But this is not 
quite the whole story; management did not r e ~ a r d  studies as a necessarv evil. 
Studies did not normally lead to specific kinds of flight hardware. They were used 
instead to demonstrate how NASA could improve the efficiency of launch vehicles 
like the Saturn IB; develop future missions as extensions of current programs; or 
design models of in-flight experiments, especially those requiring the presence of 
man. In addition, many studies kept alive mncepts that might serve as bases for 
programs not yet authorized by general management. 
The studies began almost as soon as NASA came into being. The  earliest 
studies on the design and purposes of Earth-orbital space stations dated from 
1959. By 1962 enough work had been done to justify a space station symposium 
at Langley; and by 1968 one center, MSC, had conducted forty studies, which rl 
cost $6.3 million.? Although most of the centers had formal planning groups, thr ,e 
centers-Langley, Marshall, and MSC, which established a Space 9tation Study 
Office in February 1962-were especially active in advanced studies. The  concept 
of the orbiting space station fascinated NASA engineers because it could be used 
to further almost every goal that, at one time or another, was annexed to the U.S. 
space program. An orbiting station might serve for space exploration, for basic 
research, for national security purposes, and for scanning the Earth's surface. The  
.. .- - - . 
Notr that wha~  was a mlzslon for a crntrr or program otfitr m~ght bc a suhordmatr goal lor the agency at 
l a w  I'hcrr 1s no ~nmnsistcnrv In dlalnguishin~ a wntrr's m~sston--r , to drvrlop mannrd spamralt-lmm 
thr NASA mlulon of putttng a man on the M m n  and rrturnlnR h ~ m  safely 
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centers and various ad hoc NASA-wide task forces had to explain what a space 
station would entail before they could convince management that the ideal was, 
in fact, worth pursuing. They had to show that a long-duration station, one that 
would operate for a year or more, was technically feasible. They had to study the 
vehicles that would be needed to resupply and equip the station. They had to know 
the environmental requirements of supporting a crew of a given size. Above all, 
they had to establish the justification for a manned station. The  presence of man 
in space was at once the main justification for the space station and its greatest 
stumbling block, for it had to be demonstrated that man could do what a com- 
pletely automated system could not. 
The  immediately apparent feature of NASA study programs is t h  continuity 
of the research on space stations. What preceded and what was an alternative to 
the lunar landing program became, first, an "extension" of it and then a sequel 
to it. Between 1959 and 1969 center planning groups confirmed that the basic 
technology for orbiting stations was available, that such stations could serve a 
variety of purposes, and that their cost could be reduced considerably by having 
them supplied by means of reusable space transportation systems? The  impact of 
the studies was cumulative. Particularly as the first Apollo launches drew near, 
NASA increased the funding and manpower of the study groups. There was one 
agencywide study in 1966, another the following yew, and two in 1968. The  rcots 
of post-Apollo planning lay in the agency's beginnings; by 1969, planning in- 
volved the combination of elements and concepts that already existed. 
By comparison, the planning offices reporting to the Administrator achieved 
very little. From 1959 fa 1962 NASA prepared and updated a formal long-range 
plan, with projections of current and tentatively approved programs. In 1963 the 
plan was dropped, along with the Offices of Plans and Program Evaluation that 
drafted it. Other experiments, like the Policy Planning Board, were no more 
successful. The Board, a mixed panel of headquarters and center officials, met a 
few times in 1964-1965 before its dissolution; and its members were advised that 
Webb did not want to receive any formal reports or recommendations.' Except for 
the Future Programs Task Group, which was created. under pressure from the 
White House, NASA management issued no formal statement of post-Apollo 
plans between 1963 and 1968. T o  be sure, the formal planning sequence worked 
badly: the long-range plan was not integrated with the budgetary process, offered 
little guidance to the program offices and centers, and tended to be distributed 
outside NASA before detailed project planning had taken place.' But none of these 
defects was beyond all remedy; presumably, if NASA management did nothing to 
improve long-range planning, it was because officials had no time and little use 
for it. By 1963 most of the funds that Congress was likely to vote were for 
currently authorized programs, leaving only modest sums for programs beyond 
advanced studies. Because Apollo and Gemini almost totally preoccupied key 
officials, it was difficult for most of them to spare much thought for a future that 
might be very different from the present. The tendency was mostly in the other 
direction, to a reduction of commitments. In the case of the supersonic transport 
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program, Dryden, according to one source, successfully argued that the agency 
should limit itself to R&D support since, with Apollo under way, "NASA could 
not politically sponsor two high-technology, enormously expensive programs in 
the same budget years without one of them being sacrificed to the other or killing 
each other off in competition for funds."" In any case, there seemed little point in 
presenting Congress with ten-year cast projections for programs that would have 
to be authorized one year at a time. 
But the principal reason for the absence of a Icng-range plan, encompassing 
all the others, was Webb's refusal to authorize one.' He would not commit himself 
publicly to new programs where costs were unpredictable, congressional approval 
uncertain, the likelihod of changes ever present, and the program offices them- 
selves deeply divided over long-range plans. A formal plan would simply tie his 
and other agency officials' hands. Despite a certain flamboyance of language, 
Webb behaved as cautiously as the head of afi agency that employed over 400 000 
persons and disposed of a $5.5 billion operating budget could be expected to 
behave. He was convinced that the agency could not plan unilater~llv, that 
decisions about the sequcl to Apollo were political decisions and, as s ~ h ,  the 
prerogative of the President and Congress. When he, or Seamans on his behalf, 
approved the annual study program, he did nothing more than encourage the 
program offices to focus on the near-term prospects far technology already k ing  
developed. Neither Webb nor Scamans saw his role as one of blocking out the 
outlines of future missions. That was the job of the program offices. In turn, they 
insisted on their right to be informed, the right to be consulted, and the right to 
warn. Later it is shown what Webb demanded of the program offices before their 
plans muld become line items in the NASA budget. 
The real point of departure for a survey of post-Apollo planning is the report 
of the Future Programs Task Group. By the end of 1963, NASA had assumed the 
organizational shape it was to retain into the 1970s, insofar as the field centers 
reported to the directors of substantive program offices, NASA and DOD had 
staked out their respective jurisdictions, and the large construction projects were 
under way. 
But there were also signs that the honeymoon of NASA, Congress, and the 
President was coming to an end. Congress had cut the Administration's budget 
request for 1964 by more than 10 percent and a NASA request for a supplemental 
appropriation by half. Potentially a more serious problem for NASA was the 
agency's shifting position on the purpose of the lunar landing. Was the investment 
in Apollo predicated on beating the Russians to the Moon?, to demonstrate 
American technological superiority?, to inaugurate the exploration, not only of the 
Moon, but of the near planets as well? Or was the Apollo mission a means to 
create a capability to operate in space for whatever purposes the United States' 
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chose? In practical terms, three-quarters of NASA's work force was working on 
some aspect of the manned spaceflight program. Unless NASA could sell a 
program to extend Apollo beyond the lunar landing, it would have to start 
disb-nding most of the work force by 1966, when the major facilities would be 
completed and the Saturn V launch vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft would be in 
production. 
The Future Programs Task Group was created to prepare a reply to a letter 
dated 30 January 1964 from President Johnson to Webb.' With the 1965 budget 
due to go to the Hill, the President wanted to know what NASA was doing to lay 
the basis for future programs. The proximate reason for his letter pertained to the 
NERVA nuclear rocket program and the absence of near-term missions that 
would require it. But for Johnson, NERVA was only an excuse for what prin- 
cipally concerned him. Could NASA list possible span objectives beyond those 
already approved? What planned supporting research and technology would these 
aims require? How much of NASA's current R&D work, especially in launch 
vehicles, could be used in support of future programs? To  prepare a reply Webb 
named Francis Smith, a Langley engineer and future Assistant Administrator for 
University Affairs, to head a special task force. Its summpry report, dated January 
1965, was released the following April. While the task iorce was drafting its 
report, Webb sent interim replies to the President, of which the first (20 May 
1964) outlined several possible future missions without choosing among them. But 
in a letter of 16 February 1965 he endorsed two specific objectives: the exploration 
of Mars by unmanned vehicles, already recommended by the Space Science Board 
in October 1964, and the use of t5e Saturn booster and the lunar module for a 
variety of missions in Earth and lunar orbit and for exploring the lunar surface. 
In a sense, Webb's letters and the final report were more significant for what they 
left unsaid than for their explicit proposals, of which there were few. Indeed, the 
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences seized on the lack of 
specific recommendations as a basis for criticizing the report: "Alternatives are 
presented, but no criteria are given as to hcw a selection would be made."' This, 
however, was beside the point, since Johnson had asked only for "a statement of 
possible space objectives beyond those already approved." More serious criticisms 
:ere that the report contained little that was new, and that it said dlmost nothing 
about military applications and coordination with DOD. 
In fact, the Senate committee had hinted at real weaknesses in NASA's 
planning structure. Although Smith and the task group adhered to the letter of 
Johnson's instructions, one would suppose that if NASA had a specific post- 
Apollo plan, it would have been presented. If NASA presented options without 
choosing among them, it was because there was almost no agreement within 
NASA as to what should follow the lunar Lnding. But even if there had been 
something approaching unanimity, the climate in 1965 was unfavnrable to ambi- 
tious space programs. Webb or Mueller might have been able to carry the agency 
with them. They were much less likely to carry the Bureau of the Budget, 
Congress, or the public. Moreover, NASA planning was complicated by its rela- 
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tion to military space programs. As shown, NASA had come to a m p t  the Air 
Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) as a legitimate military program that 
in no way conflicted with Apollo. Webb ratified the December 1964 memorandum 
of understanding on the scope and purpose of MOL. But the Future Programs 
Task Group report was silent about the potential conflict between a military 
MOL and a NASA space station in areas such as the experiments to be flown, the 
availability of Apollo hardware for MOL, and the possibility of needless dupli- 
cation. Also, the 1961 Webb-Gitpatric agreement required NASA to seek the 
approval of DOD before promding to develop a new launch vehicle. The  1964 
AACB launch vehicle study demonstrated that NASA would save almost nothing 
should it decide to switch from the Saturn to the Titan family of launch vehicles. 
Nevertheless, NASA engineers were seriously considering the Titan I11 as the 
launch vehicle for major programs listed as options for the 1970s: space statims 
in synchronous orbit or unmanned payloads to the near planets. But NASA in 
1965 had not arrived at any firm conclusions as to how or whether it would modify 
the Titan 111 for its own purposes. 
T o  the extent that there was agreement, it was that Apollo had created a 
capability to operate in space. But that was about the extent of agreement. Webb, 
for example, stressed "capability" almost to the exclusion of the programs that 
capability made possible. In his view, the lunar landing mattered because it was 
the most dramatic proof that the United States had achieved the freedom to 
operate as it chose in spacu. At a 1965 briefing for Webb on "Apollo Extension 
Systems," he dismissed the idea that the lunar landing was any kind of end in 
itself. What NASA was developing, his argument ran, was the "capability to fire, 
to launch, to get into orbit." 
We have got a hypothesis. . . that the lunar landing is iht most useful way to do the 
development and to prove we have done it. But this could actually bc displartd in terms of 
national objmiva. 
. . . Now I don't want thc argumcnt to center on whether vlc know tha~ we arc going in '68 o i  
sometime later. I want it to center on the dcvelopmcnt of a capability which we have several 
possibilities to use. 
. . . 1 want to begin to talk about the true situation lrathcrj than to ronunur so sharply to ~OCIIS  
on that just because President Kennedy u d  language that none of the three of us (Webb, 
Dryden, Scamans] recommended to him when he said "we will put a man on the moon." "' 
What kind of follow-on to Apollo would Webb approve? At the Apollo Extension 
Systems and other briefings, he said more, far more, about what the Apollo 
mission might lead to than what, in his opinion, it ought to accomplish. He was 
willing enough that proposals should percolate upward from the program direc- 
tors. But no proposal would become a budget line iten1 until it met specified 
conditions. First, it must involve minimal interference with the current Apollo 
mission; second, it should make the fullcst use of existing hardware; t h u ,  ic had 
to define with precision thc goals and experiments of the proposed mission; fourth, 
it had to avoid the appearance of duplicating military programs, especially MOL; 
finally, it m m  not commit the agency to funding level; appreciably higher than 
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the current approved budget." 
Unlike the Administrator and general manager, the program directors were 
free to defend interests that were something less than agcncywide. As Associate 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, George Mueller had to tackle three 
problems, each of which could be resolved on condition that the other two were 
handled at the same time. He  had: to retain the h n d s  and hold together the 
manpowep assembled for Gemini and Apollo, arrive at programs that he could sell 
to top management and Congress, and ensure that Apollo itself should somehow 
generate its squcl .  Mucller's dcsign was nothing if not ambitious. For the "main- 
line" Apollo program, he envisaged an annual flight schedule of six Saturn IBs, 
six Saturn Vs, and six launches of the Apollo spacecraft-the "6-6-6" formula, 
later changed to 6-6-8.'' As for post-Apollo plans, Mueller enumerated five 
options: Earth-orbital programs for long-duration space statians; lunar oper- 
ations; planetary landings; an all-out program in Earth-orbital, lunar. and 
planetary activities; and a "balanced" program that combined othcr options in a 
cost-effective way." Each program would be directed to a precise objective. Thus, 
if the nation should desire direct economic benefits, the logical squc l  to Apollo 
would be a program of Earth-orbital operations. In Muellcr's view, Apollo 
Extensions-which became Ap l lo  Applications in August 1965 and Skylab in 
February 1970-was not so much one of the five program options as it was an 
intermediate step from Apollo to future programs. It was his conviction that the 
agency had to organize around one big mission rather than risk sccing its resources 
frittered away on a number of sn~allcr ones. T o  disperse what had been assembled. 
only to reassemble it, would be immensely wasteful. Any new goal must have the 
same nztional priority an Apollo. Without some precise goal, such as the lunar 
lai:ding, "I du not believe that our progress would have been as rapid, as widely 
supported, or as sound as it has been."" By late 1965 Muellcr had seized upon 
a national goal that would more than equal Apollo: a manned landing on Mars 
and return by 1980. 
But this is getting ahead of the story. NASA was not a unitary, centralized 
agency; planning was done from the bottom up rather than the top down. M3r- 
shall and Houston had bcen doing space station studies since the early 1960s. In 
1964-1965 these wntcrs and OMSF divisions at headquartcrs had begun to block 
out the elements of a post-Apollo planning organization. At Ma,.shall von Braun 
created a Future Programs Group in the fall of 1964. At headquartcrs Mucllcr 
appointed William Taylor in May 1964 to head a special studies office to dcsign 
a post-Apollo program; in October it was strengthened by the addition of a 
thirty-man task force established to consider uses for Apollo hardwarc through 
1971; and in August 1965 Muellcr moved from a d v a n d  studies to project 
definition by establishing a Saturn/Apollo Applications Officu at headquarters." 
At that time and for several years beyond, OhlSF planners considered two kinds 
of program: one using surplus Apl lo  hardwarc, thr othcr pointing to the dcvcl- 
opmcnt of an Earth-orbital spacu station. Before the space station concvpt could 
b,wmc an approved program, Mucllcr, his cuntcr directors, and E. Z. Gray, the 
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head of the OMSF Advanced Manned Missions Division, had to specify what 
such a project would accomplish. In general terms, Muellcr and Gray knew what 
they wanted a space station to do. It would have to support a variety of experi- 
ments, which would be developed in modules attached to the main station; it 
would have to be deployable in a cumber of (rrbits, ranging from a 30" inclination 
to synchronous orbits; it would rquire a minimm lifetime of three years; it 
would be designed for deployment in lunar orbit; an; it should have "modular 
growth potential to fully utilize the launch capability of the Saturn V when the 
mission requirements develop to this level of size." l6 But working out the general 
principles was not easy; in late 1865 only three Apollo Applications experiments 
were under development." In addition, OMSF plans had to satisfy two rquire- 
ments: to furnish the Bureau of the Budget with precise cost estimates and to 
establish working relations with OSSA, which would make space science an 
integral part of a followsn to Apollo. 
Yet the differences between the program offices went deep. It was Newell's 
contention that "OSSA was established to be responsible for space science, not 
unmanned space science," a conviction not shared by Mueller." OMSF was 
mission oriented, while OSSA was organized around research disciplines; hence 
Newell's office was not locked into fruitless, interminable arguments over the 
merits of manned versus unmanned flights. Indeed, to most outside scientists, the 
burden of proof that man was nmssary to operate in epace fell squarely on 
OMSF. Specifically, mme scientists, especially those working for NASA as prin- 
cipal investigators, thought that there was too little science and too much en- 
gineering in NASA; that flight experiments assumed the presence of man, whereas 
it was precisely his presence that had to be justified; and that the results obtained 
from Mercury and Gemini could have been obtained with much less expense from 
automated systems. It wa. not that manned programs were unnecessary. A case 
could be and was made that man was needed as a scientific observer, as a subject 
for medical experimentation, as a technician to maintain and repair equipment, 
and as an astronaut-pilot, once low-cost space transportation sys:ems became 
available.'" The point was to consider each case on its merits and to decide, for 
instance, whether lunar exploration called for the trained astronaut-scientist, a 
package of scientific instruments left on the surface, or both. 
While OSSA claimed the authority to plan space science for the whole of 
NASA, OMSF had the money to pay for and to fly approved experiments. In 
practice, the issues between the two offices had to be resolved by compromises that 
were not aiways acceptable to OSSA. In November 1963 Newell established a 
Manned Space Sciences Division whose director, Willis Foster, reported to him 
and to Muclh ;  and in January 1964 Mueller created a Manned Space Flight 
Experime:,cs Board to evaluate recommendations for experiments to be flown on 
Gemini and Apollo. Under this arrangement, each mgram oflice was responsible 
for designing experiments within its nwn sphere: OSSA for space science, OART 
for technological experiments, and the OMSF Directorate of Space Mediciirc for 
medical experiments. Meanwhile, a DOD review board would submit military 
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experiments to be flown by NASA." While the program offices had full authority 
to design experiments, OMSF had the ukimate authority to accept and integrate 
them with the flight hardware. 
By July 1966 the only definite result of NASA planning was the existence 
of several program alternatives, none of them authorized. At headquarters plan- 
ning was being done, not only by specialized divisions within the program offices, 
but also by a Planning Coordination Steering Group (PCSG) established by the 
three program associate administrators late in 1965. In a joint memo to Seamans, 
they had proposed creating ad hoc planning groups to draw together the plans 
already drafted by the offices they directed.'' As finally approved by Seamans the 
PCSG would be supported by five working groups, each of which would review 
the planning already under way, use that planning as their point of departure, and 
then develop programs within guidelines set by PCSG. As a new entity with no 
independent base, PCSG did not play an important role until 1968-1969 when 
under Newell's leadership, it tried to develop an agencywide plan for the 1970s. 
Meanwhiie, OMSF and OSSA continued to do the most important planning. 
In OMSF, planning centered on the Each-orbital space station and on the con- 
cept of a.1 "orbital workshop" using the spent upper stage (S-IVB) of a Saturn 
IB (later changed to the Saturn V). The orbital workshop, which was at the heart 
of Apollo Applications, was supposed to perform a numbel ~f missions, including 
lunar exploration, solar astronomy, and experiments whose general purpose was 
to establish the usefulness of man in space. The  basic Apollo Applications hard- 
ware wou!d consist of the orbital workshop; a multiple docking adaptor for the 
command and service modules that would house the astronaut crew; an airlock 
connecting the workshop with the modules; and an Apollo Telescope Mount 
(ATM) that, attached to either the service n:odule or the docked lunar module, 
would be an observatory to study the Sun's fine structure in 1969 during the solar 
msximum.'' The  ATM was intended to carry o : ~ t  part of the mission of the 
Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory (AOSO) canceled in December 1965, but 
it would go beyond AOSO in making us: of man. The  astronaut-scientist could 
orient and point the ATM in the ;.enera1 k i n i t y  of the Sun, determine and set 
camera exposures and the sequences of the various experiments, recover exposed 
film and magnetic tapes, and seler? solar events of intere~t .~ '  This, in simplest 
terms, was what Apollo Applications was about. But other considerations tended 
to complicate this scheme, which itself was the product of two years of desigrs, 
advanced studies, and negotiations between ONISF and OSSA. How would the 
orbital workshop feed into the concept of the long-duration space statim? Where, 
precisely, would the ATM be located? Was the A'TM really the most effective 
way of doing sola: astronomy or was it make-work for Marshall now that work 
on Saturn was phasing down? Furthermore, the design and outfitting of the work- 
MANAGING NASA IN THE APOLLO ERA 
shop itself was not beyond criticism. The original plan-the one approved by 
Seamans in August 1966-called for launching a Lueled S-IVB stage. After the 
fuel had been burned getting into orbit, the ?stronauts, who would be launched 
separately, would outfit the stage as a workshop. This "wet" workshop would en- 
able NASA to use the Saturn iB instead of the Saturn V as the launch vehicle. But 
it also meant that the astronauts would have to assemble the workshop while work- 
ing in space; something that Gemi~ i  '-ad shown to be difficult and cumbersome. 
Had the difficulties involving Apollo Appiications been purely technical, 
Mucller would still have had his hands full. But organizational questions arose 
at the same time. M~ei ler  wanted the entire program under OMSF control; in 
this and in the actual daign of the ATM, he and Newcll came to a parting of the 
ways. Newell argued that the ATM belonged on the service m~.?ule-a proposal 
that even MSC Director Robert Gilruth had trouble amptins The upshot was 
that Mueller managed to persuade Seamans to assign he ATM .o Marshall and 
to a m p t  his proprsal for placing the ATM on the lunar module. Sear,isns signed 
the project approval document authorizing the ATM on 29 August 966, two 
weeks after Mueller and the Management Council had wor1,td put the "i'olcs and 
missions" of Apollo Applications in a series of meetings ;:t Lake Logan, North 
Car~l ina .~ '  Apollo Applications would follow the same pattern as the program 
from which it grew. Marshall was charged with develcping the ATM and the 
workshop; Houston, with astronaut training, crew systens, and flight operations. 
The Lake Logan agreement confirmed that the managcc.cnt of Apllo Applica- 
tions would be concentrated i.c OMSF and that expwimcnts and proposals would 
be incorporated at the discretion of Mueller arid his program directors. 
But the most serious problems dogging the program pertained to its under- 
lying assumptions: the role of man in Earthsrbital operations, the use of Apollo 
hardware, the wet workshop. All were subjected to very sharp critiristn from 
NASA officials, from Congress, from the Bureau of the Budget, and from various 
scientific advisory groups; most of them stressed the lack of well-defined flight 
experiments and the possibility that the program would only duplicate MOL. In 
June 1966 Newell and his deputy, Edgar M. Cortright, drafted a memo pointing 
to "the lack of a .;ubstantial, visible end product to serve as a focus for the effort. 
After four or five years of activity, NASA will have spent many biilions of dollars 
and have relatively little to show for it in comparison with where we a u l d  be i r ~  
space for about the same amount of money. . . . [Apollo Applications] as now 
configured just doesn't sccm to justify such high costs for an extended period."26 
In Congress, critics of the program tended to seize on the possibility that Apollo 
Applications would wastefully duplicate MOL and that it was high time for 
NASA and DOD to come togcther in a joint program.'7 For different reasons, the 
Bureau of the Budget stared this concern. Budget Director Charles Schultxe and 
Budget examiners were sceptical that NASA needed more moniy. In negotiations 
with Webb, Dryden, ~ n d  Seamans, he insisted that, while the Bureau had no wish 
to reduce U.S. manned capability in space, neither did he beiirve that the s p i c  
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budget should be based on what could be donc within the limits of U.S. technical 
capability, on what the Russims were doirlg, or on the peak level of industrial 
manpower for developing Apollo. The space program was not a WPA.2"With 
important decisions pending, the Burtau needed answers to certain pressing 
questions. Should the nation continue manned flight after the lunar landing? 
Should NASA buy more launch vehicles and spacecraft to keep productiun lines 
running? And what specific manned space flight capability did the United States 
need? In the summer of 1966 NASA officials had not yet arrived at precise, 
definitive answers. 
THE ROLE OF THE OUTSIDE ADVISOR 
The  job of long-range planning was immensely complicated by NASA's need 
for outside scisntitic and technical advice. NASA's various committee? reflected 
the diverse purposes of the committee members.'" Some, like the Space Science and 
Applications Steering Committee (SSASC) and its subcommittees, were primarily 
source selection boards for evaluating flight experiments. Others, like the missions 
boards established in 1967, were intended to map out long-range research and to 
serve all of NASA in a particular discipline. Last, there were bodies like the 
Manned Space Flight Science and Techndogy Advisory Committee (STAC), 
whose purpose was not so much to design future programs as  to work out the 
detail!: ~f prograns already approved. The same diversity applied to membership 
as ;c. nurpose. The members of the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board, fgr 
examb.e, were appointed by the Administrator but reported to the Associate 
Administrator for Space Science and Applications, the same official who ap- 
pointed all the members of the SSASC subcommittees. 
What was the rationale for the mixed advisory boapds? Why did NASA seek 
outside advice at all? What use did it make of such advice, and to what extent did 
advisors merely respond to the initiatives of NASA management? The principal 
reason for seeking outside advice was the impossibility of NASA providin~ it for 
~tself. Unlike engineering, wherc NASA had talent comparable to the best in 
industry, NASA could not attract scientists of Nobel laureate caliber. Indeed, 
scientists of the highest rank were more valuable to NASA as c~nsultants than as 
staff; a scientist not actively involved in ongoing research might fird himself out 
of touch in little more than a year. Uoreolrer, it was much more difficult to 
combine science and administration tll,.,~ i: was to combine enginee-ing with 
administration. As Newell complained in 1965, 
We havt not yet solved the problem of how to maintain the continuing scientific competence 
of s professional xientist while at the same time asking him to devote his working hours to 
administration. . . We can achieve the best in our scientific programs only if those in the 
very to notch grnq have a major influence on the planning of scicnre as well as in carrying 
it out X 
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The best scientists-Luis Alvarez, Harold Urey, Charles Townes-were pre- 
pared to serve as consultants, as members of advisory panels, and as principal 
investigators, but they were not willing to abandon lucrative consulting work or 
to submerge their careers in the larger goals of NASA programs. 
Indeed, NASA's use of outside advisors was of a p i m  with its policy of 
contracting for goods and services. The relation between NASA and its principal 
investig&ors was strictly contractual; the advisory bodies that passed on experi- 
ment proposals were, legally, source selection boards. For the rest, the NASA 
advisory panels served the same purposes as similar groups elsewhere in the 
Federal community. They provided independent appraisal by distinguished out- 
siders; they were sources of new ideas; and, to a degree, they served to legitimize 
programs that NASA officials independently decided the agency must have. 
But whatever its virtues, the structure of the NASA advisory process had 
serious drawbacks, especially its extreme complexity. Writing in 1967, one official 
observed that "so many different types of institutions, organizations and relation- 
ships are evolving currently that it is difficult even to enumerate, much less 
describe the elements of the overall situation."" There was no substantive body 
of policy that set forth how or even why NASA had to draw on these groups for 
advice; there were important jurisdictional overlaps between the Space Science 
Board and internal advisory panels; and the center planning groups and the 
agency advisory committees were virtually insulated from each other. T o  Webb 
and Newcli the problem with the advisory process was that it was unpatterned 
and unsystematic and that it failed to involve qcientists in policy making. Many 
scientists, including (or especially) those serving NASA as consultants or ;@, incipal 
investigators, saw the problem as systemic rather than incidental to the NASA 
advisory process. Their most prominent spokesrncn, such as Norman Ramsey, 
Philip Abelson, and Bruce Murray, wanted autonomy in the making of science 
policy that NASA was not prepared to give. Their argument boiled down to three 
propositions: that the separation of power and responsibility was deadly for 
science; that NASA space science was hit-or-miss, with little evidence of coherent 
planning; and that even a successful program like Surveyor ended as "a shallow 
imitation of what it was intended to be, or what could have been done with thc 
enormous funds and extended time."" 
A brief account of the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board illustrates these 
generalities. Earlier, mention was made of the Ad Hoc Science Advisory Commit- 
tee established by Webb in January 1966 and chaired by Norman Ramscy, a 
Harvard chemistry professor. The committee was created not to advise on specific 
projects but rather to examine how to mnduct the program and to suggest ways 
of involving outside scientists to a greater degree in science policy making. So 
thoroughly did the Ramscy committee do what it was asked to do, that all but two 
of its proposals had to be turned down. Its recommendation for a general advisory 
committee of outside scientists was rejected because it would have required a 
fundamental reorganization of the agency and because it migh~ force the Admin- 
istrator to choose bttwecn accepting the commirtec's advice and supporting the 
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President's program." ' Webb and Newell flatly rejected a proposal for strcngthen- 
ing the scientific competence of the laboratories at Marshall and for reorganizing 
tne centers generally to give experimenters greater power. They did accept the 
suggestion for a consortium of universities to manage the construction of space 
ohervatories. Even the proposal that NASA did accept, for the creation of a 
Planetary Missions Board, had been tentatively approved by NASA before the 
Ramsey committee completed its work. Officially established as of 1 May 1967, 
the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board (and the Astronomy Missions Board 
established in ~ovember)was  to be an advisory committee of outside scientists 
aopointed by Webb, although the executive director, as required by law, was a 
NASA employee detailed from OSSA." In t h m  respects the Board's terms of 
reference were broader than those of any previous advisory body, even if they fell 
short of the general advisory committee recommended in the Ramsey report. It 
was chartered to perform its functions for all of NASA, not just OSSA; unlike the 
Space Science Board, its members had a m s s  to NASA internal documents; and 
"unlike previous advisory bodies, the LPMB was to msider  both general and 
specific NASA objcctive~."~' 
The Board might have had a greater effect on NASA policy had it been 
created a few years earlier. The Board members wanted an integrated program 
as they conceived it, one with a balance between a few large missions and small- 
scale programs using automated spacecraft. The Board ultimately failed in its 
purpose largely because its members could not bring themselves to accept the 
cancelation of programs that they considered to be essential. Each program cut- 
back or tern.'nation from 1967 through 1970 marked a stage in the deterioration 
of relations between the Board and NASA: the cancelation of Voyager in Sep- 
tember 1967, Mueller's indifference to the bard 's  recommendations, the Sep- 
tember 1969 report of the President's Space Task Group, the cancelation of two 
Apollo flights in 1970. Committed as they were to a vision of what was 
scientifically desirable, Board members had little patience for the budgetary pres- 
sures that shaped NASA from without and the internal forces that made it im- 
perative to keep manned space programs alive at the expense of smaller unmanned 
ones. To  them, as well as other scientists who served as principsl investigators, the 
agency was simply the only available means for achieving certain important ends. 
It should be stressed that there was no basic difference between those scientists 
who supported and those who publicly criticized NASA; indeed, some of NASA's 
severest critics, like University of Iowa physicist James van Allen, often served as 
principal investigators. What disturbed Board members was the sacrifice of pro- 
grams like Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter to what they regarded as engineering 
extravaganzas. When they learned the details of the report of the President's 
Space Task Group, which had recommended a manned mission to Mars before 
the end of the century, their first reaction was in offer to resign; and further 
derisions to replace several Apollo missions with Skylab and move the Viking 
project to 1975 only added to their frustration. The changes and cancelations 
strengthened their conviction "that science was accorded second-citizen status" 
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and that "the scheduling of the lunar exploration is matched more to engineer- 
ing . . . than to scientific requirements."36 The  gulf between the Board and 
N(rSA was unbridgeable, and in August 1970 the Lunar and Plaetary Missions 
Board held its final meeting. 
Rather than specific recommendations concerning future programs, the over- 
riding issue between NASA and the scientific community was governance-the 
decisions on what programs should be approved and at what level of funding and 
who should be charged with conducting space science supported with public 
funds. In turning to the actual recommendations of the advisory bodies on which 
NASA drew, the surprising thing is how cautious they were in drafting post- 
Apollo programs. Most of them endorsed the validity of manned spaceflight and 
all argued in favor of a "balanced" program as they conceived it. The governance 
issue was seldom raised explicitly; for that, one mLst turn LO the report of the 
Ramsey committee or the papers of the Lunar and Pl~zctary Missions Board. 
In the papers of the Space Science Board, one finds some cautiously worded 
criticism regarding the content, rather than the organization, of the space pro- 
gram. In 1965-1966 the Board released several reports bearing on long-range 
plans, three of which were based on a summer study held at Woods Hole, 
Massachusetts, in 1965.'- The study was sponsored by the National Academy of 
Sciences and funded by NASA. Two conclusions are noteworthy: that the national 
space program should embrace a number of goals rather than a single overriding 
mission and that there should be a gradual shift from manned to unmanned 
programs and from lunar to planetary exploration. In July 1966, Harry Hess, a 
Princeton geologist and chairman of the Space Science Board, enlarged on the 
proposals in a letter to ~ e b b . ' Y h e  Board, he explained, was not prepared to 
question the value of a continuing national space program or of Apollo, but its 
members were convinced that there would have to be changes in emphasis during 
1968-1975. Aside from repeating the proposals qf the Woods Hole study, the 
Board re-ommended "continued manned lunar exploration with Apollo hardware 
but with decreasing allocation of resources toward the end of the period." The 
Board was even more sceptical of the need for a manned -e station in Earth 
orbit. T o  be sure, not all scientists shared these views; D- d e s  Townes, the 
chairman of STAC and recipient of the 1964 Nobel prize in .\sics, emphatically 
disagreed, but his was increasingly a minority view outside NASA. 
The President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), many of whose mem- 
bers served on NASA advisory bodies, showed the same mixture of praise for 
NASA achievements, ambivalence over its program planning, and reluctance to 
touch on the governance issue as the reports mentioned. In two 1967 reports 
PSAC carried thc proposals outlined by the Space Science Board several steps 
further. The first, "The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period," was released 
in February and represented the most ambitious survey of the space program in 
several years. The Joint Space Panels of PSAC proposed an elaborate but bal- 
a x e d  program, "based on the ex~ectation of eventual manned planetary ex- 
ploration.""' In common with the earlier reports, the PSAC report stressed "a 
balanced program . . . integrating manned and unmanned efforts . . . ," and that 
252 
NASA'S LONG-RANGE PLANNING, 1964-1969 
"the most challenging ultimate o b ~  for space exploration is the exploration 
by man of the nearby planets." " While the report endorsed several NASA 
objectives, it did so with reservations; it recommended one or two manned lunar 
explorations per year for several years as well as unmanned spacecraft "capable 
of landing significant scientific payloads anywhere on the moon."" But the report 
was far from enthusiastic about the conduct or results of NASA planning. In 
particular, PSAC sharply criticized the ATM-not the concept itself but the way 
that NASA proposed to realize it. The Space Science Board had said as much: 
Several Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatories "would have been an order of 
magnitude cheaper than a single Apollo Telescope Mount solar mission, and 
would have been available sooner, provided continuous Ion! term observing, and 
supported a substantially larger number of  experiment^."^- The Committee also 
recommended a greater integration of manned and unmanned mission planning. 
The report of tht PSAC Space Science and Technology Panel was completed 
in Decemht-r but not made public. Whereas the earlier report had surveyed 
prospects for the ensuing decade, this report focused on the ensuing fiscal year.4' 
In general, its criticisms were those of earlier PSAC and Space Science Board 
reports, although, if anything, its conclusions were even more pointed and scep- 
tical. Beyond the governance issue, the PSAC panels and the Space Science Board 
wanted a different kind of program balance than NASA seemed able to provide. 
What did their reports have in common? First, an emphasis on the importance of 
stronger unmanned planetary progrm;. despite assurances by NASA that the 
agency was doing all that could be done; second, a tendency to question the value 
of Apollo Applications because it was competing with scientifically more valuable 
programs, because the role of man seemed to be inadequately justified, and 
because MOL hardware, suitably modified, could be used instead. ' Finally, the 
PSAC reports, especially, pointed to certain economies that might be achieved in 
planning space programs, such as using DOD launch vehicles and MOL hard- 
ware, using a separately launched lunar-roving vehicle as an adjunct to manned 
missions, and combining unmanned spacecraft with ground-based studies. The 
PSAC report of December 1967 was especially critical of one argument advanced 
in favor of Apollo Applications: "Operational space systems for economic benefit 
are unlikely to be manned  system^."'^ The overall effect of the reports was to cast 
doubt on the adcquacy of NASA planning. 
TOWARD A POST-APOLLO NASA, SEPTEMBER  OCTOBER 1968 
Since preceding chapters have described the administrative changes of 
1967-1968, very little need be added by way of summary. Most of the important 
changes had their source either in the Apollo fire or in the budget cuts voted by 
Congress, which led to the elimination of Voyager and the reduction of Apollo 
Applications by one-third. The fire led to the headquarters reorganization of 
Mmch 1967, to further delays in Apollo and Apollo Applications, and to the 
253 
MANAGING NASA IN THE APOLLO ERA 
creation of an Office of Organization and Management under Harold Finger as 
a check on the presumed freedom of the program and functional offices to do as 
they pleased. In particular, Finger worked to revise the project authorization 
system, so that the project approval document (PAD) would become "a single 
control document for each of our program activities" and would remove "from the 
program offices, particularly the large project program offices, some of their 
earlier flexi5i1ity to adjust funds among different projects and programs."'" In 
Apollo Applications, for example, there would be PADs for every financial man- 
agement code, one each for the orbital workshop, the Saturn IB, spacecraft 
development, and the like; and each PAD would include the definition of major 
subsystems, estimates of total funds for completing the job, the principal 
headquarters-center program responsibilities, and identification of related PADs. 
The reductions in NASA's budget requests also affected the nature and scope 
of agency planning. Webb became more determined than ever to salvage Apollo, 
even if it meant postponing decisions about its sequel. Thus Webb hesitated to sign 
a definitive contract with McDonnell-Douglas for the Apollo Applications air- 
lock, even though both sides had fully agreed to its terms and N.AS.4 had the 
option to cancel it "if the clearing up of uncertainties makes it unwise to promd 
with the work under this contract."" Moreover, the reductions in force at various 
centers, particularly Marshall, also added to delays in those programs that had 
been approved. Some of the effects of these losses in manpower are described in 
an earlier chapter, in particular., the rise in the average age of center personnel. 
the loss of morale caused by massive reductions, and the conversions of support 
contractor personnel to civil service categories. The effects on research and lonp, 
range planning at the centers took several years to work out. The p m s s  of 
adjustment is often difficult to trace, since it was the long-term result of many 
small, incremental changes made by the centers and headquarters. The nature of 
these adjustments is touched on at the end of this chapter. 
There were, however, important developments in NASA planning that have 
not yet been examined. Take, for instance, the field of launch vehicle development, 
particularly as it pertained to the Titan 111. As s h ~ w n  in chapter 8, this Air Forcu 
vehicle had become an important element in post-A~ollo planning. As early as 
1964, NASA and DOD had carried out a joint study to establish the feasibility of 
switching from the Saturn to the Titan family. In addition, the Air Force had 
urged on NASA the use of Titan 111 for Surveyor and Voyager. In 1964-1965 
NASA was too deeply mrnmitted to the Saturn IB to consider switching for 
unmanned payloads. But the Titan remained an increasingly attractive alternative 
for unmanned programs still in the planning stage. Since 1962 NASA had studied 
the Titan as a booster for unmanned payloads; in 1956 a Lewis center study 
showed the value of Titan 111-Centaur for future high-! clocity missions, and later 
that year NASA contracted with the Martin Company for a study of 'Titan 
111-Centaur integration.'" About the same time, NASA took note of the March 
1966 report of the House Government Qperations Committee recommending a 
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merger of MOL and Apollo Applications; at the Budget Bureau's request, NASA 
prepared a study to see if Apollo Applications could be designed around Titan I11 
or Titan 111-MOL. Predictably, NASA concluded that it could not, since its cur- 
rent programs were adquately supported by cxisting vehicles. 
Future programs were a different matter, however. Three gaps were evident. 
No vehicle except the Saturn V was capable of putting a payload of 15 000 to 
56 000 kilograms into low Earth orbit; several missions, such as a Mars-Venus 
flyby, were beyond the capacity of the Atlas-Centaur; and no current vehicle could 
resupply a large manned space station, in the event that one was built."' In 
addition, decisions had to be made on reducing the costs and the number of launch 
vehicle types and whether to modify existing vehicles, make nrw combinations of 
existing stages, "or develop new vehicles for nlissions beyond the capability of 
existing vehicles.""' The  Saturn V was too big and expensive, while the Saturn 
IB/Ccntaur and the large solid-fuel motor programs had already been scratched. 
In 1967-1968 NASA conducted a number of studies. including two joint studies 
with DOD, to establish its mission rquirements for the next decade. In particu- 
lar, a 1968 joint "cmnomy study" recommended the Titan HID-Centaur, a new 
combination of cxisting stages, as the most promising vehicle for future missions. 
In February 1969 NASA and 1)01) reached informal agreement on cooperating 
in the future development of the Titan 111. NASA would be in charge of intcgrat- 
ing the 'Titan HID with the Centaur, would procure standard Titan quipment  
through the .4ir Force, and would handle the technical direction of 'l'itan IIID- 
Centaur launch operations."! 
Another area of concern to NASA was aeronautical research. Although fund- 
ing for acronautical R&D steadily rose from 1963, it remained an insignificant 
fraction of th: NASA budget-in 1968 a little over :! percent. Yet the importance 
of planning aeronautical research was quite out of proportion to the amount spent 
on aerona~tics programs. NASA had come under cnnsiderable pressure from 
Ccngress to spend more on aeronautics dating from a 1966 report of the Senate 
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, which had recommended a rnn- 
solidated Federal aeronautics budget." The  problem for NASA wiis to integrate 
aeron.tutical R&D with its other programs and to find the right orgarritational 
location for aeronautics. For many reasons. NASA continued to nccd an aero- 
nautics program, one not separable from its other activities. Aeronautics remained 
essential to NASA programming. Most of the center directors and many hcad- 
quarters oficials had spcnt part of their careers in aeronautical research for 
NACA/NASA. At centers like Langley and Anles it was not possible to separate 
physically the differcnt facilities for aeronautical and space R& I). NASA support 
and NASA facilities were highly valued by 1X)D and FAA. And hybrid programs 
like the 5-1 5, the wingless lifting M y ,  and the space shuttle n~arked the con- 
vcrgencuof iteronautical and space !ethnology. As N.4SA n~ovcd in the early 1970s 
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from Apollo Applications to the space shuttle, the experience gained in aero- 
nautical research and testing became an exmdingly valuable asset in the conduct 
of the space program. In the early 1970s NASA management also decided that the 
best way to upgrade aeronautics was to strengthen it within an existing program 
office, such as the Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART), rather 
than establish :. separate "Office of Aeronautics." Had NASA established an 
aeronautics ofhce separate from its own field centers, the office would have been 
"an external competitor for work in 'OART centers,'" and would have ended up 
weaker rather than stronger." And it was not pract id  to separare one OART 
center to report to a new aeronautics office since none of the OART installations, 
exrept for the very small Flight Research Center, was devoted exclusively to 
aeronautics. 
Early in 1968 NASA made a fresh start in long-range planning. In January 
Webb appointed Floyd Thompson, the Lhrector of Lan le , to chair a task force k' to recommend a program for the post-Apollo period.' At the end of January 
Webb named Thomas 0. Paine, the director of General Electric's think tank 
TEMPO, to succeed Seamans as Deputy Administrator. In March Newell, who 
had moved up to become Associate Administrator the previous September, reor- 
ganized the planning groups set up some two years before The Planning Coordi- 
nation Steering Group became the Planning Steering Group (PSG) chaired by 
Newell and consisting of Wyatt, the deputy directors of the program offices, and 
the center directors. The working groupq increased from five to twelve, were 
assigned the job of drafting "Planning Source Documents," which were to serve 
as the basis of the program memorandums required by the Bureau of the Budget, 
as a source of material for project approval documents, and as the raw materials 
3f long-range planning. In addition, a separate Planning Coordination Group 
(PCG) of headquarters planning officials was created under Arnold Frutkin, the 
Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, to guide the working groups 
and to submit their planning source documents to PSG for review." To com- 
plement the reports of the working groups, the PCG would draw on institutional 
working groups for analyses of the organizatioral elements in planning: the 
balance of in-house and contractor work, the effect of new programs on center 
operations, and the like."" This was clearly a more ambitious planning process 
than the one-shot Future Programs Task Group of 1964-1965. The mjective of 
the new planning system was to break down the parochialism that divided head- 
quarters from the centers and, by bringing key NASA officials together, "to 
develop significant alternative program possibilities so that management 
decisions . . . can be . . . effectively determined."" Given the 'ecentralized na- 
ture of NASA policy making, this was asking a great deal 0 !gency officials. 
Moreover, the new planning system aimed at replacing the g, :ral manager 
concept, under which Seamans had been responsible for all project approvals and 
for monthly reviews of the status of these projects, with group management. This 
was the rationale for the establishment of a Management Council in January 
1968, to which the PSG would report, and for replacing the program reviews for 
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each program office held for the Deputy Administrator with a general manage- 
ment review before the Management Council. 
The planning reforms were intended to reverse some of the byproducts of a 
decade of decentralized management. But to put the matter thus hardly accounts 
for the comparative failure of PSG/PCG to plan successfully. One has to know 
what the system was not before one can evaluate it. PSGjPCG did not presert 
the Administrator, Congress, or the Bureau of the Budget with a single author- 
itative NASA program. Rather, it offered three authorized NASA planning 
groups. In 1968 there were more than a dozen ad hoc and standing advisory and 
planning groups, most of which had no formal connection at all with ;he PCG.'" 
Two that did, Bellcomm and the Mission Analysis Division at Ames, remained 
distinct and apart. Bellcomm, in particular, became a sort of in-house planning 
staff attached to Mueller's office." By 1968 Bellcomm officials were sitting in as 
observers at meetings; indeed, Bellcomm was commissioned by STAC to prepare 
a study on the uses of man in space."" Within the NASA organization there was 
as much competition as cooperation in drafting a long-range plan. 
Three additional problems impeded center-headquarters cooperation. Ex- 
cept for PCG, which consisted of headquarters planning officials, all the members 
of PSG and the working groups participated part-time. Second, the process itself 
was, or became, exceedingly complex; aside from the standing committees report- 
ing to Frutkin and Newell, there was a special studies group within the PCG and 
a "synthesis" group of top headquarters officials within the PSG. The nomen- 
clature a,ld the process it tried to describe were both cumbersome, and early in 
1969 the system was revamped and streamlined. Finally, Newrll, Frutkin, and the 
chairmen of the working groups hesitated before two quite different courses. 'They 
could outline the programs they considered  intrinsical:^ desirable at whatever 
cost, or they could anticipate the sort d budget that the Executive Office and 
Congress would accept and design programs that could be managed within the 
lower budgets of the 1970s. Given the political atmosphere during the last two 
years of the Johnson administration, the problem, it turned out, was for NASA 
to keep what it already had rather than to make a completely fresh start. 
THE END OF A DECADE-REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
SPACE TASK GROUP, OCTOBER 1968-OCTOBER 1969 
At a White House press conference on 16 September 1968, James Webb 
announced his resignation as N.ISA Administrator, effective 7 October, his 62d 
birthday. After nearly eight years directing the space program, he was leaving to 
pursue interests in education and urban affairs and also to smooth the transition 
to the next administration.' As President, Nixon would certainly want his own 
'Another vcrsmn of thc cwcumstantrs bch~nd Wcbb's res~gnation is heard ~ns~dc  NASA. I n  a mming  with 
the Pres~dcnt, hc sought to restore varlous budget cuts and threatened to resign unless he had his way. At 
this. Johnson rallcd in thc W h ~ t c  HOUK prcss corps to announce that M r .  Webb had somahmg to say, 
whcrcupon Wcbb announrcd that he was leav~ng NASA. 
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man; Humphrey would necessarily want someone else as well. Webb left the 
agency at a time when NASA was making measurable progress toward the lunar 
landing but with few approved programs beyond it and with the design of Apollo 
Applications still in doubt. Webb's prognosis for the space program was almost 
grim: 
1 am not satisfied with the program. 1 am not satisfied that we as a nation have not bcen able 
to go forward to achieve a first position in space. What this really means is that we are going 
to bc in m n d  position for some time to come.6' 
In the summer of 1968 Apollo Applications was more than a year behind 
schedule, owing to cuts made b.1 Congress-the authorized $253 million xas  
eventually reduced to $150 million-and to the reprogramming of funds from 
Apcllo Applications to Apollo. Reporting in July, the Thompson committee 
endorsed the concept of Apollo Applications but expressed serious reservations 
about its design that ranged from the planning of experiments to the absence of 
backup hardware to the "questionable nature" of the ATM experiment."' Webb's 
departure made a complex rituation even more complicated. First as Acting 
Administ;-ator and then, from March 1969, as Administrator, Paine's view of 
long-ranse planning was very different from Webb's. Paine wanted an ambitious 
post-Apollo program, specifically one that included a program of manned lunar 
exploration after the first landing; and he believed that a large, long-duration 
space station-something talked about but not acted on in NASA for almost a 
decade-must be on the agenda. 
Between October 1968 and June 1969 the NASA planning apparatus 
creaked into gear. To describe even briefly the plans and task force studies 9f the 
next year would take the discussion too far afield. Suffice it to say that Pdine went 
far beyond Webb in planning for the future, undeterred by the practical 
difiiculties in getting the White House to make funding available. He emphatic- 
ally endorsed Muetler and Townes' proposal for extended manned exploration 
and even went beyond them. In December 1968 President-elect Nixon appointed 
Townes to chair a special task force to consider the space program over the next 
two decades. The Townes report, which was not released by the White House, did 
in fact call for a vigorous, multifaceted program, although it disapproved of any 
commitment to a large orbiting space station."' Paine impatiently dismissed what 
he saw as the report's aversion to the word "commitment"; those who had drafted 
it, including Seamans, did not wish to "commit" the nation to anything. To  this, 
Paine replied that while he could understand the reluctance to makc commit- 
ments, he could not sympathize with it. The great value of Apollo was that it "gave 
.nore meaning to the space program because people identify more readily with 
men than with machines." And he continued: 
Wc have bcen frustrated too long by a negativism that says hold back, bc cautious, take no 
risks, do less than you arc capable of doing. 1 submit that no perceptive student of the history 
of social progress doubts that we will establish a large laboratory in earth orbit, that we will 
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provide a practical system for the frequent transfer of men and rupplier to and from such a 
I '  
t 
laboratory, that we will continue to send men to the Moon, and that eventually we will und  I 
men to the planm. I F  this is true, now ir the time to my ao. . . . We in NASA arc fully 1. 1 
canrciouc of practical limitations. . . . In the light of thew conrideratiom, we can k rcnrible 1 
and moderate about our rqucatr for mourn-bul we must know where we are goin&. f 
1 
By early 1969 two groups in addition to PSG were weaving the fabric of 
NASA planning. Paine was meeting with his program and center directon to f 
draft a specific plan for a followsn to the first lunar landing, which was scheduled I 
for July. Mueller and his staff, assisted by Bellcomm, were preparing their 
version of the shape of things to come. They had one great advantage over the 
members of PSG and its working groups: they knew (or thought they knew) where 
they were going. Mueller wanted both the space station and a low-cost trans- 
portation system. He saw the station as a logical and necessary step in a national 
space program, as a way station to the moon, as practice for planetary missions, 
and a step in reduction in the costs of space operations.""' The transportation 
system would have all the virtues of economy, plus the added virtue of changing 
the role of ground support from one of "being . . . the senior partner in the 
operation into a truly supponlng role where it handles those things that require 
external coordination rather than internal operations.""" 
Almost as soon as Paine became Acting Administrator, he endorsed Muel- 
ler's plan for an orbital space station. In May 1969 Paine set up two task forces: 
one, headed by Charles Mathews, Mueller's deputy, to examine the concept of a 
manned space station in permanent Earth orbit; the other, headed by Mueller, to 
study the space shuttle, a low-cost transportation systrm for supplying the space 
station. Then on 22 July, two days after the Apollo 11 landing, Mueller an- 
nounmi that NASA was switching from a "wet" to a "dryt' workshop, that is, an 
unfueled S-IVB outfitted on the ground and launched by a Saturn V. There were 
several reasons for this change: the cancelation for budgetary reasons of MOL on 
10 June, which ended the debate over wasteful duplication; the knowledge of 
OMSF officials that Saturn Vs would be available for Apollo Applications after 
the lunar landing; finally, the conclusion of Mueller that, with the cuts in the 1970 
budget, NASA would no longer be able to support the wet workshop schedule 
with the funds available.'" As one official put it, 
We decided that we had no choice. . . . Obviously the Saturn-5 m.s will be in excess of the 
Saturn IB casts. But you wdl m the program that we have here 1s one that predicates a space 
station and spare tug coming up together . . one of the forcing functions, In addition to the 
dollars, was the faa that the weight of the workshop had been growing with time. . . It is 
a good illustration of what happens when you put a prog;am in a holding pattern. . . And 
we have just m n t l y  gone out of that holding partem and are now hopcfrrl that we will get 
approval to p forward with t h ~ s  dry workshop and to move out and finish the job." 
All this time Newell had bten trying to persuade headquarters and center 
officials to produce a long-range plan. What had been the "Synthesis Group" of 
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the previous planning cycle became the Planning Steering Group; what went by 
that name in 1968 was now the Planning Review Committee and included the 
program and center directors; while the working groups, renamed planning pan- 
els, were "to guide the plannin activity" but "not attempt to do all the planning 
within an assigned catcgory."'"pThe flaws in the earlier planning structure only 
npeatcd themselves in 1969. There wzs the same inability of PSG to represent 
itself as spokesman for the entire agency, the same lack of adquate staff support, 
and apparently the wnviction of some members of the planning panels that 
drafting an integrated plan was a futile exercise. 
These difficulties wen  wnpounded by the unchecked decline in the NASA 
budget and by President Nixos's establishment in February 1969 of a Spa= Task 
Croup (STG) to draft an overall plan for the next decade of h e  U.S. space 
program. The STG, chaired by Vice President Spiro Agnew, included Robert 
Seamns, who became Secretary of the Air Force that February; Thomas Paine; 
and Lee DuSridge, the President's Science Advisor. The existence of a high-level 
task force outside NASA meant that internai NASA planning would be done 
mostly in terms of what that task force found acceptable. In effect, planning within 
the agency procnded along paths that alternately converged and moved apart. 
The various planning groups werc drafting programs that were intrinsically 
desirable for NASA; they were thinking in terms of programs that were likely to 
be approved given current and projected funding levels; and they assembled the 
kind of program that could be sold to the STG. In the end, the STG represented 
a partial victory of the views of Paine and Mueller.-" In its September 1969 report 
to the President, the STC recommended a balanced program of manned and 
unmanned space exploration and singled out as a primary goal a manned M a n  
mission before the end of the centurv. This, it will be recalled, had heen Mucller's 
proposal for a long-term objective to sumed Apollo; but the idea had remained 
dormant virtually until the launch of Apollo 1 1, when Vice President Agnew had 
advanced what he called "a simple, ambitious, optimistic goal."7' This was all 
that Mueller, von Braun, and Paine had needed and this goal, expanded into a 
plan of impressive -pe, became the cornerstone of the STG report. 
In addition, the STG sketched three possible NASA programs at three 
different funding icvels: 
1. A manned Mars mission by the mid-1980s; an orbiting lunar station; a 
fifty-man Earthsrbiting space base. Fundinp would rise f r  . $4 billion in 
FIT 1970 to $8-910 billion in l980.-' 
2. Mars mission in 1986; $8 billion maximum in early 1980s. 
3. Initial development of )ace station and rcusablt shuttles, as in the tint two 
options, but deferral of decision on M a n  landing date, while maintaining 
goal of a landing at some point after 1980 but before the end of the century. 
The concurrent development uf the shuttle and the space station would call 
for a risc to $5.7 billion in spending by 1976; if they werc developed serially, 
fundine would risc to $4-$5 billion. 
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For all the boldness of its planning, the STC had no power to commit the 
nation to anything. It was merely a statement of alternatives, like the NASA 
reports to the STC or the various PSAC and Space Science Board reports of 
1965-1967; and it pointedly avoided setting a specific date for a manned mission 
to Man. In the event, it was as much as Paine could do to hold on to what the 
agency already had. Throughout 1969 NASA continued to lay off cmploym at 
the centers, and at the end of the year Paine announced the closing of the 
Electronics Research Center, even as work on the unfinished $60 million complex 
proceeded. By that time it was becoming appartnt that, as one journalist wrote, 
:here would be "no set goal for landing men on Mars, no plan to colonize the moon 
and no sudden push to orbit a permanent manned space station above the earth 
in the next five yean."" The moa ambitious goais of the STG report were tacitly 
dropped; Nixon's message of 7 March 1970, which was an endorsement of the 
third and least expensive of the STG options, made no mention of a Mars landing. 
The result of four years of studies and long-range planning was one "dry" orbital 
workshop launched in May 1973, four years behind schdule; three "visits" to the 
workshop by astronaut crews; and the commitment by President Nixon in Jan- 
uary 1972 that a reusable space shuttle would be built. Strictly spea'ing, there 
was 110 post-Apollo space program. Instead, there were discrete programs, some 
of which, like the shuttle and Skylab, were whar NASA managed to salvage from 
the manned programs of the 1960s. 
4 summary account of NASA planning brings out its extreme complexity, 
the mixture of technical and administrative considerations that guided it, and the 
inability of NASA planners to design a plan around which the entire agency could 
rally. This coniluding section concentrates on three aspects of NASA pianning: 
how and by whom it was done, how well it succeeded, and the rather puzzling lack 
of attention paid by NASA officials to the administrative consequences of substan- 
tive programs. 
Recall that in the 1960s there were at least four planning cycles, the last two 
of which overlapped. In the early 1960s NASA prepared and then dropped a 
formal long-range plan. This was followed by *he Future Programs Task Group 
of 1964-1965, the various special studies and task forces directed by OMSF and 
OSSA, and the PSG/PCG planning exercises of 1968-1969. Having sr'd this, 
were there any features common to all of NASA planning? The evidence suggests 
there wcw. NASA planning was additive rather than synthetic; t! i t  is, every 
agency ;;;in tended to be the sum of its pans, not an integrated whole. Most 
planning, and almost all that mat.cred, was carried out by the centers and pro- 
gram offices, not by headquarters staff offices reporting to the Administrator. 
There was a persistent tension in the plans drafted by the program offices an? 
agency task forces between the technically feasible and the politically accept%c. 
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No plan had apy chance of sucnrc until it was acceptable to the NASA Admin- 
istrator, the Congress, and the White HOUK. Lackina a rigorous analysis of the 
costs and benefits of each plan, NASA officials below the level of the Office of the 
Administrator relied on the technically feasibk. And "feasibility" means only that 
something i; possible, not that the method or program is the most effective means 
of accomplishing a given end. Al SIIOWC, even the OMSF center directcn were 
sceptical of the design of the ATM and its location on the i u a r  module. 
What complicated the job of planning was the confusion beiwcen an "inte- 
grated" and a "balanced" program in the various reports and studies dealing with 
post-Apollo planning. The latter term was almosl always used by those who 
attacked. as well as those who defended, NASA policy. The Space Science b a r d ,  
PSAC, the Space Task Group, and the Townes committee all believtd that what 
they propsed struck the proper balarce bawcen manned and unmanned pro- 
grams, or lunar-planetary explwr.;ion and Earth-wb:tal applications sateiiites. 
Yet Webb, a! least, was prepared to argue that NASA already had a balanced 
program within the funding authurized. The anccpt cf a balanced program had 
meaning only in terms of some ,~niiorm standard which all couid refer and, 
lacking which, couid be used to advocate whatever some official or advisory bcJy 
considered desirable. 
In theory, an integrated plan could be defined as the "framework that would 
meld many separate program elements into a coherent whole."" Interpreted this 
way, the term was ambiguous. All too often, NASA officials tended to  confuse 
means with ends; the space station was treated as a "mission" when it wae only 
a "capability." In an agency that was no longer organized around one overriding 
mission, the proposal to design an unmarned interplanerary probe could be 
regarded f ro3 two quite different ;iewpoints: either as preliminary to 2 manned 
mission, or as an end in itself. The difficulties in drafting ~ r !  integrated plan were 
part of the failure to consider what such K plan would imply tor the organization 
and management cf NASA. For the moment, one might distinguish between the 
short- and long-term difficulties of drafting such a plan. At the end of the 1969 
plznning cycle, Newell wrote a report to serve as a kind of balance sheet of the 
strengths and weaknesses oi NASA planning. He was remarkably frank a b o ~ t  &he 
difficulties of getting all the agency divirions to participate. Hc noted that there 
was not enough center participation; that the scope of the planning task, added to 
other responsibilities, had overworked many line oficials; that some (unnamed) 
pawns cocid not separate their roles as heads of centers and operating divisions 
from their agencywide responsibilities within PSG; finally, that fundamcr,:d 
conflicts over program priorities between OSSA and OMSF had been aggravated 
by impending budgetary cutbacks.-' None of this shodd have been surprising. 
The decentralized struHurc of NASA \;as desigd to carry out the Apollo 
mission, but it **as r'ot calculatecl to lead to integrated planning. Praisely b e a u k  
manned spaccfl ight tmk so large a portion of :he agency's budget and manpower, 
planning tended to be mostly in terms of devising a sequel to Apollo or moving as 
far from it as possible. It is also worth noting :hat the verv same problems :hat 
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Newel1 cited in getting the centers and headquarters to work toge:: er had been 
anticipated in the problems that CMSF had working with its operating divisions. 
What Seamans singled out as the chief faults in OMSF planning in the summer 
of 1967 were virtually identical to those discussed by Newell over two years later: 
The apparent absencc of sn agreed upon base underlying estimates and assumptions; the 
overly centralized direction to planning that forbids candid review and analysis of meaningful 
alternatives by providing only one grogram view for consideration; and an apparent lack of 
Center participation in the key elements or the planning process that deal with program 
objectives and realistic possibilities of contributing to their achievement. Above all, there 
appears to be a lack of calldid communication within OMSF and between OMSF and other 
orgz.~izational elements of NASA that frustrates . b t  possibility of developing and impld- 
mer. ..g the best total Agency program under the varying conditions that we must face.76 
It was this lack of communication between agency divisions that made the 
long-trrm su~:ess of any planning exercise doubtful. In addition, there was no 
authoritative voice to speak for the agency. PSG and its panels might have evolved 
into a kind of standing committee ior agency planning, but, before this happened, 
their role was preempted by OMSF assisted by Bellcomm. There is also evidence 
that some 013cials would pot or perhaps could not out all their cards on the table. 
Adequate planning requires that rhe pianners be kept fully informed about the 
organization's resources. But, as Newell observed, 
We found that some of the centers would not discuss the question of their staffing because they 
were afraiL that if they indicated that they could take or- new prqcx h a t  they wanted :a 
get, the availability of people would be signalled for headquarters to take those people away 
and put hem somewhere e!se." 
The attitude of "we have nothirig to gain by speaking up" meant, almost inevita- 
bly. that a proposal presented by a working group "had more certainties than 
challenges; each elemerrt could be shown to be feasible in terms of projected time 
and effort, but the total effect in terms of forward motion was pedestrian, even 
timid."'" 
Perhaps one can account for the failure of NASA planning by asking what 
an integrated plan would have hvohed. A successful plan would have related 
three pairs of variables: aeronautics to space technology, the rationale for un- 
manned systems to that for manned systems, a..d substantive programs to institu- 
tional changes. Nothing is more striking than the failure of the working groups 
or the Institutional Working Group of 1968 to recommend changes at the centers 
or changes in the relations betwee11 Tenters and headquarters that would have 
accompanied the programs they advocated. In essence, the NASA organization of 
1969-1970 was almost unchanged from that of November 1963. The reader may 
object that this is putting the cart before the horse a d  that there could be no 
apreement on organization in the absence of agreement on programs. It is true that 
the 2961 reorganization succeeded the lunar landing decision. But the situation in 
1968-1969 was fundamentally different in two respects: the agency co  longer had 
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an overriding mission comparable to Apollo, and in a period of declining budgets, 
the agency needed flexibility to adjust to changes. In fact, the phasedown of Apollo 
had raised questions that were basically administrative. What should be the 
division between ad~anctd m a r c h  and development at the centen? Should each 
center "belong" to a designated program office, or should emphasis on cross- 
servicing become morc wmmon? Should responsibility for applications remain 
with 0SS44, hc assigned to a separate program office, or be diffused throughout 
the agency? Should NASA maintain a separate Office of University Affairs de- 
spite the virtu..l demise of NASA support for university research? How ; hould 
NASA avoid excessive dependencv of DOD support?" In the area of manpower 
planning alone, some questions could not wait for new programs before they were 
resolved, questions such as the following: Should work be moved from centers that 
had too much to ccntcrs that had too little? Was there any way of defining 
"wasteful duplication" in a way that would eliminate unnecessary, overlapping 
facilities at the centers? And how could NASA best maintain its in-house com- 
petence and promote employees with management skills to morc responsible 
positions? 
In 1968- 1969 no key official dared tq discuss publicly the organizational 
shifts that a post-Apollo program would entail, although task forccs like the one 
that wrote the !966 Hjornevik report had already done some of the nmssary 
thinking. Organizational s:ructure docs matter, even if it only ratifies power 
relations that already exist. The restructuring of center-headquarters relations 
was potentially the most explosive issue facing NASA management. A major 
reorganization cwuld easily have torn NASA apart, since almost turtainly it w ~ d d  
have meant that some centers would have gained at the expense of others. 
Although no official discussed the scope of organizational change publicly, a 
few had ideas on what NASA ought to become. Mueller, for instance, proposed 
a restructuring of NASA that would have left the agency, in organizational terms, 
where it had been before 1961."' He proposed a stricter demarcation between 
research nnters like Langley, development ccntcrs like Marshall, and operational 
cuntcrs ;ike KSC. In view of the availability of m,mpower at JP1, and Marshall, 
he s~ggestcd the transfer of development projects to these installations. He went 
further iri advocating clearer statements of roles and missions for the renters, the 
withdrawal of rescarch centers from projcct management, the separation of re- 
search functions from development and contract administration at !hi. rescarch 
laboratories, the creation of a separate headquartersoffice to manage pro;.trs once 
they k a m e  "operational," and the delegation of responsibility for planning icm the 
program otticus, with a separate policy staff for general guidance. Finally, he 
urged that otticials rcmgnize that NASA's competence was in applied, not basic, 
research and that NASA should rely on universitier for the latter. In effect, 
Muellcr propoccd a radical simplification of the NASA organization at a time 
when therc was no wnsensus on a post-Apllo organization. Some of his pro- 
posals, liCe the one for an "Otfice of Operations," were workable. As one otticial 
observed at the end of 1969, 
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At somc point . . . we will bc fac.d with the need for 24-hour-a-day. 365-day-a-year oper- 
ations with scvrral manned and t.nmanncd space vehicle in operation at the same time. This 
will meaq greatly expanding and integrating launch and mission control capability on one 
hand, and simplifying and cost cutting of systems on tlte other. 
. . . ht somc point we will need tn give serious consideration to a total operations organization 
hr c in Headquarters to manage an agency-wide operations pmgram.n' 
On :' e other hand, an attempt to work out a s i ~ ~ c t  division of labor between the 
cvntel-s would have been fraught with risk, esp-ia!ly if a center's original reason 
for being should end. Also, as shown, some of the older NACA centers like 
Langlcy welcomed the assignment of flight projects because development work 
generated new research problems for the center's laboratories. The  truth seems to 
be that no center could survive simply as a job shop. As Marshall officials 
explained to the Hjornevik task force, 
A Center must hav: a cmtral role and mission around which it builds its mmpetencc and 
achieves its placv rn the world. 
With a wntral role and mission firmly established and operating, a Center can take on related 
activities to fill in pcaks and vallrys in its workload. wen working for other Centers, if 
necessary ."' 
En 1969 the issue oT the reorganization of NAS.4 was simply too divisive to be 
raised. Yet changes in organization had to accompany-and in some cases were 
a precondition for-a functioning agency. 
In sum, NASA failed to produce an integrated plan, either as a future course 
of action or as a means of adjusting to the actual funding levels authorized by 
Congress. Yet there is evidence that a few centers were able to p1:m successfully, 
even in the absence of guidance from headquarters or knowledge by top manage- 
ment that anything out of the ordinary was happening."' The  evidence is fragmen- 
tary; successful planning at Goddard or Langley was not part of any agencywide 
plan, was as much a response to the logic of current programs as it was to funding 
cutbacks, and has to be inferred fro- scattered documents. At a center like 
Goddard, which had eighteen ongoing projects in 19' !, the emphasis was on 
p1ottir.g manpower requirements in order to main:ain balance between the 
projects. All NASA center directors had broad discretionary powers; a director 
had the authority to control personnel assignments, to ask for more people if 
necessary, and to reprogram funds from one research task area to another within 
the same research subproyam. This flexibility is the key to understanaing how 
a center like Goddard muld cwpc with its responsibilities for developing un- 
manned Earth-orbital satellites, for managing NASA's data-reduction network, 
and for dealing with the growth and complexity of a new generation of spancraft. 
As 3n example, consider the growth in complexity of the Orbiting Solar Obser- 
vatories (OSO), the first of which was launched in 1962. By 1971 the OSO had 
evolved into a very large, very complicated orbiting 1,lboratory: It had more than 
tripled in total weight, had greatly increased its relative pointing accuracy, and 
r~~ t :*ned  .I much largcr volume of data. As one center official remarked, 
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Scientistq no longer arc satisfied with a static experiment and wish to perform as dynamic an 
experiment as pouible. For example, the firat OSO's were capable of only photographing the 
entire solar disk. Now the wientists want to examine specific portiona of the solar disk of 
interest to them.'. 
Center management developed the ability to move employees from one project to 
anoiher, to prevent an imbalance in the mix of skills at the centers, and to reduce 
or elimmate manpower in areas that no longer demanded top priority. This was 
not so much planning in the PSG sense, as it was adaptation to a tight budget, 
stricter personnel ceilings, and the perceived need (as-of 1971) for a new in-house 
flight project that would have to be managed within the resources available. No; 
that Goddard's experience could be repeated elsewhere; the center was unique for 
its mixture of large and small flight projects, the coordination of science and 
engineering disciplines wit5 those responsiule tor managing NASA tracking nt:- 
works, and the ability of its project managers to perform in-house work that other 
centers usually contracted out. But it was precisely this kind of ~estructuring at 
the field level that represented the most successful p!anning within NASA at the 
end of the 1960s. 
Chapter 10 
Summary Conclusions 
T he leading premise of this book is that NASA was (and is) an organization, not a specific mission. The space agency was created two-and-a-half years 
before President Kennedy made the decision to commit the United States to a 
lunar landing, and it was still in business the day after Neil Armstrong and Buzz 
Aldrin touched down in the Sea of Tranquillity. Once one concedes that Apollo 
marked a rare convergence of technology and political support, one is still as far 
as ever from knowing the institutional elements that were characteristic 01 the 
space program and that would persist beyond Apollo. NASA's remarkable success 
in managing its programs depended on the ability of the agency's top officials to 
enunciate goals, to maintain good relations with the White House and Congress, 
to shape the agency from within, and to delegate to the program offices and centers 
the authority they needed to get the job done. 
In 1961 NASA was a new ~rganization in a state of flux. When Webb and 
Seamans appeared on the scene, NASA was a loosely structured agency whose 
field centers worked in relative isolation from each other and from headquarters. 
The lunar landing mission demanded much greater coordination-and for the 
time being, greater centralization-than had been the case. One of the most 
important aspects of the Apollo program was the speed with which the crucial 
administrative and program decisions were made and the major prime contracts 
awarded. Excep for the decision to go to all-up testing, the major Apollo program 
decisions were made between August 1961 and July 1962. Had they been 
stretched over a longer period, it seems unlikely that they would have received the 
support tkat they did. A comparison between the establishment of the Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC) and the Electronics Research Center (ERC) brings this 
out. NASA announced the selection of Houston as the MSC site after a brief 
survey. Yet the creation on the center p e r a t e d  powerful political support; the site 
itself was well located in rclation to Michoud, Marshall, and the Cape; a3d tile 
reasons given for estab!;shing a new center were justified in relation to the Apollo 
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mission. In contrast, almost two years elapsed between the decision to establish the 
ERC and its formal establishment. There was no such consensus as existed in the 
case of M-SC; NASA could not convince Congress or the public that a capability 
in electronics research was as vital to the agency as one to develop the Apollo 
spacecrrlft. The point is that the agency's top officials made the important deci- 
sions while there was time to do so. The 1961 reorganization had to be reversed 
two years later, but it gave NASA management the opportunity to bring the 
centers under tighter control than before. 
Another element in the success of the NASA organization v,as flexibility: 
flexibility for the Administrator to appoint to excepted positions, to award major 
R&D contracts without competitive bidding, to reprogram within appropriation 
accounts and to transfer between them, to devise and administer a custom-tailored 
entrance examination, and the like. Examples such as these represent flexibility 
within the system, ._at a departure from it; variances from the norm were allowed 
by Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Civil Service Commission. This 
flexibility allowed for that "free play of the joints" without which institutional 
rigor mortis sets in. The use of excepted positions, for example, served not only 
to retain cmp.oyees within the organization but also to bring in new blood and to 
expose NASA to outside influences. Similarly, without the authority to negotiate 
major contracts noncompetitively, it is unlikely that the lunar landing would have 
occurred on schedule. Indeed, this authority was probably more important for 
NASA than the introduction of incentive provisions in 1962. As shown, incentives 
were difficult to administer: they required a great deal of manpower and paper- 
work, the criteria for incentive payments were hard to pin down, and a con- 
tradiction was inherent in fixing targets for changing programs. NASA manage- 
ment might well have awarded development contracts without adding incentive 
provisions. But it is hard to imagine Gemini, Apollo, or Nimbus becoming oper- 
ational had the agency been bound by competitive bidding or other rules that 
would have constrained its ability to choose its sources. The Apollo engineering 
support contracts were good examples of the agency's freedom in this respect. The 
T I E  contract began as a letter contract and so remained for over a year, until 
NASA and Boeing negotiated the definitive terms. In this and other cases, the 
flexibility available to NASA dcpended on congressional willingness to tolerate 
practices that the legislature might have disallowed elsewhere. 
Similar flexibility extended to other sectors. In the period under in- 
vestigation, NASA had no formal, agencywide, long-range plan; no general advi- 
sory committee, such as the one established for the Atomic Energy Commission; 
no inspector-general, chief scientist, or chief engineer; no directorate for managing 
launch support and tracking and data acquisition together; no central planning 
staff attached to the Ofice of the Administrator. Webb explici ly rejected a 
proposal to create a general advisory committee of outside scientists. Hc and other 
NASA officials also oppo~ed a congressional bill to create an "Inspector of Pro- 
grams and Operations" for NASA because the legislation would have involved 
assigning an already limited number of personnel to another overhead function 
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and would have created a suspicion among NASA engineers that their indepen- 
dence was being restricted. Also, senior officials wen  understandably reluctant to 
have people looking over their shoulders and questioning their programs. These 
functions were handled in other ways. Moreover, the absence of a plan or general 
advisory committee rescued the agency from becoming captive to policies that 
might cease to be relevant. 
To maintain flexibility and to adapt the agency to change, reorganizations 
were frquen:: in 1961, 1963, 1965, and 1967. This policy of calculated change 
had two purposes. Top management was unwilling to be rigidly bound by its own 
past policies. More important, each reorganization wrnt beyond simple 
corrections-to improve communications between decision making and s u p p n -  
ing staff or to free the centers from unneeded super.ision-but was designed to 
turn the agency around from one xt of programs to those of a quite different son. 
NASA was vulnerable: first, because it had to stake its claim to territory of its own, 
rather than becoming (as its predecessor agency, the National Advisory Commit- 
tee for Aeronautics, had become) a supportir-g arm of the military services or a 
supervisory agency with a small in-house staff and contractor-operated facilities, 
like the Atomic Energy Commission; second, because, as Raymond Bauer and 
others have noted, the civilian space program is discretionary. "We do not necd 
to do it, in the same iqerativc sense that we believe we necd to be militarily 
armed." ' NASA's vulnerability was amntuated by the special oversight exercised 
by Congress. NASA had to obtain authorizing legislation before appropriations 
could be voted, keep the congressional committees "fully and completely in- 
formed" of pending action, and "come into agreement" with the legislative com- 
mittees for certain kinds of reprogramming: During the 1960s top NASA officials 
had to be ready to change when change was imperative and to refuse to a m p t  
organizational forms as important beyond the goals they might serve. 
NASA managers saw their responsibilit. sin political terms and took it upon 
themselves to justify NASA where it mattered most: to the President, to the 
Bureau of the Budget, whose fiscal authorities set the terms of the annual budget 
rqucst, and to Congress, which had the power to modify that q u e s t .  What 
Sapolsky has said about Polaris surely applies here: 
Competitors had to be eliminated, rwiewing agencies had to be outmancuveml; 
congnumen . . . newspapermen and academicians had to !x w p t e d .  Politia i s  a systemic 
requirement. Whdt distinguishes prqrams in government is not that some play politics and 
othm do nor, but, rather, that some arc better at it than others.' 
NASA would dcxribc a goal within the broader mission: put a communications 
satellite in synchronous orbit, or develop a manned spancraft to soft-laud on the 
Moon and a vehicle with liquid-hydrogen upper stages to launch it. But actual 
development involved fa: more than the finding that the pb could be done. The 
technical problems-say, of negotiating the prime contracts or fitting schedules to 
costs-had political dimensions, owing to the requirement that NASA submit its 
programs to Congress for annual authorization. Alm. important dcvthpment 
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concepts would receive very little support either from Congress or the user com- 
munity unless they could be shown to work. Thus NASA had to choose between 
purs . ~ : q  its own programs or "seeking development funding withcut having the 
backin of other agencies who [might] well utilize the emerging capability in 
time." f 
Previous chapters have enumerated case after case in which NASA asserted 
its organizational independence, in no case more so than its relations with the 
military. The history of NASA from its establishment to 1963 can be charted in 
terms of NASA's ability to design its programs, procure its hardwdre, and support 
its spacecraft without overt interference from the military. The t~ dnsfer of JPL 
and the von Braun team to NASA, the Webb-Gilpatric mc wandum of under- 
standing, President Kennedy's decision to assign the lunar mission to a civilian 
agency, and the Gemini agreement represent stages by which NASA asserted its 
determination to run the agency as its officials considered necessary. Not that re- 
lations between NASA and DOD can be easily categorized. Although chapter 8 
classifies them as support, coordination, and rivalry, some programs did not fit 
neatly into any category; others, like Gemini, tended to become joint programs 
over tame; while a program like MOL was in some ways competitive with Apollo, 
although the former relied ht-ivily on NASA technology and ground support. 
Nevertheless, without a strong assertion of independence, NASA would have be- 
come what the services anticipated on the eve of the Space Act-a research agency 
supporting military projects. 
The po!itical strategies of NASA management were fourfold: to maintain 
NASA's independent status as an R&D agency; to curb outside interference by 
advisory and coordinating groups; to seek the approval of Congree: for measures 
that :he agency was a h u t  to take; and to limit NASA's support for other agencies, 
the better to concentrate its resources on Gemini and Apollo. NASA's relations 
with DOD are an example of the first type of strategy; its conflicts with PSAC, 
the Ramse:~ committee, and the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board are exam- 
ples of the second; chapter 7 lists cases where NASA responded to the n.ood of 
Congress; while NASA's position on the supersonic t,ansport reflects Webb and 
Dryden's desire not to strain NASA's resources to the h i t .  In addition, Webb 
dismantled the headquarters office that prepared the NASA Long-Range Plan, 
precisely to avoid premature commitment to projects beyond Apllo. 
The account of NASA's relation with its advisory committees illustrates 
Webb's reasons for denying outside scientists the role they demanded. In rejecting 
the Ramsey comrnitteA proposal for a general advisory committee, he did so 
specifically because such a committee would have fettered his power to run the 
agency and to defend the President's budget. In NASA, the advisory process 
worked effectively in dccigning experimental payloads or selecting principal in- 
vest~gators. Within rather narrow limits, advisory groups could do even more; thus 
the Astronor y Missions Board, establist.? C. in November 1967, proposed what 
became the F igh Energy Astronomy Observatory and may have saved the Apollo 
Telescope Mount when NASA officials were serioii~!~ considering its cancel- 
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ation,%ut the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board and the Astronomy Missions 
; Board, the principal attempts to create parallel advisory bodies for "strategic" 
scientific planning, were short lived. There were other flaws in the advisory 
process: the overlapping of jurisdictiow, the lack of standard operating procrnure, 
and the infrequent meetings of such groups as the Space Science Board. ' i ~ t  it 
seems clear that the comparatively ineffective role of the missions boards owed 
something to management's reluctance to give their members the responsibilities 
they had come to expect. In general, then, NASA managenxnt was exceedingly 
wary of delegating authority to outside advisory grbups. 
As has been noted, NASA was remarkably dm~tralized for so large an 
agency. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that programs such as Apollo 
or the Orbiting Observatories could not have been managed without the delegation 
of authority to the centers and JPL: authority to negotiate contracts up to a 
specified amount, to transfer funds betwnn programs, to start new research tasks 
without seeking specific authorization, to shift manpower from one division to 
another, and so on. The strategy of senior rnandgement was to give the centers 
what they needed to get the job done but not so much that their work would lose 
its relevance to the agency's mission. During the 1960s the "research" and the 
"development" centers tended to become more like each other; centers repor?ing 
to one program office began to work for others; while those centers with a mixture 
of projects weathered the budget cuts at the end of the decade better than those 
with one or two large development programs that were phasing down. One of the 
most important byproducts of Apollo was the pressure it placed on the oMer 
centers to enter into development work, as with Langley's management of Lunar 
Orbiter, Lewis' of Centaur, and Ames' of Pioneer and Biosatellite. It was not so 
much a matter of pressure from headquarters as pressure from within the centers 
themselves that brought about this change. It should be added that many NACA 
engineers adjusted rapidly to the style of the new agency and rose to high positions 
within it: younger men like Edgar Cortright, Harold Finger, and George Low, as 
well as veterans like Abe Silverstein. One wonders if centers like Langley and 
Lewis really had much choice in taking on these programs. Had they remained 
research centers and nothing else, they would very likely have dwindled to insig- 
nificance. The centers had, so to speak, to latch onto the coattail; of Apollo. 
Several lessons may be derived from the history of NASA's efforts to delegate 
authority to the field installations. The first is the extent to which sumssful 
decentralizatior. hinged on the developnent of new management devices for tnon- 
itoring and control. The second is that reorganization in the field had to be 
matched by changes at headquarters. The third lesson is the most important of all. 
Decentralization is relative. In a large agency . . . there can be no such thirag as complete 
centralization or Cmntralization . . . top management that has pursued a policy of central- 
ization over the years may feel that minor relaxations of such a polic) constitute a conversion 
to dmntralizrtion. Conversely, an organization accustomed to liberal delegationsof authority 
and responsibility might view one or two decisions to withhold some further delegatioas a, 
a return to mtrali2;:ion. . . . 
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As more and more authority for a wide range of rerporuibilitier is decentralized to the ngim, 
the need for strong, centralized laming in-. This is particularly true in the mmage- 
ment of the Agency's rmurar. P 
Did NASA have this kind of centralized planning? George Mueller once 
summarized the relations between headquarters and at least some of the centers. 
One reason that the Manned Space Flight Centm are enthuaiaatic about the MSF or- 
ganization is that MSF haa delegated authority to the c m t m  to the gcatat  extent possible. 
Thc a n t m  have few "documented tvpe" conatrainta plaqd upon them, but the conatrainta 
b ,e been carefully choren m that I ;SF has good conttol.' 
This may have been adequate for Apollo, whose scope was such that Ceadquar- 
ters, while it could coordinate, inspect, and develop standards, could hardly man- 
age it directly. By 1968-1 969 the same centers-Marshall especially-were in the 
early phasrs of a withdrawal process brought on by cuts in manpower and funds. 
The problem of new roles and missions could be alleviated by the centers, but only 
in pan. Most of them were adaptable, and nearly all had gone through at least 
one reorganization in the late 1950s or early 19609, moving from aeronautics 
research to launch vehicle development, as at Lewis, or from development work 
on guided missiles to lunar ~ r t d  planetary probes, as at JPL. By 1969 another 
cycle of reorganization was under way, as facilities that were no lo~qer needed 
were closed, others were modified to accommodate new programs, .ihilc new 
facilities like the Lunar Receiving Laboratory at MSC were accomplished facts. 
Yet the more subtle changes in a center's mission could only occur gradually. And 
here, it seems, the failure of headquarters to draft a ccherent long-range plan left 
the centers at a serious disadvantage. The advancvd stud.ies and task-force reports 
of 1964-1969 were no substitute for a NASA-wide plan. The difficulties in 
planning were real enough? as PCSG and the members of its working groups 
found out. Thcre were too many planning groups, with little coordination among 
them; a lack of common interests among the centers; and the arti.6cial forcing of 
the planning process by the creation of the President's Space Task Group. Still, 
top management might hi .e done more to bring the proms to some visible result 
inside the agency. In particular, not enough was done to relate substantive pro- 
grams tc an institutional framework. 
NAS.2 throve during the prosperous early 1960s and survived the cutbacks 
of the late 1960s because of four elements within, or conferred upon, the or- 
ganization: administrative flexibility; the ability of senior manzyment to play the 
political game on the Hill, at the White House, and before the public at large; the 
decentralization of program management to the field; and the timeliness with 
which tLle important decisions were made. Whether the success of NASA in 
managing large-scale endeavors affords a precedent for future Manhattan 
Projects or Apollx is another matter. Apollo will aiways stand as a monument to 
the ability of hundreds of thousands of men and women in widely dispersed 
locations to accomplish a program of staggering magnitude. But to the extenr that 
4 
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Apollo serves as a model for future "wars on poverty" or "wars on cancer," the 
lessons of the program will have been learnt badly. Whatever can be said about 
the NASA organization, there were no mir;rculous shortcuts to success, neither 
PERT nor incentive contracts nor project management as such. The problems of 
education, of transportation, of revitalizing the inner cities are-as has k e n  said 
more than once-problems of kind rather than degree.They are also problems 
of value. In all three cases, technology may contribute to a solution, but it cannot 
of itself define the problem. The space program enjoyed a favorable political 
environment, few direct competitors, and no vested interests. In organizational 
terms, the success of NASA depended on turning all three to advantage. 
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Flight Rcuarch kn tc r ,  bnglcy, Lcwts, and the Elmrontrcl Rcuarch Center thrt NASA p r o p 4  for tht 
FY 1964 budge to OART. Kmncdy Spar Ccntcr. Manncd Spactctaft Cmter, and Manhall S p w  FI:;;ht 
Ccnw to OMSF For establrhmcnt d tht Lunch Operrt~ms Ccnta, lee Scamansrx~t lntcrvitw, pp. 51 -52 
Ibid., p. 100. 
" "Dr Samans stat& *L.ir ;rwp would met weekly to focus 11s attmtron on nunugcmtnt pdicna. 7-m 
a d  p r d u r a  In ord.. to insure :hat thc new q a n i u t l o n  works tfTmrvclv P r o p m  m t t m  would bc 
drruutd 111 d t h l  at tht monthly status mr tws " From minuta of firm Man.ycmmt Commrtta malng, 14 
Oa 1963 
'' R m d  on a nrmwandum from Wyatt to Edy r  M r t g h t ,  I)rputv A ~ l r r s t t  Admlntstrator ({BSA), "Pn- 
vntatron Formats. Avoclaw Adm~n~strator's Monthly Program Marngs." 9 nL ;965 
" l h i s  tr as good a placc as my to ran out and cxplatn tht varrous titles d hut,, m m  &cialr The hcadr 
of tht prqram 6 m  w m  "Dlrmon" from 1961 to 1961, when thcy bccamc "Auonatt Admrniuraton for 
- " Thc (Mfirc d l'rark~ng and D a t ~  Arqurs~t~on k r m c  a prqram &-t in ikcrmbtr 1965 Followtnm 
thr. 1963 rtorganlutron, thc hcads of the ofTim rtponlng to Wcbb (t g , Public AfTarrs. Lcg~slat~ve AfTarn. 
ORK;INqL PAGE 19 
OF PoOR QUALITY 
NOTES TO PAGES 46-54 
International Programs) became "Assistant Adminiatraton for,." Fdlowing the 1963 G n i z a t i o n ,  the 
heads d the dhcts reporting to Sumam (e.g., Industry Affairs, MM Affairs. Rog.mmiry, Administra- 
tion) kamc "Deputy hmiak Administraton." changed to "Agirwrt Administraton" in the 1%5 rroryri-  
zation. Althoyl~ it appears in early &tion charts, the dfia d "Associate Dcputy Admindrator" 
actually d a t a  from 1965, when it was created for Willis Shaply. Thc Asmiate Deputy Administrator had 
g m m l  ruponsibility for m m u l  affairs, aprcially l i  with Cmgms, thc Buruu of thc B*, and thc 
Department d Defense. OM d the noa confusiq titles was "Ikputy Anodrtc himhistrator." In 
1%2-1963 Ihm wcre two such &&, om lor "Manned Spacc F l i t  Centm." the othcr for "Ckhcr than 
Manned Space F l i t  Ccntm." The 1963 rrorgniution rep iad these with a w e  offkid who acted as 
Scamam' deputy. Thc Deputy hmciatc Administrator fram 1964 to 1966, Earl Hilburn, had a number of 
raporuibilitia for procurement, l i  with thc General Amounting (Wfice, a d  as all-purpose d e -  
shooter. Hilburn was d i m t ~  of two task farces that i n v d p t e d  the 1964 6 failure a d  thc relation 
~cen cow and schedule s l i p p a p  in major NASA pmgrmr. The p o r i t h  lapsed when tiilburn left NASA 
but was revived in the 1970s. 
See draft memorandum, I4 Nov. 1962, cnlar@ng the smpc of d Plans and -run Evaluation and 
giving its head special responsibility for evaluating eumnt programs. "In this rcgad I [Webb?] believe we 
should reconsider foqoing mision d the long rage plan for calendar year 1963 in order to apply maximum 
available effort to initiating the review and analysis outlined above." 
O n  13 March 1963 Webb wrote to Abe Hyatt, the office Director, that " t h m  is n.~ doubt that our short 
range planning needs increased emphasis, and at the same time should be given higher priority than updating 
the long range plan." In August Webb decided to disperse th- functions of the Ofice of Plam and Program 
Evaluation among other headquarters divisions, and Hyatt left at the m d  of October. 
\I Webb to James Elliott, Director of Management Analysis (Office of Administration), 7 July 1965. 
\.This and the following paragraph arc b a d  on several internal memorandums, especially one from James 
Elliott to members of the NASA Management Committee, 20 May 1964, and a briefing memorandum for the 
Administrator, 5 May 1965. 
'- T h e x  included policy statements (NPDs), ~ a n a ~ e m e n t  Instructions (NMIs), detailed handbooks (NHBs), 
statements of procurement procedures (NPCs), and temporary notice (NNs). Headquartcn Management 
Instructions (HQMIs) and delegations of authority (HMDs) wcre added later. 
Published as NPC 107. 
w According to Scamans, Webb "wanted to have a clear-cut outline of what every responsible prson'spb was 
and who they dealt with, and all this kind of thing-which is . . . a classical way of dealing with big organiza- 
tions . . . but it's somctlma hardcr to visualize what you do in given circumstance if there are only word-type 
pb descriptions." Seamans exit interview, p. 60. 
For origins of secretariat, see draft report of Adm. Rufus E. Rose (USN, Ret.), "Development and Establish- 
ment of the Executive Secretariat," 27 Jan. 1966. 
" The plan for a secretariat was outlined by Jack Young in "Plan for Keeping the Members of General 
Management More Fully Informed," 2 Oct. 1963, which was rwiscd by Seamans before being fowarded to 
Dryden and Webb. 
" lntervicw with Lawrence Vogel, Director, Headquartcn Administration, 13 Oct. 1976. 
43 There is a good description of the State Department secretariat in a "Report on Federal Secretariat Func- 
tions," prepared by NASA consultant J. S. Patterson and submitted 17 Aug. 1961. 
Source: Vogc', interview. It must bc stressed that Webb needed the secretariat to get on top of l n f n a l  in- 
formation and that he preferred pan-time consultants like Gen. Gmrge Cabell (USAF, Ret.) or Ambassador 
Joscph C. Satterthwrite as mntacts with other agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the State 
Department. 
" Memorandum from Webb to heads of all ~ e a d a u a & . s  Office and Dirmors of Field Centers, "Office of the 
Adm~,.istrator," 29 Dec. lY65. This mcmorandkn incorporated many of the changes recommended in "Thc 
Office of the Administrator: Evolving Concepts and Practim," prepared by Jack Young and staff in Dm. 1965. 
.d Minutn of the "Special Meting of the Deputy Administrator on Reorganization," 30 Dec. 1965. Seamans 
was appointed Deputy Administrator on an interim basis, since the Senate was not in scssion, and his 
appointment was routinely confirmed in Jan. 1966. 
47 See notr 45 above. Vogel was both executive officer and executive secretary. 
-This example is cited by Assistant to the Administrator, W. H. C l m ,  "The Secretariat," 17 May 1967. 
49 Scamans exit interview, p. 79. 
"Srr note 46 above 
" Br~cfing for Webb an Voyager program by Edgar Cortright, 8 Feb. 1967, :: R 2 ,  47. 
" lbid., pp. 82-83. 
"Webb to R m a n s ,  5 Jan 1967, and phb to Finger, 6 Jan 1967 
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Artmuttcs and Amnauhcs. lW7 (NASA SP-4008, 1968), p. 75. 
" N M I  1130.1, "Rok and Raponibiliticr-Thc Aoocirtc Adminimator for Orgn iu t ion  and Murymmt," 
14 Mu. 1968. !kt notc 1 abow. 
Y Truurripc d Murymrnt Adviwy Panel meting, I 9  Apr. 1968, pp. 41.4849. 
"Webb memorandum. 27 Jan. 196R. 
Newdl was not mrdc hpoci.tc Admininntor in antkiption d Seuaura' dcpucure; he w u  dacd the 
podtian Mom Smmm announced his intention to l a w .  Newdl to NASA Historian E w  Emrnc, 20 Scpt. 
1968. 
T.E. Jenkins (Dimtor, Program and Special Repom Division. Executive Secretariat) to Newell. "NASA 
Monthly S u t u  Reviews i n  support d the NASA Murymcat Council," 7 Jan. 1966. 
*This d k  w u  originally matcd by Webb to aublc Gen. W i l l i  M c K u  (USAF, Ra.) to wnr u r 
troubkrhootcr. and i t  rjnriicd d htk marc than an o t b  with II seoe-y. I t  w u  wound up ahor~ly after 
McKcc left NASA i n  1%5 to become the FAA Adminisrator. 
* ' N M I  1IM.15, 12 FA. 196% 
Thc firs quolarim is arrrplcd from Nevdl's memocandurn to Dimcon d Hcrdquutm P q r m  and Suf 
06m. 11 Mar. 1968; the m n d ,  f m n  a mmKvandum d 4? Nw. 1966, "Reyhr ly Scheduled Mc*inp 
Chaired or Attended by the Admininrrtw." Ncndl's 11 Mar. memorandum incaporr td the mummen- 
dations d an Ad Hoc G m p  on Project Statw Reviews that rrpwccd an 1 Mar. 
"T rmmip t  d M a n y m r n t  Advisory Pak I  Meeting, I 9  Apr. 1968, pp. 28.29. 
U 
,. 
On the pmblcm of communications within bureau. scc Downs. lnndr B u m c m c y ,  chap. 10. 
Gcn. Jamb E. Smart (USAF. Ru.) CI al.. "A Ph~lorophy of Managcmcnt tor NASA." 23 Junc 1%7, p. 1. 
lbid.. pp. 16-17. 
" Leonard R. Sayla and hfargam K Chandler, M a n a p g  Imrgc Systems: Orgntzattonsbr the Futun (New 
York. Harpcr & Row. 197!). p 173. Prof Sayles, of the Calumbia Univmity Graduate School of Bwincrt. 
was appointed a special assistant to WcM, in  Scpt. 1966 and was a "munscllor" to thc Management Advisory 
Pancl when it was crcatrd in 19&q Emphasis added. 
Y For thc inspcanr-gcncral tmnrcpt, scr memorandum fmm Charles G. Haynrs. Dimtor of lrupntions (Ollicc 
of Adm~nisrratton). 28 Junc 1966 Hc noted that the following hcadquaflcn of f im and divisions had 
inspcciron functtons: thc Inspeaion Division, thc Audit Division. and thc Division of Management Analysis 
and Rmarrh. all in  thc Offirc of Administration; thc Off ia of Pmgramming, and the Offia d Industry 
Amain. 
' Rcport of Steering Group for Study of NASA Acquisition Press, Managrmcnt Study ojS.4.W Acqucrttton 
hfi~.ru. Junc 1971. p. 6 
'NASA Sourcr Etu1uatto-i Board Manual (NPC 402, Aug. 1964). p. 2-1. 
' House Committee on Covcrnmcnt Operation*, Military Opcrations Submmm~tttc, ( h t n m m t  Procurs- 
mrnr nnd ( i~n~raclcn~. Part 2. 91st Cong., 1st m s  (25-27 Mar. 1969). p 505 
' l'cst~mony of David E. &II, Dimtor. Burcau of the Budgct. HCJK Committtc on Govcrnmcnt Operations, 
Military Opcrations Subrommiti~, Svstrms lkrdopmcnt and ~Uanagrment. 87th Cong.. 2d ~ s s .  (21 Junc 
1962). p. 44. 
' Houx Commlttcc on Scicnrc and Astronautin. Rrotcuj of the Spacr'hgram. 86th Cong., 2d m. (1960). 
p 400. 
' O n  these ~nstitutions. scr Dean Coddington and J. Cordon Milliken, "Thc Futurc of Federal Contrarc 
Kcsearch Ccntcrs." in  Thomas P. Murphy, cd., Sctrncr. Cmpoltttcs, and Federal Spndtng (Lexington, 
Mass. Hcath Lcxlngton Books, 1971), pp. 87-1 10. 
Wcbb to Drydcn and Scamans, 25 Oct. 1963. I n  congrcsaional testimony, John Young, the NASA Dtmtor 
of 4dministration. stated that i t  was NASA policy not to creak not-for-profit corporations See Houx 
Committtc on Govcrnmcnt Opcrations. Military Opcrat~ons Subcommittee, Systrms I)svelopmrnt and 
hlar~agrmrn~- IWJ. 88th Cong., 1st scss (1963) pp ?l4-2lS 
' :n 1966. for example, 6 pcmnt of RAND'S $22 million budge was for work dune under contract to NASA 
Armrd Form Managcmrnl (Fcb. 1966). p. 71. Many RAND rtudia wcrc mmmi~ioncd by OMSF and thc 
Apollo Program Offirc in  support of long-rangc and mntingcncy planning Thc cxtent of NASA's use of 
"nonprofits" may be gauged by thc fact that In 1964 RAND had contracts with NASA totaling $3.3 million. 
whilc MIT's Lincoln Laboratories had contracts totaltng over $7 mtllion. Astmnaultcr an ' Arrunaulccs. 1W. 
p. 435 
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ln tav im with Kenneth Webolcr, Oflice d h a h n t  hockate Administrator for Center Opmtionr (Syatanr 
M v t ) .  31 Aug. 1976. 
lo Wcbstcr interview. Scc also NHB 2410 1, Management Rvccdurcs)(or Aulmatu Dolo h c e s n n g  Equtp  
mmt, July 1965. The annual reports to the Bureau d the Budget on utilitirur d ADP quipmart  w m  
ei in the Bureau's Circular A-55. 15 Nw. 1%3. 
" Housc Committee M Sciam and Annwuutia, Subannmittee on .4dvmccd Rc+uctr and Tdnohgy, 1968 
NASA Aulhonzdcon. 90th Cong.. 1 s  rss. (1%7), pp. 567-568. 
I' In 1969 thefdlowing r m t m  w m  authaitrd to ngolhtccontraasup to $2.5 million: Amcr, Langly. h i s ,  
Goddud. the Manned S p a 4  and Marshdl centas, and thc Spra N u d m  RopuLim O f k .  Up to 
$1 million: Kennedy, the Headquartas Contracts Division. and thc NASA P w b  Ol5cc. Up to $500 000. 
the Flight R a u t h  Center and Wallops Station. 
'I NASA h r c e  Ewluafnn Board Manual, p. 4-1. 
'' Clwmcc Danhaf, C m r n c n f  Contmcttng and Techndopcul Change (Washington, D.C.: Thc B d i n g s  
Institution, 1968). p. 95. 
"Thii  p r a p a p h  is baxd on an article by Robert B. Hall. "The Armed h i c u  R o c u m e n t  Act d 1947 
Should Be Reformed," reprinted in H o w  Committec on Government Operations, Military Operations 
Subrommittce, C o m m r n l  Awuremmt and Confmcftng, Part 7 (22.2628 Mav 1969). pp. 201-2015. 
'' Ibid.. p. 2006. 
I' Robert L. P m y ,  "The Atlas, Thor, Titan, and Minuteman," in Eugene M. Ernmc, ed.. The Htstory oJ 
Rocket Technology. Essays on Research. Dnrloprnmr, and L'ftl~fy (Detroit: Wayne State University Pras, 
1964). p. 149. 
"This t u r d  out to k the ckx. It took the Thor only 3.5 years and the Atlas 5.2 years to go from pFogrnm 
approval to first operational squadron, instead of the 6-8 years first projected. By canparison, it took the B-47 
7.8 years and the 8-52 9.4 years to attain operational capability. Jchn Greenwood, "The Air F o m  Ballistic 
Missile and Spa- Program (1954-1974)," Amspace Htsfonan (Dcc 1974), 195. Qunle is from Michael H. 
Armamst, The Poltfrcs oj  Weapons Innovahon: The Thor-Juprter Confrouzrsy (New York: Columbia Univer- 
sity Pms,  1969), p. 157. 
Iq Amcos t ,  The Poltttcs of Weapons Innovatton, p. 157. 
In 1958 Ramo-Wooldridgc merged with Thornpaon Products to become TRW, Inc., while SpaceTechnology 
Laboratoria (STL), which had performed gmcral systmu engineering and technical direction for the Air 
Force, became a separate incorporated subsidiary. In 1960 the nonprofit Aerospace Corporation was atab- 
Iished with a nucleus of STL personnel to f m  TRW/STL to mmprtt for production mntracts. 
" Armacost. The Poltftcr oJ Weapons Innovatton, p. 153 
P Danhof, Coucrnmrnf Confracftng and Technologral Change, pp. 50-51. 
21 Joseph Fernandez, The Onpn,  Ewluftort, and Operafton oJthe NASA Contractor Source Eudluafton Board 
Awrrs, unpublished M.Sc. thais (Massachuwts Institute of Technology. June 1966), p. 11. Emphasis in 
orignal. 
" Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
" For an account of the 1959 "production of documents" controversy, see Rosholt, Adrntntsfraftur Htstory,. 
pp. 99-102. 
lbid.. p. 257. 
" See "Ofha of Pmcurcment: Organization and Funct~ons," July 1963. 
m H o u r  Committee on Government Operattons, Courrnrncnt Ffocurrmmt and Contracftng, Part 2, 
pp. 475-476. The justification for nonmmprtitivc procurement was signed by Webb in Dec. 1967. 
n H o w  Cammittee on Science and Astronautla, 1W NASA Authonmtron, 88th Cong., 1st uss. (1963), 
p 3020. 
a Amrding to the National Science Foundation, they supplied a %percent average aharc during fiscal vcam 
1960-1966 and 85 percent during 1967-1969. Artmnauftcs and Amnauftcs, 1968, p 333. 
" Published as Report to the Prestdenf on Cowrnrnmf C'ontrac~tnpji~r Research and Droclopment. S.Doc. 94, 
87th Cong., 2nd xaa., May 1962. This report, exapt for two bnc; .:missions, is rtprinted in its entirety in 
W. R. Nelson, ed., The Poltttcs oJSctrncr (New York: Oxford l!niversity P w ,  1968), pp. 193-220, from 
which the following cxarpts are c~tcd 
" Ibld., pp. 200, 201. 
" Ibid.. p. 216. For rccommcndations concerning RBD contracts, SCC pp. 209-210. 
For details of Salary Reform Act, scc Danhof, Gouemmenl Contracltng and Tcehnolo~cal Change, pp. 121 - 
122; for Kennedy's memorandum of 2 May 1963, rce H o u r  Committee on Government Operations, Syrfrms 
Dcoclopmenf and Managmrnl- lN3, pp. 271-281. 
"On t h e  and other d o r m s  in Defcnu management. scc testimony of Director of Defenx Rescarch and 
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Engineering Harold Brown, in H o u r  Committee on Govcmmcnt Operations, Systems Dnnlopmmt ond 
Monogtmmf, pp. 436440, and h i s t a n t  Sea*Pry of Defense (Installations and Logistie) Thomas D. 
Morris, in ibid., p. 551. 
Y Hwsc Cwnmittec on Science and Astronautia. 1W NASA Authonzofwn, p. 463. 
" Another catalyst for DOD and NASA r e f o m  was the publicatium in 1962 of Peck and S c h m r .  Wropons 
Acqtctstfron Process: An Economtc Analysts. This was one of the first a u d i a  to demonstrate the incffiaencies 
of CPFF mtracting. Peck and Schcm found an average cost production e m  of 220 percent in a sample 
of twelve CPFF programs. The study and its influma on NASA policy w m  d i d  in a memorandum 
from Assistant Administrator for Industry .4fiain h h a r d t  Dorman to Harold Finger dated '8 Dm. 1967. 
NASA Circular 231, 29 May 1962. Subject: Special Rocumnent Study Reprinted in 1W NASA Author- 
~zalton, pp. 1786-1787. 
BChar la  to Wcbb. 25 Feb. 1963. Subject: NASA Pmummnt .  This manorandurn summarizes Charla' 
56-page report. "Rccommcndations C o n m i n g  NASA Procurement Policia," submitted at the same time. 
Two other reports by Charles w m  "Conversion frnm CPFF to CPIF," 7 Aug. 1963, and "Cost Reduction 
Incentives in Research and Development Contracts," 23 Aug. 1963. 
a On Sept. 1962 circular, see Circular 242, 1 Sept. 1962. Subject: Use of lnrmtive Contracts. Reprinted in 
H o w  Committee on Science and Astmnautia, 1954 NASA Authonzafton, pp. 3009-301 1. For Nov. 1963 
dimivc,  see House Committee on Scicna and Astronautics, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., l a  sm. 
(1965), p. 387. 
" Webb to James E. Underwood, 27 Sept. 1966. Webb was also a member of the Commission on Government 
Procurement from March 1972 to the completion of its report the following k m b e r .  
" As justification for Elcctrcmia Research Center, nec NASA report, "Role and Mission of the NASA Electron- 
ics Research Center." in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1964 NASA Authonzofton, 
88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963), p. 1002. The entire report, at pp. 999-1009, is perhaps the most concise analysis 
of the rationale for maintaining a large in-house staff. 
43 Report ofthe Survey Task Tmm for Study of Major Systems Contracts (JPL: 10 Nov. 1965), p. 38. 
House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, 88th Cong., 2d sess. 
(executive session, 4 Mar. 1964), pp. 627, 626. 
" Tatimony of Deputy Associate Administrator (OSSA) Edgar Cortright in H o u r  Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, 1965 NASA Aufhonzafton, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (1964). pp. 1539-1540. 
a Third draft of a memorandum from Executive Serretary Lawrence Vogel to Deputy Associate Administrator 
for Industry Affain William Rieke, 2 Dec. 1965. Sub*: Administrator's Selmion of Contractors to Provide 
Support Servim. 
47 This section is based on the following sources. "DOD Contract Administration Services Support Task Croup 
Report," to George Muellcr, 5 Fcb. 1965; Paper, Clyde Bothmer, Offia of Industry Affairs, to Rieke, 30 July 
1965. Subject: The Future of Contract Administration in NASA; NASA, Office of the Executive Secretary 
(Program and Special Reports Division, 31 Oct. 1966), Procurement Program, pp. 32-33. 
* Seamans to Muellcr, 23 Sept. 1964. 
Memorandum, E. Z. Gray. Director, Advand Manned Missions, 7 Apr. 1965. Subject: Componrnt/System 
Interaction Problems 
Y) Statement of Webb in transcript of Senafe Heanng Dry Run (8 June 1967), p. 6. This was a rehearsal 
involving Webb, Muellcr, and Phillips for a hearing in cxrmtive session on the Apollo fire by tale Senate 
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Scienm. 
'' Sec note 48 above. 
'' Webb to Seamans, 20 Oct. 1964. This i s  the source for indented quotations below 
" Sources: Rough notes and staff papers of pint cost and schedules validation team at Marshall Space Flight 
Center, June-July 1963; interview with James Elltott, Office of Management Planning, 5 Oct. 1976. 
" Seamans to nien~bers of NASA Management Committee, 17 July 1964. Sub* Outline for Dirussion- 
Probable Contributing Factors to P r o m  Schedule Slippage. 
Ftrst and Second Infenm Reports to the A5soctafe Admtntsfrafor on Studtes Relaftng to Management 
EJe~ttveners tn Scheddtng and Cost Esttrnalmg, 15 Sept. 1964 and 15 Dec. 1964. The staff work underlying 
these reports was carried out by the Program Review, Resourm Analysis, and hlanagement Reports 
Divisions of the Office of Programmkg, with Thomas E. Jenklns as cwrdinator. 
" Flrsf Infmrn Report . . p. 26. 
" Sec ibid , pp. 27-28, for specific recommendations. 
Y Phased project planning was also used in studies for the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory (canceled in 
Dmmber 1965), the Hypersonic Ramjet Experiment, and the 445-newton-thrust engine for Surveyor, 
Voyager, and the Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory. Cited by Bernard Maggin, "Phased Projea 
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Planning," NASA Managanmt Seminar, 12 >an. 1966. 
"Senate Committee on Acronrutial a d  Space Scimcss, 1966 NASA AuthonzaliJn, 89th Cong., 1st sm. 
(1WS). p. 95. 
NPD 7121.1,28 Oa. 1965. Subjca: Phased Rojm Planning. 
*' Alain Enthovm md K. Wayue Smith, How Much is Encugh? Shplng  the DeJense Program, 1961- 1%9 
(Ncw York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 240. 
Report ojCommirrion on Cowtnmmt Awuronmt, vol. 2 (Dec. 1972), p. 100, n. 11. 
"For DOD policy on pro(lram definition, see DOD Dimtive 3200.9, 1 July 1965. Sub*: Initiation of 
Engineaing and Operational S y a t m .  
A pmonal service a.ltraa is one in which "an employa-nnployee relationship ktwcen the Government and 
contractor pcroonnel is provided for in the contract, or actual practice in this mpm lea& to that conclusion." 
The U.S. Comptmller General and the Civil S a v i a  Commirto~,  in decisions handed d u ~ s  in 1965 and 
1967, ruled such contracts invalid. A contract for nonpmonal m i m a  "contemplates the furnkhiig of a 
service as an end pmduct, rather than merely man-hours of effort. The CMLtractOr is actually independent, 
not merely a servant, employee or intamcdite a p t  of the Govcrnmmt." For t h a c  definitions, uc NASA 
Office of Programming, Pmgram Reports Division, A w u r m m t  Program (27 Oct. 1964), p. 27. 
'' H o w  Committee on Covernmcnt Opaations, Special Studia S u b m i t t e e ,  A Cost R u P e  /br Support 
Sewxces, 90th Cong., 2d M. (23 Apr. 1968), p. 7. This was one of a saiu of hearings held by subcommitter 
chairman Porter Hardy, Jr. (D-Va.) in 1967 and 1968 on NASA mtracting for support services. 
" T h e  guidelines are in section 3, "Criteria for Contracting Out," in NASA P o k y  and Awedures for Use 
ojConlrarls /or Nonpersoml h r c e s  (NPC 401, Apr. 1964), iuued after reviews by the General Amounting 
Office and the Civil Service Commission disclosed that the method uacd at Goddard in hiring technical wri tm 
and typists violated the Civil Service Act and the 1949 Classification Act. 
" The relevant guidelines are in the Bureau's Bulletin 60-2 (21 Scpt. 1959), which was superseded by Circular 
A-76 (3 Mar. 1966; revised, 30 Aug. 1967). 
GAO Report 5133394, "Potential Savings Available Through U r  of Civil Service Rather Than 
Contractor-Furnished Employea for M a i n  Support Services," June 1967. 
* Bernard Sisco, Deputy Assistant Director for Administration. Goddard Space Flight Center, to Carl Schrie- 
bcr, NASA Office of P r o c u m t ,  12 Nw. 1964. 
H o w  Committee on Government Operatiom, A Cost Projilejor Support Smccs ,  p. 6. 
7'  HOUX Committee on Government Opmtims.  Special Studiu Subcommittee, Support Smnce Contracts, 
90th Cong., l a  sm. (21 June 1967), p. 70. 
72 However, the OMSF m t m  were pmnitted to use Boeing for ''local support," for which the nmosary funds 
would be transferred to k i n g ' s  contract for the first stageof the Saturn V. Memorandum, Mueller to Paine, 
9 July 1969. Subject: Phaacdown of Bocing TIE Support . . . Followir?g the First Sucuasrul Lunar Landing 
Mission. 
7' Samuel Phillips to hlucller, 13 Dec. 1968. Subject: Future OMSF Engineering Rquirements. 
7' The discussion of the BeIlcomm, General Electric, and k i n g  TIE contracts is based on the following surccs: 
impeaion of pertinent file in Headquanm Contracting Office; interview with Alexander Lyman, NASA 
Office of Energy Affairs, 3 Dee. 1976; Apbllo Program Office, "Apollo Program Office Experirnce with 
Engineering Support Contractors," 15 Scpt. 1969; and Apollo Program Office, "Paper on the Bocing 
Technical Integration and Evaluation Contract . . . ," 1 Oct. 1968. 
7' "Apollo . . . Experience with Engineering Support Contractors," p. 11. 
"This quotation and the Gemini-Apollo comparison arc in ibid., p. A-2. 
77 k, for aampte, House Committee on Science and Astronautia, 1964 NASA Authonzatron, pp. 146, 
376-377. 1126-1 133 (Bcllcomm) and 389-390. 1102-1 107 (GE). 
78 Ibid., p. 1130. 
n H o u r  Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Awrdrng Conflrcts 14 
Interest In Dcjensc Contract~ng and Employment, 88th Cong., 1st SCSS. (22 Nov. 1963), pp. 81-83. Re- 
strictions on GE are in NASA Cirmlar 280, 16 Apr. 1963. Subject: Restrictions on contracting with the 
General Electric Company where competitive advantage may exist. Reprinted in House Committee on 
Science and Astronautia, 1964 NASA Authonzatton, pp. 3265-3266. 
"Paper on k i n g  TIE . . . ," p. 4. 
'I Ibid.. D. 8. 
lbid.; bp. 6-7. 
" On a visit to the Manned Spamraft h t e r  in August 1968, Finger explained "that one of the reasons for 
selecting k i n g  for the TIE contract was that North American Rockwell's interest In subcontracts with 
k i n g  for the SST made Bocing lua competitive with North American Rockwell than other large aerospace 
firms. [North American Av~ation has merged with Rockwell Standard in September 1967 ] Therefore, Bocing 
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w u  in a better position to step in to m a q c  the Downcy plant if such a drastic mururc had been nmrtPry 
to get the Apollo s p a m a l t  program brek on its frec after the Apollo 204 accident." Lawrcnce Vogcl, 
memorandum for the record. "Mr. Finger's Visit to MSC to Review k i n g  T I E  Activities. 20 Aug. 1968." 
8 Nm. 1968, p. 7. 
See "Paper on Bocing TIE . . . ," passim. 
85 Lawrence Vogcl, memMndum for the d, 8 Nov. 1968. Emphasia added. 
Astwnaulics and Aeronautus. 1971. pp. 41-42. 
87 This is the chaw made by H. L. N i c b q .  "The so-called 'supporting rolc'of Bellcomm as a decidan-nuking 
input may rather k a determining influma in the policy choices of NASA otliaals. . . . That this p m o ~ ~ ~  
is at work was rcvcaled in the most important NASA technical decision: selection of the mode of flight for 
the manned lunar landing." H. L. Nicburg, I n  thr Name offirnce, rcv.iscd ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1970), p. 261. 
Courtney J. Brooks, Jam- M. Grimwood, Loyd S w m n ,  Jr., Chanotsjw Apollo (Comment draft, Aug. 
1976). p. 137. 
m Lyman interview and memorandum, Webb to Mueller, 26 Sept. 1967. Subject: Procurement Plan for a 
Continuation of System Analysis, Study, Planning and Technical Support Performed by Bellcomm, Inc. 
under Contract NASW-417. 
"Apollo . . . Experience with Engnming Contractors,'' p. 1. 
*' Bmoks et al., Chanots /or Apollo, p. 152 and n. 
92 Oilruth to Mueller, 9 Jan. 1969. See also lettm from von Braun, 21 Jan., and Kurt Debus, 14 Jan. 
93 House Committee on Government Operations, Special Studip Subcommittee, Inucsttgdton oJ the B w n g -  
TIE Contract-Part I ,  90th Cong., 2d ras. (15 July 1968), pp. 3,6,8. 
" When the Panel on Government Laboratories of the Resident's Science Advisory Cammittee visited MSC 
in 1964, they could not "help contrasting the atmosphere in which NASA's Manned Spaaaaft  Center 
operate with that of the Air Force's Avionics Laboratory. While competent profusionals populate h h ,  the 
m s e  of mission in MSC is infinitely stronger. . . . Unlike some of the lgardcs pwiously truted, NASA has 
a strong line management organization for its technical effort. The NASA organization, furthermore, is 
relatively new and does not exhibit yet the 'aging' e%cts o b m e d  in older organizations." Report ojPanel 
on Gowrnmrnt Loboratones ofthe Prendcnt's Snence Adotsory Commtttee (Jan. 1965), pp. 11, 21. 
95 Mmon J. Peck and Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acgulntton Process: An Economrc Analyns (Boston: 
Division of Rerearch, Graduate School of Busineu Administration, Haward University, 1962), pp. 56-57. 
W Webb to Frank R. Hammill, Jr (Counsel, House Committee on Science and Astronautics), 5 Apr. 1965. 
97 Thomas F. Murphy, Snrnce, Gmpohttcs, and Fderal Spmdtng, table 6-14, pp. 183-185 and 182, 186. 
98 
"Statement of the Administrator of NASA on Selection ol a Contractor for the Saturn Stage S-11," 15 Sept. 
1961, and covering Inter from Webb to Seamans, 16 Oct. 1961. 
*) Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acqwsttton Process, p. 331, n. 13. 
Irn Fernandrr, O n p n  . . . ofthe NASA . . . Source Eualwtton Board Process, pp. 15,23. It would seem that the 
high m t  barrim to entry into mapr systems development have given certain firms a lock on such programs. 
DOD figures on contract awards show that eighteen of twenty-five contractors in 1958 w m  still in the top 
bracket in 1969. Report ojCommrsnon on Cioucmmrnt Ltocuremrnt (Dec. 1972), 2:124, n. 20. NASA figurn 
are more dificult to interpret because the ability d a contrartor to remain in the top bracket year after year 
might owe l a  to its ability to compete for new contracts than for payments on mapr contracts already 
awarded, e.g., the Grumman contract for the lunar module. See NASA Data Book, tables 5-22 to 5-27. 
lo' Wyatt to Hilburn, 15 June 1964. Subject: Source Evaluation Boards, Draft Manual of Procedures, Com- 
ments The examples of overruns and slippages noted above are excerpted from this memorandum. 
102 This was one of the reasons for awarding RCA a contract for operating and maintaining two new tracking 
facilitie NASA wanted to write in a ceiling on overhead, the amount of the fixed fee, and the like; and RCA's 
respase to thcse special provisions was the most satisfactory mxived. "Selection of Contractor for Operation, 
Maintenance, and Logistic Support of the New Data Acquisition Facilitia near Fairbanks, Alaska and 
Rosman, North Carolina," 27 June 1963. 
lo' Peek and Schaer, Weapons Acqutntton h e s 1 ,  p. 377. 
'" Eraunus H. Kloman, "Case Study to the Lunar Orbiter Program," draft submitted to National Academy of 
Public Administration (June 1971), pp. 41-42, 70. One of the principal rclmns for awarding North 
American Aviation rather than the Manin Company the Apollo command and service module contract- 
although the SEB had given the latter a higher overall rating-was because of its outstanding performance 
in developing the X-15, F-86, and F-100. For e x m p u  from the SEB report, ace B m k s  et al., Chanotsfor 
Apollo, pp. 71 -72 
'* Eldon Taylor (Dimtor, Program Rev~ew and R a o u r m  Management, OSSA) to Bernard Moritz (Acting 
Associate Administrator for Organization and Management), 20 May 1969. 
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IU Finger to Phillip Whittaker (Assistant Administrator for Industry Affain), 28 Jan. 1969. 
tm Herbm Kaufman. The L m ~ f s  ojOrganizatronaf Change (University of Alabama Rar, 1971), pp. 33,35. 
la t~ocuremrnt Pmgmm (31 Oa. 1966), p. a. 
10) Management of NASA Study of N A S A  Acpuis~tron Process, p. 25. 
"O Edward B. Roberts, "How the U.S. Buys Research," in David Allison, ed., The R t D  Came (Cambridge, 
M a u . ~ M l ~  Pres, 1569), pp. 292,294. See same author's "Questioning the Cwt/Effcctivmess of the RBD 
Procurement Rorrrs," in M.C. Yovits et al., eds. Research Pmgmm Effectrvmess (New York: Gordon and 
Bmch, 1966), pp. 93-1 13, which was b a d  on research supported by NASA Grant No. NaNSG 235-62. 
"I R h ,  "How the US. Buys Research," p. 289. In a study of forty-one Defense contracts, ranging from 
$100 000 to $8 million, and ten non-DOD (NASA?) awards, from $1 million to $40 million, Robms found 
that "about 60 prmnt  of the R B D  awards w m  made on a role-aoum basis-withoutj%nnal competition." 
Ibid., p. 284. 
I I ~  Management Study oJ N A S A  Acgutrct~on h ~ e r s ,  p. 6. 
la' Memorandum, Dorman to Fingr,  18 Dec. 1967, and Ifncurrmrnt Program (31 Oct. 1966), p. 17. In FY 
1966, ninety-two incentive contracts, totaling $4.3 billion, wcre cost-plus-inanti~~c-fec; fiftyone ($447 mil- 
lion) were award fee; thirty-two ($222 million) wcre fixed-price incentives; and d t tcn  ($306 million) were 
mixed. 
111 Mucller said this at an cxcrutive session of an OMSF program review, 20 Apr. 1965. Transcript, p. 10. 
"' Dwman to Fingcr, 18 Dec. 1967. 
"* Muellcr to Morton Henig (Assistant D i a o r ,  Civil Division, GAO), 23 May 1968. 
"'See nMC 114 above, p. 10. 
I" Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., Study ojthe Effect~vcness oJ NASA lncent~wc Contracts, vol. 1. This study 
was done under NASA contract NASw-1277. The final report, on which the remainder of this section is 
b a d ,  was submitted on 5 Aug. 1966; a summary report was submitted on 15 Sept. 
'Iv The mntracts (and the prime contractors) were as follows: Pioneer spacmaft. Orbiting Geophysical Obser- 
vatories, and Folluw-on Orbiting Geophysical Observatoria (TRW Systems Group); Gemini spacecraft 
(McDonnell Aimaft); biosatellite spancraft (General Electric, Re-entry Systems Dcpanmmt); Orbiting 
Astronomical Obscrvatoria (Grumman); Delta vehicles (Douglas Aircraft); Lunar Orbiter spamraft (Boe- 
ing); instrumentation units and prototype guidance computer and data adapters (IBM Federal Systems 
Division); ST-124M stabilized platform (Bendix Corporation); crawler transporter for launch complex 39, 
KSC (Marion Power Shovel Company); Manned Spaceflight Tracking Network operation and maintenance 
(Bendix Field Engineering Corporation); base support services for KSC launch complex (Trans-World 
Airlina); support services for MSG (Brown & Root/Northrup). 
I" Summary Report, pp. 2-3. 
"I Study of the Effectlweness oJ NASA Incentrue Contracts, p. 51. 
"' Pwcurement Program (31 Oa. 1966), p. 20. 
"' Study oJthe Efftcfrwenesr oj  NASA Incentrue Contracts, p. 72. 
la' Sapolsky has noted the same mntradiction in the development of weapons systems. "Unlike cost-pius 
contraas, the targets and their ranking in incentive contracts are s u p p d l y  fixed for the length of the 
contract and, thus, can reflect only the conditions that exist at the beginning of the development effort or that 
can be thei~ articipated. . . . Yet, unpredictable changes in political conditions affecting mapr weapon 
aquisitions seem to q u i r e  constant alterations in project targets and their rankings. . . . It m s  unrealistic 
to expect the development and procurement targeuof major weapon systems . . will remain fixed." Harvey 
Sapolsky, The Polans System Dewelopment, p. 214. 
12% Study o j lhr  Effectrueness oJ NASA Incentwe Contracls, pp. 80-94. 
I From 57 500 at the end of June 1961 to 115 500 one year later and to 218 000 one year after that. NASA 
Do& Book. table 3-26. 
'This is the figure given by Seamans for the third quarter (Jan.-Mar.) of FY 1966. House Scima and 
Astronautics Committn, 1968 NASA Authonzatron, 90th Cong., 1st s ~ .  (1967), p. 11 1. 
' NASA Pmonncl Division. Personnel b o l s ~ o n  Report. The In-House Work Force, Sept. 1969, p. 3. All figurn 
arc as of 30 Junc. The employment figures are divided between contractor and in-house employes as follows 
1966,360 000 contractor and 36 000 in-hour, 1967,273 000 and 34 000; 1968,235 000 and 33 000; 1969, 
186 000 and 32 000 The 11-percent decline in the NASA work lorn from 1966 to 1969 conceals the 
variations between one ccntcr and another in pcnonnel reductions 
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' NPD 1240.1, "Functional Managemc-!." I 3  June 1966. 
' Memorandum, Ray Klinc to membcra of NASA Pmonncl Manrgcmcnt Review Committcc, 21 Feb. 1968, 
'Conrolidation of Cornmenla on Items in  the Civil Service Inspections Report." p. 2. Thcn cdmmmts w m  
omitted in the Committcc prcgma report of Apr. 1963. 
'The remainder of this and the wholc of the next paragraph are b a d  on a paper by Lcnnard Carulli, 
mnagmtnt  analyst in thc Organization and Management Planning Division. "Estahlishing and Filling 
Excepted and Super-Grade or Key Positions," 5 May 1967. The quotation immcdiatcly below is fmm p. 4. 
' Ibid., p. 6. Adams is Mac Adams, who rumcded Raymond BitplinghofT as W i a t e  Administrator for 
Advand  Research and Technology in  1965. Holma is Brained Holmcs, D i m o r  of Manned Space Flight 
from 1961 to 1963. Harry Coat was fired as D i m o r  of Coddard in  July 1965 in the wake of diagmmcnt 
with general management ovcr the proper amount of supervision of the center by headquarters. Coctt thought 
that there was too much suprvision. i f  not downright intcrfmnce; Alsoriate Administrator for Sparr Science 
Newcll and Scamans, that in the existing external climate they muld do no less. 
'This section draws cxtensivcly on the note and memorandums aucmblcd by Howard N. Braithwaitc, staff 
assistant to the NASA Execut~ve Salary Committe from 1958 to 1967. Two items wcrc particularly useful. 
"A Summary of Mapr  kvclopments . . . ," Jan. 196'1 (c i td  as "Summary"), and a papcr a d d 4  to 
Associate Deputy Administrator Willis Shaplcy, 23 Apr. 1968, titlcd "Histor) of Supcr-Cradc Positions. 
NACA/NASAV (citrd as "Supcr-Gradc Positions"). I would also like to thank Bill k, of thc NASA 
Penonncl Oftirr, for making less mysterious the intricac~es of NASA's use of cxwptcd positions. 
' Braithwaite, "Super-Grade Positions," p. 4. "P-8," on the old civil wrvirr professional scale, was quivalent 
to CS-I 5 on thc new "gcneral whcdulc." 
'" Ibid., pp. 4, 3. l ta l ia and invcrtd mmmas om~ttcd. 
'I Victor K. Heyman. "Government by Cantract: Boon or Boner?" hb l rc  Admrnrslmlron Rrtwul21 (Spring 
1961) 63. 
I' Ibid. 
"Thew wcrc thc positions from gradc CS-16 and abovc that r c r t  aauallyjillrd, rathcr than sirn~ly authorized. 
There were 341 nonquota GS-16 positions, 355 exwptcd positions (out of 425), and 11 Put Law 313 
positions for a total of 707 positions filled. One important point is that al l nonquota positions were filled at 
the CS-16 Iwel. As a matter of pol~cy, NASA uscd its allo~mcnt of cxrrptcd positions to appoint at grades 
GS-17 and CS-18 in order to avoid having to justify such appolntmcnts to thc Civil Scrvice Cammrsnon. 
" Braithwaitc, "Summary," p VII .  
" Braithwaitc, "P-ing of Actions lor Exwpted and CS-16/18 Positions," 15 Nov 1963. p. I. 
I' Braithwaite, "Executive Personnel Program," p. 46. 
I' Braithwaitc. "Summary." p. I V  
I' Memorandum from John W Macy. Jr . Chairman. U.S. Civil Srrviw Commission. I 4  0h. 1966, to hcadr 
of cxmrtivc departments and agencies. 
'* Macy to Wcbb, 29 Aug. 1966 
" Braithwaitc memorandum. 22 Feb. 1968. p 10. 
" Comparisons of employment f igum for difTerent agencies art notoriously difficult k a u v  of thc lack of 
uniform definitions of mupatinnal groups. For what they arc worth. the data rollmcd by thc National Science 
Foundatlon (NSF) show that in 1969 the 7 Fcdcral agencies employing the grratest number of sricntists and 
enginen were iK)D (76 026), Agriculture (25 783), Interior ( I  5 34O), NASA (13 918). Commem (6 293), 
Health, Education, and Wclfart (6 123). and Transportation (5 049). Thus NASA employed more sclcntists 
and c n ~ i n c m  than all but thrrc Fcdcral agencies, and thcv t h m  had murh greater total employmmt than 
NASA. Sou-. Natlonal Sclence Foundatlon, P-tmIrJic, Trrhntcal and f l r a l~h  Prrsonnrl In thr Frdrml 
Chmnnrnl. lW9 (NSF 70-44), table 6. Evcn mow remarkable i s  that the pcrrrntagc of NASA scientists and 
and enginccn actually rngagrd In RbD has brrn rons~stcntly higher than that of any othcr C~vernmcnt 
agency. The data d m c d  by NSF at two-year ~ntcrvals from Ortobcr 1967 to Otlobcr 1973 show that thc 
pcrrcntagc of NASA wrcntlrts and rngincm in RBD has ran~cd from a low of 51 7% In 1967 to a hlgh of 
53.3% in 1973 By rompartson. the f igum in those years for DHEW and Doll, with the next highnt pcr- 
rrntaga w m  XIHEW. 45.9% and 44 5%; and IXID, 33% and 33.8%. Figum for other agenoes arc much 
lowcr. 1 am indebtcd to Jorcph Gannon of the NSF Manpowcr Utlliution Studies Group for this ~nformation 
"This definition is ~ncludcd as part d NASA's reply to a scrim of questions submitted by Senator Gaylord 
Nelson (D-Wis.), rhainnan of the Subrammittcc on Employmt  and Manpower, Committe on Labor and 
Public Welfare. NASA alvmblcd a number d ppmmnd tables and titled themllmion Rrply lo Sm. Govlord 
Nrlson (1965). Thir definition IS trkcn from thc Rrplv. p. 12-1 
" Raholt. Admrnrslralrtv Hrs~ory. p 267. 
" Ibld, pp. 267-2611 
"Reply lo Srn (&lord ,Vrlrun, p 12-3, whlch 1s b a d  on thc same rourrr as that for table 3 
Ibid, p. 12-6. The last fyrrc is an atimate from budget pjcaiona for FY 1966. 
Exrmtiw Ordcr 11246, "Equal Employment Opportunity," p. 1. 
US. Senate, Committee on Appropriationr, S u b m i t k r  on KUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Certain 
Other ln&pendmt Agencies-Part I ,  93rd Cong., 2d mr. (1974), pp. 108-109. See pp. 1-156 for a gma i l  
miew d NASA policy on EEO. The remainder of this paragraph and the whole d the next arc bud on 
material submitted at thew hurings. 
nSec Adm. W. Fred Boom (USN, Ru.), NASA Ofice oj Drjrnse Affairs: The First Fiw Ytars (NASA 
HHR-32, Dee. 1970), pp. 42-60, for m amount of NASA's IUC of military dctailea. See aIw FApr E 
Ulrmcr, "USAF Rolcnionaliun-A National Raoura," Air Fwcc Magazhe (Dee. 1967): 101-106. Re- 
tired military &am who have worked for NASA include Adm. Boone, Lieut. Gen. Frank Bogart (USAF), 
who w u  Deputy Amxiate Administrator (OMSF) More beooming hmch te  Dimtor d MSC; Maj. Gm. 
Robert Curtin (USAF), who bmme the fim Di- d Facilitia in May 1968; and Lieut. Gm. Duward 
Crow (USAF), who was appointed Amciatc Deputy Admini~ator of NASA in 1975. 
'P NASA Lhta Book, tabk 3-6. 
" Boonc, NASA Om o/ Drjense Afirrs, p. 55. 
For information on astronaut selection, ra note 28 above, pp. 122-131. 
11 Memorandum for the record. 5 Feb. 1968. Subject: Trip by [Pcrronnel Management Review Colnmittee] to 
Lewu Racorch Center on January 26, 1968. Memorandum w u  written by Ray Kline, executive secretary 
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to the Committee. 
For material on patterns of support service contracting at the Manned Space Flight centm, ICC Office of 
Programming (Program Reports Division), Itonrremmt Aogram, 27 Oct. 1964, pp. 21-23. 
" Howe Government Operations Committee, Military Af i in  Subcommittee. Munle  and Space Ground S u p  
port Oprrotions, 89th Cong., 2d a. (21 M u .  1966), p. 63. 
Webb to Kermit Gordon, Dimor ,  Bumu of the Budget, 14 Dec. 1964. 
" Annual Report ojthe Comp~wller General of the Unrled Sh(crbr Fucal Year 1964 (Washington: USGPO, 
1364), p. 19. 
Interview with Walter Shupc, Dimtor, GAO Liahn Activities, 6 Dee. 1976. 
" J o q h  P. Harris, Conpssional Control oj .4dminirtration (Washington, D.C.: The Bmokings Institution, 
1964), p. 141. Emphasis added. 
H w c  Committee on Government Operatiom, Military Affairs Subannmittee, Cowrnmenl Oprralrons In 
Space. 89th Cong.. In  rar. (4 June 1965). p. 14. 
Annual Report ojthr Comptwller General . . . 1W, pp. 291-292,436. In Aug. 1971 the Ratt & Whitny 
Division of United Aimaft Corporation filed a formal pmca with the GAO against the award d the contract 
for the main engine of the space shuttle to the Rocketdyne Division of No;ch Amcriun Rockwell. Astronautics 
and Amnautrcs, 1971 (NASA SP-4016, 1972), pp. 218, 233. 
Thac  reports arc drawn fran the lists of audit report# published in the annual reports d ihe US. Comptroller 
General. 
4 1  In a memorandum of I Apr. 1966, Deputy Auociate Administrator Earl Hilburn tmta that "a high pet. 
cmcy  of the GAO draft reports have bcm uncclled (dropped) becaw of NASA's replia. Recent exampla 
arc the QK with respect to the Douglas fee on subcontracton' wak in awuKction with the Delta, the Nerva 
ace duling with the contracting arrangcmcnt k t w m  Westinghouse ud Amjet, and weral cam involving 
rruocublrnar d COW at contractor's operations (LTV, Roeketdync,Douglas, ac.)." 
Of6a d the Executive Semury (Progrm and Special Reports Division), A u l l  A P p m ,  31 Oct. 1966, 
pp. 15-16. 
4' Tranvrip d taped meeting of Webb, Seunuu, and all thc center dimton, 28 Sqn. 1966, p. 35. Stub, of 
anuw, had recently left the Bumu d the Budget, of which he was Deputy Diwor ,  to head the GAO. 
"Coru idaa t i~  in the M l n y m r n t  of Manpower in NASA," p. 1. 
"On the "Marshall problem," see ibid., pp. 3-4. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
ol Ibid., p. 13. Sec waion on "Aligning Manpower and Program Rquimnmts," pp. 13-20. 
* Ibid., p. 15. 
" Ibid., p. 18. 
" U.S. Comptroller General, "Report on Potential Saving Avrilrble Through Uw d Civil Service Rather Than 
Cantracta-Furnished Employees fa &ruin Suppal Smim, Natiohll Aemnrutia and S p a  Adminis- 
tration," June 1%7, Codc B-133394. This repon was submitted to Congeu, md +a w m  m t  to Webb. 
F a  figum ,a Marrhrll and C;oddud contra&, wc tabla, pp. 9,23. 
\ $  lhid , p. 34. 
Arwlron Wrrk and Spcc. Trchnology (XI OR 1967), p. 20. 
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"For NASA raponv to the CAO repon and the Pcllmi decision, m H o w  Committee on Seima and 
r5l1ronrutia, Subawnmittcc on NASA Owmifit, Suppwt Smn'ce Gmtmcling by the N u i d  Amnaulus 
and Space Adminbr~lion, 90th Cary., 2d a., (Apr. 1968), pp. 5,7%, 19,23-25. 
"NASA News Relaw, "NASA Contraaor Convcnion Plan," 27 Dec. 1968. 
" Annual Report ojthc Comptmllcr Gmeml . . . 1N9, pp. 146-148. For fhrnga at Manhall, ace bricfing by 
von Braun for the Admininrator's Management Advirory Pancl, 1 1  ? Apr. 1969, pp. 14-1 5. 
For 1%2 review, ace Rahdt ,  Administmtiw H i s b y ,  pp. 268-269. 
" From m e r  letter, Mary to Webb, 10 Oa. 1967. 
MrnKKlndum for the by Ray Klinc, "Dircuuion d Pnronncl Management Review Committee with 
Mr. Webb on January 8, 1968," 9 Jan. 1968. 
NASA PrnOnncl Division, Personnel Lhuision Report: The In-Howe Work Force, Scpt. 1969, pp. 52-55. A 
"high" or "low" rare was one highs or lower than the NASA-wide percentage. In FY 1969, Langlcy had the 
lowcat arcuion and the lowed separation rates in NASA. 
'I NMI 1152.26, acc. 3. 
.I Pmdnncl Management Rcvim Committee, Aogrers Report, Apr. 1968, p. 23. 
lbid., p. 2. 
6% For thac  mmmendationa. uc ibid.. w. 19. 22. 15. 3. ,. . . . 
." Ibid., p. 2. 
"' James E. Webb. "NASA Aa An Adaptive Organization," John Diebold h u r t  on Technological Change, 
Harvard Uniwnity Graduate School of Businas Adminiatration (Boston: 30 Scpt. 1968), pp. 47-48. 
Y Briefing by vnn Braun for Management Adviwry Panel, p. 8. 
" "Considerations in the Management of Manpower in NASA," p. 4. 
m Vrm Braun briefing, pp. 8-1 1. 
'' Pcmnncl Management Rrvim Committee, Aogress Report, p. 21. 
" The average age of prnnrnmt cmployrcr had rim to 41, up 1.6 years a i m  1958. The grutcat net ION had 
been for t h m  undcr age 25. NASA O R c c  of Penonnci, The In-House Work Force, Sg. 1970, pp. 20-21. 
11 Paine to Mayo, 18 Aug. 1969, pp. 2-3. 
" h i d .  
" Finger to Auiatant Administrator for Adminiatration William Lilly, 25 Scpt. 1968. 
"Set m e  73 above. 
71 MSC, "Background . . . d the Reduction-in-Fora at the Manned Spaoecfalt Cents  during FY 68 . . . ," 
(n d.). p p  5-6. 
n See note 33 above. 
n Paper In film of Pmonnel M a ~ g c m c n t  Rcvim Committee, hacd on disc&on by Sumans with the 
Cm raittcc. 18 Jan. 1968. 
"' .Lkima11~ Exit Interview, p. 51. 
'I Memot rndum for the r d  by Ray Kline, "Dircuuion with OSSA 1 :.,J M a n a v m t  on January 29,1968," 
MJm. 1968. 
' Webb to Chef Hdihdd (D-Calif.), 20 May 1964. 
'Joint DOT-NASA Report. Ciml Amatton Research and DrwrOpmrnt P o l q  Study (Mar. 1971), pp. 2- 
5/24 M i a  omitted. 
' NASA H a d g u a n m  M a n y m m t  Saninar, Unit 11, "The Planning and Approval Pramu" (Nw. 1964). 
p. 5. 
'"Report on Excged  Poritiocu in the ORa d Ragamning," 12 M u .  1965. 
' Exit intmiew with DeMarquia Wyatt, canduaed by Erync Emmc. John Skmp, and Willum Fkming, 
21 Junc 1973, p. 97. 
'This paragraph a d  the m t  arc hrd on a memorandum from Fkmiry to Summna, I I Sepr. 1964. 
' "Scafl Paper on Ropowd Space Scirna Dau C m t a  Conap," 8 Ncw. IW5. 
' Se8man1 to Ncwdl, I5 Nw. 1W5. 
* Raymond A. bucr and R i  F. M q a .  NASA Pfann~ng and D r a w n  Mahng-Anal Report (typrcrip 
oontrvta report, Jan. 1970), d. I, p. 111-12. On the probknu involved in sniping the Saturn IB/Centaur 
to either Lewis or Marshall, rc draft d u r n ,  Scrmuu to Mucllcr, N w d l ,  a d  Buplinghdl. '‘Gun- 
s i d m t h  Conclrniry M u r y m r n t  d Saturn lB/Cmuur," 2 Feb. IW5. 
'' Samrnr  to Pmgun Annciate MrninistraIora, "Sekction d C o n ~ o n  for Advancd Studia," 24 Oa. 1%3. 
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l 1  Thc varied nature d there studia should be s t m a d .  A study might k exploratory, which rystematically 
analyzes an idea for a new prugram or system; it might k m examination d Jdbil i ty to dacrminc 'WK 
practicability of ammplishing, within a a p c i M  period, a given a p a  project, program or majot oarfponcnt"; 
it might be pommrfnc, a study of tradcolTa between thc dilTcrcnt elements d a FFogam; it myht bc r 
preltminaty drstgn study, which n u k a  detailed uwrumnts d the urumptioru undalyily u r l i a  rtudy 
phawr; or it might k a &ratled rnplnemng den@, in which thc da&n cwld k apceified to thc point where 
it waa posriblc to let contracts IN hardware produnion. Citation is from thc ORa d Plans and Pmgram 
Evaluation, "Rwicw of NASA's A d v a n d  Study Pmgram," Oct. 1963, p. 7. 
" NASA Data B w k .  tablc 4-23. See alm a staff paper, "NASA Advanced Studia Midon," I May 1963. 
I > For funhcr pidclina, m Scramma to Pmgram Auaiatc Administrators, "Award d Cantram for A d v a d  
Systems and Miuion Studia," 14 Apr. 1966. 
" lntcrvicw with William Flerning, 8 Fcb. 1977. 
"Transcript of tape, "Meting with Mr. Webb on Budget Dirmuion, 1 l Aug. 1967, pp. 28-29. 
I' b u c r  and Mcycr, NASA Planntng and Dcnnon Maktng, vol. 1, pp. 111-31/32. 
I' At a staff mming in the summcr d 1967, Auaiate Deputy Administrator Willia Shaply mnounccd that 
"Dr. Seamans has authorized a mapr inhouse study on the s p r c  station concept. OSSA wants this study and 
considers such a natir.11 as NASA's most important potential contribution. This view ia nol oh8re.d by otherp." 
From nnla oi functional ualT mrrtil~g taken by NASA Exmtivc ORm L a w m e  A. V w l ,  20 July 1967. 
" Thin account is b a d  on Adm. W. Fred Pmnc (USN, Rn.), NASA Ofke oJDrJrnse Afitrs (NASA HHR-32, 
Dm. 1970). pp. 86-96, and HOUK COmmittu on Gwcrnmmt Operatiom Committn, Military A h i n  
Subcummittec, G -rmrnmt O@ratton~ In Spocr, 891h Cow., 1st uu. (4 J u m  1965), pp. 84-91. 
'* Gowrnrnmt Oprrartonr tn Spocr, p 90. 
an BaMc, NASA Oficc oJ Lkjrnsc Affatrr , p. 88. 
" Ibid., p. 92. 
Courrnmm~ Of~rmltonr tn Spore, p 90 
" O+Kcc d Plans and Program Evaluation, "Rcvicw of NASA's A d v m d  Siudy Proflam," Oct. 1963, pp. 3, 
13. 
" h m m s  to Pmgram Auociatc Adminirtraton. "Guidelines for FY 1965 Contraa Advand Miuion Study 
Program." 12 Oa. 1964. 
" Fleming to George Trimblc, Dirmor, OMSF A d v a n d  Manncd Miuion Program. 19 JUM 1967. 
'' Stamans to Program Auociatc Adminiatraton. "Advand Miuion Studia," W Aty. 1967. This anion was 
pmcdcd by a mcmorandum from Fleming to Wcbb datcd 22 Aug., mommcnding that hc withdraw apprmal, 
and by the diruuion of a d v a n d  studies cited in now 15 abovc. On thc MSC study contract for a Man-Vcnw 
flyby, m Snmcr 158 (24 Nw. 1967): 1028. 
Thc Air Fore  approach to RBD planning is set forth in thc Air Form Sys~mn Command 375 vtia of 
manuals. 
'NASA H c a d q u n m  Manapnrnt  h. u r ,  Un~t  111, "Budget Formulation and Exautim" (Nw. 1960, 
p. 26. It should bc noted that thc 506 green was iuucd by Seamans to thc pmgram dlictl; t h y ,  in turn, kucd 
a 506 white authoriztng m o u r m  to thc m t m .  
Wync to headquarters am, 29 May 1963. Sub*. Revision d Projm Appmval Doctt-i System. 
Stc notc 28, p. 24. 
" This paragraph is b a d  on the lollowing m r m :  Memorandum, ltilburn to Sununs,  30 Au6. i765. f+ct: 
Establishmt d M r c  d Finan-, Program Rwicw k m m t ,  Ftnannd Maruyrmmr h p m ,  31 &I. 
19M, and NASA. Managemrn~ Eficttwnrrr Report lo thc Restdtnt olthr U n d  Ski;:,& Ftscol Ycorr 1971 
and 1970, submitted to thc M c r  d hlmagcmcnt m d  Budget, 13 Oa. 1970. to !cm the rrguiiz-t d ihc 
M a ' s  Ctmlar  A-44 
See Hilburn mcmorandum a t d  in natc 31. 
" Wyatt to P a m ,  10 Apr. 1969. Subjca NASA COU Projmionr. 
Ibid In a study d twclvc ma& wupons pmjtas, PC& and Schcrcr found that avcryc a s i s  c x d d  cstinutca 
by r factor d 3 2 Pcrk and Schcm, Wroponr Acqutstlton Itwrrs, ublc 16.1, p. 429. 
I ' s C  M ( C  33. 
..arvcy %pisky, Thr Pulanr Syrrrmr Drwlopmml (Cunbridgr W u v v d  Univmity Prcu, 1972). pp. 125, 
246 
" Erumun Klonun, Cast Studv of the Suyrxyor Pmpam (typed nunuwript, Junt 1971), p. 216. 
Mancirandum, T H d l c r ,  Jr., to Fleming, 4 Mar. 1965. Subject. Cac Rclrtioruhip Study, Rap* Gemini. 
Alm, tntmicws w~th  Fleming, b r d  M a i n  drtcd 1 Fcb. 1977. and DcMarquia Wyatt, 9 M u .  1977 
* N s n  and daily Logs ol Gmt Vrlidrt~on usk fora mcmbm. J u m  1963. 
a For an a w n t  d NASA w i n g  tcchniqwr, wc DcMarquis Wyatt, "Gut Mod& for ~ C X  Rogram~," 
o lmurc dclivcrcd rt the Natic,nal C o n f m  on thc Managcmmt d Amwp.rr Pragruru at thc Univmity 
d Mtuourt, Columbia, 17 Nw 1966, a d  iuucd ar a NASA news relcw. 
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'' Memorandum, Dixon F-hc to J. L. Mitchell, 27 May IWS. Fonythc w u  program muugw d thc 
Mvarcad Orbiting M a r  Obrmatay. Emphuir in original. 
'* Aashnc Mminiarj ta fa Industry Af i in  h h a r d t  Damrn to Wyatt, 9 Jum 1967, ating a letter from 
von Braun d 27 March. 
'' Thc principal nunqemcnt ilutruaions w m  NPD 7000.1, "Authorization and Convd d Agency Progunr 
and Albation d Rcrourm," iowd 16 M u .  1968; NPD 7121 .I A. "Phued Rojm Planning," 2 May 1968; 
NHB 7121.2, "Phmd Project PIanniw Guidclinu," final draft, 28 Feb. 1968, ioucd Aug. 1968; and NMI 
7100.4, "Authorization a d  Control d Rcwrch and DMlopnnrt P m p m ,  Prom, Other Advitia, and 
14 
Rmurcu Related Thcmo," I5 A y .  1966. 
Aa illustration d thc omfunion in defining and authorizing pcojxu, cwuidcr thc manalia d :d l i t i a  
planning. To avoid thc cumkrmmc authorization proms, many m t m  funded their frdlitia out d R&D 
money by distinguishing between nonwvcrablc frdlitia, which w m  funded out of " c a u t ~ a i o n  d frcilitiu" 
(COF) many, and rwrable facilitia, which could be funded out d R&D money. Thc flooring a hating 
duar d a building annot k mrrd from thc building itwll; thc &in md furnitur t an. A enter muld build 
8 shdl fa $100 000 under COF and then install millionr of dullam worth d qu ipma t  under R&D b u r  
the equipment w u  rwrrblc from thc building in which it w u  contained. One rrrron f a  rrarblirhing thc 
Fxilitia Ot%a in May 1968 w u  to control w h  mnnruaion funding. 
"Tranrcrip d Webb's rcnurb at w i n g  d Manymrnt  Advirory P w l .  19 Apr. 1968, p. 58. 
* Erit intcrvim with Hardd Finger, 16 Apr. 1969, p. 24. 
" Fingcr cited a Ccntaur PAD mt up by OSSA. " H m  wc wee in thc middlc d a budget rrduaion proms. 
Wc w m  cutting momy out d thc Ccnuur program . . . an; 1 PAD d u n e  coma in that induda a bud$ct 
numbcr for hvrl y u r  1970 that I know is higher than t k  one ,hat wc'rc going to be hudling. So I d I'm 
n a  going to rig, the PAD. So t k  Ot%a d S p a  Sci- and Appliations got very upm. Wdl, we docl't know 
that's thc final n u m b .  . . . 1 wid yes we do, you know darn well it im't going to k thc right number. And 
I said I'm M go in^ to ask thc Adminiarrta. in fact, I won't allow thc Administrator to s i p  mncthing t h t  
hc knows is wrong." See Fingcr crit intcrvicw, p. 32. 
*bid., p. 33. 
* This a i o n  is bucd on intcrvims with Frederick Bryant and Richard Stod (3 Feb. 1977) and Rokn  R q p  
(1 1 Fcb. 1977), all d OTDA, and Rm'ew o/ Tmcking and his Acputntion h p m ,  h a r i n g  bcfm the 
Howc Commitm on Scicna and hronrut ia ,  Aeronrutia and Spaa Tcchno&gy Subwmmittcc, 93rd 
Cq., In  md 2d up. (OE( 1973-Jan. 1974). 1 have uscd thc prumt t a u t  fa mm d thu waion, rina 
OTDA's current aganiution and operating philaghy arc my clow to what i k ,  x m  in thc mid-1W. 
' F a  background d thc decision to build mc Iaqc antmna, wc tmimony 7f DSN D i w a  Eberh.rdt Rcthtin, 
in Houv Camnrittcc on Sciena and Astrmutia, Manned Spmx Flight Subcrnnrnittce, 1967 NASA Author- 
tzafwn, 89th Cay., 2d mesa. (I%), pp. 762-763. 
" Soum: Rapp intmim. 
* Scc &pa 4. notc 59. 
" R m r w  oJ Tracmng and Do& Acqurntwn Propam, p. 58. 
wHarw Canmittec on S e i m  and h r a u u t i a ,  1961 NASA Aulhonzafton. 88th Cacy.. In up. (1%3). 
p. 1882. 
" Scc Wwin P. Hmnun, Adumtures tn Research (NASA SP-4302, 1970), apccially pp. 397, 399, SOC-407, 
411-412. 
Fingcr to Ray Ronutowski (D imta ,  Organization a d  Management Planning &virion), 22 May 1967. 
Sub*: OART M a v t  and Contiml Syttcm Propoul f a  SRT. 
" Richard L. Chapnun a rl., Project M a ~ m r n t  tn NASA (NASA SP-324, 1973), pp. 28-30. 
Y -am Rcvim Document, M w o n  Andyns thutnon P r o p m r ,  21 Sep 1W7. 
Infamation supplied by M a n t  Amci8tc Adminiatrrtw fa C m t a  Qwalianr Paul Cotton, 22 Fcb. 1977. 
&ton w u  Dimtor d thc Pnrgun a d  Raources Division fmm 1967 to 1970. 
* Mcmaudum, Bisplinghoff to OART Division Dimon and StaIT, 28 May 1964. Sub*. Orynizationrl 
Changa in OART. 
*' Scc minut- d 3rd meairy d NASA M a n q m m t  Conconnittee, 27-28 Occ. 1963, ra ion on SRT-Revid 
Auumpiau. 
" Mcmaandum, M a t e  Adminimator fa M v a d  Restarch d Technology Juna S a g  to F i n p ,  
27 June 1960. 
*'Mcmaudum. Dr. Leo P h a  (specid aninant to Auociatc Mminiurrtor, OART) to Wiliu Shapky, 
7 A q .  1%9. Sub* Okmationa on OART. 
Set MC 62 Md Chlpnun, ~ J I C ~  M a m p m r n t  tn NASA. p. 41 
*' hncipal wnvm l a  this &ion includc a Progun Rcvicw D o t u m t ,  Snrnce and Appluafumr M a n q r -  
mml. and an intcrvicw with Dr. Hmvr E. Nmcll, 1 Feb. 1977 
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N&n P. Hetheritqton, "Winning t k  In~i i t iw:  NASA ud the U.S. Sprr Seiaror Roqua," h o 4 w  
(Summcr 1975): 105. 
"See kiduy by Newell to Science A d v i i y  Canminee, 1 July 1966; R e p t  d the Cornrnitte d the 
Mminiurata, IS Aug. 1966; me.norandum, N w d l  to Seunw, 20 Dce. 1966, cammemiry m the rrpon; 
ud In tmm Rrsponsr lo fhr R ~ ; M :  oj fhr Ad Hc r m c r  Muuwy Adwwrmittrr, 7 June 1967, which 
incaporated mat d Ncwdl's aiticisiiu. 
RIporl on Advisory Boor&, IS Jan. 1968, p. 41. 
" S a t e  Committee on Acmnrutiai ud S p a  Scienoa, Scirniuh' Trstimony on Spocr W, OW Cay., Ir 
wrr. (10-1 1 Junc 1%3), upecially awnmaru d Dr. Philip A b h  at p. 11 ud Rd. Martin Sehwarzdild 
at pp. 160-161. 
m Sa nrtunent d Dr. John N a q k  in Somcr and A$$lica&onr M a n q m r n l ,  p. 46. 
" H w w  Conrmitclc on Sdrna ud Aaronautia, Space Science ud A p p l i e u i  S u k a a m i w ,  1966 NASA 
Aulhonzatton. 89th Cong.. 1st w ~ .  (1%5), p. IOU. 
" Nwcll, drab d " F u n d m  and Authaitia d RqrM Murr( rn  d Pmjtc~ M- in Oms d Sprc 
Srima and Appliatiau Flight ProQm," 10 Fcb. 1966. Thi~ l d h c d  by ,L. w week a rrotpniruion d 
OSSA that aublilhcd a Progr4m Review and Raavm M a n y a n n t  divirion in ach p m p . m  dhcr .ad et 
up a Manned Flight Experinmu W.rt to work with OMSF. 
"See t r u r r r i p  of briefing lor Webb by &ddwd diici.lr on OAO-I lailwr, 4 Nw. 1966, p. 53. 
" Ramtation by CoM.rd d k h h  to NASA Hudpuutrn m m q a n m t  u puc ( "lnrtitucirml Bue 
Sludy," 12 June 1971, p. 13. 
" Sourm: Newcll intmiew uwl memorandum, Hilbwn to Samuu, 21 July IWS, in w h i i  Hilbum aaid t h ~ t  
dter a long dimmion with Ncwcll thc umctn~u~ w u  to "rrmorc H m y  at once." And they did. 
76 E.uncr and Apjdrcahons Matqrmrnr ,  p. 45. 
" Thc ldbwing ravm haw pwcd d u l :  Ihr 1966 Apdlo Rqrun Development Plan ud the 14-volume 
survey d A p d b  Prqr rm Manymwnt Lucd by the A p d b  R o q a m  Oms. Nw. 1%7-Jan. 1968. 
Sanuru exit interview, p. 53. 
" Opm-rndcd miaiona "are daigned to mntinuc ao bng u mtmruuts' d e t y  b not impaired, until a d a d  
a b j a t i m  am readd with thc option at each ncp d terminrtirq the mirion." Scr(ea~nt d C c q c  M&, 
H w w  h u m  md h n m n r u t h  Committee, Apoilo h p u m  Pocr m d  Propts~ ,  ruff uudy la Subcammittcc 
on NASA Ovcnigt~t, 90th Gary. !st ICII. (I7 M u .  1967), p. 3. 
Samuu exit int .wiew, pp. 1 1  5-1 16. 
" Ibid., p. 1 1  5. 
" 2 1 ~  meeting d Man& Space Fligh. M - t CvuIVil, 24 Scpt. 1963. 
" Apnilo -am (w). Ap*lo ~ l o ~ ~ r m ~ . : t .  d. 4, ~y S p . h t e r  (1s ,Ian. I w ) .  
p. 3-1. 
Y ~ p d l o  F'ragram Me, Apdlo h p m  Manapmrnf, vo! 1. M A I I  Space F l i t  Carter (Dcc. I967), 
p. 1-2. 
" k l m ~ u f u r  and Arronoufvr, 1%3 (NASA S P 4 ,  1964), pp. 190,420. 
H w w  Scimx and h m n r u t i o  Canm9tee, 1965 NASA A u h z a f l o l ,  80th Corq., 2d wr. (1964), p. 447. 
Gilmth to E. Z. Gray, 5 Aug. 1964. b p h . l i 8  ddcd. 
Sumuu to Program Auociatc Mminiuraton, "Mu-t Rapmribilitia f a  Futum M d  n i t  
Anivitia." 26 July 1966. 
" Although the widma ir not condwivc, the dcdsiom to dmbp the s u p q m k  t ruupac  (SST) w u  probably 
d thb wn. The pressure for an S T  program crmc lmm within Comnmmt ather Ihn tram the a v i l  
aviation indwtry, which ~nsrstd that the G o u c ~ n m t  foot the bill la provine the anap. Thc prime mown 
la an ST-the H o w  Committee m Sdmc and Anmnrutia. NASA, ud F M  amd.lr (~~ with 
W D  oMci~I~)-ai& an q m m e n t  in June 1961 to ntudy thc lwibilicy d a rupnmic truupn, which 
w u  two y u n  Wort F'raidm~ h n c d y ,  in Junc IW3, authorized Gmpvm m fund an ST w m .  
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' For a h i s t q  of thae  and other proprrlr, rec Finanaal Manqrment I -  the Fcdcml Gwcmmmt, and Jawph 
P. Harris, Conpresnonal Conlml of Admtn~slrdion (W;uhin@on, D.C.: The Brooking Inrtitution, 1964), 
p ~ .  104-127. 
' F a  an account d the Bumu's reorganization anti ru powm and authorities prior to 1970, m Lmis  Fisher, 
Itrndmlial Spmdmg h u l r  (Rincetoa: Princeton Uniwraity Rar, 1975), pp. 44-51, and P u s  Woll, ed., 
h b l i c  Adm~nulmnon and Mtcy (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Pwt Ill. 
'William S. &Iler, "Dcciiion-Making in Washington," Spoce/Amnautics (Dec. 1967: $3-98, and Donald 
F. Homig, "The Pmident'r Scientin: A Private Diary," Bulletin ofde Atonx Saenttsts (Apr. 1977): 62-64. 
' BOB aaK papcr, "FY 1966 NASA Budget Review," 12 Nw. 1954, p. 1-4. 
' Horuc Government Operations Committee, Military Operations Subcommittee, Coummrnt Oprmhor~s in 
Space, 89th Cong., 1st xu. (4 June 1965), p. 106. 
' H o w  Science and Aatronautia Committee. Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, hearing on CAO Report 
on Analysu of Cort of Spocr Shuttle h p m ,  9 3 4  Cong.. 1st ress. (26 June 1973), p. VII. 
"Aa mown by NASA Administrator Juncr C. Fletcher's reply to U.S. Comptroller General Elmer Staatr, 
reprinted in ibid.. pp. 94-97. 
I '  On NASA's u x  of cost-benefit and con-cffcaivrneu studies, #c Senate Independent Offim .\ppropriations 
Subcommittee, Heannds-Parl l, 93rd Cong., 1st ncu. (1973), pp. 510-512. This includs NASA and GAO 
correspondence pcrtainiry to such studica, and aclccted lists of cat-benefit studis at pp. 511, 513, and 
518-519. Note that the diKmnre between cost-benefit and cost-cffcctiveneu a n a l p a  is that the fanner arc 
thore "in which benefits arc measurable in terms of dollan." 'Ihe CAO study concluded that while "only 
m a i n  NASA programs arc susceptible to cost-benefit analysis involving dollar-measurable benefits . . . we 
believe that all NASA pmgram arc su#rptiblc to cost-ctTcctivmeu analysis." Ibtd., pp. 51 1-512. 
dASA Asrirtant Administrator for Administration William Lilly to Elmer Staats, 16 Nw. 1967. 
" Hwrc Science and Ar~ronau~rr Committee. A u l h t t y  A ~ ~ o N  b SRSA. 89th Cong.. 1st scsr.. Rep. 
No. 273 (3 May 1969, p. 118. 
" Without citing an authority, Lewis Fisher has noted that $35 GW in R&D funds w u  r t  aside as a contingency 
fund for national xcurity purporn. See Prestden~~al Sfinding P o w ,  pp. 207-208. This is apparently an 
m o n e o u  rtlemce to wc. I(f) of the 1969 and 1970 NASA Authorization Act, which permits the Adrninir- 
trator to u x  up to $35 000 in R&D appropriations "for scientific consulrations o. extraordinary 
cxpcnm . . . and his daermination shall be final and conclusive upon the amounting o f f i m  of the G w m -  
men!." This is the Administrator's "champagne money" and has nothing to do with national xcurity. 
" NHB 7330.1, ". ryproval of Facility Projects" (July 1966), p. 25 
I' Painc to Speaker of the Hour ,  15 Jan. 1969, mcloring copy of draft bill to authorize appropriations for 
NASA. 
I' 1966 NASA Authorization Act, rcc. 4(3). Emphasis added. However tile act did prwidc that such pI 'OpM 
might be funded if the Committee was notified in advance and gave approval. 
" h t c  Committee on Aeronautical and Space Scienm, 1966 NASA Aulhonzatton, pp. 947-950. 
I* Wyatt to William McCandlcss (Auistant Director for B u d ~ u  Review, BOB), 12 Mar. 1964. 
m h.rnw~andum for the m r d  by Adm. Rufus E. Rose (USN, Ra.), "General Management lnvolvcment in 
Formal Budge Pmeas," 1 Scp. 1965 
" Donald Crabill (Economics, Science, and Technology Division, BOB) to BOB D i m o r  Charls  Schultzc, 
27 Oct. 1967. 
" BOB Director Robm Mayo to Painc, "1971 Budget Appeal Procedum," 20 Oct. 1969. 
" NASA n a b  p p c r  (draft), "The NASA Programming Pnmu," 24 Jan. 1966. p. 8 
Minutes of NASA Management Committee mming, 17 J;n. 1966, and papcr on "NASA lncmcntal  
Funding Study," 20 Apr. 1966. 
Senate Committee on Aemnautic~l and Space Scienm, Space Launch Vch~cles, 89th Cong., 1st xsa. (26- 
27 Jan. 1965), pp. 10-17,25-30. 
w o n ,  lkcmon lo Go lo the Moon, p. 91. 
" Tranrcrip of w i n g  of Webb, Seamms, and all the center di tetcn,  28 Sept. 1966, p. 35. 
" PPBS p r a t e d  an enormous litcraturc ktwccn 1965 and the early 1970s. k i d s  the w u r m  cited klow. 
two c w n p d i a  ar: specially uacful. "Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System: A Sympium." Publtc 
Admtntstralton Reutcw 26 (4) (Dcc. 1966), and U.S. C o n g a ,  Joint h n o m i c  Committee, Subcommittee on 
Ecanomy in Covmmmt, The Analysts and Eualwt~on of Pubhc Expndttures: The PPB System, 3 vols., 90th 
Cong.. 2d wu. (1969). 
"In a 21 June 1971 memorandum ammpanying 11s Circular A-11, the Office or Management and Budga 
uated t h a ~  "agcnncs arc no longer q u i d  to submit w ~ t h  their budget submiu~onr the multi-year program 
and financtng plans, program memoranda and special analytical studla or the rhedula  . . that nron- 
cilc information clauificd amrding to the progrm rad appropriation struaurcs." 
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" T h i ~  waa Public Law 84-863 (1 Au(l1956), for which KC F i n a n d  Managemmt in the FIcZrml Cowmmmt, 
p ~ .  92-97. 
" Alin C. Enthovm and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is  Enouqh? Shaping the D. /me  System, 1961-1969 
(New York Hdt, Harper and Row, 1971), p. 25. 
Hamy S.poUy, The Polofii S y s m  Drwlopmmt, pp. 18&181. 
" Enthovcn and Smith. How Much IS Enowh? D. 18. " .  
lbid., p. 52. 
"The ~ h n w  u Allan Schick's in his "A Death in the Buraucracv: The Daniv d Federal PPB!' h b l w  
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Appendix A 
~ ' ~ o t e  on Sources 
N o one who investigates segments of NASA's history will underestimate the difficulty of finding out what happened and why. Particularly in the study 
of organization and management, the researcher is pretty much on his own. 
Organization charts and management instructions are the visible tip of an im- 
mense mass of submerged documentation. Researchers who enjoy the thrill of the 
chase will find themselves fully occupied, and not least among their problems will 
be locating primary sourm. They will have to contend with the sources' dispersal 
throughout headquarters, center offices, and the Federal Records Centers to 
which they are eventually retired; the absence of catalogues or data retrieval 
systems comparable to those maintained by NASA for indexing and classifying 
aerospace literature; and the lack of uniformity in those records inventories that 
are available. There has never been a central file or filing system at NASA 
Headquarters. The responsibility for maintaining, inventorying, and retiring 
m r d s  rests with each office. The only general guide to NASA internal documen- 
tation is GSA form 135, which every Federal agency fills out before retiring 
records. The same caution applies to these forms as to the documents they de- 
scribe: some are detailed m d  precise, others are cursory at best. 
These deficiencies are not ameliorated by the published material. When one 
has eliminated promotional literature, spaceflight stories "as told to" Able and 
Ham, and the kind of learned lumber that spares the reader no smallest detail, one 
is left with a residue of works that attempt to deal with the space program in a 
scholarly way. Yet, with one exaption, no book tries to get the whole of NASA 
betwen two covers. The exception, Frank W. Anderson, Jr.'s Orders of Mag- 
nitqldc. (NASA SP-4403, 1976), is brief-less than 100 pages-amcise, well 
written, and one of very few works that treat the histories of NACA and NASA 
together. But no work that was prepared as a chapter for a bicentennial history 
of public works in the United States can claim to be definitive. In short, an essay 
on N U A  administrative history must draw on a multitude of sources without 
d y i n g  too heavily on any one of them. 
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Thm remain the petiodic official repom on U.S. space activities. Thm of 
these, sponsored by NASA, may be ranked in ascending order of du lness :  
1. The twenty-two remiannual reports issued by NASA from 1959 through 
1969. They provide brief summaries of agency programs and policies, with 
Iiitle comment or analysis. 
2. The annual report of the President to the Congress on U.S. aeronautical and 
space activities. Originally prepared by the Space Council More it was 
abolished in 1973, the "President's report" has hem the responsibility of the 
NASA History Office since 1975. Each report deals with aeronautics and 
astronauti~, agency by agency. Although more than half of the report covers 
NASA and DOD, there are ~ l s o  sections on such unlikely agencies as the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of State, and the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Each chapter is prepared by the agency 
in question. 
3. The Astronautics and Aeronautics (A&As) chronologies prepared by the 
NASA History Office. There are separate volumes for each year since 1962, 
and at the time of writing (October 1979) the series was complete through 
1974. ABAs are enormous compendia of facts culled from newspapers, trad: 
journals, congressional hearings, and agency press releases. Their very lack 
of system adds to their value. Much of the information included is hard to 
come by elsewhere, and much of it has a broader bearing than the volume's 
title would imply. Each volume offers extensive coverage of U.S. science 
policy, international aspects 01 the space program, and announcements of 
NASA and DOD prime contract awards. Used with an awareness of their 
limitations, A&As give remarkably full coverage of aspects of the space 
program for which printed sources are available. 
Apart from interviews, congressional h .uings, and the sources mentioned, 
the research on which this book is based ruts principally on two collections: the 
files of the NASA History Ma at NASA Headquarters in Waskington, D.C., 
and the NASA documents housed at the Federal Records Center in Suitland, 
Maryland. Thm is no need here to describe the resovlra!s of thew collections; 
Alex Roland's Cui& to Research inNASA History (2d ed., NASA History Office, 
Nov. 1977) covers the ground most adequately. Rather, I would like to mention 
the ways in which I have used the material in an administrative history of an 
agency as large and diversified as NASA. 
One limitation is the fragmentary quality of the sources. The reader who 
expects the documents to deal with large subjects in a large way will be diaap- 
pointed. Their value consists in their confirmation of particular facts, as controls 
on other documents, and as bases for presentations of agency programs that were 
entered into the annual congressional authorization hearings. Occasionally a 
source give an historical account of specific programs or organizational entities; 
examples include staff papers on NASA excepted positions, on the rationale of the 
Apollo enginming support contracts, on NASA responses to recommendations of 
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the H o w  Science and Astronautia Committee, and on executive m i m a t .  
The program m i m s  held for Webb fall into the umc category. Howmr, such 
p a p ,  moat of which w m  never circulated outside the agency, ore the exception. 
l 3 e  gap between official statemmtsof policy and internal deciuon making is often 
uncomfort~bly wide, and that gap is only partly c l o d  by internal document), 
interviews, and prucntations k f o n  NASA's authorization and rppmpriationr 
committees. To a dcgm, the historian's terrnr of references rn bounded by the 
evidence; I have tried to deal with problem areas for which inadequate supporting 
documentation exists. 
A special cane is pre~nted by the tape recordings stored at Suitland. In 
1966-1967 metal dozen managanent meetings w m  taped. While the purpol~ 
of the recordings is not entirely clear, moat seem to have been prepared u 
reference material for edited transcripts and-given Webb's strong intmrt in the 
study of public administration-u m u m  material for studia such u this book. 
The tapes run from forty-five minuta to t h m  houn and cover most of NASA's 
substantive program reviews, as well aa strategy sessions attended by NASA 
acnior oficiala. Few tranrcripts arc available, and most of the taper have ken 
u n u d  and unheard since they w m  sent to Suitland a decade ago. Their value 
is lers in disclasing previously unknown fa- than in giving a remarkable glimpa ' 
of the give-and-take of NASA decision making at the highest level. We hear 
Webb, Mueller, and Phillip in a dry-run rehcanal for a conpxaional bearing 
in executive seuion on the Apollo fire. We hear Edgar Cortright briefing Webb 
on the Voyager program and explaining how the program would be parceled out 
among the centers. As another example, the briefing held for Webb on ncgo- 
tiationa for renewal of NASA's mntraa with JPL is a franker amount of NASA 
relations with the laboratory than anything NASA would have cared to submit in 
public hearings. Apart from the notorious exception of the Nixon t a p ,  the NASA 
tapes are a unique record of the decisions made by mio r  Federal officials. Not 
all the taper are as valuable as the t h m  just cited. But as a wble, they a n  an 
unusual and almost unknown historical resourn, and it would be a service to 
scholars to have the best of them transcribed and edited. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms Cited in Text* 
M C B  
ADP 
A 0  
ARPA 
ATM 
BOB 
COF 
CPFF 
CSC 
DHEW 
DOD 
DOT 
DSN 
EEO 
FAA 
FY 
GAO 
GE 
JPL 
KSC 
LOR 
~ e t o ~ u t i a  and Anronr~t ic  Coordinating Boud 
Automatic Data Procaring (Equipment) 
Administrative Operationr 
Advanced Research Prow Agency (DOD) 
Apllo Telescope Mount 
U S .  Bureau d the B u d p  
Construction of Fadit ia  
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee 
U S .  Civil Scrvia Commiuion 
U S .  Department of Hulth, Education, and Welfare 
U.S. Deputment d MrnK 
U.S. Department of Tranrporution 
Deep Spaa Nawork 
E q u l  Employment Opportunity 
Federal Aviation Agency (w Administration) 
Fiscal Year 
U.S. General Accounting Otfia 
Gmerrl Electric Corpration 
J a  Prapulaion Labontoy 
Kennedy Spaa C m t a  
L u ~ r  Orbit Rmdezww 
This list omits rbkcviatiau md acronyms citd only in the purqrph in which h e y  am Idmtihal. t i 
APPENDIX B 
MOL 
MSC 
MSF 
NACA 
NASA 
NERVA 
NMI 
NSF 
OAO 
OART 
OMB 
OMSF 
OSSA 
OTDA 
PAD 
FCC 
w, 
PERT 
PFP 
POP 
PPW 
PPP 
PSAC 
PSG 
RLD 
RFP 
RIF 
SEB 
SRT 
SSASC 
S T  
STAC 
STG 
Ti, 
TWA 
V/STOL 
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Manned Orbiting Labartory (DOD) 
Manned Spracrrft Center 
M m e d  Spra  Fliet  
National Adviroy Cornminu for Acronrutia 
National Acronawtia and S p a  Administration 
Nuclear Engine for Rodtct Vehicle Applidon 
NASA M a n y m m t  Instruction 
National Scicna Foundation 
Orbiting Aurmomiai Okavrtory (NASA) 
OHia d Advanced R a u r c h  and Techm!gy (NASA) 
Oflice of Manymmt  and Budget 
Oflice of Manned S p a  Flight (NASA) 
ma of S p a  Scicna and Application, (NASA) 
ma oi Trackiry and Data Acquiutim (NF "A) 
Project Approval Document 
Planning Codination G m p  (NASA) 
Planning Coordination Steaing Croup (NASA) 
-am Evaluation and Review Technique 
Program and Financial Phn 
Program Operating Phn 
Planning-Progran.ming-Budgeting System 
Phased Project Planning 
Praidcnt'r S c i m  Adviwry CortLni~~a 
Plmning Steering Group (NASA) 
Raurch and Development 
Request for Propaul 
Reduction in E m  
Source Evaluation Board 
Supportin8 Racrrch and Tdmnolqy 
S p a  Sciena md Application# Steering Committee (NASA) 
Supcraonic T r a p o r (  
Scimcc a d  Technology Mvirory Committee (NASA) 
(Praidmt'r) S p a  Tad Group 
Technical Integration and Evaluation 
Traru-Wwld Airlina 
Venial or Short Take-Ofl and tudi (aimrft) 
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Biographical Sketches of 
Principal NASA Officials 
Hugh L. Dryden 
Rorn in Pocomoke City, Maryland, in 1898. Rmived B.A. in 1916 and 
Ph.D in 19'9 from The Johns Hopkins University. Joined the National Bureau 
of Standards in 1918 and during the 1920s and 1930s produced many technical 
papers in aerodynamics for the Bureau and for the National Advisory Committee 
ior Aeronautics (NACA). Member of NACA Committee on Aerodynamics from 
1931. Named Assistant Director of the Iiureau of Standards in 1946 and Associate 
Director six months later. Joined NACA in September 1947 as Director of 
Research; became NACA Director in h'qy 1949. Deputy Administrator of NASA 
from 1 October 1958 to his death on 2 December 1965. 
Harold B. Finger 
Born in New York City in 1924. Received B.S. in mechanical engineering 
from City Collegc of fiew York in 1944 and M.S. in aeronautical engineering 
from Case Institute of Technology in 1950. Joined Aircraft Engine Research 
Laboratory -renamed Lew!; Flight Propulsion Laboratory in 1948-in 1944, 
where he remained until his appointment to the NASA Headquarters staff in 
1958 as Chief of the NI . lear Engine Program. Manager of the Space Nuclear 
Propulsion M c c  from its etablishment in August 1960 until his assignment to 
headquarters early in 1967. Served as Associate Administrator for Organization 
and Management, 15 March 1967-1 May 1969, when he became an Assistant 
Secretary in the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Robert R. Gilruth 
Born in Minnesota in 1913. Earned B.S. and M.S. in aeronautical en- 
gineering from the University of Minnesota, 1935-1936. Joincd Langley Labora- 
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tory in 1937; became Assistant Director in 1952. In October 1958 appointed to 
head the Space Task Group managing Roject Mercury, the nation's first manned 
spaceflight program. Director, Manned Spacecraft Center, November 1961-Janu- 
ary 1972, when he was named to the newly created position of NASA Director of 
Key Personnel Development. Retired in Deccmbcr 1975. 
T. (Thomas) Keith Glennan 
Born in North Dakota in 1905. After graduating from Yale University in 
1927 with a degree in electrical engineering, he became involved with the new 
sound motion picture industry and worked in Hollywood as a sound engineer and 
studio manager from 1935 to 1941. Served as Adminis rator and then Director of 
the U.S. Navy Underwater Sound Laboratories, 1942-1945. President, Case 
Institute of Technology, 1947-1966, with two leaves of absence: first to be a 
member of the Atomic Energy Commission (1950-1952), then to be the first 
NASA Administrator (19 August 1958-20 January 1961). Member of many 
boards and committees, including General Advisory Committee of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Aerospace 
Corporation. 
D. Brainerd Holmes 
Born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1921. Rmived B.S. in electrical en- 
gineering in 1943 from Cornell University. Worked for Western Electric and Bell 
Telephone Laboratories from 1945 to 1953, when ht  joined the Radio Cor- 
poration of America (RCA). Served as General Manager of RCA's Major De- 
fense Systems Division, in which capacity he was project manager for the Ballistic 
Missile Early Warning System, which was completed on time and within cost. 
Joined NASA in Oaober 1961 as Director of Manned Space Flight. Named 
Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Spacc Flight Centers on 30 Oc- 
tober 1962. Announced resignation on 12 June 1963 and returned to industry as 
senior vice president of the Raytheon Company. 
George E. Mueller 
Born in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1918. Rmived B.S. from Missouri School 
of Mines in 1939, M.S. in electrical engineering from Purdue University in 1940, 
and Ph.D in physics from Ohio State University in 1951. Worked in Bell Tele- 
phone Laboratories before joining faculty of Ohio State University in 1946. 
Appointed professor of electrical engineering at Ohio State in 1952. Before joining 
NASA in 1963, spent five years with Space Technology Laboratories, serving 
successively as Director of the Electronics Laboratories, Program Director of the 
Able Space Program, Vice President of Space Systems Management, and Vice 
President for Research and Development. Associate Administrator for Manned 
Space Flight, NASA, from 1 September 1963 to 10 December 1969, when he 
returned to private industry. 
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Homer E. Ncwell 
Born in Holyoke, Massachwetts, in 191 5. Rmived B.A. and M.A. in teach- 
ing from Harvard University and Ph.D in mathematics from the University of 
Wisconsin in 1940. Taught at the University of Msryland from 1940 to 1944, 
when he pined the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Became head of NRL 
Rocket Sonde Branch in 1947 and was in charge of the laboratory's upper 
atmosphere research programs. Became Acting Superintendent of the Atmosphere 
and Astrophysics Division and was also Science Emgram Coordinator for Project 
Vanguard. Joined NASA in October 1958; became Deputy Director of the Office 
of Space Flight Programs. Direaor, Ofiice of Space Scienm, 1 November 1961- 
I November 1963, when he became Associate Administrator for Space Science 
and Applications. Served as NASA A s d a t e  Administrator from 1 October 1967 
to his retirement at the end of 1973. Author of many papers and several books on 
mathematics and span science. 
Thomas 0 .  Paine 
Born in Berkeley, California, in 1921. Earned A.B. in engineering at Brown 
University in 1942; served as a submarine officer in the Pacific during World 
War 11. Received M.S. and Ph.D from Stanford University (1947 and 1949) in 
physical metallurgy. Worked as research associate at Stanford before pining 
General Electric Corporation (GE) in 1949. From 1963 to 1968 was manager of 
the GE TEMPO Centcr for Advanml Studies, an interdisciplinary study group. 
Appointed NASA Deputy Administrator by President Johnson on 31 January 
1968. Became Acting Administrator following resignation of James Webb on 7 
October 1968. Nominated by President Nixon to b m e  NASA Administrator on 
5 March 1969 and confirmed by Senate fifteen days later. Resigned en 15 October 
1970 to return to GE; became senior vice president in 1973. Chosen president and 
chief operating officer of the Northrop Corporation in February 1976. 
Samuel C. Phillips 
Born in Arizona in 1921. Received B.S. in electrical enginecring from Uni- 
versity of Wyoming in 1942 and M.S. in electrical enginecring from University 
of Michigan in 1950. Joined the Air Corps in 1942 as a second lieutenant, rising 
to Air Force brigadier general in 1961, major general in 1964, and lieutenant 
general in 1968. Served as Director of the Minuteman Program from 1959 to 
1963; appointed Vice Commander of the Ballistic Systems Division (Air Forn 
Systems Command) in August 1963. Detailed to NASA Headquarters in January 
1964 as Deputy Director of the Apollo Program. Appointed Apollo Program 
Director in October 1964 and served through August 1969. Commander, Air 
Force Space and Missile Systems Organization, September 1969-April 1972; 
Director, National Security Agency, April 1972-August 1973; Commander, Air 
Force Systems Command, August 1973-September 1975, when he became vice 
president of Energy Systems Management Division of TRW, Incorporated. 
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Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 
Born in Salem, Massachuactts in 1918. Earned B.S. at Harvani University 
in 1939 and MS.  and Sc.D. at Maasachusctts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 
1942 and 1951. From 1941 to 1955 he held teaching and p r o w  management 
positions at MIT. Joined RCA in 1955, becoming chid engineer of its Missile 
Electronics and Controls Division. With NASA from 1960 to 1968, first as 
M a t e  Administrator (1 September 1960-2 December 1965) and then, suc- 
ceeding Hugh Dryden, as Deputy Administrator from 21 W m b e r  1965 to his 
mignation on 5 January 1968. Appointed Hunsaker Professor at M I T  in 1968. 
Served as Air F o m  Secntary from February 1969 to May 1973. President, 
National Academy of Engineering, 1973-1974. Administrator, Energy Research 
and Development Administration, January 1975-January 1977. Currently 
Henry R. Luce Professor at MIT Alfml P. Sloan School of Management. 
Willis H. Shapley 
Born in Pasadena, California, in 1917. Studied iit the University of Chicago, 
1938-1942. Joined staff of the Bureau of the Budget in 1942, becoming a Prin- 
cipal Examiner in 1948, Assistant Chief (Air Force) of the Bureau's Military 
Division (1956-1961), and Deputy Chief of the Military Division from 1961 to 
1965. In each position he was charged with reviewing mearch and development 
programs of DOD and the programs of NACA/NASA, and he was instrumental 
in drafting the original version of the 1958 Space Act. Served as NASA Deputy 
Associate Administrator from 1 September 1965 to his retirement in August 1975. 
Abc Silventein 
Born in Terre Haute, Indiana, in, 1908. Received B.S. in mechanical en- 
gineering from Rose Polytechnic Institute in 1929 and a mechanical engineering 
professional degree from the same school in 1934. Aerodynamic mearch engineer 
at Langlcy Laboratory from 1929 to 1940; head, Full-Scale Wind Tunnel, 1940- 
1943; transferred to Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory, 1943. Chief, Wind 
Tunnel and Fhght Division, 1943-1949. In 1949 was placed in charge of all 
research at Lewis Laboratory. Associate Director of k w h  Laboratory, 
1952-1958. Transferred to NACA Headquarters in May 1958 to help prepalv 
the transition to NASA. Director of Space Flight Programs for NASA, October 
1958-October 1961, in which capacity he contributed greatly to the development 
of NASA's unmanned pmbcs and satellites. Director, Lewis Research Center, 
November 196 1 -November 1969. k a m e  director of Environmental Planning 
for Republic Stcel Corporation in Clevtlmd, Ohio, in 1970. 
Wernher von Braun 
Born in Wiersitz, Germany, in 19 12. Attended institutes of technology in 
Berlin and Zurich and received doctorate in physics at the University of Berlin in 
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1934. Joined the rocket experimental center in Pccncmunde in 1937 and was 
director of m a r c h  until 1945; his work and that of his colleagues led to dcvtl- 
opment of the V-l and V-2 guided missiles u d  against the Allies during World 
War 11, Sdr.rende~ed tc US. Army in 1945; came to the United States and worked 
at the White ,Sands Missile itq, bdorc moving to the Redstone Amnal in 
Huntsville, Alabama, in 1950. Became U.S. citizen in 1 W .  IDcvelopcd the Rcd- 
stone and Jupiter-C twkets, the latter of which placed kxpiorrr 1, the natioll s 
first unmanned satellite, into orbit on 31 January 1953. Tvg,&rrcd to NASA in 
1960 and was Dimtor of the Marshall Space Flight Center from July 1960 to 
February 1970, when he was appointed NASA Deputy Assaciate Administrator 
for Planning. Resigned in July 1972 to bccome corporate v i r  pmident 
(Engineering and l)tvelopment) at Fairchild Industries. D i d  in Alexandria, 
Virginia, on 15 June 1977. Author of many papers on mketry and spacc flight, 
von Rraun was one of the k s t  known figures in the history of the U.S. space 
program and played a crucial mle in the development of the Saturn mcket. 
Janws E. Webb 
Born in Granville County, North Carulina, in 1906. Rhvivd B.A. in d u -  
cation from Ilniversity of North Camlinn in 1928. Studied law at George Wash- 
ington tlniversity and was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in 1936. 
Joined S p r y  Gymscnpe in 1936, rising to vice pmident in 1943. k a m e  
Assistant to the Under .Swrctary of the 'I'rcasury in 1946; served as Dimtor of 
the Bureau of the Budgt from 1946 to 1949 and as Under k r c t a r y  of State from 
I949 to 1952. In private business fnm 1952 thmugh 1960; served as president of 
Republic Supply Company, as assistant to the president of the l ierr-Mdkc Oil 
Company, and ns a n~e~rrher of the b r d  of M c l h n e l l  Aircraft. Administrator 
of NASA, 14 February 1961 -7 October 1968, when he rrturncd to the private 
sector as a lawyer and consultant. Member, Commission on Chwnment Pro- 
curcment, M a w h - l k m h c r  1972. Member of many boards and task foms; 
currently H trustee of the National Geographic L%iety and a member of the Board 
of Kqents of the Smithsonian Institution. Author of Spcc &t M a n q m t n t  
(New York: hlcGraw-llill, 1969). 
Ikhtirrquis Wyatt 
Born in St. Joseph. Missouri, in 1919. K w i v d  B.S. in nrechanical enginccr- 
ing fmm hiissouri School crl Mines in 1941. Served as a research scientist and 
supervisor at the Lewis Laboratory from 1944 to 1958, specializing in aem- 
dynamic nnd thcr~nodynanric studies of advanccd aircraft and pmpulsion systems. 
Served at NASA Headquarters fmln October 1958 to his rctircment in July 1973. 
I)ittctor, Otticr of Pmgrms. June 1961 -November 1963; lkputy Assistant 
.4dministrator.~Assistrlrt Administrator for Programming, Novcmhcr 1963- 
h1arc.h l9b7. Assistant Adlninistrirtor for P q r a m  Plnnnin~ and Analysis, 
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15 March 1967-May 1970, when he became Assistant Administrator for Plan- 
ning. Until the 1967 reorganization Wyatt's office had mapr responsibility for 
budget preparation and review of program proposals. 
Appendix D 
Types of Contracts Authorized by NASA* 
Finn jked price-Provides for the payment of a definite price upon the 
delivery and acceptance of the items or services specified in the contract. It is used 
when designs and specifications are firm and fair, and reasonable prices can be 
established before performance. With this type of contract the contractor assumes 
the maximum performance risk and has the most incentive to reduce his cost. 
Fixed-price incentive-Has the same concept and criteria as the firm 
fixed-price type, except that profits may be adjusted for rewards or penalties 
related to the contractor's sumeding or failing in attaining prescribed goals. . . . 
Fixed-price escalation-Differs from the firm fixed-price type in that 
specific contingencies generally related to unstable market or labor conditions are 
recognized by a provision which pen.lits the price to fluctuate up or down as the 
particular contingencies materialize. 
Fixed-price redetermination -Concept and criteria are the same as for the 
firm fixed price exxpt that uncertainty as to costs may be present, which are 
resolved by an adjustment of the price upward or downward after a specified 
delivery or completion point has been reached. 
Cost-plus-fixcd-fee-Provides that the contractor will be reimbursed for all 
his acceptable costs plus a fixed amount of fee as profit. This type of contract is 
generally used for research, development, ot studies for which the parties cannot 
reasonably predict the required level of effort, the parameters to be invest:gatt2, 
or the probable costs. 
Cost-plus-incentive-fee-Similar in concept to the CPFF contract but gener- 
ally with a clearer view as to the work to be done and results to be obtained. The 
fee in this type of contract is not fixed but is established in terms of target, 
Source House Committee on Science and kronrutia, 1%5 NASA Aurha'catwn, 68th Crmg., 26 ua. 
(1964), pp. 1327-1328. 
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maximum, and minimum within which range the contractor's earnings are gov- 
erned to the extent to which he exceeds or falls short of targets in terms of cost, 
schedule, performarice, or a combination of these. 
Cost-plus-award-fee-. . . provides for a basic fixed fee for perfor:mancc to 
a level deemed amptable, plus an additional award fee, not in cr~tcess of a 
stipulated maximum, for accomplishment better than the 'amptable' level. . . . 
Cost sharing-The contractor is paid no fee and is reimbursed for only part 
of his con, ampting in lieu of monetary reimbursement certain commertial or 
other benefits which may be found in the contract.' 
Cost reimbursement-The contractor receives no fee and is reimbursed only 
for his amp.dole costs. 
Appendix E 
Chronology of Administrative and Other Events, 
4 October-The Soviet Union announced that it had successfully orbited an 
Earthsrbital satellite, Sputnik 1, as its contribution to the International Geo- 
physical Year. This was followed by the launch of Sputnik 2, three times as large 
as its predmssor and carrying a dog as yssenger, on 3 November. 
7 Novemk-President Dwight Eisenhower named James Killian, head of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as Special Assistant for Science and 
Technology and chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee. On 
27 November the Committee was transferred from the Office of Defense Mobi- 
lization to the Executive Office. 
31 January-The Army's Juno 1 sumssfully launched Explorer 1, the first 
U.S. Earth-orbital satellite. The payload was developed by the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, while the experiment of Prof. James Van Allen of the University of 
Iowa detected a hitherto unknown belt of radiation above the Earth. 
7 February-Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy established the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency at a level above and distinct from the services. The new 
agency was intended to sponsor projects without immediate military application, 
although the military strvim were authorized to act as executive agmts on many 
of its ptojcds. 
5 March -President Eisenhowtr approved recommendations of the Advi- 
4 
sory Committee on Government Orga-iziition that the new civilian space agency 
be lodged in a reconstituted National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. 
I 
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14 April -Administration's draft legidation submitted to Congrtss. 
15 July-The final version of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 
1958 was p a d  by Congress. It provided for an agency headed by a single 
Administrator, for a National Aeronautic3 and Span Council to set overall policy, 
and for a Civilian-Military Liaison Committee to coodinate the programs of the 
Defense Department and the new agency. The act authorized the Administrator 
to fill up to 260 "excepttd" positions exempt from civil service regulations and 
stipulated that the agency would take title to all patents dwclopcd in the course 
of work performed under contract to the agency. 
29 July-Resident Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space 
Ad. 
3 August -The National Academy of Sciences established a Space Science 
Board, one of whose principal functions was to advise the Spacc Agency on its 
science programs. The Board w-.a funded jointly by the National Science Founda- 
tion and NASA until 1964, when NASA assumed sole mponsibility. 
15 August-The Senate confirmed the nomination of T. Keith Glennan as 
NASA Administrator and Hugh Dryden as NASA k p u t y  Administrator. At the 
time of their appointments, Glennan was president of the Case Institute of 
Technology, and Dryden was Director of the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics. 
27 August-A rider to the NASA Appropriation Act stipulated that NASA 
would have to seek authorizing legislation before it could request appropriations 
for the 1960 fiscal year. This requirement was made permanent in 1959. 
30 Septemk-The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics went out 
of existence at the close of business. 
1 Octoh-NASA began its official existence. By Executive Order 10783, 
the President transferred to NASA all the property and civilian personnel of the 
Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard Division. Also transferred were several 
lunar probes sponsored by the Army, the F-1 rocket engine under Air F o m  study, 
and over $100 million in unexpended funds. 
7 October-Project Mercury, the nation's first manned flight program, was 
established. The project was to be directed by a Spacc Task Group stationed at 
the Langley Research Center and headed by Robert Gilruth. 
3 &cembct.-Executive Order 10793 transferred to NASA the Jet Pro- 
pulsion Laboratory's functions and Guvernmcntswned property. The laboratory, 
founded in 1944, was to operate as a facility of the California Institute of Tcch- 
nology under contract to NASA. 
January --The position of .4smiate Administrator was established at NASA 
Hcadquartcri. Richard Horner, Assistant Air F o m  Secretary (Research & De- 
velopment) was named to fill the p i t i o n  on 1 June. 
3 April-An agreement between NASA and the Department of Defense 
(DOD) established a procedure for the detailing of military personnel to NASA. 
73 April-The Advanced Research Project Agency's T i m  meteorological 
satellite was transferred to NASA. 
1 May -NASA renamed its Space Center in Beltsville, Maryland, the God- 
dard Space Flight Center, in honor of one of the founders of modern rocketry. The 
center, formally established in January 1959, was largely staffed hy Vanguard 
penonnel transferred to NASA. 
Augurt -Glennan promulgated guidelines for contract awards cxmding $1 
million. The Administrator, assisted by ad hoc boards, became responsible for 
establishing the selection criteria for each contract. 
21 Octobtr-President Eisenhower announced decision to transfer the 
Army's Saturn project to NASA. As part of the transfer, NASA was to rmive the 
Development Operations Divisior; of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, located 
at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. 
12 November-A NASA-DOD agreement established the principles by 
which each agency was to reimburse the other for services rendered. 
Dccmbcr-A headquarters reorganization created a new Office of Launch 
Vehicle Programs, with responsibility for Saturn and the new Huntsville installa- 
tion. The new M c e  was headed by Maj. Gen. Don Ostrander (USAF), acting 
head of the Advanced Research Projeas Agency. 
14 March -The transfer of the Development Operations Division to NASA 
became effective. 
15 March -President Eisenhower named the Huntsville facility the George 
C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The formal mass transfer of personnel 
and facilities from the Army Ballistic Missile Agency took place on 1 July. The 
new center was headed by Wcrnher von Braun, who had been in charge of launch 
vehicle development at the Redstone Arsenal before the transfer took place. 
May-NASA established a Space Science Steering Committee to act as an 
internal advisory body for the Director of Space Flight Programs, Abe Silverstein. 
Following the 1963 reorganization, the Committee was renamed the Space Sci- 
ence and Applirations Steering Committee, and its subcommittm were expanded 
from seven to thirteen. 
June-Congress authorized an increase in the number of XASA excepted 
positions from 260 to 290. 
28-29 July- At a NASA Industry Program Plans Conference in Washing- 
ton, D.C., Silverstein announced that the agency's manned circumlunar mission 
project would be named Apollo. 
1 September-RCA engineer Robert C. Scamans, Jr., succeeded Horner as 
Associate Administrator. 
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13 September-NASA and &?D fonnoliy establuhed an Aeronautia and 
Auronautia Coordinating Board, chaired by the NASA D e y t y  Adminiatrator 
and the Director of D e f e n ~  R d  and Engineering, to coordinate program, 
avoid wasteful duplication, and identify problmu. The agreement provided that 
actions b a d  on Board amrideration of m t t m  "may be taken by individual 
members." 
12 Octobcr-The Advisory Committee on Organization established by Glen- 
nan the preceding March nubmitted its final report. The Committee, headed by 
Lawrence Kimpton, chancellor of the University of Chicago, consisted of outsiders 
with extensive experience in business and Government. While the repon 
surveyed the entire scope of NASA organization, it apparently had little effect 
on the conduct of operations--coming as it did at the end of the Eisenhower 
administration. 
10janwry-A task force headed by Jerome Wiesner of MIT issued a report 
to President-elect John F. Kennedy. The report concluded that NASA had plaad 
too much emphasia on manncd space flight and not enough on unmanncd spas  
science and that NASA activities showed little sign of forward planning. 
7 February-President Kennedy nominated James E. Webb, a lawyer and 
former Director of the Budget, to he NASA Administrator. Webb's nomination 
was eonfirmed by the Senate on 9 February. 
February-August-At Webb's behest, NASA officials conducted sevaal 
studies that laid the groundwork for the November reorganization. 
23 February-Webb and Deputy Smetary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric 
agreed that NASA and DOD would not initiate development of space launch 
vehicles or boosten without mutual consent. 
20 April  -Congress approved an administration proposal to reorganize the 
Space Council. Public Law 87-26 transferred the Council to the Executive Office 
of the President, made the Vice President the chairman, reduced the Council to 
five statutory members, and authorized the Council to "assist" as well as advise 
the President. 
5 May-In the nation's first manned span flight, Alan Shepard was 
launched by a Redstot,c Loostet for a fifteen-minute suborbital flight. 
25 May-President Kennedy addressed a pint session of Congress and 
outlined the broad-gauged national space program prepared by Webb and Re- 
fern Secretary Robert McNarnara. Kennedy proposed (a) the goal, "before this 
decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to the 
Earth"; (b) the development of a nuclear rocket; (c) the development of commu- 
nications and meteorological satellites. The President accompanied his masage 
with a r q u u t  for an additional $549 million, most of which was earmarked for 
the lunar program. 
5 June-NASA announced the atabliahment of an Office of -am 
under DeMaquis Wyatt to m e  as a planning and mtiew ruff to the A d a t e  
Administrator. 
28 June-A pint report iuued by NASA, DOD, and the Federal Aviation 
Agency concluded that the development of a commercial supersonic tranaport 
aircraft waa technically feasible and in the qational interest, that the Govern- 
ment's role should be one of assistance to industry, and that "maximum feaaible 
recovery of direct government cpenditurea ahould be wught." 
20 July -A pint NASA-DOD Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group was 
created under the cochairmanship of Nicholas Golovin (NASA) and Lawrcnce 
Kavanau (DOD). Although the group could not rerolve the quution of miuion 
mode for Apollo, it made meral important recommendations, including one that 
the Air Force proceed with the development of the Titan 111 launch vehicle. 
9 August -NASA rnnounccd fint mapr Apollo contract award, to MIT's 
Inatrummtation Laboratory for Apollo Guidance and Navigation. 
24 August-NASA announced aclcction of site at Cape Canaveral, Florida, 
as site of Apollo launches. A NASA-DOD agreement provided that the site would 
be operated aa apint venture under single management to prevent duplication and 
that the Air Force would be auigned rerponaibility for all "range operations." 
September-December -NASA announced prime contractors for the three . 
stager of the Advanced Saturn launch vehicle: k i n g  for the firat stage (S-IC), 
North American Aviation (Rocketdyne Division) for tbe recond (S-II), and Doug- 
las Aircraft for the third (S-IVB). 
19 September-NASA announced that a new Manned Spacecraft Center 
would be atablished at Houaton, Texaa, with the Space Task Group as its 
nucleua. 
Ocfobrrr-Congcu authorized NASA to raiae its ceiling of excepted p i -  
tiona from 290 to 425. 
1 Noumber-NASA announced a major headquartera reorganization. The 
following offices w m  abolished: Advanced Rercarch Program, Space Flight 
Programs, Launch Vehicle Programs, and Life Science Programs. Five new 
offiaa were ertablished: Advanad Ruearch and Technology (under Ira 4bbott); 
Space Scienea (Homer Newell); Manned Space Flight (D. Brainerd Holmer); 
Applications (vacant, s~baequcntly filled by Morton Stoiler); and Tracking and 
Data Acquisition (Edmond Buckley). All NASA field inatallationa were to report 
directly to Auociate Adminiatrator Scamam. 
28 Nouember-Dcapite a report from the wurce eva!uation board rating the 
Martin Company higher technically, Webb, Dryden, and Seamans relccted North 
American Aviation as prime conwactor for the Apollo command and m i c e  
modulea. 
7 Ddcmk-Scamam announced the creation of a new program, Gemini, 
as a followon to Mercury. Its mapr purpoaes w m  to develop the technique of 
rcndmoua in space and to extend orbital flight time. 
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12 December-NASA requested the Army Corps of Engineen to mume 
mponsibility for managing its construction of new facilitia, particularly at the 
Cape. 
21 December-First meeting of the Manned Space Flight Management 
Council, chaired by Holnes and including the Manned Space Flight Center 
directors and their staff. 
24 January-Rstablishment of NASA Office of Public Affairs. 
9 Febnutry-NASA annou~ced that General E l w t c  had been selected for 
a mapr supporting role in Apollo to provide integration analysis of the total z p -  
vehicle, assure reliabi!ity of the entire space vehicle, and develorr and operate a 
checkout system. 
21 Februury-Webb wrote to the president of American Telephone lurd 
Telegraph (AT&T), rquutirrg that the Bell System provide experienced mff to 
prepare studies and analyses in support of the lunar landing. On 23 March 
AT&T announced the formation of Bellcomm, Inc., a profitmaking corpration 
owned by AT&T and Western Electric and working exdusively for NASA. 
30 April-Task force on Gover.iment Contracting for Research and Devel- 
opment submitted its report. The Committee, chaired by David Bell, the Director 
of the Budget, included Webb and McNamara. Its principal recommendations 
were (aj that Government salaries should be competitive with thore offmd lor 
similar work by private industry; (b) that certain functions should never be 
contracted out; (c) that Government facilities should be used to the fullest possible 
extent; and that, where possible, the Government should use fixed-price rather 
than cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts and that provision be made for incentive 
arrangements. 
29 May-Webb appointed a 3tudy group chaired by Walter Sohier, NASA 
General Counsel, to review source evaluation.procedureu and various mahods of 
improving contractor performance. Throughout 1962 NASA mwed toward the 
introduction of incentive clauses in its mapr development contracts. 
1 Jdy-The Launch 0pra:ions Center at Cape Canaveral wa, officially 
activated as a separate NASA field installation. 
I 1  July-In a press conference NASA explained the dioicc of 1 .,., A orbit 
rendezvous as the Apollo mission mode. NASA also announad that an ilr.,.wed 
version of the Saturn I would be developed to test-fly the Apollo configuration irr 
Earth orbit. 
21 July-NASA selected design for thc Advanced Saturn launch complex 
northwcst of the Cape. The launch vehicle, would br: erected and checked out 
vertically and then transported to launch complex 39, already under construction. 
3 1 August -President Kennedy signed the communications satel!ite bill, 
establishing a private corpration in chrrge of the U.S. portion of a future global 
communications satellite network 
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11 Octobct-Congress pawxi the Federal Salary Reform bill, which in- 
creased the rate for G P l 8  from $18 500 to $20 000 bnd created r m q u o t a  
category of scientific and research positions to be filled by agencies, including 
NASA, upon approval by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. 
j 0  Octobs*-Holmes was named Deputy Associate Administrator for the 
Manned Span Flight Centers. Under this arrangement, MSFC, the Manned 
Spacecraft .Center (MSC), and the Launch Operations Center would report 
directly to Holmes, rather than to Seamans. 
20 November-NASA named Adm. W. Fred h o n e  (USN-Ret.) to the 
newly created position of Deputy Associate Administrator for Defense Affairs. 
14 January-A NASA-IX)D agreement provided that Merritt Island 
Launch Area would be operated as a NASA installation, separate and distinct 
from the Air Force's Atlantic Missile Range; that NASA would bt mpnsible  for 
master planning of Merritt Island; and that DOD would remain responsible for 
operation and management of range facilities of Atlantic Missile Range as a 
national asset, providing common rangc service to DOD and NASA. 
17 January -NASA's budget rquest for FY 1964 wac sent to Congress and 
i~duded $5 million for land acquisition and engineering services for an Electron- 
ics Research Center in the Boston area. 
21 January-NASA-DOD agreement mnfirmed NASA's role as Gemini 
project manager, created Gemini Program Planning Board to plan experiments 
for NASA and MID, and agmd that "DOD and NASA will initiate major new 
programs or projects in the field cr manned space flight aimed chiefly at the 
attainment of experimental or other capabilities in near-earth orbit only by mu- 
tual agreement." 
25 February-Memo from Seamans to all center directors recommending 
that requests for proposals, including the incentive clause, "contain the pncisc 
language of the definitive contract terms." 
March --Establishmcnt of NASA Office of Industry Affairs, with the Pro- 
curement Division placrd under it. At the same time, the Industrial Applications 
Division of the Ofice of Applications was renamed the Technology Utilization 
Division and charged with disseminating information on the mmmercial applica- 
tions of span technology. 
1.5- 16 May -Astronaut Gordon Cooper's twenty-two-orbit flight concluded 
the Mercury program. 
5 June-Delivering Air Force Academy commencement addms, Pmident 
Kennedy said, "It is my judgment that this Government should immediately 
mmmcnce a new program in partnership with private industry to develup at the 
earliest practical date the prototype of a ccrmmcrcially sucwuful supersonic trans- 
port superior to that being built in any other muntry of the world." In a 14 June 
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letter io Speaker of the House he described the proposed supersonic transport 
development. 
12june-D. Brainerd Holmes announced his resignation as Deputy Associ- 
ate Administrator for the Manned Space Flight Centers. Dr. George E. Mueller, 
Vice President for R&D of Space Technology Laboratories, was named to s u d  
him on 23 July. 
24 September-At meeting of the Manned Space Flight Management Coun- 
cil it was resolved that the monthly program review and the monthly Management 
Council meetings should be combined and that the size of the Ccuncil should be 
decreased. 
14 October-First meeting of the NASA Management Committee, chaired 
by Seamans and attended by key headquarters functional officials, including the 
heads of' the Offices of Industry Affairs, Public Affairs, International Affairs, and 
Administration. 
29 October-At meeting of Manned Space Flight Management Council, 
Mueller stressed the importance of an approach to meeting schedules that would 
"maximize 'all-up' systems flight tests." He also said the philosophy should 
include obtaining "complete systems at the Cape . . . and scheduling both delivery 
and launch dates." (Minutes of Management Council). 
1 November-Major reorganization of NASA Headquarters became effec- 
tive, consolidating the program offices and delineating certain staff functions. 
George Mueller was named Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, 
with MSC, MSFC, and the Launch O~erations Center reporting to him; Homer 
Newell became Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, with 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Goddard Space Flight Center, and Wallops Sta- 
tion reporting to him; while Raymond Bisplinghnff, the Associate Administrator 
for Advanced Research and Technology, directed the Ames, Flight, Langley, and 
Lewis Research Centers. These program managers would report to the Associate 
Administrator. Also reporting to Seamans would be the Deputy Associate Adminis- 
trators for Industry Affairs, Administration, Programming, and Defense Affairs. 
29 November-President Lyndon B. Johnson signed executive order chang- 
ing the name of the Launch Operations Center to the John F. Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC). 
10 December-Defense Secretary McNamara announced cancelation of the 
Dyna-Soar ma~ned aero-spacecraft project. Some of the funds saved would be 
divertd into long-range exploration of the military uses of man in space, the chief 
project of which would be a Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) using Gcmini- 
type spacecraft. 
Q/anuary-NASA and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) signed a memo- 
randum of understanding on supersonic transport. FAA was to be responsible for 
direction and management of design and evaluation of proposals; NASA, for 
conducting background research, providing technical advice, making resources 
available to 1;M, and vehicle flight testing. 
14 January-NASA-DOD agreement on instrumentation ships provided 
that ships required to support NASA and DOD programs would be placed in pool 
operation on behalf of both agencies, and that the Navy would be the lead agency $ 
on ship modification and conversion. 3 i 
30 January-In letter to Webb, President Johnson requested that NASA 1 
outline its post-Apollo plans. NASA established Future Programs Task Group 
under Francis Smith to reply to President. 
1 
30 January-Basic agreement between NASA and U.S. Weather Bureau to 
establish a National Operational Meteorological Satellite System. The Weather 5 2
Bureau would determir.~ overall requirements, operate command and data acqui- L 
sition stations, and process data for integration into weather analyses. NASA i 
would design and launch spacecraft, operate launch sites, and conduct launch I 
operations. 
Apn'l-NASA issued NPC 401 on use of contracts for nonpersonal services. 
20 April -NASA-DOD agreement assigned responsibility to DOD for pro- 
viding contract administration services within the Philadelphia region. This 
agreement served as prototype for NASA use of DOD contract administration 
services throughout the United States. 
27 Apr i l4  May-House Science and Astronautics Committee's Subcom- 
mittee on NASA Oversight held hearings on failure of Ranger 6 lunar probe. 
July-December-Joint study conducted by AACB Launch Vehicle Panel 
confirmed NASA dccisim to use tht Saturn rather than the Titan 111 launch 
vehicle for Apollo. 
I September-NASA Electronis Research Center at Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts, was formally activated. 
15 September-A task force headed by NASA Deputy Associate Administra- 
to; Earl Hilburn issued first report on Studies Relating to Management Efective- 
ness in Scheduling and Cost Estimating. Second report submitted on 15 Dmmber. 
10 December-Webb, McNamara, Donald Hornig, the President's Science 
Advisor, and Kermit Gordon, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, reached 
preliminary agreement on the purpose and scope of the MOL 
January-Future Programs Task Group issued final report. This outlined 
future program possibilities, but did not specifically choose among them. In a 
letter to the President of 16 February, Webb endorsed the exploration of Mars by 
unmanned vehicles and the use of the Saturn booster and the lunar module for a 
variety of missions. 
25 January -Webb and McNamara announced NASA-DOD agreement on 
MOL. Both agencies would conduct cooperative studies to identify experiments 
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that might be conducted in conjunction with the military program, while DOD 
continued intensive studies aimed at defining primary military objectives. 
22 May -NASA-DOD agmment outlined principles in the management of 
colocated tracking stations. 
22 July-Harry Goett dismissed as Director of Goddard Space Flight Cen- 
ter after persistent disagreements with senior NASA management. Dr. John 
Clark, director of Sciences in the Oflice of Space Science and Applications, named 
Acting Direaor. 
6 August-Saturn/Apollo Applications directorate established within Office 
of Manned Space Flight $0 plan and direct programs utilizing technology devel- 
oped in Apolio. 
25 Augwt-At a White House news conference, President Johnson an- 
nounced approval of DOD development of the MOL at a cost of $1.5 billion. First 
unmanned flights, launched by a Titi.n IIIC, would bqpn late in 1966 or early 
1967. At the same press conference, he announced that he was extending the DOD 
system of planning-programming-budgeting to civilian agencies, including 
NASA. 
1 September-Willis Shapley, formerly Deputy Chief of the Military 
Division of the Bureau of the Budget, became NASA Associate Deputy 
Administrator. 
28 October-NASA officially instituted its policy of phased project planning. 
Research and development process divided into four stages: ac'vanced studies, 
project definition, design, and development/operations. 
2 December-Hugh Dryden, NASA Deputy Administrator since 1958, died 
z~t  age 67. 
29 December-NASA Headquarters reorganization plan disseminated 
throughout NASA. The plan provided for the following changes: establishment of 
Office of the Administrator, in which the Administrator and Deputy Administra- 
tor would be supported by the Associate Deputy Administrator with a strong ser- 
retariat;andestablishment ofoperating pattern whereby theDeputy Administrator, 
Dr. Seamans, would serve as general manager. Among other changes, Director of 
Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition would be made Associate Administrator 
for Tracking and Data Acquisition, and heads of all functional staff offices as well 
as the four program offices would report to Deputy Administrator. 
ld fanuary-Webb invited Norman Ramsey, a Harvard physics professor, 
to form a committee to evaluate NASA's advisory structure. 
21 March-A report of a subcommittee of the House Government Oper- 
ations Committee recommended that NASA's Apollo Applications and the Air 
Force's MOL be merged in order to avoid wasteful duplication. 
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19 May-A report of the b a t e  Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Scienm questioned the adequacy of NASA funding for aeronautical R&D and 
suggested a separate budget for aeronautics as a possible solution. 
5 August -The consulting firm of Booz, Allen and Hamilton submitted its 
report to NASA on the effectiveness of the agency's incentive contracts. Based on 
a study of fifteen major contracts, the rtport concluded that incentive contracts 
were more effective than mst-plus-fixed-fee in holding down costs but that NASA 
still had much to learn about their benefits and limitations. 
15 August -Ad Hoc Advisory Committee chaired by Norman Ramsey sub- 
mitted its rcpm to the Administrator. Its principal ncommcndation, that NASA 
establish a general advisory committee of non-NASA scientists reporting to the 
Administrator, was rejected by Webb and Newell. 
29 Augwt -Seamans signed project approval document authorizing Apollo 
Applications proposal. The approved plan called for launching the fueled upper 
stageof a Saturn IB, which would then be outfitted by the astronaut3 as an orbital 
"workshop." 
8 Septemtm-A NASA task force led by Wesley Hjornevik submitted its 
"Considerations in the Management of Manpower in NASA." Purpose of rcport 
was to consider "possible methods by which Center complements could be ad- 
justed by management to meet the n d s  of changing roles and missions." 
15 November-With sumssful flight of Gemini 12, NASA's Project Gemini 
officially ended. 
27 January-Threc-man crew for NASA's first manned Apollo spaceflight 
died when flash fire swept through the Apollo 1 spamraft on the launch pad at 
KSC. Victims were Virgil Grissom, one of seven original Mercury astronauts, 
Edward H. White, and Roger B. Chaffte. NASA appointed Apollo 204 Review 
Board, chaired by Floyd Thompson, Director of Langley Research Center, on 
28 January. 
February-In its rtport on The Space Program it1 the Post-Apollo Period, 
the Pmident's Science Advisory Committee rejected the idea of selecting a single 
major goal as focal p i n t  for U.S. post-Apollo program and urged instead 
a "balanced program based on the expectation of eventual manned planetary 
exploration." 
15 March -NASA carried out a major headquarters rcorganization, the 
fourth since 1961.. Harold B. Finger, Manager of NASA-Atomic Energy Com- 
mission Space Nuclear Propulsion Office since its formation in 1960, was named 
to new position of Associate Administrator for Organization and Management. 
Reporting to Finger would be the Assistant Administrators for Administration, 
Industry Affairs, Technology Utilization, and University Affairs. DcMarquis 
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Wyatt became Assistant Administrator for Program Plans and Analysis. Budget 
and programming functions previously under Wyatt were transferred to the Office 
of Administration, headed by William Lilly, where they would be integrated into 
a NASA-wide system for resources management and budgeting. 
9 April-Apollo Review Board submitted final report. While Board was 
unable to pinpoint exact ignition source, it did identify many engineering and 
design deficiencies that led to the disaster. 
10 April-10 May -House Science and Astronautics Committee's Subcom- 
mittee on NASA Oversight held hearings on Apollo fire. It adjnurned without 
issuing a report. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space .Sciences held 
concurrent hearings but issued no report until January 1968. 
1 May -NASA established the Lunar and Planetary Missions Advisory 
Board to assist in developing a general strategy for manned and unmanned lunar 
and planetary missions. Board would work with all senior officials involved in 
such missions and would report to the Associate Administrator for Space Science 
and Applications. An Astronomy Missions Board with similar responsibilities for 
space astronomy was established on 13 November. 
9 May-At hearing before Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences, Webb announced that NASA was extending Bocing Company's re- 
sponsibilities to include integration of command and service module and lunar 
module with Saturn booster system. 
7 7 May -In memorandum for the record, Seamans recorded decisions taken 
several days before by senior management: (a) main Apollo program to take 
priority over Apollo Applications; (b) all Apollo hardware to be configured for 
mainliire mission; (c) Apollo Applications flight schedules and mission rquire- 
ments to remain tentative pending further progress on mainline Apollo and 
further definition of payloads. 
18 May-Bernard Moritz appointed Assistant Administrator for Special 
Contracts Negotiation and Review, with special responsibility for such major 
contracts as those involving the Apollo command and service modules and .the 
Saturn S-PI stage. 
june-U.S. General Accounting Office issued report concluding that certain 
support service contracts at the Goddard and Marshall Space Flight Centers were 
excessively costly and that the Government could have saved inoney by using civil 
service employees. 
25 August -NASA announced that Homer Newell would become Associate 
Administrator, effective 1 October. He would be s u d e d  as Associate Adminis- 
trator for Space Science and Applications by Dr. John Naugle. 
September-Owing to reductions in the NASA budget request, NASA sus- 
pended production of the Saturn V rocket beyond the fifteenth vehicle and can- 
celed the Voyager unmanned mission to Mars and the NERVA I1 nuclear rocket 
program. 
October-Leo Pellerzi, General Counsel to the U.S. Civil Service Commis- 
sion, declared certain NASA support service contracts illegal, chiefly because 
contract personnel were performing the regular work of the agency. During the 
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next few months, NASA issued guidelines to bring such contracts under tighter 
central control. 
October-U.S. Civil ,Service Commission submitted its "Evaluation of Per- 
sonnel Management" to Webb. The report conc lud~  that there wen  a number 
of problem areas in NASA personnel management: lack of headquarters lead- 
ership in supervisory training and promotions, lack of understanding by super- 
visors of their personnel management responsibilities, and lack of management 
support for qua1  opportunity programs. To reply to the report, Webb established 
an internal Personnel Management Review Committee on 21 November. 
2 October-Webb announced resignation of Deputy Administrator Sea- 
mans, effective 5 January 1968. 
9 November-Successful launch of Apollo 4. This was the first launch of the 
Saturn V rocket, as well as the first launch from KSC. 
January-Establishment of NASA Management Council, chaired by New- 
ell and attended by representatives of all the headquarters program and functional 
offices. 
26 January-Resignation of Edmond Buckley as Associate Administrator 
for Tracking and Data Acquisition. He was succeeded by his deputy, Gerald 
Truszynski. 
27 January-In a memorandum to all key NASA officials, Webb outlined 
a revised system for project approval and control. A NASA operating plan would 
serve as ar! official statement of resource plans for the current year, and each item 
in the plan would be covered by project approval documents, all of which would 
be reviewed by the Office of Organization and Management, 
7 7 March -Associate Administrator Newel1 announced that the project sta- 
tus reviews before top management would become "general management reviews" 
to be attended by all key headquarters officials. 
2 May-NASA issued revised guidelines for phased project planning. The 
four phases were now designated preliminary analysis, definition, design, and 
development/operations. 
1; September-At a White House press conference, James Webb an- 
nounced his resignation as NASA Administrator, effective 7 October. Thomas 
Paine, who had been named Deputy Administrator by President Johnson the 
preceding February, became Acting Administrator. 
December-President-elect Richard M. Nixon named Dr. Charles 'Townes 
to head a task force to make recommendations in space planning. 
February-President Nixon established a Space Task Group to draft a plan 
for the next decade of the U.S. space program. Chaired by Vice President Spiro 
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Agnew, the task group included NASA Administrator Paine, Secretary of the Air 
Force Robert Seamans, and Lee DuBridge, the President's Science Advisor. 
5 March -President Nixon announced nomination of Acting Administrator 
Paine to be NASA Administrator. Nomination confirmed by Senate on 20 March. 
20 March-Appointment of NASA Associate Administrator for Organi- 
zation and Management Harold Finger to be Assistant Secretary for Urban 
Research and Technology, Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Nomination confirmed by Senate on 25 April. 
May -NASA "procurement lead time" study uncovered major delays in the 
processing of NASA R&D contracts. 
7 May-NASA announced establishment of task group on manned space 
stations under Dr. George Muellcr, Associate Administrator for Manned Space 
Flight, and of task group on space shuttle under Charles Mathews, Mueller's 
deputy. 
1 June-Report of task force headed by Dr. Townes recommended con- 
tinuation of $6 billion space effort, disapproved of any commitment to large 
orbiting space station, and urged commitme~t to unmanned planetary probes. 
10 June-Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard announced cancel- 
ation of MOL because of cuts in defense spending and advances in unmanned 
satellite systems. 
20 July-Apollo 11 astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin landed on 
Moon. 
22 July-NASA announced revised plans for first orbital workshop, with 
1972 launch using first two stages of Saturn V to launch workshop and Apollo 
Telescope Mount together. Workshop would be outfitted on ground and would 
arrive in Earth orbit equipped for immediate occupancy by astronauts and with 
Apollo Telescope Mount attached. 
1 September-Lt. Gen. Samuel Phillips (USAF), Apollo Program Director 
since 1964, resigned to become Commander of Air Force Space and Missile 
Systems Organization. He was succeeded by Rocco Petrone, Director of Launch 
Operations at KSC s ine  1966. 
15 September-President's Space Task Group presented report The Post- 
Apollo Space Progra* 1: Directions for the Future to President Nixon. Report 
recommended goal of balanced manned and unmanned programs; increased em- 
phasis on utilization of space technology; and development of new systems and 
technology space operations that emphasized commonality, reusability, and econ- 
omy through development of new space transportation capability and space sta- 
tion modules. Report outlined three possible NASA programs for manned Mars 
landing before end of the century. 
10 N~vember-NASA announced resignation of Dr. George Mucller as 
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, effective 10 December. No 
successor was named. 
13 November-President Nixon sent to Senate nomination of Dr. George 
M. Low as NASA Deputy Administrator. At the time of his nomination, Low was 
Apollo spacecraft manager at MSC. Senate confirmed nomination on 26 Novem- 
ber, and Low was sworn in on 3 Dmmber. 
29 December-NASA announced decision to close Electronics Research 
Center at Cambridge, tulassachusetts, owing to budget cuts. 
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